AIR POWER FOR PATTON'S ARMY
The XIX Tactical Air Command
in the
Second World War
David N. Spires
Air Force History and
Museums Program
Washington, D. C.
2002
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Spires, David N.
Air Power for Patton's Army : the XIX Tactical Air
Command in the Second World War / David N. Spires,
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
1. World War, 1939-1945— Aerial operations,
American. 2. United States. Army Air Forces. Tactical
Air Command, 19th— History. 3. World War, 1939-
1945 — Campaigns — ^Western Front. 4. Close air sup-
port — History — 20th century. 5. United States. Army.
Army, 3rd — History. I. Title.
D790 .S65 2002
940.54'4973— dc21
2002000903
In Memory of
Colonel John F. "Fred" Shiner, USAF
(1942-1995)
Foreword
This insightful work by David N. Spires holds many lessons in tacti-
cal air-ground operations. Despite peacetime rivalries in the drafting of service
doctrine, in World War II the immense pressures of wartime drove army and
air commanders to cooperate in the effective prosecution of battlefield opera-
tions. In northwest Europe during the war, the combination of the U.S. Third
Army commanded by Lt. Gen. George S. Patton and the XIX Tactical Air
Command led by Brig. Gen. Otto P. Weyland proved to be the most effective
allied air-ground team of World War II.
The great success of Patton's drive across France, ultimately crossing
the Rhine, and then racing across southern Germany, owed a great deal to
Weyland's airmen of the XIX Tactical Air Command. This deft cooperation
paved the way for allied victory in Westren Europe and today remains a clas-
sic example of air-ground effectiveness. It forever highlighted the importance
of air-ground commanders working closely together on the battlefield.
The Air Force is indebted to David N. Spires for chronicling this
landmark story of air-ground cooperation.
RICHARD P HALLION
Air Force Historian
V
Editor's Note
One of the striking features of this story is the broad sweep taken by
Third Army and XIX Tactical Air Command across France. It demanded a
large number of maps be used to show places and activities in ways that words
could not. However, to the greatest extent possible this work relies on maps
prepared by contemporaneous creators, and thus has a number of maps repro-
duced from original histories of the period. Moreover, those which came from
other sources largely were taken from the West Point Atlas of American Wars,
a pair of volumes produced for the use of classes at the U.S. Military Acade-
my at West Point, New York. That volume has maps in larger format and with
more explanation, so readers who wish to study the maps in greater detail are
referred to that source, listed with each map.
Preface
Air Power for Patton's Army is a case study of one air-ground team's
experience with the theory and practice of tactical air power employed during
the climactic World War II campaigns against the forces of Nazi Germany. By
the summer of 1944, the Allies had four fighter-bomber tactical air commands
supporting designated field armies in northwest Europe, and in the fall they
added a fifth (making four American and one British). Of these, the U.S. Third
Army commanded by Lt. Gen. George S. Patton and the XIX Tactical Air
Command (TAC) led by Brig. Gen. Otto P. Weyland deserve special attention
as perhaps the most spectacular air-ground team of the Second World War on
the Allied side.
From the time Third Army became operational on August 1, 1944, until
the guns fell silent on May 8, 1945, Patton's troops covered more ground, took
more enemy prisoners, and suffered more casualties than any other Allied
army in northwest Europe. General Weyland's XIX TAC was there every step
of the way: in the high summer blitzkrieg across France to the Siegfried Line,
in the battle of attrition and positional warfare in Lorraine reminiscent of
World War One's western front, in the emergency drive to rescue American
troops trapped at Bastogne and help clear the Ardennes of Germans in the
Battle of the Bulge, and finally, in crossing the Rhine and charging across
southern Germany to the Czech and Austrian borders. There, Third Army
forces linked up with Soviet military units converging on the fabled German
Redoubt area from the east.
This study does not suggest that Weyland's XIX TAC proved superior to
other tactical air commands in the European theater or that Weyland emerged
as the only effective air leader. Indeed, numerous laurels were garnered by
Weyland's colleagues and their respective TACs: Maj. Gen. Elwood R.
Quesada's IX TAC that supported the First Army, Brig. Gen. Richard Nugent's
XXIX TAC that supported the Ninth Army, and Brig. Gen. Gordon P. Saville's
XII TAC that supported the Seventh Army and the French First Army.
Moreover, during Ninth Air Force's eight-month buildup prior to Overlord (the
invasion of France in June 1944), IX TAC, under an innovative General
Quesada, played the central role in preparing for air operations at Normandy
and on the continent. General Weyland remained in the background until
Patton's forces entered combat on August 1, 1944. Because the XIX TAC
entered combat later, it could and did use to good advantage the valuable expe-
rience of the IX TAC.
Traditional army and air force antagonisms and unsound tactical air doc-
trine are frequently cited as the major impediments to smooth air-ground rela-
tions and effective combat operations. Much of that contention was apparent
vii
Air Power for Patton's Army
in Washington, D.C., even during World War II, where, facing the demands of
a worldwide conflict, headquarters' staffs all too frequently focused on prob-
lems of intraservice and interservice competition at all levels. For military
leaders and staffs in Washington, service politics often took precedence and
preferred doctrine often served to buttress disagreement. With their respective
service priorities and in their role as advocates, these officers viewed matters
of doctrine more rigidly than did their counterparts in the field. For them, unal-
loyed service doctrine prescribed the right conduct of air-ground relations;
deviations could hardly be tolerated.
In the turbulent postwar period. Army Air Forces (AAF) leaders moved
swiftly and purposefully to create an independent Air Force. In the late 1940s
many U.S. Army officers, with some justification, worried that the new U.S.
Air Force's absolute control of tactical airplanes and equipment, its doctrinal
assertions, and its overwhelming focus on strategic priorities in the emergent
Cold War meant that the army would receive less rather than more tactical air
support for ground combat operations. In the charged atmosphere of that day,
critics often found fault with the air-ground relationship forged during the
Second World War and returned to doctrinal citation and interpretation when
supporting one position or another in air-ground disagreements or other con-
troversy. Had the various partisans reflected instead on the cooperative,
wartime air-ground record of those "comrades in arms" in the XIX
TAC-Third Army in Europe, they would have found their worst fears refuted,
as indeed they would find similar fears refuted today. When genuflecting
before the altars of doctrine in peacetime, it seems the absolute importance of
pairing military leaders of goodwill in wartime who respect, trust, and rely on
their service counterparts as comrades in arms is easily forgotten.
In preparing this study, I received help from many quarters. Above all I
wish to thank Dennis Showalter and Daniel Mortensen for their unflagging
support and enthusiasm for the project. Dennis read the entire manuscript and,
as always, offered insightful comments and unstinting encouragement. Dan
generously shared his wealth of knowledge on tactical aviation in general and
Operation Torch, in particular. It was he who first called my attention to the
cooperative, rather than confrontational, nature of air-ground relations. I
remain in his debt.
Individuals at two major military archives also deserve special thanks.
My friend Elliott V. Converse III, a former commander of the Air Force
Historical Research Agency at Maxwell Air Force Base, went far beyond the
call of duty to support my research efforts. As a result, I benefited from the
knowledge and helpfulness of the agency's outstanding group of archivists
and historians: Richard E. Morse, Robert M. Johnson, James H. Kitchens,
Timothy D. Johnson, Archangelo DiFante, Marvin Fisher, Sarah Rawlins, and
SSgt. Edward Gaines. They made special arrangements to accommodate my
every request for information on the XIX TAC and related tactical aviation
viii
Preface
subjects. Joseph Caver in the Research Division had copied from Weyland's
XIX TAC scrapbook many of the pictures that appear in this volume. I am
grateful to John Slonaker, archivist at the USA Military History Institute,
Carlisle Barracks, who introduced me to a wealth of information on the Army
and Army Air Forces, beginning with Third Army's magniiicent After Action
Report of its 1944-45 campaign. Mr. Slonaker also went out of his way to help
with long-distance requests.
I also wish to express my appreciation to the people in Norlin Library's
Inter-Library Loan Department at the University of Colorado. They enjoyed
nothing better than to pursue my requests for obscure military reference mate-
rial. Their success record was outstanding and I am grateful. Several others
assisted on specific areas of the work. Jerold E. Brown of the Army's Combat
Studies Institute at Fort Leavenworth supplied me with important material on
the Lorraine Campaign and shared his understanding of the Army's special
long-term interest in it. David Maclsaac willingly tracked down Gen. James
Ferguson's television interview and provided useful information on the Battle
of the Bulge. My friend Bang Nguyen assisted enormously with the maps and
charts.
Special thanks are owed several former participants in World War 11 tacti-
cal air campaigns in Europe, and I will always be grateful for the privilege of
sharing their recollections and insights. They are Lt. Gen. John J. Bums, 371st
Fighter Group P-47 pilot; Maj. Gen. Robert L. Delashaw, Commander, 405th
Fighter Group; Brig. Gen. Russell A. Berg, Commander, 10th Photo Recon-
naissance Group; Gen. James Ferguson, XIX TAC Combat Operations Officer;
and Gen. Robert M. Lee, Ninth AF Deputy Commander for Operations.
I am especially indebted to Cargill Hall, the person responsible for con-
tract histories at the Air Force History and Museums Program, who carefully
edited the final manuscript and helped make the story more readable, under-
standable, and convincing. Others who read and contributed most helpful sug-
gestions are: Perry D. Jamieson, Eduard Mark, David R. Mets, Daniel R.
Mortensen, John Schlight, Richard K. Smith, David Tretler, and Herman S.
Wolk. Any errors of fact or interpretation that remain, of course, are my own.
At the end of this project I am more than ever convinced that the tale of
Generals Weyland and Patton, of the XIX TAC teamed with the U.S. Third
Army in the Second World War, deserves to be told. These men's achieve-
ments continue to inspire and instruct, and I am pleased to spread the word.
David N. Spires
Boulder, Colorado
ix
Contents
Foreword v
Preface vii
Charts xiii
Maps xiii
Photographs xv
1 The Doctrinal Setting 1
Evolution of Early Tactical Air Doctrine 1
Doctrine in Practice: Operation Torch 7
Tactical Air Doctrine Refined 14
2 Preparing for Joint Operations 21
The Generals Paired 23
Organizing Allied Assault Forces for Joint Operations 28
Manning and Equipping the Assault Forces 33
Training Underway 39
The Issue of Joint Training 43
Normandy: On the Job Training 49
Air-Ground Support System Refined 56
Hedge-Row Fighting to a Breakout 64
3 The Battle for France 69
Exploiting the St. L6 Breakout: Blitz Warfare U.S. Style 70
Supporting Patton's End Run to the Seine 86
From the Seine to the Meuse 96
Protecting Patton's Southern Flank 103
A Decision in Brittany 108
Final Pursuit to the Mosel River 113
The French Campaign Reviewed 118
4 Stalemate in Lorraine 123
Autumn's Changed Conditions 123
Refinements in Command and Control 128
Stalemate along the Mosel 132
Planning an Offensive 143
From Metz to the Siegfried Line 149
Mission Priorities and Aerial Resources 158
xi
Air Power for Patton's Army
Assault on the Siegfried Line 171
Lorraine in Retrospect 181
5 The Ardennes 185
Operation Autumn Fog 186
The Allied Response 190
Victory Weather 199
Support Facilities and the Aerial Relief of Bastogne 203
Protecting the Corridor, Dealing with Friendly Fire 208
The Luftwaffe Responds 215
Consolidating Support Elements and Flight Operations 220
Clearing the Bulge 225
Ardennes in Retrospect 234
6 The Final Offensive 239
Operational Challenges and New Tactics 242
Into the Siegfried Line 248
Through the Eifel to the Rhine 254
Springing the Saar-Mosel-Rhine Trap — and
Across the Rhine River 260
Once More: "Blitz Warfare U.S. Style" 270
Defeat of the Luftwaffe 275
Advance to the Mulde River 281
Down the Danube Valley to Austria 283
Victory 289
7 An After Action Assessment 291
Notes 317
Sources 353
Index 371
xii
Contents
Charts
1 . Channels of Tactical Control of Combat Aviation in
Typical Air Support Command 5
2. Allied Command Relationships in the Mediterranean
March 1943 13
3. Organizational Chart of the Ninth Air Force
December 8, 1943 31
4. Air Support Mission Request System
July 1944 57
Maps
1 . Torch Landings in Northwest Africa
November 8, 1942 8
2. Ninth Air Force Installations
June 1, 1944 42
3. The Normandy Battlefield 50
4. U.S. Airfields in Western Europe, 1944-1945 72
5. Northwestern France, 1944: The Breakout 78
6. Northwestern France, 1944: The Exploitation 92
7. Northwestern Europe, 1944: Pursuit to West Wall Operations,
August 26-September 14, 1944 101
8. European Theater 124
9. Northwestern Europe, 1944: 6th and 12th Army Group Operations,
September 15-November 7, 1944 126
10. German Counterattacks Against XII Corps:
September 19-30, 1944 134
11. XX Corps Operations:
October 1944 136
12. XII Corps Attack:
November 8, 1944 154
13. Location and Movements of Major XIX TAC Units:
November 1944 161
14. Third Army Operations:
November 19-December 19, 1944 168
15. Third Army: Last Phase of Lorraine Offensive:
December 3-19, 1944 176
16. The Ardennes: The Initial German Attack and Operations,
December 16-25, 1944 187
xiii
Air Power for Patton's Army
17. Air Assignments for the Ardennes Counterattack
December 1944 191
18. The Ardennes Operations:
December 26, 1944-January 16, 1945 210
19. The German Offensive in Alsace-Lorraine
January 1-30, 1945 221
20. The Ardennes Operations:
January 17-February 7, 1945 231
21. Eastern France and the Low Countries, December 16, 1944-
February 7, 1945, and Allied Plan for Rhineland Campaign . . . 241
22. West-Central Germany and Belgium, 1945: Rhineland Campaign
Operations February 8-March 5, 1945 251
23. West-Central Germany and Belgium, 1945: Rhineland Campaign
Operations March 6-10, 1945 259
24. West-Central Germany and Belgium, 1945: Rhineland Campaign
Operations, March 11-21, 1945 261
25. Germany: Crossing the Rhine, Operations,
March 22-28, 1945 269
26. Germany, 1944: Encirclement of the Ruhr, Operations,
March 29- April 4, 1945 274
27. Germany, 1944: Reduction of Ruhr Pocket & Advance to Elbe
& Mulde Rivers, Operations, April 5-18, 1945 277
28. Central Europe, 1944: End of the War, Final Operations,
April 19-May 7, 1945 284
xiv
Contents
Photographs
Gens. George S. Patton and Otto P. Weyland xviii
Gen. Bernard L. Montgomery 9
Field Marshal Erwin Rommel 10
Brig. Gen. Laurence S. Kuter 11
Gens. Lewis H. Brereton, Carl A. Spaatz, and Dwight D. Eisenhower ... 15
Gens. George C. Marshall and Henry H. "Hap" Arnold 16
British Air Vice Marshal Sir Arthur Coningham with
Brig. Gen. Auby C. Strickland, and Lt. Gen. Frank M. Andrews ... 17
Lt. Gen. Mark Clark with Patton in Sicily 21
Lt. Gen. Omar N. Bradley 22
Lt. Gen. Patton and Brig. Gen. Weyland 23
General Patton with troops of the 3d Infantry Division 25
Maxwell Field, Alabama 26
President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill at Casablanca 28
Maj. Gen. Lewis H. Brereton 32
Air Marshal Trafford Leigh-Mallory 33
Maj. Gen. Elwood R. "Pete" Quesada 36
P^7 Thunderbolt 37
Lt. Gen. Henry H. "Hap" Arnold 44
Aerial photo of the formidable defenses at Normandy Beachhead 52
The D-Day assault 53
Armorers attach a 500-lb. bomb to a Thunderbolt 55
An F-5 with D-Day invasion markings 61
Air attack, 406th Fighter Group 63
XV
Air Power for Patton's Army
Maj. Gen. Troy Middleton 70
Crews arming P-47s 74
An air-ground officer directs aircraft (above); a Ninth Air Force tactical
air liaison officer with the Third Army (below) 75
Night armed reconnaissance missions using tracers 76
Maj. Gen. John S. Wood 77
Army engineers laying steel mesh (top), and broom-massaging
the airstrips (bottom) 82
Aviation engineers preparing fields for landing aircraft (top), engineer
battalion works on a bomb crater (bottom) 83
Mechanics hoist a severly damaged P^7 onto a trailer (top),
technicians are checking planes (center), and a mechanic checks
out a P-51 Mustang (bottom) 84
A crane is used to transfer bombs (top), airmen load crated bombs
onto trucks (bottom) 85
The command post for Gen. Weyland's rear headquarters near Laval . . .93
Col. Russell A. Berg 95
German Enigma machine 105
Field Marshal Bernard L. Montgomery with Lt. Gens. Omar Bradley
and William H. Simpson 106
Some of the 20,000 German prisoners who were surrendered to
General Macon, Ninth Army, and General Weyland, XIX TAC, on
September 16, 1944 107
Maj. Gen. Richard E. Nugent 114
Transportation Section, rear headquarters, Chalons, France 116
Gen. O. R Weyland in a Thunderbolt 120
Gen. O. P. Weyland awards an Air Medal to Col. Roger Browne 128
A P-61 night fighter equipped with rockets 130
Brig. Gen. Gordon R Saville 138
xvi
Contents
The lab of the 10th Photo Reconnaissance Group 142
Breaching the Etang de Lindre Dam at Dieuze, France, before
( above) and after (below) 145
Generals Patton (right), Hodges (left) and Bradley (center) 147
Gasoline for Patton's Third Army arrives 150
An F-5 from the 31st Photo Reconnaissance Squadron 152
Maj. Gen. Ralph Royce 155
Demolished command post of the 17th SS Panzer Grenadier
Division at Peltre, France 156
A cutaway of a German FW 190 157
A-20 Havoc in France 162
Air and ground coordinators near the front (top and bottom) 164
Coordinators receive messages (top), direct overhead aircraft (middle),
and help spot for flak and ground fire (bottom) 165
Generals Spaatz, Patton, Doolittle, Vandenberg, and Weyland (left to
right), December 1944 175
Low-level photo taken at the Siegfried Line (top), Patton's troops
breach the formidable defenses (bottom) 178
Generals Patton and Patch 179
A squadron commander with his flight leaders 180
Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt with Adolf Hitler 186
Gen. Hasso von Manteuffel 188
Vehicles move past wrecked American equipment (above). Tanks
from the 4th Armored Division in the Luxembourg area (below). . 193
A P-38 from the 367th Fighter Group 197
Paratroopers from the 101st Airborne Division 198
Capt. Richard Parker, 405th Fighter Group (left), a P-61 forced
to crash-land (below) 202
xvii
Air Power for Patton's Army
C-47 crash-landed after dropping its supplies 205
F-6s (above), an M-7 tank directs fire (below) 207
Col. James Ferguson and General Weyland 213
Gens. Weyland and Sanders, with Col. Browne and Gen. Patton 214
Damage caused by the Luftwaffe raid on January 1, 1945 216
Radar installation 218
Photo of the Saar River at very low altitude 224
Bf 109 227
Troops from the 4th Armored Division (top), 101st Airborne
Infantry Division troops move through Bastogne (bottom) 228
Destroyed 88-mm gun ( top). An ambulance ( bottom)
removes wounded 229
General Weyland and his staff meet with General Vandenberg
and General Schlatter 230
Destroyed self-propelled gun near Dasburg, Germany 236
The Bullay Bridge collapsed into the Mosel River 243
A 354th Fighter Group P-51 Mustang 247
Ninth Air Force fighters entrenched in snow 250
Shot of Saarburg, Germany 255
Troops from the 90th Infantry Division 263
A tank destroyer from the 4th Armored Division 264
Thunderbolts hit an ammunition train (top), a truck
convoy (center), and a locomotive (bottom) 266
Generals Patton (with pointer) Eisenhower, and Devers 267
Third Army crossing the Rhine River 27 1
P-5 1 from the Pioneer Mustang Group 279
Generals Patton, Spaatz, Doolittle, Vandenberg; and Weyland 280
xviii
Contents
P-47s with occupation stripes during the postwar period 292
German Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt 314
xix
Gens. George S. Patton and Otto P. Weyland
Chapter One
The Doctrinal Setting
The U.S. Third Army-XIX Tactical Air Command air-ground combat
team is better understood in light of the doctrinal developments that preceded
its joint operations in 1944 and 1945. Well before World War II, many army
air leaders came to view close air support of army ground forces as a second-
er third-order priority. After World War I the Air Service Tactical School, the
Army Air Service's focal point for doctrinal development and education,
stressed pursuit (or fighter) aviation and air superiority as the air arm's prima-
ry mission. Air superiority at that time meant primarily controlling the air to
prevent enemy reconnaissance. At least among airmen from the early 1920s,
tactical air doctrine stressed winning air superiority as the number one effort
in air operations. Next in importance was interdiction, or isolation of the bat-
tlefield by bombing lines of supply and communications behind them. Finally,
attacking enemy forces at the front, in the immediate combat zone, ranked last
in priority. Airmen considered this "close air support" mission, performed pri-
marily by attack aviation, to be the most dangerous and least efficient use of
air resources.^ Even in this early period, the air arm preferred aerial support
operations to attack targets outside the "zone of contact."^
Evolution of Early Tactical Air Doctrine
By the mid-1930s, leaders of the renamed Army Air Corps increasingly
focused their attention on strategic bombardment, which had a doctrine all its
own, as the best use of the country's emerging air arm. Certainly among senior
airmen at that time, tactical air operations ran a poor second to strategic bom-
bardment as the proper role for the Army Air Corps. But this preference for
strategic bombardment was not entirely responsible for the decline in attention
paid to pursuit and attack aviation. Scarce resources and technical limitations
contributed to tactical air power's decline in fortune. Pursuit prototypes, for
example, competed with bombers for resources, and Air Corps leaders hesi-
tated to fund them when they often could not agree among themselves or with
their Army counterparts on the desired performance characteristics and engine
types. At the same time, the aircraft industry preferred the more expensive
bombers for obvious economic reasons, and also because that particular Army-
funded development offered technological benefits for commercial aviation.^
1
Air Power for Patton's Army
In attack aviation, tlie Spanisli Civil War demonstrated tlie liigli risl<s of
relying on traditional tactics of low-level approach with the restricted maneu-
verability at that altitude, in the face of improving antiaircraft defenses.
Attack aircraft thus had to be given whatever advantages of speed, maneu-
verability, and protective armor that technology allowed, and they also had to
be mounted with sufficiently large fuel tanks to ensure an extended range
with a useful bomb load. For single-engine aircraft, this challenge proved
insurmountable in the late 1930s. Under the circumstances, civilian and mil-
itary leaders considered the twin-engine light bomber the best available
answer. In the spring of 1939, Army Air Corps chief, Maj. Gen. Henry H.
(Hap) Arnold selected the Douglas A-20 Havoc for production. The fastest
and most advanced of the available light bombers, it was clearly a major
improvement over previous tactical aircraft. Nevertheless, it was neither
capable of nor intended for precise, close-in support of friendly troops in the
immediate battle zone. The A-20 fell between two schools: airmen criticized
its light bomb load while Army officials considered it too large and ineffec-
tive for close air support of ground operations. The Army also disagreed with
the Air Corps over enlisting pursuit aircraft in a ground support role.
According to Air Corps tactical doctrine, pursuit aircraft should not provide
close air support except in emergencies. As a result, before 1941 Army Air
Corps fighters such as the Bell P-39 Airacobra and the Curtiss P-40
Warhawk, though suited to the close air support role, were seldom equipped
or flown with bomb racks.''
After 1935, desires for an independent air force, doctrinal preferences,
and financial limitations reinforced the airmen's focus on the strategic bom-
bardment mission. Increasingly, Air Corps leaders relied on bombers rather
than fighters in their planning for Western Hemisphere defense. Turned
against an enemy's vital industries, they saw strategic bombing as a potential
war-winning strategy. Above all, such a strategy promised a role for an Air
Corps independent of direct Army control. For many airmen, a strategic mis-
sion represented the key to realizing a separate air force. The Boeing four-
engine B-17 heavy bomber that first flew in 1935 appeared capable of per-
forming effective strategic bombardment. Furthermore, in 1935, when the
U.S. Army contributed to the revision of Training Regulation 440,
Employment of the Air Forces of the Army, it gave strategic bombardment a
priority equal to that of ground support. In an earlier 1926 regulation, strate-
gic bombardment was authorized only if it conformed to the "broad plan of
operations of the military forces." If the primary mission of the Army's air arm
remained the support of ground forces, by 1935 the growing influence of the
Army Air Corps and the need for a consolidated air strike force resulted in the
establishment of General Headquarters (GHQ) Air Force, the first combat air
force and a precursor of the numbered air forces of World War II. Although
Air Corps leaders might emphasize strategic bombardment, they also upheld
2
The Doctrinal Setting
conventional Army doctrine, asserting tliat "air forces furtlier tlie mission of
tlie territorial or tactical commander to which they are assigned or attached."
Taken as a whole, the revised 1935 regulation represented a compromise on
the question of operational independence for the air arm: although the air com-
mander remained subordinate to the field commander, the changes clearly
demonstrated the Air Corps' growing influence and the Army leadership's
willingness to compromise.^
German blitzkrieg victories at the beginning of World War II rekindled
military interest in tactical aviation, especially air-ground operations. On April
15, 1940, the U.S. Army issued Field M anual (FM ) 1-5, Employment of the
Aviation of the Army. Written by a board that Army Air Corps General Arnold
chaired, it reflected the German air achievement in Poland and represented a
greater compromise on air doctrine than did the 1935 Army training regula-
tion. The field manual, however, reaffirmed traditional Air Corps principles in
a number of ways. For example, it asserted that tactical air represented a the-
aterwide weapon that must be controlled centrally for maximum effectiveness,
that the enemy's rear rather than the "zone of contact" was the best area for
tactical operations, and that those targets ground forces could bracket with
artillery should not be assigned to the air arm.^ To some unhappy Army crit-
ics, the new manual still clearly reflected the Air Corps' desire to control its
own air war largely independent of Army direction.
On the other hand, the 1940 Field M anual did not establish Air Corps-
desired mission priorities for tactical air employment, but it did authorize
decentralized air resources controlled by ground commanders in emergencies.
Although the importance of air superiority received ample attention, the man-
ual did not advocate it as the mission to be accomplished first. Rather, assess-
ments of the particular combat situation would determine aerial mission prior-
ities. Among other important intraservice issues it ignored, the manual did not
address organizational arrangements and procedures for joint air-ground oper-
ations.^ Field M anual 1-5 attempted to strike a balance between the Air Corps'
position of centralized control of tactical air forces by an airman and the
ground forces' desire to control aircraft in particular combat situations. Given
this compromise approach to air support operations, much would depend on
the role of the theater commander and the ability of the parties to cooperate
and make the arrangements effective.
The common theme that emerges from these prewar doctrinal publica-
tions is one of compromise and cooperation as the most important attributes
for successful air-ground operations. This theme reappeared in the manual
issued following the air-ground maneuvers conducted in Louisiana and North
Carolina in 1941 that tested the German system of close air support. In these
exercises, newly formed air support commands operated with specific ground
elements, but a shortage of aircraft, unrealistic training requirements, inexpe-
rience, and divergent air and ground outlooks on close air support led both
3
Air Power for Patton's Army
General Arnold and Lt. Gen. Lesley J. McNair, Commanding General of the
Army Ground Forces, to declare the joint training unsatisfactory. Although the
air and ground leaders exhibited patience and a willingness to cooperate, that
spirit did not always filter down to the lower echelons of command. As a
result, despite greater attention paid to close air support in all quarters, the state
of air-ground training in the U.S. Army by the spring of 1942 was cause for
genuine concern.^ In response to these shortcomings and the country's entry as
a combatant in World War II, the War Department published FM 31-35,
Aviation in Support of Ground Forces, on April 9, 1942. This field manual
stressed organizational and procedural arrangements for the air support com-
mand. Here, as in previous publications, there was much to satisfy the most
ardent air power proponents in the newly designated Army Air Forces (AAF).
The air support command functioned as the controlling agency for air employ-
ment and the central point for air request approval (Chart 1). Later, in
Northwest Europe, Air Support Command would be renamed the Tactical Air
Command (TAC) in deference to air leaders in Washington and would support
specified field armies. Centralized control of air power would be maintained
by collocating air and ground headquarters and assigning air support parties to
ground echelons down to the division level. The field manual called for ground
units to initiate requests for aerial support through their air support parties,
which sent them to the air support command. If approved, the latter's com-
mand post issued attack orders to airdromes and to aircraft.^
Field Manual 31-35 of 1942, like FM 1-5 (1940), acknowledged the
importance of air superiority and isolation of the battlefield. It also declared
that air resources represented a valuable, but scarce commodity. Accordingly,
it deemed as inefficient the use of aircraft in the air cover role in which, when
they were based nearby or circling overhead, they remained on call by the sup-
ported unit. The 1942 manual nonetheless stressed the importance of close air
support operations "when it is not practicable to employ other means of attack
upon the desired objective in the time available, or when the added firepower
and moral effect of air attacks are essential to insure the timely success of the
ground force operations. Despite opposition expressed later by key air lead-
ers, this rationale for close air support would govern the actions of General
Weyland and other tactical air commanders in Northwest Europe. On the cen-
tral question of establishing priorities for missions or targets, however, the
manual remained silent, and this would cause difficulty.
In the final analysis, would the ground or air commanders control
scarce air resources? The manual's authors attempted to reach a compromise
on this fundamental issue. The 1942 Field M anual declared that "designation
of an aviation unit for support of a subordinate ground unit does not imply
subordination of that aviation unit to the supported ground unit, nor does it
remove the combat aviation unit from the control of the air support comman-
der." Attaching air units directly to ground formations was judged an excep-
4
Channels of Tactical Control of
Combat Aviation in Typical
Air Support Command
Normal ground force command
— — Air support control
— — — — — Direct control
^^^^^^^M Coordination
SOURCE: MORTENSEN, A PATTERN FOR JOINT OPERATKMS. P. 21 .
Chartl
Channels of Tactical Control of Combat Aviation in
Typical Air Support Command
5
Air Power for Patton's Army
tion, "resorted to only when circumstances are such that the air support com-
mander cannot effectively control the combat aviation assigned to the air sup-
port command. "^^ Yet "the most important target at a particular time," FM
31-35 added, "will usually be that target which constitutes the most serious
threat to the operations of the supported ground force. The final decision as
to priority of targets rests with the commander of the supported unit."^^ \ ^
principle, therefore, air units could be parceled out to subordinate ground
commanders, who were authorized to select targets and direct employment.
Despite the central position accorded the commander of an air support com-
mand and explicit recognition that air assets normally were centralized at the-
ater level, aviation units still could be allocated or attached to subordinate
ground units.
Field M anual 31-35 of 1942, like its predecessors, attempted to achieve
a balance between the extreme air and ground positions. This manual, howev-
er, underscored the importance of close cooperation among air and ground
commanders:
The basis of effective air support of ground forces is team-
work. The air and ground units in such operations in fact
form a combat team. Each member of the team must have
the technical skill and training to enable itto perform its part
in the operation and a willingness to cooperate thoroughly.^^
To its credit, the manual discussed in detail the command organization and
air-ground techniques to be used across a broad spectrum of subjects, and air-
men and ground officers involved in tactical air operations would adopt this
manual as their how-to guide throughout the war. Though some have criti-
cized it, they often seem to forget that it was AAF officers who drafted and
issued FM 31-35; it was not forced on a reluctant air arm by antagonistic
ground officers who failed to appreciate the uses of air power.
In the spring of 1942 time was needed to achieve the desired cooperation
and to train air and ground personnel at all levels in the command and employ-
ment of air-ground operations. When the field manual appeared in April, how-
ever. Operation Torch, the Allied invasion of North Africa, was a scant six
months away. How could the participants master the complexities of the most
challenging of joint operations in so shorta period? Despite what might appear
as an irreconcilable conflict between air and ground perspectives of the day,
the joint action called for by the manual proved to be less a problem than the
limited time available to absorb its precepts and to solve practical problems at
the field level. There was not enough time.
6
The Doctrinal Setting
Doctrine in Practice: Operation Torch
Operation Torch became the desert crucible in which the Allies tested
tactical air doctrine in combat. This initial Allied ground offensive of the
Second World War also exposed the many weaknesses of an American nation
unprepared for large-scale air and ground combat operations. Although air-
ground command arrangements for the invasion largely conformed to the 1942
FM 31-35, Allied headquarters completed a memorandum the month before
the invasion that sought to clarify further air-ground command and control
procedures. If anything, it served to enhance the role of the ground comman-
der and, in the eyes of the air commanders, increase the chance that air power
might be misused. Only after failure in the field would Lt. Gen. Dwight D.
Eisenhower, Supreme Commander of Allied forces in northwest Africa, turn
to the British example of teamwork displayed in the northeast African desert.
There, Air Vice Marshal Sir Arthur Coningham and Lt. Gen. Sir Bernard
"M onty" L . M ontgomery. Commander of the B ritish E ighth A rmy, operated an
effective air-ground system based on equality of forces, joint planning, good
communications, and a Royal Air Force (RAF) in command and control of its
limited forces in the joint air-ground plan.^^
In command of the invasion. General Eisenhower controlled all military
resources in northwest Africa. If he thought of air forces in terms of theater
interests, he chose not to designate a theater air commander, and British and
American invasion forces remained loosely integrated. United States air forces
were further decentralized to support the separate task forces during the inva-
sion. Twelfth A ir Force had its components parceled out to the three task forces,
whose commanders had direct operational control of the air forces assigned to
them as authorized by FM 31-35 (Map 1). Similarly, the planners assigned
British Eastern Air Command to support operations of the Eastern Task Force.
Once the initial landings succeeded, plans called for an Allied task force to push
eastward toward Tunisia, with supporting American air forces. Later, U.S.
ground forces would be consolidated into U .S. Fifth Army, which would func-
tion as a planning and training headquarters, with XII Air Support Command
attached to provide close air support to Fifth Army ground forces as required.^^
Although the November 8, 1942, landings in French Algeria on the
northwest African coast of the Mediterranean Sea succeeded easily, combat
inexperience, logistics shortages, and the inability to establish all-weather air-
fields close to the battle zone during the race eastward toward Tunisia, com-
bined to prevent defeat of the Axis forces. Effective close air support failed in
the face of poor communications, an absence of radar, and the prevailing ten-
dency of ground forces commanders to call for and rely on defensive air cover,
and of airmen willing to give it. By December 1942, the A Hied ground offen-
sive proved unable to penetrate hastily formed German defensive lines west of
7
Map 1
Torch Landings in Nortlnwest Africa: November 8, 1942
Reprinted from: Daniel R. IVIortensen, A Pattern for Joint Operations: World War II Close Air Support, North Africa,
(Washington, D.C.: Center for IVIilitary History, 1987), p 54.
The Doctrinal Setting
Tunis. With tlie onset of winter, Eisenliower lialted tlie offensive. Reviewing
recent events, lie criticized insufficient air support. Witli air forces larger tlian
tlie enemy's, the Allies proved unable even to wrest local air superiority from
the Germans and Italians. Clearly, it was time to regroup and reassess."
In early January 1943, General Eisenhower centralized control of histac-
tical air forces in northwest Africa by creating the Allied Air Force.
Commanded by Lt. Gen. Carl Spaatz, it was composed of the U.S. Twelfth Air
Force and the British Eastern Air Command. Spaatz chose as his deputy Brig.
Gen. Laurence S. Kuter who had been serving as the air operations officer on
Eisenhower's staff. Kuterwould prove to beastaunch proponent for adopting
the British air-ground system, one that centralized control of aircraft under one
airman reporting to the lead ground commander. Eisenhower sought in the
reorganization to end piecemeal, decentralized air action largely along nation-
al lines. Yet, the vast distances, poor communications, and commanders who
preferred operating along national rather than functional lines ensured that
coordi nati ng and central i zi ng the di recti on of cl ose ai r support operati ons w i th
ground forces would remain a problem. Even so, creation of the Allied Air
Force served as an important move toward eventual centralized control of all
air forces in the M editerranean theater.^^
Adversaries of the war in Nortli Africa, Gen. Bernard l^ontgomery,
Commander, Britisli Eiglitli Army...
9
Air Power for Patton's Army
During the second Allied offensive in northwest Africa in January 1943,
XII Air Support Command deployed from French Morocco on Africa's Atlantic
coast to support 1 1 C orps i n central Tuni si a. D espi te the best-l ai d pi ans of the X I! 's
commander, Brig. Gen. Howard A. Craig, the airmen could muster little support
when the Germans counterattacked II Corps in force on January 18. Among the
many operational problems cited, air force officials stressed the misuse of air
assets by the corps commander, M aj. Gen. Lloyd R. Fredendall. Army officers,
however, judged enemy air superiority to be the most alarming. The Allies sim-
ply did not have sufficient aircraft to achieve local air superiority everywhere.^^
Atthis juncture Eisenhower acted to achieve greater centralization of the
air support effort by assigning General Kuter to command the newly created
Allied Air Support Command in the Allied Air Force. Kuter collocated his
headquarters at Constantine, Algeria, with that of Lt. Gen. K.A.N. Anderson,
the British army commander of all Allied forces in northwest Africa involved
in the Tunisian offensive. Kuter immediately set about controlling all Allied
air support of ground operations. Yet, a few days later, when the Germans
counterattacked in central Tunisia on January 30, 1943, Allied tactical air sup-
port broke down. Ground commanders repeatedly insisted on defensive air
umbrellas that divided and dissipated the strength of the tactical air forces.
Either many more aircraft had to be made available— most unlikely at that
ti me— or the process of al I ocati ng ai rcraft had to be i mproved. E i senhower and
other key leaders in the theater did not believe the air doctrine to be at fault.
They believed that doctrine was misapplied on the battlefield.^"
The Battle of Kasserine Pass in mid-February 1943, highlighted the
shortcomings of tactical air support of ground forces. Enemy troops over-
... and Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, Commander, Afrika Corps.
10
The Doctrinal Setting
Brig. Gen. Laurence S. Kuter
was deputy to General Spaatz
and assumed command
of the newly created
Allied Air Support Command in
the Allied Air Force.
ran Allied bases, communications broke down, bad weather restricted close
air support activity, and unexpected friendly fire often proved more lethal
to Allied airmen than did hostile German flak.^^ Of the many critics of air
support during the land battle, British Air Vice M arshal Coningham, who
assumed command of the Allied Air Support Command from Kuter during
the course of the engagement, was perhaps the most influential and outspo-
ken—as subsequent events at Gafsa made plain. Coningham immediately
reorganized tactical air forces on the basis of the British Western Desert
system of centralized resources, established mission priorities designed to
conserve scarce forces, and placed senior airmen in control of all air ele-
ments.
The colorful if volatile American tactician M aj. Gen. George S. Patton
commanded II Corps near Gafsa during the battle for Tunisia in early 1943. On
April 1, unopposed German aircraft bombed and strafed his command post
killing three men including his aide-de-camp. Patton vented his anger against
Allied tactical air forces in an April Fool's Day situation report, which, for
emphasis, he transmitted under his own name. That brought an equally sharp
retort from Coningham, now commander of Northwest African Tactical Air
Force (NATAF), who bluntly questioned Patton's understanding of air power
and the bravery of his troops. Intervention by senior officers and a personal
meeting between the two soothed frayed tempers, but did not prevent further
friction in air-ground operations.^^
11
Air Power for Patton's Army
Patton's displeasure with air support in Nortli Africa empliatically under-
scored tlie differing air and ground perspectives of tactical air operations in
1942-1943. Patton's complaints typified those of a field commander facing
unopposed air attack without air support of his own. The solution for the
ground commander most often fixed on securing direct control of the aircraft
that could provide continuous air cover over his lines. (Unchallenged air attack
against ground forces could hardly be explained away by airmen offering
assurances that the supporting air force contributed best when attacking the
enemy elsewhere. To front line troops, what remained unseen did not appear
effective.) In response, Coningham could argue that the army misused tactical
air power by parceling out aircraft to individual army units for combat air
patrol missions to serve as a local air umbrella. That prevented the tactical air
force from taking advantage of its flexibility and ability to concentrate forces
to achieve air superiority. Even though Allied fighter-bombers might not be
seen frequently by the foot soldier, Coningham believed them to be more
effective in most cases when used primarily to attack the enemy's air forces in
a counterair role and to perform interdiction operations to isolate the battle-
field, rather than when committed in direct support of troops under fire.^''
The air support changes that Coningham introduced reflected a larger
reorganization of all Allied air and ground forces in the M editerranean theater
approved earlier at the Casablanca summit conference in late January 1943, and
subsequently implemented throughout northwest Africa on February 18.
General Eisenhower became the Mediterranean theater commander and con-
trolled all Allied forces (Chart 2). For the first time, he operated with a genuine
unified command set up along functional lines. British Air Chief M arshal. Sir
Arthur Tedder, assumed command of all Allied air units in the M editerranean.
T he N 0 rth w est A f ri can A i r F orces ( N A A F ) , I ed by G eneral S paatz, repi aced the
Allied Air Force, becoming the most important of Tedder's three regional air
forces. It, inturn, consisted of three functional commands, with NATAF respon-
sible for all tactical air support of ground forces in the region. Appropriately,
Air Vice Marshal Coningham was named its commander.^^
The new organizational arrangement also formally recognized distinct
aerial priorities, with air superiority and interdiction preceding those of close
air support. Air officers approved targets based on need and suitability, and air
and ground officers performed planning functionsjointly. Coningham issued a
pamphlet which he circulated to reach the widest possible audience. Based on
a short talk by British field commander General M ontgomery (which, inciden-
tally, Coningham authored), it praised the British Western Desert system of air-
ground cooperation. That system, M ontgomery asserted, succeeded by virtue
of the coequality of the land and air forces and the spirit of cooperation.^^
Despite the attack on Patton's headquarters by German aircraft in early
April 1943, no one could doubtthat air support improved after the reorganiza-
tion. The organizational changes combined with good flying weather, more
12
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Chart 2
Allied Command Relationships in the Mediterranean, March 1943
13
Air Power for Patton's Army
support people, and many more aircraft improved Allied military performance.
Air planning became more integrated as M ontgomery's Eighth British Army,
advancing westward from Egypt, forced retreating German troops back into
Tunisia where General Anderson's forces, moving eastward from Algeria,
sought to close the pincers. In this offensive, theater interests received top pri-
ority in decision-making. The successful attack in mid-March 1943, against
the German-held Mareth Line, located along a 22-mile stretch of central
Tunisia running from the sea to the M atmata Hills, and the ultimate defeat of
German forces in May, highlighted the new flexibility and concentration of
tactical air forces that, selectively, made local air superiority possible.
Some intractable problems nonetheless remained. Coningham, for exam-
ple, never quite solved the air-ground request system to the satisfaction of
ground commanders. Although centralized, the process functioned too slowly,
especially for "on call" or "immediate" missions." Poor communications
equipment also could not transmit and satisfactorily receive over long distances.
The solution would come later in Italy and Northwest Europe when pilots and
ground controllers acquired improved radio communications equipment and the
Allies had far more aircraft available for support. Strained relations among
some commanders in North Africa also forced General Spaatz to spend most of
the spring in 1943 keeping peace between air and ground officers and educat-
ing both sides on the need for cooperation. Nevertheless, communication prob-
lems and local enemy air attacks continued to prevent the Allies from achiev-
ing complete air supremacy until near the end of the campaign. Even then, suc-
cess primarily came when Allied forces overran German airfields in Tunisia.
Tactical Air Doctrine Refined
As military operations in North Africa drew near a close in the spring
of 1943, tactical air doctrine became an increasingly important issue for air-
men like General Kuter and others in Washington, D.C. Should FM 31-35 of
1942 be retained or, if revised, should it reflect the system now operating in
North Africa? Additionally, could such a revision be done by air and ground
officers in the spirit of cooperation and compromise that had characterized
earlier doctrinal statements? Some officers were convinced that it was too late
for compromise, and only wholesale acceptance of the new theater tactical air
doctrine would do. In a scathing review of early failures in North Africa, writ-
ten as he left his five-month combat tour for an air staff assignment in M ay
1943, Kuter described forAAF commander General Arnold what he judged
to be specific misuses of tactical air power.^^The air umbrella topped his list;
he and other ai r force I eaders j udged thi s to be the core of the ai r-ground prob-
lem in North Africa. For them, it represented a wasteful and inefficient use of
limited air forces that made the attainment of air superiority impossible. Yet,
14
The Doctrinal Setting
not all ground commanders embraced the air umbrella concept. General
Eisenhower, for one, firmly believed that ground forces should not expect
permanent, defensive air cover. Not only were theater resources insufficient
for such a task, he believed troops dependent on air cover were unlikely to
exhibit the aggressiveness fostered by the combat of arms. Other Army offi-
cers, however, were much less inclined to forego the air umbrella idea.^°
General Kuter also argued forcefully for American adoption of the
British close air support system, contrasting the mistakes made between
November 1942-February 1943, with the successes achieved after the post-
Casablanca reorganization. Among the lessons cited, he called attention to
concentrated forces employed against specific objectives, a composite theater
force, and equality with the Army in decisions of air employment. By the
spring of 1943, these lessons had become a familiar refrain in higher AAF cir-
cles. At the same time, Kuter acknowledged that the air forces required better
communications with ground forces, and he criticized the AAF for shortages
of communication equipment, deficient radar, and an inability to provide early
warning of aircraft attack, or provide a reliable fighter control system. He saw
the ultimate solution in an independent air force, where decisions on air oper-
ations would be made by airmen. Until that happened, air forces had to be
made "coordinate"— coequal— with the ground forces to achieve successful
air-ground operations.
Gens. Lewis H. Brereton, Carl A. Spaatz, and Dwight D. Eisenhower (left to
right) critique tactical air doctrine.
15
Air Power for Patton's Army
Generals M arshall, Arnold, and others in the War Department had pre-
viously been impressed with General Montgomery's pamphlet, written by
Coningham, Some Notes on High Command in War, and with reports from
other key participants in North Africa such as Generals Spaatz, Brereton, and
Quesada. Kuter's critique helped prompt a revision of tactical air doctrine.
Marshall assigned the task of revising American air-ground doctrine to the
War Department General Staff's operations division and a special board of air
and ground officers. The resultant FM 100-20, Command and Employment
of Air Power, issued July 21, 1943, epitomized AAF headquarters' interpreta-
tion of experiences in North Africa and the influence of Coningham's RAF
system. Army chief of staff George Marshall, who initiated the project,
approved the final document.
This field manual specifically addressed mission priorities and command
arrangements. Like FM 31-35 of 1942, the new manual gave the preponderant
role i n the empi oyment of ai rcraft to ai rmen, subject to the theater commander's
final authority. In addition, it directed that air forces be centralized and not
parceled out to specific ground commands, and that close air support missions
be limited because of their difficulty, high casualty rate, and relative inefficien-
cy.^^ New provisions reflected AAF thinking and influence in the War
Department. In a dramatic opening section, FM 100-20 employed capital letters
to proclaim and emphasize the equality of air power in joint warfare: "LAND
POWER AND AIR POWER ARE CO-EOUAL AND INTERDEPENDENT
Gens. George C. Marshall and Henry H. "Hap" Arnold were impressed with the
tactical air doctrine refined in North Africa under the British.
16
The Doctrinal Setting
British Air Vice i^larslial Sir Artliur Coningliam (left), designer of close air
support in North Africa, shares experiences in the African desert
with Brig. Gen. Auby C. Strickland (center) and Lt. Gen. Frank M. Andrews.
FORCES; NEITHER IS AN AUXILIARY OF THE OTHER. THE INHER-
ENT FLEXIBILITY OF AIR POWER IS ITS GREATEST ASSET... CON-
TROL OF AVAILABLE AIR POWER MUST BE CENTRALIZED AND
COMMAND MUST BE EXERCISED THROUGH THE AIR FORCE COM-
MANDER IF THIS INHERENT FLEXIBILITY AND ABILITY TO DELIV-
ER A DECISIVE BLOW ARE TO BE FULLY EX PLOITED.''^"
Field Manual 100-20 set an unequivocal hierarchy of aerial missions.
"The gaining of air superiority is the first requirement for the success of any
major land operation. "^^ The manual specifically addressed, as a first prereq-
uisite for air superiority, obtaining improved communications equipment for
an effective fighter offense and, for defense, a reliable early warning radar net-
work. In listing appropriate targets for the air superiority mission, it eliminat-
ed provisions for an air umbrella because it was "prohibitively expensive and
could be provided only over a small area for a brief period of time."^^
Next to air superiority, interdiction— aerial attack on enemy lines of
communication and supply behind the front line— designed to achieve isola-
tion of the battlefield received second priority. Close air support— attacking
17
Air Power for Patton's Army
enemy forces near or on the front line— ranked third. In justifying a last place
for close air support, air power proponents normally cite only two sentences
from the relevant paragraph: "In the zone of contact, missions against hostile
units are mostdifficultto control, are most expensive, and are, in general, least
effective.... Only at critical times are contact zone missions profitable."^^
Criticism of the close air support mission as wasteful, of course, was hardly
new. Indeed, airmen had made it a major doctrinal point throughout the inter-
war period. The authors, however, clearly took pains to explain the difficulties
of extensive close air support while stressing the importance of cooperation
and coordination in attaining common goals. Even so. Army Ground Forces
did not share the AAF's enthusiasm for the 1943 manual. In its view, the new
doctrinal publication envisioned an air force less inclined than ever to support
army operations. Army leaders complained, and legitimately so, that FM
100-20 had been issued without the concurrence of theArmy Ground Forces.
Obviously publication of the new manual would not improve air-ground rela-
tions overnight.
In a brief 14 pages, FM 100-20 (1943) attempted to end the imprecision
and ambiguity in air-ground doctrine that characterized earlier attempts to cre-
ate an effective air-ground relationship. From the AAF perspective, it emphat-
ically stated the co-equality of aerial missions in joint operations, clarified lines
of command and control, and established aerial mission priorities on which
ground commanders could reflect. Yet, in practice FM 31-35 (1942) remained
the key air-ground manual because it prescribed precise organization and pro-
cedures for specific combat situations, although that manual's cumbersome air-
ground communications system and procedures remained problem areas.
Future air-ground teams, relying on trial and error and a cooperative spirit,
would still have to devise arrangements that suited their peculiar theater cir-
cumstances and took advantage of better equipment in larger quantities. The
regular army, it seems clear, never completely accepted FM 100-20; the man-
ual remained largely a philosophical rather than a practical treatise. Indeed, FM
31-35 would be the manual later revised to incorporate wartime experiences.^^
However gratifying it might be to airmen, in practice the new doctrine
di d I itti e to i nf I uence future operati ons i n a formal sense. A I though F M 100-20
(1943) gave airmen greater independence and more say in the disposition and
employment of air assets. General Weyland and other air commanders in the
field still reported to Army officers of higher rank whom they were committed
to support tactically. If these pragmatic airmen generally followed the 1943
precepts of FM 100-20, they never allowed theory to stand in the way of mis-
sion accomplishment. As a result, they would take liberties with command
arrangements and mission priorities never envisioned by air advocates such as
General Kuter and others like him on the air staff in Washington, D.C.
Despite legitimate areas of concern in air-ground relationships. Allied
officers in North Africa during World War II for the most part cooperated
18
The Doctrinal Setting
earnestly and tried sincerely to solve the thorny issues of command and con-
trol and of air-power mission priorities. The severe criticism of published doc-
trine used during Operation Torch is largely undeserved.'^" This combat effort,
the first Allied combined and joint operation of the war, suffered most from
inexperienced and inadequate forces operating with an air-ground doctrine yet
to be tested in combat. The problems and frustrations encountered in the North
African and Sicilian Campaigns did promote important improvements in com-
mand and control of air-ground operations. By the time of the Normandy
buildup in early 1944, many air and ground officers had tested doctrine under
combat conditions, worked out problems, and created bonds of friendship and
trust that they broughtwith them to the campaigns in Northwest Europe. When
confronting a common enemy, reality tempered the application of formal doc-
trine in the field, and cooperation tended to override intraservice and interser-
vice rivalries.
19
Chapter Two
Preparing for Joint Operations
As A Hied preparations for tlie invasion of tlie continent began in earnest,
Generals Patton and Weyland appeared in tlie United Kingdom within a week
of each other. Patton arrived by airatPrestwick, Scotland, incognito on January
26, 1944, following a painful five-month exile in Sicily. The so-called slapping
incidents, in which he lost his temper and struck two hospitalized soldiers suf-
fering from combat fatigue, left him sidelined while others received choice
European command assignments: Lt. Gen. M ark Clark assumed command of
the U .S. Fifth Army in Italy, and Lt. Gen. Omar Bradley, Patton's former sub-
ordinate in North Africa and Sicily, became commander of all American troops
during the buildup in the United Kingdom. Immediately on arrival, Patton jour-
neyed to London where General Eisenhower, Supreme Commander, Allied
Expeditionary Forces, informed him that he would lead the U.S. Third Army,
which would enter the conflict only after Bradley's U.S. First Army had
ensured success in the initial landing on the coast of France. At that time,
Bradley would turn over command of the First Army to Lt. Gen. Courtney H .
H odges and assume command of an army group, with both Patton and H odges
reporting to him. By all accounts, Patton was grateful for the opportunity.^
Lt. Gen. Clark,
soon to take command of the
Fifth Army in Italy, confers with
Lt. Gen. Patton in Sicily.
21
Air Power for Patton's Army
Lt. Gen. Omar N. Bradley, com-
mander of all American troops
for the Normandy invasion.
At the beginning of February 1944 Patton personally welcomed the
advance party of Third Army Headquarters personnel at Peover Hall in
Knutsford, near Chester, in Cheshire. The main body of his army would not
arrive until late March, and Third Army units would continue to disembark
until D-D ay on J une 6, by which time 275 separate Third Army camps dotted
the northern English countryside. For the next five months Patton faced the
challenge of molding his inexperienced headquarters and subordinate units
into the capable fighting force he demanded. M eanwhile. General Eisenhower
directed him to remain incognito, misidentified as the commander of a mythi-
cal U .S . A rmy group i n southern E ngl and prepari ng to I and i n F ranee at C al ai s.
In this covert operation known as Fortitude, Allied leaders took advantage of
the Germans' known apprehension about Patton's next appearance, success-
fully deceiving them into believing that Calais was the appointed landing site
for Operation Overlord. ^
Largely unknown outside the A A F, General Weyland looked forward to
his first combat assignment. While Patton busied himself establishing head-
quarters at Peover Hall, Weyland arrived without fanfare on January 29, 1944,
22
Preparing for Joint Operations
after leading his 84tli Figliter Wing of P-47 figliter- bombers on a four-weel<
trans-AtI antic fliglit tliat staged from Nortli Carolina southward across the
Caribbean through Brazil and French West Africa, then north from Africa
across the Bay of Biscay to Keevil and nearby airfields in the vicinity of
Salisbury in southern England. Weyland immediately was reassigned as deputy
to General Quesada, commander of the IX Fighter Command. With headquar-
ters at Uxbridge, 16 miles northwest of London, IX Fighter Command would
prepare and train American fighter contingents for the invasion. The reassign-
ment orders also named Weyland commander of a IX Fighter Command sub-
ordinate organization, the XIX Air Support Command— redesignated XIX
Tactical Air Command (TAC) in April 1944— one of several tactical opera-
tional commands earmarked for service in support of field armies in France.
Like Patton and with two jobs to manage, Weyland began almostfrom scratch
to assemble and shape a largely inexperienced group of A merican aviators and
support personnel into an effective fighting force.^
The Generals Paired
Despite arriving within a week of each other, the two commanders prob-
ably did not meet personally until much later. Given their disparate personali-
ties and backgrounds, at first glance this selection of officers as combat part-
ners could hardly seem to be a likely combination. Though both hailed from
California and had married women of prominent families, each exhibited vast
differences in temperament, outlook, and experience.
Born in the affluent Pasadena suburb of San M ah no in 1885, George S.
Patton, J r., grew up on a palm tree-covered estate that abuts what is today the
Huntington Library and Gardens. His family, rooted in Virginia aristocracy, was
Lt. Gen. Patton
and
Brig. Gen. Weyland
23
Air Power for Patton's Army
Steeped in a tradition of military service. Patton's fatlier and grandfatlier gradu-
ated f rom tlie V i rgi ni a M i I i tary I nsti tute ( V M I ) ; tlie I atter di ed under arms for tlie
Confederate States of America during tlie Civil War. After attending the
Classical School for Boys in nearby Pasadena, California, where he developed a
lifelong interest in military history and the deeds of great men, Patton spent a
year at V M I before enteri ng West Pol nt i n 1904. T here, despite a poor f i rst year's
performance in mathematics, he distinguished himself in military science and
athletics, and stood 46th in the 1909 graduating class of 103. Throughout his life,
Patton suffered from dyslexia, which his biographer, Martin Blumenson, con-
siders important to an understanding of his complex personality. If the dyslexia
provoked inner turmoil and a sense of insecurity, it likely helps explain his well-
known outbursts of profanity and arrogant behavior. Unquestionably, he drove
hi msel f to surmount that parti cul ar aff I i cti on and become a great mill tary I eader.'^
Indeed, by the early 1920s Patton had made a name for himself in the
United States Army. After graduating from West Point, he entered the cavalry
and achieved prominence for his superb horsemanship, swordsmanship, and as
a U.S. pentathlon athlete in the 1912 Olympics. Serving briefly as an aide to
Chief of Staff Gen. Leonard Wood, in 1916 he joined Gen. John Pershing's well-
publicized "expedition" into Mexico in search of Pancho Villa. While there,
Patton gained notoriety by wounding one of Villa's generals in a dramatic pistol
fight, "man-to-man." When America entered World War I in 1917, Patton left
for France as commander of the American Expeditionary Force's Headquarters
Troop. M ore important to his future career, however. General Pershing placed
him in charge of organizing an American tank corps. Leading this First Tank
Brigade in the battles of St. M ihiel and the M euse-Argonne in 1918, his mech-
anized force helped propel the American assaults before German machine gun
fire left him wounded and out of action. In a field hospital he accepted the
Distinguished Service Cross, the Purple Heart, and promotion to colonel.
During theinterwar period, Patton held important posts in the cavalry and
tank corps and along the way attended both the Army's Command and General
Staff School, the Army War College, and served as the G-2 operations chief in
Hawaii. His drive and leadership skills brought him to the attention of a future
chief of staff. Gen. George C. M arshall. As the U .S. Army's foremost authority
on tanks and mechanized warfare at the outset of World War II, Patton was the
logical choice to organize the U .S. Armored Force at Ft. Benning, Georgia. As
commander of the 2d Armored Division he participated in the Tennessee and the
Carolina maneuvers, and served as an umpire in the Louisiana war games. He
was also a private pilot and thus predisposed to view air favorably. In 1942 he
assumed command of the First Armored Corps and organized the Desert
Training Center at Indio, California, in preparation for Operation Torch, the
invasion of North Africa.
In the invasion of North Africa in November 1942, Patton commanded
the Western Task Force, which landed at Casablanca in French M orocco. Then,
24
Preparing for Joint Operations
in March 1943, he led the U.S. II Corps following the Kasserine Pass battle.
Later, he assumed command of Seventh Army for the invasion of Sicily in J uly
1943, where he achieved recognition by besting British General M ontgomery's
forces in a race for Palermo and his subsequently undesired notoriety in the
slapping incidents. George Patton combined temperamental outburst and tact-
less public conduct with a mastery of mechanized blitzkrieg warfare and, under
fire, leadership by example. At least the latter attribute moved General
Eisenhower to call him the best driver of troops in combat on the Allied side,
while it caused the German High Command to fear him in the field above all
Allied army commanders.^
0. P. Weyland, 17 years Patton's junior, was born in 1903, 100 miles east
of Los Angeles in blue-collar Riverside the second son of an English mother
and a German immigrant father, who was a musician turned itinerant farmer.
In 1919, after attending a number of public schools in southern California and
in Corpus Christi, Texas, he enrolled at Texas A&M University, graduating
with a degree in M echanical Engineering in 1923 as a member of the Reserve
Officers Training Corps (ROTC). After graduation, and before deciding on an
aviation career, he entered the United States Army Air Service as a reservist
and went to work for Western Electric in Chicago, Illinois. The engineering
profession, as Weyland recalled later, offered little excitement in a cold cli-
mate, and he was bitten by the flying bug while serving reserve weekends at
Chanute Field. In 1924, he exchanged reserve status for a regular Army com-
mission and began flight training at Kelly Field, Texas. Weyland impressed his
contemporaries as quiet, competent, and altogether without a flair for the dra-
matic.
General Patton with troops of
the 3d Infantry Division awaiting
evacuation from Sicily by air.
25
Air Power for Patton's Army
After completing flight training in 1925, Weyland joined the 12th
Observation (Reconnaissance) Squadron at Fort Sam Houston where he first
acquired his knowledge of, and appreciation for, tactical air requirements in
support of army ground forces. He went on to command the 4th Observation
Squadron at Luke Field, Hawaii, an assignment he chose over a more presti-
gious post in the Philippines because it offered tactical work with a full-
strength army division. In the mid-1930s he returned to Kelly Field as an
instructor pilot and chief of the observation section. His early career involved
more than operational flying assignments; he attended the Air Corps Tactical
School at M axwell Field, Alabama, in 1937 where his field experience with
the ground forces helped him graduate as number one in his class. Two years
later, in 1939, he completed the Army's Command and General Staff School
course at Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas.
During the first years of World War II, Weyland served with the renamed
Army Air Forces primarily in Washington, D.C. There, he was assistant to the
chief of the National Guard Bureau's Aviation Division before receiving assign-
ment to AAF headquarters, first as Deputy Director for Air Support and then as
Chief of the Allocations and Programs Division in the office of the Assistant
Chief of the Air Staff. The latter assignment placed him at the center of the avia-
tion buildup, which included work on AAF air inspector M aj. Gen. Follett Brad-
ley's plan for building up the forces needed in the cross-channel invasion. This
brought him into frequent contact with the AAF commander. General Arnold.
Between Washington assignments, Weyland commanded the 16th Pur-
suit Group in Panama, which flew P-40s, and in 1941 he became chief of staff
of the Caribbean Air Force (later redesignated Sixth Air Force). Weyland's
Maxwell Field, Alabama, served as the home of the Air Corps Tactical School,
where much of the tactical air doctrine developed in the 1930s.
26
Preparing for Joint Operations
commander, Gen. Frank Andrews, judged this air force to be "tied to no island
commanders but available for a concentrated blow for the defense of the
Canal. Here, Weyland helped army leaders understand the benefits of cen-
tralizing limited air resources in support of ground forces scattered over a large
geographic area. With that background and experience and promoted to
brigadier general in late 1943, he assumed command of the 84th Fighter Wing.
On January 1, 1944, he flew with it to England and a new assignment.
Shortly after arriving in England, the U.S. Army notified General
Weyland that he and the XIX TAG would be paired with theThird Army and
its famous commander. General Patton. Privately, Weyland harbored doubts
about this assignment with the fiery army commander— an understandable
reaction given Patton's public criticism of Allied air support in North Africa.
Long afterward, Weyland recalled that he had no idea why he and his orga-
nization were paired with Patton and his Third Army, though he admitted:
"nobody was just real anxious to do it [join Patton]. Nobody was really envi-
ous of me, let's put it that way."'' Doubtless at that moment in time, Patton's
air subordinate could anticipate confrontations if he were to avoid being
bulldozed on major air employment decisions. Despite his quiet demeanor,
however, Weyland could be entirely forceful when the occasion demanded.
General Ferguson, his operations officer in World War II, perhaps described
him best as "soft-spoken but a firm and very capable fellow."^
W hatever Patton's feelings might have been on learning that his air com-
mander lacked any combat experience, Weyland brought to the partnership a
military background in tactical operations that would prove excellent prepara-
tion for the air-ground mission that both would face. Though without combat
experience, he had spent his entire career in tactical aviation and he understood
air-ground requirements better than most did in the A A F. He also brought to
the XIX TAG extensive experience in fighter operational units, a thorough
knowledge of tactical air operations, and a willingness to cooperate in fixing
air-ground objectives. M oreover, his subdued, more taciturn personality com-
plemented Patton's flamboyancy. If Patton dramatically referred to their asso-
ciation as "love at first sight," the two commanders apparently understood one
another and got along well from the very beginning.^ Gertainly, by war's end,
Patton emphatically would describe Weyland as "the best damn general in the
AirGorps."!"
Even before Patton and Weyland began assembling and training the
troops of their new commands for combat in France, however. Allied leaders
had to organize the multinational air and ground forces that would be required
in that enterprise to function in concert.
27
Air Power for Patton's Army
Organizing Allied Assault Forces for Joint Operations
Plans for a cross-channel invasion of France received renewed impetus
when Allied leaders met at Casablanca, French Morocco, back in January
1943.^^ At that time in North Africa, Allied forces were firmly established and
had begun to close on German and Italian forces in Tunisia from the east and
west. In Russia, Soviet forces had halted the Germans' eastward onslaught at
Stalingrad. In the Southwest Pacific, Americans had seized the initiative at
Guadalcanal and seemed to have checked Japanese expansion. The A Hies now
had reason to believe that the tide of war at last had turned in their favor. To
ensure the success of an assault on Fortress Europe, the Allies at Casablanca
decided to stress operations against the German submarine menace, intensify
pressure on German resources and morale through the so-called Combined
Bomber Offensive originating in the United Kingdom, and clear the
M editerranean Sea by invading the island of Sicily.
Following the Casablanca Conference, the Combined Chiefs of Staff
undertook a detailed study of cross-channel invasion requirements based on the
tragic landing made at Dieppe, France, by British and Canadian forces in
August 1942. A successful assault, the study concluded, required a massive
landing of forces at a beachhead that offered access to a key port with a good
road network leading into the French interior and within range of Allied fight-
er aircraft in England. For that beachhead, planners chose the Normandy coast
President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill at Casablanca.
28
Preparing for Joint Operations
between Cherbourg and Caen. In M arch 1943 they submitted their analysis to
British Lt. Gen. Fredericl< E. Morgan. HisappointmentasChief of Staff tothe
(as yet unnamed) Supreme Allied Commander (COSSAC) charged himto plan
for an invasion as early as possible in 1944. Allied leaders at the Trident
Conference in Washington, D.C., in M ay 1943 set that date for M ay 1, 1944,
and confirmed it in November at the Teheran Conference in Iran. In late January
1944 however, shortly after General Eisenhower's arrival in London to assume
the duties of Supreme Commander, he and British General M ontgomery, the
designated ground forces commander for the invasion, decided to expand the
COSSAC's initial plan in Operation Overlord. They opted for an assault force
strengthened, from an original three to five army divisions and a landing-
frontage expanded from an original 25 to 40 miles. To procure the needed
equipment for Overlord— especially landing craft— Eisenhower postponed an
Allied landing on the M editerranean coast of southern France by one month.
Providing for the necessary tactical air support for the invasion. Allied
leaders moved the Ninth Air Force from Egypt to England. On the continent,
the Ninth would pair with the 12th Army Group in the American contribution
to the air-ground campaign in Northwest Europe. M ore significantly for tacti-
cal air developments, however, the Ninth's subordinate tactical air commands
would work directly with armies in the field. Commander of Eighth Air
Force's VIII ASC, Brig. Gen. Robert C. Candee, offered a proposal for the
specific organization of the Ninth Tactical Air Force (TAF) in England to
include a bomber command, a fighter command with two air support divisions,
an air service command, and for the first time, an air defense command and an
engineer command. The Air Support Divisions, later renamed Air Support
Commands, then Tactical Air Commands, would support designated field
armies on the continent. Candee's proposal reflected the findings of a seminal
Eighth Air Force observers' report. Air Operations in Support of Ground
Forces in North West Africa (March 15-April 5, 1943).
Colonel Philip Cole prepared the air operations observers report in the
spring of 1943. Cole, with a small team of Eighth Air Force officers, visited
and assessed the air-ground operations of 18 separate North African theater
units. Their report considered especially the experience of the RAF's Western
Desert Force and the U.S. XII ASC- redesignated XII TAC in April 1944-
which had collocated its headquarters near General Patton'sll Corps advance
headquarters. The 42-page report focused on tactical air organization, control,
and operations. The team found that FM 31-35 (1942) provided the organi-
zational guidelines (the division of headquarters into rear and advance ele-
ments, in particular) which allowed the air commander's staff to keep up with
and remain collocated with the army in mobile operations. Air-ground team-
work also received high marks for "close and continuous" liaison among the
air headquarters and the supported ground units. The observers described the
critical importance of "air support parties" assigned to army units, and of the
29
Air Power for Patton's Army
army counterpart liaison officers stationed at eacli air field. Tlie air comman-
der, in l<eeping witli FM 31-35, retained responsibility for directing aerial
units that flew against targets requested by the ground forces.^''
I ndeed, the C ol e team's report became the bl uepri nt for organizi ng, com-
manding, and controlling tactical air operations in Northwest Europe. To con-
trol air resources, the team recommended that the air organization with tacti-
cal units assigned to support ground forces "be organized as an Air Force
headquarters. To ensure that proper control could be exercised, this tactical
air headquarters at any one time should be allocated no more than two wings
of six fighter groups. The team recommended an increase of 100 percent (from
8 to 16) in the number of air support parties assigned directly to the Air
Support commander in addition to a battalion of Aviation Engineers.
Successful air-ground military operations in North Africa had required addi-
tional air support parties in the field and the ambitious airfield construction
program contemplated for mobile military operations on the continent war-
ranted engineers assigned to each field air command. The report also urged
that these "principles of Air Support organization and control evolved by the
Western Desert Force RAF and modified to suit American organization and
procedure, as represented by X II TA C , be accepted as the current model for the
organization of such units."^^ Ninth Air Force would adopt all of these recom-
mendations for the campaign in Northwest Europe."
A few months after Cole submitted his report, American and British
leaders met at the Quadrant Conference in Quebec, Canada, in August 1943,
and confirmed the cross-channel invasion, now codenamed Qverlord, for the
spring of 1944. The Allied leaders also called for a massive air offensive,
termed Pointblank, designed to destroy German air forces prior to the land-
ings, and creation of an Anglo-American tactical air force to be l<nown as the
Allied Expeditionary Air Force (AEAF). The U.S. component of this com-
mand. Ninth Air Force, thus would be largely independent of and separate
from the Eighth A ir Force and other strategic air forces. The N inth A ir Force,
which moved from Egypt to England on Qctober 16, 1943, under the com-
mand of M aj. Gen. Lewis H . Brereton (ChartSj, initially consisted of a small
headquarters conti ngent from the N i nth and el ements of the E i ghth A i r F orce's
VIII ASC, including Colonel Cole. A vastinflux of new, largely inexperienced
personnel as yet untested by combat accounted for the bulk of this tactical air
force, which over the next seven and a half months grew to more than 170,000
officers and enlisted.
The N inth A ir Force, however, depended on the Eighth for basic support.
Administrative matters remained centralized under the Eighth Air Force,
which dominated the AAF in the United Kingdom and, after January 1, 1944,
its successor, the United States Strategic Air Forces (USSTAF) in Europe.
Supply officers in Weyland's XIX TAC repeatedly complained that logistic
bottlenecks could have been prevented had they been able to establish an inde-
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Organizational Cliartof tlie Nintli Air Force, December 8, 1943
31
Air Power for Patton's Army
Maj. Gen. Lewis H. Brereton
pendent administrative cliannel directly to AAF supply agencies stateside. As
for operational matters, the Ninth like its British counterpart the Second TAF,
looked to the Anglo-American A EAR for direction. Here, the issue of com-
mand prerogatives appeared much less clear.
Two weeks after the Ninth Air Force arrived in England, on November
1, 1943, the Allies activated the AEAF under the leadership of Air Chief
Marshal SirTrafford Leigh-M allory, the most controversial air commander on
the Allied side. Leigh-M allory reportedly was possessed of a difficult person-
ality. Yet, personality clashes normally reflect issues of larger importance. In
this case, from the time of his appointment, Leigh-M allory and the AEAF
became the focus of a complex tug-of-war over command authority involving
not only American tactical air forces but all U .5. and British strategic forces
as well. Recent studies have been more sympathetic to this British officer in
view of the challenges he faced. Simply put, Leigh-M allory believed that he
should have the authority to plan and direct all Allied strategic and tactical air
forces in support of the invasion, rather than simply to coordinate plans and
operations of the AAF's Ninth Air Force and the RAF's Second TAF.
General Spaatz, USSTAF commander, for one, thought otherwise and
opposed the use of strategic air forces against tactical targets in Normandy.
Heavy bombers, he declared, should be employed against strategic targets in
Germany. M oreover, as General Brereton's diaries make clear, American air-
men resisted placing U.S. tactical air forces under a British officer.^" These
issues festered throughout the winter of 1943-1944 as Leigh-M allory. General
Eisenhower, and the strategic bomber leaders argued over the use and control
32
Preparing for Joint Operations
of heavy bombers. Eventually, Eisenhower received the authority he needed to
use the strategic bombers in support of Overlord objectives. But in tactical
matters, the AEAF's authority was more clearly drawn. According to the Joint
Operations Plan for the invasion. Ninth Air Force would "execute air opera-
tions in the U .5. sector as directed by AEAF" and together with Second TAF,
would support ground forces "in coordination with AEAF."^! As it turned out,
the various tactical agencies cooperated reasonably and efficiently after the
invasion.
Jurisdictional disputes among the top commanders, however, seldom
affected leaders at lower echelons who, like General Weyland, had excellent
relations with their fellow airmen and army counterparts. In any case, Weyland
and his colleagues had challenges enough to face in building up their forces,
training for the invasion, fighting enemy air forces in Operation Pointblank,
and participating in the attacks against German rocket and buzz bomb launch-
ing sites on the continent.
Manning and Equipping the Assault Forces
General Weyland'sXIX TAG, headquartered atAldermaston Court, near
Reading in Berkshire, in February 1944 consisted of 30 officers and 77 enlist-
ed men— but it counted no pi lots or aircraft. The XIX TAG was a subordinate
element of the IX Fighter Gommand led by General Ouesada, recently arrived
from the M iddle East with the original Ninth Air Force contingent. The Ninth
Air Force was a tactical air force, and its IX Fighter Gommand controlled the
Air Marshal Leigh-Mallory
presides at a squadron briefing.
33
Air Power for Patton's Army
fighter and fighter-bombers employed in the close air-support role. Both air-
men, in effect, wore more than one command hat. Quesada commanded the IX
Fighter Command with its two subordinate air support commands, the IX and
XIX TACs, and commanded the IX TAC, while Weyland served as his deputy
commander at IX Fighter Command headquarters at Uxbridge and as com-
mander of the XIX TAC.
General Quesada directed the equipping and training of both air support
commands. Quesada's IX TAC received priority over Weyland's XIX TAC for
personnel and equipment during the buildup in England. The former support
command, augmented by fighter groups later destined for Weyland's com-
mand, would be the first to deploy to airfields in France in support of the
lodgement and breakout. Weyland's XIX TAC would become operational on
the continent, along with the Third Army, after the breakout. Initially, air lead-
ers planned to inactivate IX Fighter Command once the two tactical air com-
mands, as they were redesignated in April, had grown to full combat strength.
The fighter command proved too valuable as an operational coordinating
agency, however, and did not inactivate until the last fighter-bomber group
deployed to the continent in late July 1944.^2
Generals Weyland and Quesada also contrasted with respect to person-
ality, leadership style, and the experience each brought to the European the-
ater." Unlike Weyland, Pete Quesada, to use his own words, had an impulsive
personality. A hands-on leader, he enjoyed flying combat missions with
younger pilots (he was 40 years old in 1944). His assignments included duty
as an aide to key Air Corps and political figures and as chief of the Air Corps'
foreign liaison section. He had attended courses at the Air Corps Tactical
School and the Army's Command and General Staff School when, as com-
mander of XII Fighter Command, he I eft North Africa for Engl and, he brought
to his new N i nth Air Force post tactical operations experience, an appreciation
for technical innovation, and tremendous energy and drive. Responsible for
directing all tactical air training and operations for fighter-bomber groups in
theUnited Kingdom, hewould lead IX TAC in operations supporting the First
Army, commanded initially by General Bradley in Normandy and, after the
breakout, by General Hodges. The First Army would operate on the Third
Army's left flank in the drive across France.
If Quesada had arrived in England several months before Patton, and if
his combat experience made him the best choice to direct training in England
and tactical air operations in Normandy, army and air force leaders might have
deliberately avoided putting these two headstrong personalities on the same
air-ground team. By pairing Weyland and Quesada, these complementary per-
sonalities were able to contribute to teamwork at IX Fighter Command. Both
brought to their commands extensive tactical experience, a willingness to
innovate, a commitment to air-ground objectives, and the drive to make the
cooperative effort successful.
34
Preparing for Joint Operations
As for Weyland's XIX TAC's staff structure, administratively it repre-
sented a normal air support command organization including a chief of staff,
deputy chief of staff, and four assistant chiefs of staff to head the main branch-
es, that is, personnel (A-1), intelligence (A-2), operations (A-3), and supply
(A -4). After a number of personnel changes in the spring of 1944 Weyland
(the ROTC graduate from Texas A&M), assembled a team that remained
mostly together throughout the entire campaign. His chief of staff. Col. Roger
J . Browne (West Point, class of 1929), and his deputy chief of staff. Col. James
F. Thompson, Jr. (West Point, class of 1932), brought to their posts extensive
prewar experience as pursuit and observation (reconnaissance) pilots. The
other officer mostdirectly involved in flying operations. Operations Chief Col.
James Ferguson, rose rapidly after entering the Air Corps in 1936 from a civil-
ian school and, like General Weyland, had received a regular Army commis-
sion. He arrived in England as commander of the 405th Fighter Group. In the
forthcoming campaign. Colonel Browne would command the XIX TAC's rear
headquarters while Colonel Ferguson would direct activities from the com-
mand's advance headquarters, and Colonel Thompson would form a small X-
Ray (small, mobile command post) detachment to keep pace with General
Patton's rapidly moving command post echelon during the dash through
France. The remaining support branch chiefs consisted of Maj. Robert C.
Byers (A-1), Lt. Col. Charles H. Hallett (A-2), and Lt. Col. Howard F. Foltz
(A -4), all of whom belonged to the Air Corps rather than the regular A rmy.^''
A mong the many i mportant attached units supporti ng the X I X TA C , the
communications and engineer troops proved indispensable. The command's
operations turned on effective communications and two battalions of Signal
Corps personnel under the command of Col. Glenn C. Coleman (West Point,
class of 1938) constructed and operated equipment for routine command com-
munications as well as the radios and vehicles used for the air support nets.
Over the course of the campaign. Colonel Coleman's troops developed four
communications networks. The command net linked the command with the
wings and groups as well as adjacent units; the control net centered on the
Tactical Control Center, linking it with the command's radars, radio intelli-
gence unit, and ground observers; the liaison net tied the command to its tac-
tical air parties at the Army's corps, divisions, and combat commands; and
finally, the air-ground net included aircraft, ground stations at airfields, and
tactical air parties that moved with the army. The four networks relied on five
types of communication. Air-ground communications used VHF radio while
point-to-point communications employed land-line telephone and teletype,
FM radio telephone and teletype, HF radio, and both ground and air couriers.
The engineers comprised the second major support group. Based on a
recommendation from Colonel Cole's Eighth Air Force Observers Report,
Ninth Air Force's Engineer Command assigned brigades consisting of self-
contained aviation battalions of 27 officers and 760 enlisted men directly to the
35
Air Power for Patton's Army
Major General Quesada
tactical air commands. Fortunately for the XIX TAC, Col. Rudolf E. Smyser,
Jr., commanded the 2d Aviation Engineer Brigade. A West Point graduate
(class of 1928), Smyser had been a driving force in developing aviation bat-
talions in the prewar Air Corps and had served for two years as Eighth Air
Force's Engineer Chief. During that time he had visited the North African the-
ater and gained first-hand knowledge of engineering construction require-
ments for mobile warfare conditions. In the coming offensive, elements of his
battalions would construct or refurbish a total of 43 airstrips using six differ-
ent types of surfacing material.
In the spring of 1944, while Ninth Air Force's engineer and signals offi-
cers labored to form operational units for the tactical air commands. General
Weyland wrestled with major command problems of his own. Beginning in
February 1944, Weyland faced four simultaneous challenges: first, building
XIX TAC with the required personnel and equipment; second, properly train-
ing all members of the command; third, conducting flying operations in support
of Eighth Air Force bombers; and, finally, participating in air-ground training
with General Patton's Third Army. Because Quesada's command received pri-
ority for personnel and equipment, the XIX TAC remained a small force until
the spring of 1944. By the end of M arch, it still totaled only 3,223 personnel in
contrast with IX TAC's 27,093. The command's personnel problems extended
beyond insufficient numbers to fill the authorized billets. Technical specialists
remained in short supply, and in some cases, the table of organization did not
include essential functions. One of the most glaring omissions involved air liai-
son officers to work with the army. Recommendations like those of Colonel
Cole's North African Campaign analysis and Patton's lessons learned report on
36
Preparing for Joint Operations
the Sicily operation seem to liave escaped tlie attention of planners at AAF
headquarters in Washington, D.C. Air Staff officials failed to foresee the need
for airmen in air support parties who would work together with army operations
officers down to division level. To meet that need, the tactical air command had
to assign them from existing authorizations, which intensified the overall short-
age of personnel in Weyland's command."
Within two months, by the end of M ay 1944, General Weyland's manning
situation improved considerably. On the eve of D-Day, XIX TAG had grown
from 3,232 to 11,965 officers and enlisted men— though it was not yet half the
size of General Quesada's IX TAG. The major increase in personnel occurred
when theXIX TAG received its first operational flying units in April 1944.
During the Second World War, in contrast to later practice, it was the fighter
group rather than the wing that served as the primary flying organization.
100 Fighter Wing 303 Figliter Wing
354 FG 358 FG 362 FG 363 FG 36 FG 373 FG 406 FG
(P-51) (P-47) (P-47) (P-51) (P-47) (P-47) (P-47)
Then, wings served a coordination and communications function linking the
fighter groups with the headquarters and its associated tactical control center.
During the campaign in France, the command found the wings to be an unnec-
essary administrative echelon and recommended their elimination in future
operations. Normally, each fighter group consisted of three squadrons for a
total of approximately 200 officers, 800 enlisted, and 75 aircraft.^^
The rugged, well-armored P-47 Thunderbolt
proved to be an ideal fighter-bomber.
37
Air Power for Patton's Army
The 100th Fighter Wing joined Weyland's command in late M arch 1944
and became operational on April 15. Its groups already had been in the
European theater for as long as four months under IX TAC control for training
and operations. The 354th Fighter Group, in fact, had been the first operational
fighter group in Ninth Air Force and proudly called itself the Pioneer M ustang
Group. Units of the 303d Wing, however, joined the command directly from
the States and needed two to three weeks to become operational. Even after
both wings achieved operational status in early M ay 1944 they continued to be
assigned to IX Fighter Command and IX TAC for flying operations, rather
than to the XIX TAC.
The XIX TAC had the distinction of being the only tactical air command
in the theater that flew P-51 aircraft. Both the P-51 Mustang and P-47
Thunderbolt, or Jug, had been designed initially as high-altitude fighters. The
P-5rs six .50-caliber machine guns, superior maneuverability, and extended
range when equipped with drop-tanks made it the ideal aircraft for long-range
escort and fighter sweeps. Because N inth Air Force visualized the need for at
least a modest P-51 capability to counter the Luftwaffe threat, it retained two
groups, the 354th and 363d Fighter Groups. Although both belonged to
Weyland's command, the great flexibility of tactical air power made them
readily available, as required, to assist the operations of other Ninth Air Force
tactical air commands. The P-51 proved less capable as a fighter-bomber. Its
liquid-cooled, in-line engine made it more vulnerable to antiaircraft flak and
even small arms fire at low altitudes, and during steep dives it tended to devel-
op stability problems. The well-armored P-47, on the other hand, proved to be
an ideal fighter-bomber. Its ruggedness, turbo-supercharged air-cooled radial
engine, ample bomb-carrying capability, ease of operation and maintenance,
and lower vulnerability to flak damage readily offset its high fuel consumption
and restricted forward visibility. Above all, the Thunderbolt's eight .50-caliber
machine guns gave it outstanding firepower for strafing— the most important
of the fighter-bomber air support roles.
The original Ninth Air Force plan called for 1,500 tactical aircraft,
enough to equip each group with 75 planes. The plan provided for an addi-
tional 10 aircraft in reserve locally and a further 15 in depot reserve. Planners
predicted a 30 percent attrition-replacement rate for the campaign. However,
normally two months elapsed before a group received its full complement of
75 aircraft. Even then, the new planes usually arrived without their full quota
of associated equipment or requested modifications, which meant that achiev-
ing operational capability might be delayed as long as six weeks.
At XIX TAC headquarters, the officers resented their preinvasion
stepchild status and liked to blame Eighth Air Force's administrative control
of Ninth Air Force logistics for many of their problems. They believed supply
officers in the strategic forces failed to appreciate the special needs of a tacti-
cal force and did not submit their requirements for modifications promptly to
38
Preparing for Joint Operations
the appropriate organizations stateside. Even so, given the four-montli period
from tlie time Weyland assumed command until D-Day, one marvels that,
despite the speed and the scale in the buildup of forces, the bureaucratic sna-
fus encountered in so enormous an effort never became insurmountable.
Training Underway
To prepare for cross-channel operations, XIX TAC personnel participat-
ed in individual and group training programs from the time they arrived in
England until they moved to the far shore. Flexibility and mobility became
instant watchwords. Beginning in December 1943 Ninth Air Force-wide
ground training stressed mobile command post communications exercises.
Aircraft warning and control units had no time to take part, however, which
severely limited the scope and realism of this training. The results seldom
pleased evaluators. As one noted in early 1944, "the most that can be said for
this exercise is that enough mistakes were made to warrant the doubling of
efforts for further Command Post Exercises. "^^ In fact, the command post
exercises continued until the spring, when XIX TAC could issue standard
operating procedures for mobile, combined operations.
Ninth Air Force aircrews participated in an especially rigorous flight
training program. General Weyland's second command challenge. Ground ori-
entation training for new pilots emphasized airdrome procedures, communica-
tions, and minor aircraft maintenance and refueling exercises designed to pre-
pare aircrews for the austere airstrip conditions expected in highly mobile
combat operations on the continent. Flight training stressed close-air bomb-
ing techniques. When new groups began arriving at the end of 1943, General
Quesada immediately focused this program on dive-bombing, skip-bombing,
and low-level attack training. Despite their stateside preparation, new pilots
required many additional hours to master dive-bombing techniques in the
P-47. Moreover, their skills deteriorated because flying operations in early
1944 called for them to provide bomber escort rather than to perform low-level
interdiction missions. Characteristically, Quesada wasted no time in attacking
the problem on several levels. He selected two experienced officers from the
North African Campaign and sent them to operational groups and to RAF
M illfield, which specialized in training flight leaders in low-level attack pro-
cedures. As newly arrived P-47 pilot Lt. John J. Burns recalled, shortly after
arriving in England in March 1944 he checked-out in his airplane and then
spent late M arch and April at "Clobber College" at Atcham, practicing dive-
bombing techniques when not flying operational missions. Quesada also
established a research project at Salisbury Range where a team of pilots and
civilian specialists determined the best bombing techniques for reducing par-
ticular targets.
39
Air Power for Patton's Army
Operational flying became Weyland's third major challenge during the
preparation phase. Although groups from his 100th Fighter Wing had been fly-
ing against the enemy since late 1943, until February 1944 only P-51s flew
bomber escort and photo and weather reconnaissance missions. On February
3, 52 P-47S joined 71 P-51s in support of VIII Bomber Command aircraft
attacking special targets, the high-threat buzz bomb sites in northern France
and Belgium. Together with fighter sweeps, escort missions predominated
with few exceptions until late M arch, when the Allies could claim air superi-
ority in the skies over Europe.^''
The main Allied effort to wrest control of the skies from the Luftwaffe
began in earneston February 19, 1944, with a six-day assault popularly known
as Big Week. During this period, RAF Bomber Command and the U .5. Eighth
and Fifteenth Air Forces flew more than 4,000 sorties against 23 airframe and
three aero-engine factories in Germany. Supported now by sufficient numbers
of the long-range P-51 M ustang fighter, the bombers could put all of Germany
at risk, and together with the fighters, they dealt the Luftwaffe air defenses a
severe blow. By M arch. Allied pilots found that Luftwaffe fighters often failed
to challenge them and analysts estimated that the Luftwaffe's western front
fighter force of 1,410 in early January 1944 had been reduced by more than
500 planes as a result of Big Week and the subsequent air attacks against tar-
gets in France and Germany.^^
With air superiority over France largely assured, air leaders in March
1944 increasingly sent P- 47s over specific areas on the continent to dive-bomb
and strafe interdiction targets of opportunity. Dive-bombing missions that
month for the first time outnumbered bomber escort missions by 45 to 38. The
number of high-altitude fighter sweeps, nonetheless, remained high for both
tactical air commands because they provided good practice in orientation flying
for newly arrived pilots. Fighter-bomber aircrews seemed overjoyed to be fly-
ing fewer escort missions for heavy bombers now that Eighth Air Force fight-
ers were on hand in sufficient numbers. Their enthusiasm was quickly tempered
by the danger and challenges of low-altitude interdiction missions. In a percep-
tive observation, a veteran airman observed: "Our pilots are learning what we
learned in Africa— that air support work is a lot of hard work without the glory
and the huge claims of destroying enemy aircraft that are obtained in escorting
the heavy bombers into Germany." Yet, high-altitude escort and fighter sweep
assignments were the most characteristic fighter missions, the ones most likely
to produce the traditional dogfight. With air superiority, however, high-altitude
encounter missions that produced dogfights became increasingly rare.^^
When the so-called Transportation Plan to isolate the Normandy battle-
field began, M ay 1944 became the busiest flying month prior to D-D ay. In one
of the most contentious decisions of the spring. General Eisenhower overruled
the commanders of both the RA F and U .5. strategic bomber forces and divert-
ed them from an exclusive bombing of the German homeland to attacks
40
Preparing for Joint Operations
against transportation facilities in France. Of tlie five l<ey target groups-
coastal batteries, radar stations, marshaling yards, airfields, and bridges— air-
craft of the two tactical air commands concentrated their efforts against the lat-
ter three. Attacks on railroad and highway bridges in northern France became
crucial in preventing a timely German reinforcement of Normandy defenses.
By D-Day, the Allied air assault on 12 railroad and 14 highway bridges over
the Seine River delayed significantly all crossings below Paris.
Well before D-Day, the Allies planned and directed all tactical air oper-
ations from Uxbridge, near London. In early February 1944, the AEAF and its
two tactical commands, the N inth Air Force and Second TAF, established their
advance headquarters in Hillingdon House, Uxbridge, where a short time later
IX Fighter Command's advance headquarters joined them. At Hillingdon
House, the commands operated side by side with the RAF's 11 Group in a
combined control center that directed all Allied fighter operations. Later, the
British 21st Army Group and U.S. First Army personnel arrived at the center
to coordinate the air-ground request system for the invasion. The combined
control center later would direct air support operations on D-Day.^^
In M arch 1944, General Weyland's command began controlling its own
aircraft operations, thereby relieving IX TAG of operational responsibility.
Early that month Weyland sent 10 officers and 14 enlisted signal corps con-
trollers to the RAF's Biggen Hill sector control center for training. In late
March, his command began moving flying units of both wings to advanced
landing grounds (ALGs) in southeast Kent (Map 2). Deployed in full view
opposite the Pas de Calais region of France, XIX TAG units comprised an
important element of Operation Fortitude, the grand deception that convinced
theGermans that the Allied invasion would come from "Army Group Patton,"
directed against Calais.^^
T he A L G s i n K ent w ere desi gned to resembi e those pi anned f or the con-
tinent. They proved to be excellent sites for mobility training and for operat-
ing under rather stark conditions, but they lacked adequate housing, sufficient
water supplies, and road networks able to support operations under combat
field conditions. Even though the objective called for operating only with
essential support, the airstrips still needed basic operating equipment and sup-
plies. General Weyland spent a good part of his time in April and M ay 1944
working to obtain sufficient fuel supplies, to upgrade the road networks, and
to improve overall operations attheALGs. This would prove good practice for
conditions he shortly would encounter in France.'^° By the end of M ay, XIX
TAG had 2,000 men under canvas at each airstrip. Preparing the ALGs and
conducting operational flying, however, made joint field training with Third
Army more unlikely as D-Day approached. Even so, air-ground training pro-
gressed considerably over the late winter and spring of 1944.
41
Map 2
Ninth Air Force Installations: J une 1, 1944
SOURCE: Rpt, AAF Evaluation Board, ETO, "Effectiveness of Third Phase Tacticai Air Operations," p. 47, AFHRA.
Preparing for Joint Operations
The Issue of Joint Training
Joint training among air and ground elements, anotlier major part of tlie
training program, represented a fourtli cliallenge for General Weyland.
Because the N inth A ir Force had moved to England for the express purpose of
conducting joint operations with field armies, training in air-ground organiza-
tion and procedure was a priority. A Ithough the planners stressed joint training
from the start. Ninth Air Force officials seldom seemed to move from theoret-
ical and organizational instruction to actual air-ground exercises in the field. A
recent study attributes this condition to recalcitrant airmen who expressed tra-
ditional hostility toward ground support requirements: "the prewar attitude
that close air support of ground forces was not a priority air mission still pre-
vailed among flyers at all levels."^^ This conclusion overlooks entirely the real
impediments to joint training and the wide degree of cooperation among air
and ground leaders that existed in the last few months before Overlord. To be
sure. Generals Arnold and Spaatz and other leading airmen remained sensitive
to any perceived threats to air force control of air resources. After the North
African experience General F ol I ett Bradley, as well as Generals A mold, Kuter,
and others, believed the term air support was used too freely, implied a sub-
servient role, and should be changed. That specific term did not appear in FM
100-20, Arnold advised his fellow airmen. The 1943 field manual prescribed
"coequal operations," whereby "one force does not support the other in the
sense the word was used in the past." He recommended substituting the phrase
"in cooperation with" in place of "air support."'^^ 5^,;^ sentiments already had
produced a notable change in terminology when, in April 1944 AAF head-
quarters redesignated all air support commands as tactical air commands.
Indeed, all postwarXIX TAG publications on operations in Northwest Europe
would refer only as to its aerial action being "in cooperation with" Third
Army.'^^ This emphasis on coequality and air prerogatives characterized the
view in Washington that produced FM 100-20 at the close of the North
African Campaign in 1943, and it would reemerge near the war's end. Army
Air Forces leaders took their stand not on the practical lessons learned on the
field of combat, but on doctrine as it was expressed in FM 100-20.
Fortunately for Overlord, airmen in the field paid scant attention to pro-
nouncements that reflected doctrinal concerns in Washington, D.C. Indeed,
General Ouesada's IX TAG historian, writing in April 1944 on behalf of IX
and XIX TACs, seemed to express the sentiment in England. Delays in begin-
ning air support training did not occur as a result of "traditional hostility"
toward the ground support mission, he observed, but rather resulted from the
emphasis in early 1944 on escorting heavy bombers.'^'^ This escort experience
reinforced air force doctrine that properly stressed gaining air superiority as
the first priority. Following the successes of Big Week, and as planners adopt-
43
Air Power for Patton's Army
Lt. Gen. "Hap" Arnold,
commander of
U.S. Army Air Forces,
on his way to visit tlie
Ninth Air Force in the
jviiddle East following the
Casablanca Conference.
ed the Transportation Plan in April, Ninth Air Force fighter-bomber pilots
found themselves flying interdiction missions— an airman's second priority
according to doctrine— almost exclusively until the D-Day invasion.
Consequently, precious little time could be spared for close air support joint
training. Actual close air support operations would have to await ground com-
bat on the continent. In short, theater requirements dictated specific air opera-
tions in preparation for the assault on France, and those requirements con-
verged with the air leaders' doctrinal preferences. Together, they explain the
fai I ure to conduct extensive ai r-ground trai ni ng much more completely than do
simpleminded explanations that rely on a traditional hostility of airmen toward
the close air support mission.
If the Overlord buildup, training program, and operational commitments
precluded a sustained joint field training effort, at least the airmen could seize
the opportunity to spread their understanding of air-ground responsibilities.
They did so by providing lectures on joint operations, sending personnel on
field trips to thecombatzone in Italy, assigning air and ground liaison person-
nel to designated units, and when feasible, conducting small-scale air-ground
activities. Tactical airmen implemented all of these measures cooperatively
without reference to the formal doctrinal pronouncements of FM 100-20.''^
As for the forces of Weyland and Patton, the special challenge to coop-
erative efforts in England resulted from their relatively late arrival in the the-
ater and the lengthy period required for both organizations to become opera-
tional. Third Army officers spent most of their time supervising the buildup
44
Preparing for Joint Operations
and conducting essential orientation training for tlieir personnel. Weyland's
command, in the meantime, received its first fighter-bomber groups and began
meeting a full operational flying commitment. Under these circumstances, in
the time aval I able. Third Army and XIX TAC officers could hardly be expect-
ed to conduct effective joint field training.
Both XIX TAC and Third Army officers realized the importance of
acquiring airfields in France as rapidly as possible and they jointly identified
potential sites. The Army intelligence officers based their analyses on recon-
naissance photography obtained by the N inth Air Force at Third A rmy's request
beginning in March 1944. In another move designed to enhance cooperation
and to provide realistic training for ground elements, on April 11 XIX TAC
assumed responsibility from Ninth Air Force's Director of Reconnaissance for
meeting all Third Army requirements.''^ In early M ay. Third Army assigned its
first group of ground liaison officers to XIX TAC units. By the middle of the
month, the army operations officer could affirm that those plans requiring air
force support had been discussed with XIX TAC, with "many such confer-
ences. . . hel d before pi ans w ere consi dered f i nal R ef erri ng to j oi nt ai r-ground
efforts in England in early 1944, another air operations officer affirmed;
Little was known at that time about the actual close Air-
Ground Cooperation that we were later to experience. It was
up to the Air-Ground Cooperation Officers themselves to
work out ideas, try different methods, argue with one anoth-
er, and finally arrive at a uniform method of operation....
When the time came for the actual invasion, the Air-Ground
Officers who found themselves fifth wheels originally with
the ground forces were by then an integral part of the unit
upon which the Commanding General relied for maximum
help.48
This officer's enthusiasm over the progress achieved by the liaison officers on
D-Day was not entirely warranted, particularly since most had no joint field
practice or combat experience in North Africa on which to rely.
As for Weyland and Patton, they appear to have spent relatively little
time together before M ay 1944, the month before D-Day. Weyland, who knew
of Patton's unhappy experience with air support in North Africa and believed
that he "came up to England with a rather low opinion... of air power," acted
to develop good professional and personal rapport with the army commander.
He visited all of Third Army's corps and division headquarters, where he dis-
cussed the role of tactical air power and the lessons learned in the North
African and Italian campaigns. In the latter part of M ay, Weyland and his intel-
ligence and operations chiefs visited Third Army headquarters to review plans
for their movement to France and projected joint operations in Augusf^
45
Air Power for Patton's Army
Weyland made a special effort to acquaint Patton directly with tactical air
capabilities and the details of flight planning and scheduling. According to
Weyland, his air base orientation program impressed Patton; moreover, his
visit set the stage for effective XIX TAC -Third Army training in April and
M ay and made possible the true partnership that emerged in the summer.
Patton did not visit XIX TAC bases until late in M ay 1944, and his cor-
respondence refers only to a visit on May 27-28 to observe 354th Fighter
Group P-51S return from an escort mission and to hear P-47 pilots of the 362d
Fighter Group plan an interdiction mission against a bridge at Rouen. The air-
men impressed Patton with the thoroughness of their flight planning and take-
off precision. To oblige General Weyland, Patton spoke to officers and enlist-
ed men about the importance of teamwork, later observing how these activi-
ties "added greatly to the entente between the ground and air forces."^" It must
be added, however, that Patton already possessed a solid understanding and
realistic appreciation of air power. He learned to fly in the early 1920s at
M itchel Field on Long Island during interludes in one of the polo seasons and
he often flew a private plane during the interwar period. In the spring of 1941,
Patton wrote to an airman friend: "I am personally getting so air-minded that
I own an aeroplane." Late that summer he flew his own light airplane as the
senior umpire in the Louisiana maneuvers of IV Corps. Thereafter, he experi-
mented with the use of light planes in a variety of combat missions, which
doubtless contributed to the Army ground forces adopting and employing
them extensively in liaison and medical evacuation roles.^^
In a larger sense, Patton certainly understood that air support had
become critical to an Army that emphasized mobility over firepower. Indeed,
with the rapid expansion of the air arm beginning in 1941, War Department
planners made a conscious decision to provide the army primarily with light
and medium artillery and to rely on tactical aviation for additional heavy
artillery support. Significantly in North Africa, Patton went from the outburst
at Gafsa for the support he needed, to praises in Tunisia for the tactical air sup-
port he received, knowing full well the role of this support for mechanized
warfare.
Patton's after-action report on the Sicily campaign revealed a perceptive
student of tactical aviation's capabilities and limitations. During amphibious
operations, for example, he advocated limited use of an air umbrella— and
only if the "mastery of the air permits" airforcesto maintain it to thwart coun-
terattacks. His solution called for aircraft circling 10 minutes of every hour
over sensitive areas at the front, with a secondary bombing mission assigned
to them afterward. If these aircraft possessed radio communication with the air
support unit on the ground, "any counterattack can be met from the air."" This
novel approach to the controversial issue of a permanent, orbiting air umbrel-
la would be followed in principle in the Normandy invasion and in practice by
Weyland'sXIX TAC in its support of Patton's rapid drive across France.
46
Preparing for Joint Operations
Patton readily accepted the proposition tliat controlling enemy activities
in the air was "solely a function of the air," while interdiction or bombing
ahead of the ground forces required teamwork for success through target selec-
tion from the ground side and a bomb line chosen in conjunction with air offi-
cers, one that was easily identifiable from the air. Patton's assessment of close
air support deserves special mention for its realism. One should not "count on
a very great effect" from air support, he said, until air units had trained exten-
sively with ground forces. The airman's "primary mission was... attacking tar-
gets which are adversely affecting the progress of the ground troops [when]
called for by the ground." Patton did not advocate control of the air forces by
the ground commander, nor did he have any sympathy for ground officers and
their troops who expected too much from the air arm. It would be "illusory" to
expect fighter-bombers to destroy roads and railways, Patton conceded,
because direct hits seldom occurred and, in any case, such targets required
constant attention to keep them inoperable.^^
Relying on his experience in Operations Torch and Husky, to improve
air-ground support, Patton recommended extensive joint planning that would
include the assignment of well-trained air staff officers to all division and
higher G-3 operations sections, more extensive training for radio operators in
air-support parties, and joint exercise training among air-support parties and
pilots in units earmarked for combat. Thus, in England, Weyland could arrive
at a basic understanding with Patton about control over air operations with far
less difficulty than he at first might have supposed. "I had full control of the
air," Weyland, with some satisfaction declared later, "The decisions were mine
as to how I would allocate the air effort."^^
Considering the team, one might expect Patton to have ridden roughshod
over his subordinate and junior air commander whose mission, after all, was
to support his Third Army in the field. That did not occur, and Patton's
response to Weyland's orientation program helps explain much about his air-
mindedness. Patton expressed great interest in what he saw, complimented the
airmen accordingly, and spoke about the importance of air-ground teamwork
for future operations. If Patton possessed no direct command authority over
Weyland and the XIX TAC, he praised them and appealed to their sense of
mission. Patton nonetheless was a lieutenant general and Weyland a brigadier
general in the same service, and a deferential, if not command, relationship
always characterized their association. Beyond this, Patton realized that he had
in Weyland an air commander who believed that ground forces deserved all the
assistance his command could provide, an air commander who, if he had
resources available, was willing to overlook convention and doctrinal precepts
to provide that assistance whenever it was needed. Weyland always believed
that Patton remained faithful to their original agreement, that the air comman-
der would retain full control of the air forces, even if at times some Third
Army staff officers did not. Because of the basic understanding and rapport
47
Air Power for Patton's Army
between the two commanders, the contentious issue of command and control
of tactical aviation never became serious." General Patton took pleasure in
supporting the airmen and referred to the XIX TAC-Third Army association
as the most outstanding example of air-ground cooperation in his combat
experience. Others with more claim to objectivity would echo his sentiments.
Whatever the initial success and future promise of XIX TAC-Third
A rmy cooperati ve efforts i n the I ate spri ng of 1944, joint trai ni ng on the w hoi e
continued to worry Allied leaders. In early May, as D-Day approached.
General M ontgomery, who commanded the invasion land forces, expressed his
dismay in a letter to Patton— his Sicilian nemesis— and most likely in identi-
cal copies to other ground force commanders as well. He decried the apparent
separation between the armies and their supporting tactical air forces in
England. To link them into "one fighting machine," the two sides needed to go
beyond paying lip service to the principle of cooperation and establish the
actual procedures and methods necessary for success. Recalling the unity
achieved in North Africa, he counseled Patton to consider establishing air and
ground headquarters side-by-side, integrating air and ground personnel at all
organizational levels, and never move his army without consulting his air
headquarters. Indeed, M ontgomery observed, an army should take no action
before first asking: "How will this affect the air?" Every pilot supporting
ground forces likewise had to realize his only function was to aid the army in
winning the land battle. This meant "coming right down and participating in
the land battle by shooting up ground targets." Air commanders were current-
ly working hard on this aspect of the problem, M ontgomery averred, and he
urged Patton to give the matter his personal attention because much needed to
be done and little time remained available.^^
General Patton replied on M ay 7, the day after observing an "air circus"
staged by Ninth Air Force for Third Army, one in which he went aloft for a
flight in a M osquito fighter. Patton promised M ontgomery that he would do all
he could to implement the proposals for air-ground cooperation despite current
difficulties. His own "warm personal relationships with Air Force comman-
ders... and the mutual understanding which we have," Patton declared, "will, I
am quite sure, make our complete cooperation everything that you can
desire."^^ Although collocating the air and ground headquarters would have to
await movement to the continent, Patton promoted a Third Army-XIX TAG
program of joint training that intensified in M ay.
General Bradley, at that time commander of the First Army, also criti-
cized Allied air-ground training in the spring of 1944. He complained of the
indifference shown by Ninth Air Force commander General Brereton when
requested to participate in air-ground field exercises and training. "Asa result
of our inability to get together with air in England," Bradley said later, "we
went into France almost totally untrained in air-ground cooperation." At the
same time, however, he conceded that enemy rocket and buzz bomb launching
48
Preparing for Joint Operations
sites and other high-priority targets demanded a heavy flying commitment
from Brereton's forces until M ay. Yet, when in the final few weeks before D-
Day, Brereton notified Bradley that his air forces had now been released for
training with the army, Bradley told him it was too late.™
Important Allied operational flying commitments, which continued until
the time of the actual invasion, must be judged the most crucial roadblocks to
effective air-ground training in England prior to D-Day. These commitments
conformed to tactical air power mission priorities— air superiority first, then
i sol ati on of the batti ef i el d . B y achi evi ng them i n the spri ng of 1944, the ai r arm
insured that the invasion would succeed and that the close air support mission
could become a major focus of tactical air operations on the continent. If in
1944 the best efforts of air and ground leaders to pursue joint training in
England fell well short of the mark, it occurred for reasons other than doctri-
nal disputes or personal disagreements. Between Third Army and XIX TAC,
however, considerable joint planning had taken place, and a wide variety of
joint training contributed to better understanding on both sides.
Normandy: On the Job Training
Final plans for the great cross-channel assault in the late spring of 1944
called for the British Second Army and the U.S. First Army to land 176,000
troops on the first day at five designated beaches on the Normandy coast
between the Seine River and the Cherbourg peninsula (Map 3).^^ British and
Canadian forces assaulting Sword, J uno, and Gold beaches on the eastern edge
of the channel landing zone in the Bayeux-Caen area were to move inland and
converge on Caen, whose capture then would open the most direct path to
Paris. American forces assaulting Omaha and Utah beaches on the western
edge of the channel landing zone were to link up with their British and
Canadian allies along the coast and then move west and north to capture the
Cherbourg peninsula with its important port city. The British 6th Airborne
Division would drop to earth northeast of Caen to protect the British flank,
while the American 82d and 101st Airborne Divisions would perform a simi-
lar role on First Army's flank near Ste-M ere-Eglise.
In the channel. Allied naval forces were to provide transports for troops
and supplies as well as fire-support ashore to neutralize enemy positions.
Overhead, a continuous, orbiting Allied air umbrella would counter Luftwaffe
attacks, while additional fighters would fly close air support missions to help
the progress of the ground forces ashore. The Allies hoped the major air inter-
diction operation, intervention by the French Resistance underground army of
200,000, and fear of the real invasion at Calais would prevent the Germans
from mounting an overwhelming counterattack against the first troops ashore
in Normandy.
49
SOURCE: VincentJ . Esposito, ed., West Point Atlas of American Wars, V. 2, Map 48, (New York: Praeger, 1960)
Preparing for Joint Operations
The Allies also counted on some uncertainty and confusion among
German commanders to aid in Overlord's success. Field Marshal Gerd von
Rundstedt, Wehrmacht commander in chief in the west, favored a mobile
reserve to thwart an Allied amphibious attack, unlike his nominal subordinate.
Army Group B commander Field M arshal Erwin Rommel. Specifically charged
with defending the channel coast with the Seventh Army in Normandy and
Brittany, and with Fifteenth Army in the Pas de Calais region, Rommel advo-
cated an extensive array of relatively simple coastal defenses as the best
response. Rommel's experience in North Africa convinced him that Allied air
superiority would render a mobile reserve ineffective.
Both Wehrmacht commanders, however, faced additional constraints
from the Reich'sChancellor Adolf Hitler and his staff in Berlin, whose claims
on military prerogatives embraced decisions on troop disposition and move-
ment in the field— military prerogatives normally reserved to field comman-
ders. In this regard. Allied leaders hoped their elaborate deception plan would
convince Hitler to keep the stronger Fifteenth Army positioned near Calais
well after D-D ay to face the expected assault from Army Group Patton. In
early June, the German Fifteenth Army contained 19 divisions, with five
Panzer divisions back-stopping it. The German Seventh Army, on the other
hand, comprised 13 divisions, but only six were stationed in Normandy, and
only one Panzer division back-stopped them. Two of its Panzer divisions were
still in southern France. As for the Luftwaffe, Allied intelligence officers
believed that it could not play a decisive role during the invasion because the
Allied air assault in late winter and early spring had left half of the estimated
400 Luftwaffe fighters in France nonoperational. Nevertheless, despite having
massed the largest amphibious force in history against an enemy severely
weakened after four years of warfare, an Allied success in securing a lodge-
ment in Normandy remained far from assured.
No one realized the risks involved in Overlord more keenly than did
Supreme Commander General Eisenhower, who elected to launch the invasion
onj une6, one day later than planned and in spite of bad weather. D-Day events
on Omaha beach, in particular, almost convinced Eisenhower and Bradley to
call off the assault. High seas and poor visibility scattered American troops and
they unexpectedly faced murderous fire from the crack German 352d Infantry
Division, which, unbeknownst to Allied intelligence, had been in position for
the previous three months. Despite suffering more than 2,000 casualties at
Omaha, the Americans by nightfall had 34,000 troops ashore on a narrow strip
of land less than two miles deep. German resistance at the three British beach-
es also proved tenacious, while American airborne units that landed behind
Utah beach lost 2,500. Only at Utah did the Allies get ashore without difficul-
ty. Tenacity and good leadership helped the Allies gain toeholds on all five
beaches by the end of D-Day. During succeeding days, the Allies would con-
tinue to bring troops and supplies ashore and extend the lodgement area while
51
Air Power for Patton's Army
the German High Command, still believing Calais to be the main landing site,
held the Fifteenth Army in place for an invasion that never came.
The period in Normandy from D-D ay, June 6, to August 1, 1944, served
the Ninth Air Force in many ways as a practical laboratory in which airmen
and ground force officers experimented with joint air-ground methods and
techniques. In effect, they acquired on-the-job training. Initially, the Allies
planned to control all tactical air support for the invasion from the Uxbridge
headquarters in England. Accordingly, Leigh-M al lory's A EAF was authorized
to di rect the ai r effort by coordi nati ng the responsi bi I i ti es of the two tacti cal ai r
forces, the N inth and the Second TA Fs. As the invasion began, N inth A ir Force
officers planned their missions side-by-side with their 21st Army Group coun-
terparts in the Uxbridge Combined Control Center.
In Operation Neptune, codenamed for the initial assault and lodgement
on the Normandy coast, naval flagships and direction tenders provided an
important intermediate communications link. Air representatives on board the
USS Ancon and USS Bayfield, stationed off Omaha and Utah beaches, respec-
tively, received requests for air support from aircontrol parties on shore at each
division and corps headquarters, and they passed them on to Uxbridge for
action. Thereafter, although the combined control center provided flying con-
trol of strike aircraft by directing them to the general area, aircrews located and
attacked thei r targets. T he ai r pi an cal I ed f or tacti cal ai r forces to f I y four pri -
mary missions in support of the invasion force: five groups would provide
beach cover; two groups, along with four from VIII Fighter Command, would
fly convoy cover; fivegroups comprised a striking force against special coastal
Dicing sliots of the formidable defenses at Normandy Beacliliead,
taken by tlie lOtli Plioto Reconnaissance Group one month before D-Day,
provided the information needed to prepare the assault.
52
Preparing for Joint Operations
batteries and bridges; and six more groups remained on call, available to attack
targets on the scene in cooperation with ground forces.
The highly centralized Uxbridge control system proved unworkable from
the start. For one thing, the USS Bayfield experienced communications diffi-
culties and depended on the USS Ancon to relay messages. M ore serious, air
support party officers on the ground could not transmit radio messages over the
long distance directly to Uxbridge. Unable immediately to land the bulky
SCR-399 high-frequency radio equipment, which possessed a range of 100
miles, planners had to substitute the 25-mile range SCR-284, a standard
infantry radio, in its place. This meant unacceptable delays for immediate mis-
sion requests, which were supposed to be referred directly, and not to be
relayed, from the English Channel to the combined control center for approval.
That led Uxbridge officials to authorize the senior air representative aboard the
USS Ancon, Col. Larry N . Tindal, IX TAC's operations officer, to assume addi-
tional responsibilities.
Initially, Tindal and his First Air CombatControl Squadron handled fly-
ing control and detection of enemy aircraft. After D-D ay he passed targets
from liaison officers in the forward areas and reconnaissance pilots directly to
fighter-bombers that were available for his use. He also received word of mis-
sion results and passed it on to the appropriate ground units. In effect, the
senior air representative performed the function of controller in addition to
serving as the communications link for immediate, or call, missions. As air and
The D-Day assault.
Air Power for Patton's Army
ground leaders who served in North Africa already knew, responsive and
effective air-ground operations demanded greater decentralization. The cam-
paign ahead would demonstrate that centralized air command seldom func-
tioned effectively, especially in emergency situations. In France, the reality of
combat rather than doctrinal abstractions of FM 100-20 (1943) decided the
conduct of air-ground operations.^''
Although airmen flew their missions as prescribed by the tactical air plan,
they found relatively little action on D-Day and the week after the landing.
General Weyland's XIX TAG pilots participated in the first two assignments,
beach and convoy cover, by escorting troop carriers, flying area patrol missions,
and providing top cover over the assault area. On D-Day they sighted only three
enemy FW 190s and easily drove them off. The Luftwaffe's failure to contest
the landing demonstrated for all just how overwhelming Allied air superiority
had become. General Quesada's IX TAG groups, meanwhile, handled interdic-
tion and close air support responsibilities. Army-air cooperation, the airmen's
fourth D-Day mission assignment, proved especially interesting. The Army
submitted only 13 requests for air support on D-Day, and the controllers refused
five. The missions fell almost evenly between armed reconnaissance against
transportation targets and dive-bombing of coastal batteries and gun positions
farther in shore. Significantly, none of these requests originated from the air
support liaison officers assigned to the forward units. Left mostly to their own
devices, aircrews quickly realized the difficulty of locating and attacking targets
in Normandy where one hedge-row so often looked like another.
The USS A neon remained the designated control facility until June 10
when control passed to IX TAG'S 70th Fighter Wing headquarters, which had
arrived the day before at Gricqueville (site A-2), three miles inland from
Omaha beach. On June 9, IX TAG personnel also arrived to establish their
advance headquarters next to First A rmy headquarters at A u Gay. H enceforth,
IX TAG would control all flying in support of First Army in Normandy, even
though Weyland's XIX TAG pilots would remain assigned to his command. By
June 13 this advance command post began assuming operational control
through the 70th Fighter Wing and its fighter control center, although pre-
planned missions continued to be handled by Uxbridge.
The Allies took a major step during the nightof J une 17-18, 1944, when
they authorized IX TAG to operate the air support communications and control
net at A u Gay and First Army to establish the bomb line. This consisted of an
i magi nary I i ne j ust i n front of the ground forces. A 1 1 f ly i ng attacks between the
ground forces and the bomb line became close air support and required army
coordination and close flying control. Now IX TAG and First Army planned
and controlled air support missions on the continent, while Uxbridge allocated
the tacti cal ai r effort and handl ed onl y those mi ssi ons the conti nent-based j oi nt
headquarters deemed beyond their capability. M eanwhile, afew days earlier on
June 10, 1944, General Quesada's IX TAG also assumed operational control of
54
Preparing for Joint Operations
all Ninth Air Force units operating from bases in Normandy. General Weyland,
for his part, remained in England to command IX Fighter Command, which
retained operational control of IX and XIX TAC units in the United Kingdom
until they established airstrips in France. This arrangement continued until the
end of J uly. In keeping with preinvasion aerial plans, Normandy would be a IX
TAC show, with Weyland'sXIX TAC in a supporting role.^^
This new control system received a major baptism of fire at Cherbourg,
the port the Allies eagerly sought as a supply depot. On J une 21, VIII Corps
requested massive air supportfor its final assault on the fortress city. With less
than 48 hours to prepare closely coordinated attacks. Generals Brereton and
Quesada decided to send all available Ninth Air Force bombers and fighter-
bombers against German strong points and fortifications in a large area south
and southwest of Cherbourg on the afternoon of June 22. First Army and IX
TAC officers selected the targets and planned the missions. Preceded by strikes
from ten squadrons of British Second TAF aircraft. Ninth Air Force sent one
group of fighter-bombers over the target area every five mi nutes for an hour to
bomb and strafe targets that the army identified by colored smoke. Tactics
included dive-, skip-, and glide-bombing from heights as low as 200 feet.
M edium and light bombers followed for a second hour against pinpoint tar-
gets. Despite the effort on that day, VIII Corps made little progress and failed
to capture the fortress until June 26. Additional P-47 missions on a much
smaller scale continued against Cherbourg until it capitulated.^^
Armorers attach a 500-lb. bomb to a Thunderbolt.
55
Air Power for Patton's Army
The airmen expressed more displeasure witli tliese results tlian the
ground leaders did. Although Ninth Air Force officials agreed that the J une 22
attacks helped hasten the capture of the city by 48 hours, their after-action
report described planning deficiencies, poor use of the tactical force, and an
inordinately high cost in terms of pilots lost and equipment and ordnance
expended. Airmen at Uxbridge had prepared detailed plans without specific
target information or army representation, which meant that the large area
sel ected for attack di d not permi t suff i ci ent concentrati on of forces agai nst spe-
cific targets. Furthermore, the aerial attack occurred without on-the-scene
ground-to-ai r control , which resul ted i n targets bei ng m i ssed or otherw i se i nef-
fectively attacked. Moreover, fighter-bombers attacked fixed fortifications,
which the report's authors considered poor targets for tactical aircraft. They
questioned this use of air power as flying artillery.
When measured against the results, they declared that the cost of the
Cherbourg aerial operation— 25 aircraft lost and an additional 46 severely
damaged— seemed excessive. If the air attacks shattered enemy morale, at
least for a short period. Allied ground forces failed to attack swiftly enough to
take advantage of that demoralization. Therefore, the report concluded,
thought should be given to moving forward ground elements within 500 yards
of the bomb line, regardless of the risk. Yet, the challenge of coordinating swift
Allied ground attacks after airmen had softened up enemy positions would
continue to bedevil planners throughout the campaign."
The Cherbourg operation made absolutely clear that major air-ground
operations required extensive, coordinated joint planning and execution under
close control of air liaison officers assigned with ground forces. It left open the
question whether the use of light tactical fighter-bombers employed against
fortified positions could be justified in terms of damaging enemy morale, if
they proved unable to do serious damage to the actual fortifications. In any
event, as a consequence of Cherbourg, the tactical air command-army joint
operations team gained immediate prominence as the central agency for plan-
ning and conducting air-ground operations in Normandy.
Air-Ground Support System Refined
Just a few short weeks after the Cherbourg operation, IX TAC and First
Army established an effective air-ground mission request system based on FM
31-35 (1942) and the North African experience. It would serve as the model
for Third Army and XIX TAC, and for other future tactical air-ground support
operations in Europe. (Chart 4 depicts the close air support request system as
it functioned in mid-July 1944.) The key feature involved close coordination
between air and ground representatives at every level. This was achieved by
collocating army and tactical air command headquarters in the combat opera-
56
Air Support Mission Request System
July 1944
Aircraft
Executes
Mission
Time on Target n I mqc \ Control
(TOT) or Reason s V >tStatlon
TAG
Intelligence
Tactical
Air Command
Combat Opns
Army
G-3 Air
Results
I
Wing
Comt}at
OPS
Order
I Flash Report of
Ground Inform-
atlonMlsslon
' Results over
' airdrome Party
I Net to G3 Air
I Telephone or
I Teletype
I
Fighter
Bomber
Group
Results
Briefing and
Interrogating
Pilots at
Squadron
SOURCE: RPT, COL E. L. JOHNSON, G-3 (Am), FIRST ARMY TO AGF BOARD, JUL 16. 1944
Chart 4
Air Support Mission Request System, J uly 1944
57
Air Power for Patton's Army
tions center, the nerve center directed by the tactical air command's combat
operations officer. He worl<ed side by side in a large tent with his army coun-
terpart, the ground forces air intelligence officer, and his staff. Likewise, air
intelligence personnel worked together to coordinate visual and photographic
reconnaissance and artillery adjustment requests. Coordination continued
throughout the system with air representatives, termed air support party offi-
cers, assigned to work with army air intelligence officials at all division and
corps headquarters. Similarly, the army assigned ground liaison officers at
wings, groups, and reconnaissance squadrons to work with their air force intel-
ligence officer counterparts.^^
This air-ground system is best understood by following the course of
requests for preplanned and immediate air support missions. As a rule, the
army initiated preplanned requests at divisional level after discussion between
the army operations officer and the air liaison officer; these two individuals
determined the suitability of a given target for air action. The division request
then went over army phone lines to corps headquarters, which acted as a mon-
itoring or filtering agency responsible for analyzing specific requests for their
impact on the overall corps situation. From the corps, the approved request
travelled by means of an air force teleprinter or SCR-399 radio to the mobile
communications van at the J oint Operations Center. A runner took the message
to the army air operations officer assigned at the unit's combat operations cen-
ter. The army representative went to the desk of the air combat operations offi-
cer and the two of them decided if the target could be attacked. If approved,
they added it to the target list, which was presented at the regular evening joint
air-ground briefing for operations the next day.
M eanwhile, the air force combat operations officer informed the request-
ing army unit through the air liaison officer radio net of the approved target
and of the scheduled time of friendly aircraft over the target. If the target was
not approved, the operations officer provided an explanation for its omission.
After the evening briefing, the air combat operations officer prepared the oper-
ations order and sent it to a designated fighter-bomber group. There, the group
operations officer normally selected the squadron to fly the mission and the
type of ordnance to be used. Before the flight, the army liaison officer at that
airfield briefed the pilots on the enemy situation, the location of the bomb line,
and any features of interest to the air and ground forces.
A squadron of 12 fighter-bombers performed the basic close air support
mission in Europe. Four flew top cover for the remaining two flights, each
composed of four aircraft, which were assigned to dive-bomb the target.
Before takeoff, the latter aircraft were bombed-up with two 500-lb. bombs
each. A bout five minutes before the time-over-target, the flight leader checked
in with the air support party officer at army corps or division headquarters on
his SCR-522 VHF radio for any last-minute information on the target. The
army marked these targets within the bomb line with colored smoke. After
58
Preparing for Joint Operations
much experimentation, tlie air-ground teams eventually relied on red smoke as
the best for visual identification. After their bombing runs, the pilots passed
their visual reports to the air liaison officer at division or corps level; then all
12 aircraft either strafed in the target area or received permission to fly armed
reconnaissance in enemy territory beyond the bomb line. After returning to
base, both the ai r i ntel I i gence off i cer and the army I i ai son off i cer debri ef ed the
pilots. The army liaison officer then sent a flash report by phone or radio to the
army air section at the combined operations center. The air intelligence
debriefing report went through air force channels to the wing and the Combat
Operations Center, where it arrived approximately 30-60 minutes after the
ground officer's flash message. The army air operations officer subsequently
notified ground units of mission results.
Immediate request, or call, missions, were handled in the same manner
but far more rapidly. Reconnaissance and fighter crews often spotted lucrative
targets that required immediate attack. They passed the information to the
operations center at division or corps level through either air liaison officer or
wing command post channels, where army and air operations officers evaluat-
ed it. The tactical air command operations officer then either assigned desig-
nated alert aircraft to make the attack or diverted aircraft from a previous com-
mitment to the newly chosen target. The latter often were airborne at the time.
General Quesada estimated that immediate requests could be met by his air-
craft within 60-80 minutes.
The request system and the entire air-ground joint planning effort turned
on a joint meeting held each evening between key air and ground officers. In
Normandy, Quesada normally attended these meetings; Bradley did so occa-
sionally. The agenda and meeting format established by IX TAC and the First
Army in July 1944 became the standard for joint American air-ground opera-
tions planning in the months that followed.™ First, the weather officer ana-
lyzed weather forthe next24 hours both in England and in the prospective tar-
get areas in France. The air intelligence officer next assessed the past day's
missions flown by IX TAC in support of army and Ninth Air Force requests.
Then an army ground forces intelligence officer presented the previous day's
enemy ground activities, including possible upcoming enemy action. The air
intelligence officer returned to discuss targets based on intelligence obtained
that day from visual and photographic reconnaissance reports, enemy prison-
er interrogations, and a number of other sources. Based on this information, he
suggested preplanned targets for the next day from the tactical air command
viewpoint.
The army air operations officer then presented the Army's plan for
ground operations the following day and submitted the target request list he
had compiled from army corps requests. Normally, he also suggested retaining
a small force of aircraft in reserve to meet immediate requests from corps and
divisions. At this point, the air operations officer allotted tactical air command
59
Air Power for Patton's Army
forces to the various missions identified in the meeting, on the basis of liiglier
lieadquarters requests, tlie ground plan, tlie weatlier, enemy movements, and
tlie availability of his air forces. After allotting these forces, the air operations
section made flying group assignments for the various missions and this infor-
mation was incorporated in the operations order sent to these units later that
evening. The fighter control center located with 70th Fighter Wing headquar-
ters at Criqueville performed flying control for all U .5. tactical aircraft.
Requests for reconnaissance missions functioned somewhat different-
ly. ''^ The divisions and corps submitted visual reconnaissance requirements to
the army intelligence officer on duty at the Ninth Air Force combined opera-
tions center. To satisfy corps requirements, F-6 (P-51) reconnaissance aircraft
flew the entire army front to a depth of 10-12 miles, four times daily. They
also conducted regular visual reconnaissance in enemy territory to a depth of
200 miles. The air-ground team divided the area into three sectors to be flown
four times a day. Pilots reported potential targets in the clear to the fighter con-
trol center by radio. These targets often became immediate requests. Army
liaison officers with the air units also briefed and debriefed the reconnaissance
pilots and passed the information on to the corps.
The camera-equipped F-5 (P-38) aircraft of the 67th Tactical Recon-
naissance Group provided a variety of low-level photographic coverage of the
target areas. In July 1944 they flew daily front line coverage to a depth of 10
miles to construct mosaics requested by the corps. They also performed auto-
matic daily photoreconnaissance missions, which included covering specified
airfields, marshaling yards, bridges, and targets that had been attacked previ-
ously. In addition to these and other pinpoint target requests, the F-6 aircraft
furnished superb oblique photography requested by the corps headquarters for
artillery adjustment missions. Army officers seldom complained about the
quality of the aerial photography, but in the first few weeks they frequently
found the delay in receiving it to be unacceptable.
The air-ground mission request system that operated in July 1944 might
at first appear overly bureaucratic and involved. Initially, inexperience cer-
tainly produced its share of errors and delay. Nevertheless, observers in mid-
July praised the system's effectiveness and observed that procedures adopted
and equipment available had produced a level of competence and effectiveness
that augured well for the campaign challenges ahead. A bo veal I, the air-ground
request system depended on the quality of the airmen and ground force per-
sonnel involved. To be sure, officers assigned to air-ground duty had to be
skilled in the practices of their own service and familiar with air-ground pro-
cedures and methods. Beyond this, however, the influence exerted by an air-
man or a ground force officer involved in air-ground operations would disap-
pear if he failed to understand or appreciate the other side's needs and con-
cerns. Critical missions in support of ground forces, especially those missions
that airmen judged the most dangerous, expensive, and least effective for tac-
60
Preparing for Joint Operations
tical air forces to perform, depended on "teamwork, mutual understanding, and
cooperation" among all of the affected air and ground officers."
In the initial weeks of combat in Normandy, the leaders clearly did not
always have the right people in the right positions. In one of the most percep-
tive reports on air-ground conditions in Normandy at this time. War Depart-
ment observer Col. Edwin L. Johnson noted that First Army corps comman-
ders relieved three of their four operations officers assigned to air-ground duty
within two weeks of D-Day. Furthermore, the army replaced three of its 22
ground liaison officers assigned to duty with the air units. Although Johnson
tactfully avoided discussing the reasons for the reassignments, evidence sug-
gests that substandard abi I ities or poor attitudes accounted for the action. W hy
were these officers not identified and eliminated earlier? Perhaps only actual
combat offered the opportunities for assessing personal abilities and for devel-
An F-5 with D-Day invasion marlcings.
61
Air Power for Patton's Army
oping effective procedures and creating tlie teamworl< required to ensure suc-
cessful joint operations."
On tlie air side, available records do not show a similar turnover in air
liaison officers assigned to army units in thefirstfew weeks. Regardless, many
had problems, if of a different sort. N umerous references allude to army com-
manders who seemed uninterested in and unwilling to accept advice from
assigned airmen. A sizeable portion of this initial air liaison force consisted of
nonflying observers and communications officers. However well qualified
they might have been, they did not possess the credibility of rated pilots. By
early August 1944, pilots filled most of the liaison officer billets, a solution
made easier by a growing surplus of aircrew officers.^^
Beyond the need for participants who understood the requirements of
their air or ground counterparts, a number of other problems affected air-ground
operations. The continental airfield construction program, for example, failed to
meet established schedules. The IX Engineer Command's plan depended from
the start on the progress of the A Hied offensive, and bad weather and tenacious
German resistance in the Normandy hedge-rows slowed the Allied advance.
M oreover, supply channels operating from ship to shore and thence to proposed
ALGs developed bottlenecks that seemed to defy all solutions. After the land-
ing, planners also decided, correctly, thatthe overwhelming Allied air superior-
ity called for more bases for fighter-bombers and fewer for fighters. That meant
additional material had to be obtained to construct the longer runways for the
heavier fighter-bombers (5,000 feet vs. 3,600 feet). The IX Engineer Command
scheduled an ALG for each fighter-bomber group, with five to be completed by
J une 14, eight by the twenty-fourth, and twenty by mid-J uly. Although the engi-
neers did not meet their schedule for J une, by mid-J uly, only 45 days after the
landing, they had 16 airfields completed in France. As of August 1, only two
groups, including the XIX TAC's 36th Fighter-Bomber Group, continued to fly
from British bases because French airstrips remained unfinished."
For the air-ground program, these delays meant that many fighter-
bomber groups— with their army liaison officers— operated from England
well into July, where bad weather and overloaded communications channels
often made the transmission of information to the ground force headquarters
on the continent impossible. On the other hand, the engineers have been just-
ly praised for their yeoman efforts under extremely challenging circumstances
and changing requirements largely beyond their control. As an interim solu-
tion, the planners adopted the rou lament system, whereby designated clutches
of airfields received top priority for completion and servicing by mobile air-
drome squadrons. In effect, these advance airfields became staging bases for
several units pending completion of other, permanent airstrips. Asa result of
thisnovel policy, theXIX TAC wasableto provide crucial air support to Third
Army in its drive across France, even though the air bases remained as much
as 300-400 miles behind the front lines.
62
Preparing for Joint Operations
The flight leader of the 406th Fighter Group demonstrates both
the effectiveness and risk of low-level attack.
Along with other air-ground operating problems that needed an immedi-
ate solution, airmen and their civilian research specialists experimented with a
variety of equipment that became important in future operations. Among the
more prominent, the ground-based SCR-584 radar was employed to control
aircraft on blind bombing missions. Developed and used as a gun-laying radar,
firstatAnzio, Italy, in early 1944, its accuracy and potential for other functions
led General Quesada to introduce it to guide aircraft that summer. Although
achieving only limited success initially, it proved more effective after consid-
erable experimentation in late fall under conditions of static warfare and bad
weather.''^ In another first, P-47s dropped napalm bombs in the European the-
ater on July 17 against camouflaged buildings near Coutances, France. The
pilots reported a lot of smoke and the entire area ablaze. Napalm received its
major test in the campaign to reduce the Brittany forts, after which it became
a mainstay in the fighter-bomber arsenal employed against pillboxes, bunkers,
and other enclosed fortifications." In a final example of the use of new
weapons, in mid-J uly the 406th FighterGroup's 513th Squadron installed five-
inch high-velocity air-to-ground rockets. Developed by a research team at
Caltech, an earlier model had been tested by IX TAG on ranges in England
during the preinvasion period with little success. On the seventeenth, the
63
Air Power for Patton's Army
squadron of 12 P-47s, mounting 48 rockets, tested the new weapon on the
Nevers marshaling yard and achieved outstanding results against locomotives
and rolling stock. Although the 406th's rocket squadron officially remained
unpublicized well into August, German forces in Normandy came to fear its
prowess. The 513th pilots, eventually known as XIX TAC's Tiger Tamers,
gained a well-deserved reputation for destroying enemy armor with these
rockets. Later in the campaign. Ninth Air Force authorized General Weyland
to convert the remaining two squadrons in the 406th Group for rocket-firing
ground support operations.™
Hedge-Row Fighting to a Breakout
During the so-called Battle of the H edge-Rows in J une 1944, Weyland's
XIX TAG groups flew primarily interdiction missions as Allied air leaders
mounted an extensive campaign to prevent major German reinforcements
from reaching the French coast. These interdiction targets included the Seine
and Loire rivers, rail and road bridges, marshaling yards, and supply dumps.
Cherbourg proved to be the first major close air support operation for both IX
and XIX TAG units. Thereafter, England-based units, directed by Weyland at
IX Fighter Command's Uxbridge headquarters, focused on interdiction targets
while, understandably, Quesada's IX TAC headquarters in Normandy direct-
ed the ground-support operation with fighter-bombers based mostly on the
continent. Aircraft from both locations, however, continued to conduct the
escort and beach patrol missions that pilots normally found the least chal-
lenging.™
By mid-July 1944, XIX TAC fighter-bombers had gained considerable
experience flying from England and Normandy airfields to attack interdiction
and close control targets. The more experienced 100th Fighter Wing groups
arrived first on the continent, led by the 354th Pioneer M ustang Group, which
was one of two tactical flying units that first deployed from England. By the
middle of July, all four groups of the 100th Fighter Wing flew from Normandy
landing strips under IX TAC operational control.^"
The distinction between tactical interdiction and close air support, or
cooperation, missions in Normandy was not always clear. The Ninth Air Force
historian for example, identified attacks on bridges south of enemy positions
at St. Lo on J uly 16 and 17, 1944, as air-ground cooperation rather than inter-
diction missions.^^ This example illustrates the difficulty of accurately assess-
ing Phase II (interdiction) and Phase III (close air support) operations in
Normandy and throughout the European Campaign. The AAF Evaluation
Board made this point clear at the outset of its important postwar assessment
of Phase III operations, stating categorically that "it is impracticable to distin-
guish in all instances between Second and Third Phase operations. "^^
64
Preparing for Joint Operations
Traditionally, evaluators have relied on the statistical records to measure
the success or failure of tactical air power. Indeed, air operations in all theaters
in World War II reveal a preoccupation among airmen with verifying and quan-
tifying. Perhaps that reflected the larger issue of promoting the A A F's view of
itself as a war-winning element with a grandiose postwar future. This is not to
say that statistics are unimportant. Statistics, an Eighth Air Force report on tac-
tical air operations in North Africa declared, provide a method for assessing
mission accomplishment and serve to promote competition, better perfor-
mance, and a sense of pride among fighter-bomber pilots. Over-reliance on
statistical evidence is, nonetheless, unwise. Tactical airmen in Europe found it
impossible to compile accurate statistics regardless of their attempts at objec-
tivity. "The results of individual interdiction missions are hard to assess," the
Ninth Air Force historian observed, "and the assessment of the work done by
the different types of planes employed is almost equally difficult."^'^ Ninth Air
Force mission records show that pilots often reported "unknown" damage to
their targets or "no results observed." At the other extreme, pilots often made
excessively favorable claims for their bombing prowess. M ore than likely, the
truth lay in between. A Ninth Air Force report of aerial operations in France
onj uly 29, 1944, reported fighter-bomber claims for 1,452 motor vehicles, 197
tanks, and 98 horse-drawn carts and wagons destroyed on traffic-congested
roads. At the same time, however, the report conceded that "ground investiga-
tion of a portion of the roads subjected to attack indicated that, although
inevitably exaggerated, such claims were notfantastic."^^
Independent verification by ground forces or airborne reconnaissance
seldom proved feasible, nor was it capable of providing absolute answers.
Given the speed of the aircraft, the smoke often encountered in the target area,
the flak menace, and visibility limitations under dive-bombing conditions, air-
crew reporting of results could not be entirely accurate. Moreover, it often
proved difficult to distinguish between damage caused by army artillery fire
and fighter-bomber attacks. Weyland and other air force commanders recog-
nized this dilemma early and made every effort to encourage aircrew accura-
cy and to verify pilot reports by means of reconnaissance photography and
prisoner of war (POW) interrogations. Nevertheless, the problem of accurate
reportage remained unresolved throughout the campaign in Northwest
Europe.^^
Even in instances when statistical evidence proved accurate and
unequivocal, it remains questionable whether statistics represent an absolute
means of determining tactical air power effectiveness. The effect of tactical air
operations on the morale of both enemy and friendly troops was and is undis-
puted. German POW s repeatedly referred to the shattering effects that close air
support had on morale, while Allied ground forces acknowledged that over-
head friendly fighter-bombers were a real confidence builder. After the
Cherbourg assault, for example. Ninth Air Force analysts concluded from
65
Air Power for Patton's Army
enemy prisoner reports that "in any operation of this nature the morale effect
is greater than the actual damage."^^ As the commander of the XIX TAC
asserted following an air support mission in J uly, "the presence of our aircraft
over the front line troops has had an immeasurable effect upon their morale.
When our aircraft are over the front line the use of close in artillery and mor-
tars by the enemy stops." Overemphasis on statistics could very well obscure
the real significance of the morale factor.
If tactical air power's effects could not be measured precisely, enemy
and allied ground force leaders and their troops understood its impact well.
They might sometimes refer to specific examples of physical destruction
caused by tactical air, but they often described its psychological effects in
demoralizing and disorganizing the enemy. Weyland recognized the psycho-
logical importance of air power and did not oppose sending fighter-bombers
over a hesitant division to help it jump off. He also allowed his aircraft to
patrol over ground forces to raise morale and keep the enemy's head down.
Admittedly, overwhelming Allied air superiority allowed Weyland and his fel-
low airmen the luxury of flying morale missions without jeopardizing other
responsibilities. Such missions always were frowned upon by more doctrinal re
AAF officers who believed airpower should never perform functions best left
to ground-force artillery units. Weyland, like Quesada and a host of other air-
men in the tactical air commands, was a pragmatist on issues such as this and
committed his forces in every way he believed they might support or improve
Third Army's effectiveness in combat.
Leaders of XIX TAC spent much of July in Normandy on joint planning
projects with Third Army personnel. The XIX TAC advance headquarters
arrived on the continent on J uly 2 at Criqueville, which earlier was the home
base for the 70th Fighter Wing (IX TAC's fighter control center) and the 354th
Fighter Group. Three days later the forward echelon of Third Army headquar-
ters arrived on U tah beach, and on J uly 6 its advance headquarters became oper-
ational under canvas approximately 15 miles south of Cherbourg, at Nehou.
That very day, XIX TAC advance headquarters moved to join theThird Army
headquarters' forward echelon at Nehou. Detailed planning for air-ground
cooperation began immediately and continued during the complicated and
lengthy three- week movement of army and air force operational and support
units and personnel to the continent. M uch of this planning involved establish-
ing air-ground procedures, analyzing terrain for possible routes of advance, and
allocating air support from fighter-bombers and reconnaissance aircraft.^^
Third Army air intelligence personnel referred to this period in
Normandy as a "command post exercise in realities."™ Prior to August 1944,
Third Army, like its XIX TAC counterpart, played a secondary role to the
forces at the front. Yet, in addition to planning the forthcoming campaign with
the XIX TAC airmen. Third Army sent two officers with knowledge of the air
arm over to the IX TAC- First Army joint headquarters to gain experience
66
Preparing for Joint Operations
under combat conditions. Also, a number of ground liaison officers already
assigned to Third Army and Ninth Army worked with their First Army coun-
terparts during June and J uly for the same reasons. The climax of joint train-
ing for XIX TAC and Third Army came on J uly 22, when Patton's command
received a 12th Army Group directive for the Third Army's expected mission
when it became operational. In response. Third Army and XIX TAC planners
prepared an employment plan that became a two-day study for all concerned.
Meanwhile, much depended on the results of Operation Cobra which was
scheduled to begin on July 24.
In contrast to the Cherbourg experience. Cobra resulted from meticulous
joint planning and extensive efforts at coordination between Allied air and
ground forces. Cobra called for a concentrated air assault by both strategic
and tactical air forces on German defensive positions concentrated in a 3,000
by 8,000-yard area between St. Lo and Periers at the foot of the Cotentin
peninsula. The assembled aerial assault force consisted of 1,500 heavy
bombers, nearly 400 medium bombers, and 15 groups of Ninth Air Force
fighter-bombers. The object was to blast open a path for massed American
ground forces to advance with four armored columns to the south and south-
west where they could destroy and isolate enemy forces and break out of the
Normandy beachhead.
The difficulty of the earlier Cherbourg operation, the mounting of a suc-
cessful ground offensive following an air assault designed to destroy and dis-
orient the enemy without bombing friendly troops by mistake, impressed air
and ground leaders. But as successful as Cobra eventually proved to be, itcre-
ated what could be called a Cobra syndrome that would affect those who
planned future ground offensives involving carpet-bombing near friendly
troops. The tragic bombing of friendly troops by Allied heavy bombers flying
at 12,000 feet produced a false start for Cobra on July 24. A second aerial
effort on the twenty-fifth also caused substantial friendly casualties, including
the former commander of Army Ground Forces (AGF), Lt. Gen. Lesley J.
M cNair, but it succeeded in destroying and disorganizing German forces. The
next morning, VIII Corps' four mobile divisions massed along a one-division
front, moved forward to exploit the gap in the enemy lines under the closest
air-ground cooperative effort to date.
Quesada's adventure on the eve of this operation, when he obtained a
Sherman tank and installed in it a VHF radio for communicating directly with
aircraft, is now the stuff of Air Force folklore. Having proved his point to the
satisfaction of Bradley, Quesada provided the lead tank in each armored col-
umn with a standard fighter-bomber SCR-522 radio, along with an experi-
enced pilot to serve as an air controller. These air controllers then talked to
continuing relays of fighter-bombers that had been dispatched to cover the
advance of the columns throughout the day. Quesada's innovation in commu-
nications permitted what became known as armored column cover. This was
67
Air Power for Patton's Army
the close air support helping to propel mobile armor operations in tactical war-
fare that would characterize the battle of France.^''
Armored column cover succeeded immediately. At first, relay flights of
four aircraft covered the advance of individual columns, sought out targets of
opportunity, and struck those designated under the authority of the combat com-
mand commanders, directed by air force controllers. Coordination occurred
entirely at the local level, with the IX TAC -First Army headquarters allocating
air forces and identifying ground units to be supported. In three days, the air-
ground team moved 30 miles and neared Avranches, southwest of St. Lo on the
Gulf of St. M alo. The pace of advance convinced military planners to maximize
the breakthrough and its opportunity for more rapid movement. They increased
the force coveri ng each armored col umn from four to ei ght ai rcraft. N ew f I ights
arrived at hourly intervals to relieve those flights already operating in the target
area. Although both IX and XIX TAC groups flew column cover missions in
the drive beyond the St. Lo roadway, they performed other ground-support
tasks, too. Designated squadrons remained on alert for immediate requests,
while other units flew armed reconnaissance missions.
With the American breakout proceeding so well, Patton grew restive.
Officially, he and his Third Army had to wait until August 1, 1944, to enter the
fray. At his urging, however, on July 28 Bradley named him acting Deputy
Army Group Commander with operational command of all troops in the VIII
Corps zone. This conformed to plans for VIII and XV Corps to operate under
Third Army. For Weyland and Patton, the long wait had ended. The following
day, on July 29, Weyland arrived from England and reviewed plans with
Patton for operations scheduled to begin on August 1. Two days later both
advance headquarters relocated to an apple orchard five miles northwest of
Coutances. This would be the first of many joint moves as they prepared for
mobile warfare on a grand scale.
I n the past seven months, Weyland's and Patton's forces not only trai ned
together, they fashioned an air-ground plan in which all could believe. At the
same time, XIX TAC pilots and support personnel gained combat experience
in support of the Allied landings in Normandy. During this period, the First
Army- IX TAC air-ground team established a mission request and air-ground
control system that worked. By the end of J uly 1944, air and ground person-
nel gained the necessary experience with procedures and equipment to fashion
a very effective close air support system. M oreover, with an enemy now on the
run and Allied air superiority well established, Weyland had every reason to
feel confident. Yet, in the mobile warfare about to commence the air com-
mander would face new air-ground challenges. To meet them, he would be
forced to adopt and test new aerial practices that could not always be based on
prior experience or doctrinal precepts.^^
68
Chapter Three
The Battle for France
The battle for France created unprecedented challenges for Allied tac-
tical air forces. Not even the famed mobile warfare in the deserts of North
Africa could compare with the headlong dash of George Patton's Third Army
from Normandy southeastward to the German border in the summer and fall
of 1944. Atthe start of this campaign, 0. P. Weyland and his staff could call
on little combat experience beyond directing fighter-bomber operations from
IX Fighter Command in England in J une and J uly of 1944. Now, in France,
Weyland decided how best to support Third Army in what quickly became a
blitzkrieg. At one point in mid-September, the XIX TAG would perform a
variety of missions at five different locations across a 500-mile front. To
keep pace with and support Third Army, Weyland had to modify and adapt
tactical air doctrine and conventional methods of communication and orga-
nization.
In all theaters of war, AAF doctrine called for centralized air control,
for the concentrated use of air power, and for tactical missions flown in the
prescribed order of air superiority, interdiction, and close air support. Yet
these precepts, which applied most readily to positional warfare, failed in a
fluid situation that called for selectively applying air power to support con-
stantly moving ground forces dispersed over an expanding front. To direct
aerial attacks on the enemy successfully in this kaleidoscopic environment,
and to move and relocate air bases quickly, Weyland found it necessary to
decentralize operations, disperse his forces, and delegate more authority to
subordinates. In some cases he simply "threw away the book" and impro-
vised as circumstances dictated. If the Luftwaffe's weaknesses in 1944 per-
mitted tactical airmen the flexibility to modify doctrine and improvise to
solve operational problems, the demands of mobile warfare severely tested
their solutions. In that testing, Weyland relied on the goodwill of the men in
the air and on the ground, and on the good relationship already established
between his command and the Third Army. In that relationship, cooperation
and mutual respect became the keys to success for the XIX TAC-Third Army
team.^
69
Air Power for Patton's Army
Exploiting the St. L6 Breakout: Blitz Warfare U.S. Style
On the morning of August 1, General Bradley met with General Patton
and his staff and corps commanders to discuss how Third Army could best
exploit the breal<through which already found VII and VIII Corps troops mov-
ing forward 30 miles south of St. L6. Having secured the base of the Cotentin
peninsula at Avranches, Allied leaders realized their forces not only could
swing west into Brittany and seize the Breton ports as planned, but by swing-
ing east, they also could move around the German left flank toward the Seine
River and Paris. Accordingly, Third Army received a three-part mission: first,
drive south and southwest from the Avranches region to secure theRennesand
Fougeres area in eastern Brittany; second, turn west to capture the Brittany
peninsula and seize the ports; and third, simultaneously prepare for operations
farther to the east. To carry out this mission. Third Army gained the VIII and
XV Corps onAugustl, with theXX andXIl Corps scheduled to become oper-
ational and join them on August 7 and 12, respectively. Under M aj. Gen. Troy
H. Middleton, VIII Corps would exploit the breakthrough at Avranches and
move westward into Brittany. While XX Corps, commanded by Maj. Gen.
Walton H. Walker, readied its forces to move south later, Lt. Gen. Wade H.
Haislip's XV Corps would push south toward Fougeres.
In this plan, XIX TAC's mission centered on supporting the VIII Corps'
offensive with an initial force of three P-47 groups, the 358th, 371st, and 365th
Fighter Groups, which at that time continued to operate under the control of General
Quesada's 84th Fighter Wing. In early August, Weyland had no night fighter units
and only one tactical reconnaissance squadron— the 12th Tactical Reconnaissance
Squadron based at LeM olay in Normandy. The XIX TAC would receive addition-
al flying groups based on the success of Patton's drive south and east.^
Maj. Gen. Troy Middleton,
commander, VIII Corps,
aboard the USS Ancon.
70
The Battle for France
The first week of August set the tone for the first month and a half of
mobile operations in France. Third Army and XIX TAC planners met on J uly
31 to confirm an earlier decision to move XIX TAC's advance headquarters
with Third Army's forward command post during the forthcoming campaign.
The emphasis on mobility began that day, when Patton announced that Third
Army's command post would move immediately to a location five miles
northwest of Coutances. Weyland agreed to join the army's command group at
its new location the following day, on August 1. By late evening of the thirty-
first, XIX TAC's advance headquarters was in place and ready for operations
the next day. The air command's headquarters would move an additional four
times during August and twice more in September. Shortly after midnight,
Weyland called Ninth Air Force headquarters to declare his forces ready for
operations and to review plans for the following day. It became a daily custom
for the commander of the tactical air command to call General Brereton or,
after August 6, Lt. Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg, his successor as commander of
Ninth Air Force, on the Redline command net to discuss procedures, review
the previous day's operations, and discuss the course ahead. ^
During his conversation with General Brereton in the early hours of
August 1, Weyland recommended reversing the locations of the 84th and 303d
Fighter Wings. The latter, which arrived atCriqueville (A-2) from England on
J uly 26, thus would be moved and positioned near Bruchevi He airstrip (A-16),
15 miles closer to the flying units it would control in Normandy when the com-
mand became operational (Map 4). The IX TAC's 84th Fighter Wing would
maintain flying control of the three groups initially assigned to Weyland's
command until the 303d Fighter Wing was in place and prepared to relieve the
84th. The XIX TAC's second wing, the 100th Fighter Wing, which had arrived
at Criqueville earlier on J uly 4, would remain nonoperational until the com-
mand gained flying control of all assigned fighter groups. During mobileoper-
ations in France, the XIX TAC, unlil<e other commands, preferred to locate its
fighter control center near wing headquarters and its airfields, rather than near
the advance headquarters' combat operations center. Plans and directives orig-
inated at the combat operations center, but allocation of missions and flying
control of the groups were wing responsibilities.
The XIX TAC's more decentralized organizational approach called for
the wing, which the planners normally established between the advance and
rear headquarters, to relay operational orders and reports to and from the fly-
ing groups and assist the rear headquarters. Rear headquarters handled admin-
istration, supply, training, and personnel matters. At the outset of the campaign,
by mal<ing wing headquarters the center of the communications net, planners
expected the XIX TAC advance headquarters to be able to move forward with
Third Army's forward echelon headquarters and maintain communications to
groups with a minimum of required new installations. As Weyland would soon
learn, in the practice of mobile warfare, even more decentralization would be
71
Map 4
U.S. Airfields in France, 1944-1945
Reprinted from: Rpt, AAF Evaluation Board, ETO, "Effectiveness of Third Phase Tacticai Air Operations," pp. 327-328,
AFHRA.
The Battle for France
necessary if his advance lieadquarters was to l<eep up witli Patton's lieadquar-
ters and maintain reliable communications lines to his own forces.''
On August 1, 1944, however, Weyland faced other, more pressing com-
mand problems.^ That day Ninth Air Force commander. General Brereton, left
France for England to assume command of the First Allied Airborne Army.
Before leaving, he called and informed Weyland that his deputy, Maj. Gen.
Ralph Royce, would also be away temporarily and that Maj. Gen. David M .
SchI atter woul d be setti ng up the N i nth's advance headquarters a few mi les north
of Coutances near the headquarters of the 12th Army Group. Consequently,
Q uesada, as commander of the I X TA C , woul d coordi nate flying responsi bi I i ti es
and division of flying groups between the IX and XIX TACs. Quesada and
Weyland could rearrange the wings as they saw fit without any need for formal
orders. Anxious to have his own team in charge, after conferring with Quesada,
Weyland assigned to the 303d Fighter Wing control over all XIX TAG fighter
groups. That evening the 303d headquarters arrived near Brucheville (A -16)
from Criqueville(A-2),tojointhe84th FighterWing, which would remain there
until it replaced Quesada's 70th Fighter Wing at Criqueville, when the latter
moved south of St. L 6 (Map 4).
During the initial week of combat operations, Weyland's command and
control procedures evolved as his forces and responsibilities with Third Army
grew. Only by August 8, 1944, when his command was at full flying strength
with nine groups, did his two wings exercise extensive operational control. At
least until mid-August, the 405th Fighter Group remained under IX TAG'S
70th Fighter Wing for operational control. Early August would be a period of
transition, one in which fighter-bomber groups moved from IX TAG to XIX
TAG— and in some cases back again. The planners developed and refined
organization and operational procedures in response to a growing Third Army
and its requirements for ever greater tactical air support.
Although weather grounded Weyland's fighter-bombers in the morning
of August 1, in the afternoon he sent the three groups covering VIII Gorps on
two types of missions. The 358th Fighter Group flew armed reconnaissance
into the Brittany peninsula to explore the path ahead of VIII Gorps' armored
spearheads, while the 371st and 365th Fighter Groups provided cover for ele-
ments of the 4th and 6th Armored Divisions, respectively.
Armed reconnaissance normally involved squadron-size formations of
eight or twelve P-47s armed with 500-lb. bombs and with armor-piercing
incendiary .50-caliber ammunition for the aircraft's eight machine guns. The
P-47S roamed well beyond the bomb safety line, the boundary within which
all bombing was controlled by an air liaison officer. In enemy territory they
searched for targets of opportunity, such as enemy troop concentrations or
armored forces either fleeing or approaching the front lines. Patton's swift
advance often caused the bomb line to change several times a day, frequently
requiring pilots to update their maps while airborne.^
73
Air Power for Patton's Army
Crews arming P-47s with
500-lb. bombs and .50-caliber
ammunition.
The more highly publicized second tactical role, armored column cover
(which was first used at St. L6 in conjunction with the Cobra breakout)
became a standard feature of air-ground cooperation in the dash across France.
General Weyland did not alter the original procedure significantly. He nor-
mally assigned one fighter group to each armored combat command and made
it responsible for providing squadron coverage continuously during daylight
hours. Air liaison officers attached to the armored columns controlled the mis-
sions either from tanks or other armored vehicles by means of SCR-522 VHF
radio. Ordnance carried by the aircraft varied with the amount of enemy armor
and German fighter opposition expected. In areas where enemy fighters were
active, only a third of the aircraft were bombed-up. Where armor opposition
was light, P-47 pilots carried fewer bombs and resorted to strafing attacks.
The airmen considered strafing enemy forces the most effective form of attack
during combat in France and German prisoners agreed.
It became common practice for Weyland's fighter-bombers to patrol as
much as 35 miles in front of Patton's columns to search out and destroy poten-
tial resistance and keep the columns informed through the liaison officers of
what lay ahead. The column cover force often performed armed reconnaissance
in addition to a close air support mission, which made distinguishing between
the two missions difficult for the statistical control section. Furthermore, the
Third Army staff asked the airmen to report the location of the Third Army
spearheads, which frequently outdistanced their own communications. In an air
role reminiscent of the observation mission in World War I, it became custom-
ary for pilots to identify Allied ground units throughout the campaign, and the
last section of the daily mission report listed all forward sightings.''
Because of the fluid tactical situation, close control and flexibility in
planning became paramount. As a X IX TAG official observed, Patton quick-
74
The Battle for France
An air-ground officer directs aircraft near tlie front lines (above);
a Ninth) Air Force tactical liaison officer with the Third Army uses a radio
to direct fighter-bombers to enemy targets (below).
ly "turned the interdiction job inside out," requesting air power to prevent
German troop movement out of, ratliertlian into, tlie battle zone. In Brittany,
for example, the fighter-bombers accelerated Third Army's rapid advance
with column cover and armed reconnaissance missions, and thus prevented
German counterattacks from developing. Crews for XIX TAG received
explicit instructions notto destroy any bridges in the Avranches area, which
already had become a bottleneck for Allied traffic. Except for the Breton
ports, Patton's three armored columns bypassed any German strong points
along the way that might impede the advance. If, as some critics have
charged, Patton proved more adept at pursuit than destruction of the
enemy's forces, it is hard to fault his tactics during the westward thrust in
Brittany.^
For XIX TAG aircrews, Patton's blitzkrieg tactics meantthat planning
often took place in the cockpit while airborne, in response to swiftly chang-
75
Air Power for Patton's Army
Night armed reconnaissance missions used tracers witli
.50-caliber ammunition.
ing requirements of Third Army troops. Italso meant tliat tactical airpower
served as an air umbrella in highly mobile warfare, a coverage that FM
100-20 (1943) judged "prohibitively expensive" and effective only briefly
and only in a small area. Doctrinal reservations aside, Weyland always
defended his use of air cover for armored spearheads because the mobile
warfare that Patton favored left too little time for artillery to be brought
forward. Weyland and other tactical air leaders set aside established mis-
sion priorities in favor of a pragmatic response to mobile operations.
General Weyland, however, would have been thefirstto agree that the exis-
tence of Allied air superiority, air power's first priority, made armored col-
umn cover possible by releasing large numbers of aircraft for close air sup-
port.9
At the end of August 1, 1944, the 4th Armored Division approached
Rennes, 80 miles south of St. L6. Its highly regarded commander, M aj. Gen.
John S. "P" Wood, worried about a counterattack from a possible German col-
umn moving from the southwest. With XX Corps scheduled to move south
through the Avranches bottleneck the next day, Weyland's forces found them-
selves stretched woefully thin because of commitments to cover the armored
divisions and fly armed reconnaissance throughout B rittany and as far south as
theLoire. Once again he contacted Quesada for support and received two addi-
tional fighter groups for the following day.
During the next four days of the Brittany Blitz, i° between August 2-5,
Patton's forces overran the entire Breton peninsula and laid siege to the port
76
The Battle for France
fortresses at St. M alo, St. Nazaire, Lorient, and Brest (Map 5). At the same
time, XV and XX Corps moved rapidly soutli in tlie direction of tlie Loire
River and swung east toward Paris. Nintli Air Force increased tlie aircraft in
General Weyland's force accordingly. On August 2, he received the 363d
Tactical Reconnaissance Group, the command's second P-51 group, and the
405th P-47 fighter group, which would gain a reputation as one of the Allies'
top close air support groups. By this time, the 303d Fighter Wing had assumed
responsibility from Quesada's 84th Fighter Wing for administration and con-
trol of the five XIX TAG groups and the command's fighter control center.
Ninth Air Force's schedule of operations for August 2 reflected the rapidly
changing situation as well as the flexible nature of tactical air power. It con-
tained a long list of specific assignments for each of General Quesada's IX
TAG groups supporting FirstArmy. Weyland's five groups, however, could be
assigned targets entirely "at the discretion of theGG [commanding general] of
XIX TAG." The first stage of mobile warfare already compelled the air lead-
ers to decentralize operational control.
A host of problems had to be solved during the first week of August. The
shortage of air support officers for ground units led the list. The very first
request Weyl and received on August 1 was a plea from VIII Gorps to find two
additional liaison officers for Brig. Gen. Herbert L. Earnest's Special Task
Force A, preparing to attack along Brittany's north coast. One air support offi-
cer per armored division had proved insufficient because of the division's
practice of creating combat commands or special task forces in pursuit opera-
tions. Because the air liaison function had not been included in the original
personnel authorizations, the tactical air commands had to assign liaison offi-
cers to the ground units from their own organizations. Weyland managed to do
this on A ugust 1. Y et on the thi rd, he needed to f i nd three more off i cers for X V
Gorps' 5th and 7th Armored Divisions and its 28th Infantry Division. Faced
with a shortage of experienced candidates at the time, he asked General
Ouesada for help, and IX TAG immediately supplied the needed officers. A
Maj. Gen. J ohn S. Wood,
Commanding General,
4th Armored Division.
77
SOURCE: VincentJ . Esposito, ed., West Point Atlas of American Wars, V. 2, Map 54, (New York: Praeger, 1960)
The Battle for France
few days later Weyland returned the favor, providing IX TAC additional air
support needed to blunt a dangerous German counteroffensive at M ortain.^^
Enemy night flying operations presented another challenge. Maj. Gen.
Hugh J . Gaffey, Third Army chief of staff, approached Weyland on August 3,
1944, with a request for nighttime air cover for the Pontorson Bridge over the
See River and for dams and roads in the Avranches area to quell nuisance
nighttime shelling by the Germans in Northwest Europe. As in North Africa,
night combat capability would prove a key weakness of Allied air forces
throughout the campaign. Without a night fighter squadron, Weyland could
only request that Ninth Air Force provide one as soon as possible. The Ninth
responded by assigning one of IX Air Defense Command's two P-61 night
fighter squadrons to cover this Third Army area of operations. Later in the
campaign, when the Luftwaffe threat declined further, the air leaders would
assign night fighters directly to the tactical air commands, where they increas-
ingly flew interdiction rather than air defense missions.
Initial air-ground coordination also proved a problem. Several times dur-
ing the first week of August, crews flying column cover for the 4th Armored
Division in the St. M alo area complained that they could not contact the air
liaison controller with the division. Officers atXIX TAC traced the problem to
an overloaded C-channel, which pilots and the controllers used for all air-
ground communications. Lieutenantjohn J . Burns of the 371st Fighter Group
recalled that C-channel, despite being designated as the squadron channel,
turned out to be a common channel for all of Ninth Air Force once close air
support began in earnest. Asa solution to the communications congestion.
General Weyland's operations officers designated each of four channels for a
specific function. They also encouraged better radio discipline whereby flight
leaders would contact the ground station only when nearing the head of the
column. Air-ground communications problems in Brittany declined signifi-
cantly once the command introduced these procedures.^^
As Patton's forces swept forward, Weyland had to move his headquarters,
which involved relocating the advance headquarters' tents, vehicles, and com-
munications and other equipment. On A ugust 2, Third A rmy moved its forward
echelon command post 11 miles north of Avranches, and XIX TAC followed
suit the next day. That same morning, Weyland conferred with Ninth Air Force
officers about constructing a clutch of airfields for the XIX TAC farther south
in the Rennes area where the command could support ground offensives in the
direction of Brest or eastward, depending on how events unfolded. General
Royce wanted to send in engineers immediately and Weyland had to remind
him that the area remained unsecured. The XIX TAC commander always coor-
dinated airfield sites with the Third Army staff, and that evening General
Gaffey concurred in the Rennes plan as well as in a proposal to establish a
rearming and refueling strip near Avranches. Enemy activity and supply delays,
however, prevented the engineers from beginning this work until August 7.
79
Air Power for Patton's Army
The IX Engineer Command's 2d Engineer Aviation Brigade (Provisional)
handled airfield construction and maintenance for Weyland's command.
Normally its commander, Col. R. E. Smyserjr., would assign one of hisavia-
tion battalions to develop a single advanced landing airstrip with a runway
5,000 feet long and 120 feet wide. Understandably, the time required to com-
plete the field depended on the site's initial condition. A new airfield normally
took nine or ten days to complete, but the tactical air command's maintenance
officers cautioned that the engineers tended to be over-optimistic by two or
three days. Although the engineers refurbished former German airstrips that
featured sod or concrete runways, Weyland preferred prefabricated bituminous
prepared Hessian surfacing!^ for new runways during the good summer weath-
er and Patton's rapid sweep east. A Hessian surface airstrip, which could be fin-
ished in about ten days, provided a firm, smooth, relatively dust-free surface
and proved usable immediately after a rainstorm.
While the engineers worked on new airfields, the command's supply and
maintenance officers located at the rear headquarters arranged through Ninth
Air Force's Service Command to prestock these fields with ammunition, fuel,
and other suppi i es. W i th the short di stance from N ormandy to the R ennes area,
truck transportation and road congestion proved a lesser problem than the one
that developed later, when the rapid drive eastward created severe bottlenecks
and transport shortages. Normally, XIX TAC engineers considered a field
operational after the runway and one taxiway had been completed. At this
time, airdrome personnel, the real nomads of Ninth Air Force, arrived to rearm
and servicethe aircraftuntil thefighter group's ground echelon arrived. Unlike
British fighter squadrons, XIX TAC groups had their own maintenance per-
sonnel assigned to perform routine aircraft maintenance functions. The ser-
vices of the command's two airdrome squadrons proved especially valuable
for roulement operations, whereby a series of advanced landing strips could be
used temporarily by squadrons whose home bases often remained far to the
rear. This procedure increased the command's mobility, considerably extend-
ing the operational flying range of its units.
As the XIX TAC prepared for its move to the Brittany airfields, Patton's
forces already had advanced rapidly south and east. By August 5, 1944, XV
Corps captured M ayenne, 20 miles east of Fougeres, and pushed on to Laval fur-
ther south (M ap 5). Patton's tactical interests lay clearly to the east, in the direc-
tion of Germany, not to the west in Brittany, which he had instructed VIII Corps
to overrun with a minimum of force. He remained ambivalent about the need to
"reduce" the French ports that proved so difficult to assault, yet which earlier
seemed so essential as Allied supply bases for the campaign in Northwest
Europe."
The two commanders exchanged opposing views on this issue of forti-
fied positions on August 5, when Patton requested aerial attacks on German
gunboats that threatened his flank at St. M alo. Weyland declined to send fight-
80
The Battle for France
er-bombers against such targets after learning tliat on tlie previous day tlie
358tli Figliter Group liad encountered extremely heavy flak from nearby pill-
box defenses and ships in the harbor at St. M alo. Patton, perhaps mindful of
the "short bombing" at St. L6 during Operation Cobra, did not want to call on
heavy bombers, so Weyland requested medium bombers from Ninth Air Force.
At the same time, the air force command also provided the night cover over
the road south of Avranches that he requested on behalf of Third Army. This
became Weyland's method of supporting Third Army operations: he supplied
fighter-bombers whenever he believed the request sound, but otherwise he
would refuse them and turn to Ninth Air Force for help with medium bombers.
While conferring with Ninth Air Force leaders about medium bombers for
Third Army, General Weyland received the good news that the 36th Fighter
Group, flying P-47s at Brucheville, site A-16, (Map 4) had joined his com-
mand. Curry's Cougars, a favorite of his and the last of his original XIX TAC
units to arrive from England, rapidly became a favorite of Patton's too, as
attested by the letters of commendation and numerous references to shipments
of Cointreau liqueur to the 36th Fighter Group from Third Army.^^
Weyland had to have been pleased with the first five days of "Blitz war-
fare, U .S. style."^^ Despite the problematic nature of bomb damage assessment
statistics, his groups tallied an impressive score of interdiction and close sup-
port target claims at a cost of only three aircraft lost. Armed reconnaissance
and armored column cover missions clearly proved ideally suited for mobile
operations, while the air-ground support system eliminated initial communi-
cations problems and continued to improve. He also could effectively com-
mand his forces and keep pace with Third Army's advance echelon. Planning
was underway for his groups to displace forward, and maintenance and supply
experienced no difficulty providing support. Although he dealt with many
issues through established organizational channels, informal discussions with
Patton and his staff often proved highly effective. With the combat situation
changing almost hourly, informal decision-making and flexibility became
essential to air operations.
A s X I X TA C ai rcraf t ranged south of the L oi re— far ahead of the T hi rd
Army spearheads to the east— and westinto Brittany in support of VIII Corps,
General Weyland encountered growing command and control difficulties.
While Patton needed to remain as close as possible to his advancing columns
to oversee operations at the front, Weyland's focus shifted in the opposite
direction. His operational capability depended increasingly on the aviation
engineers who built new airfields and on the signals experts who provided his
communications net. In numerous respects, the air arm became more ground
based than were the ground forces. Command and control under these condi-
tions would prove to be Weyland's greatest challenge and one he never com-
pletely mastered during the mobile phase of operations.
81
Army engineers handled airfield construction and maintenance for
Weyland's advancing aircraft squadrons, laying steel mesh for
emergency landing strips (top), and on occasion broom-massaging
the airstrips (bottom).
Aviation engineers used lieavy equipment in preparing fields for landing
aircraft (top). They were also called upon to repair damage following
enemy bombardment: this engineer battalion worked with air hammers on
a bomb crater left by a 500-lb. bomb (bottom).
83
Mechanics hoist a
severely damaged
P- 47 onto a trailer to
be stripped of all
usable parts (top);
only a few miles
behind enemy lines
(right), these soldier-
technicians are refu-
eling, rearming, and
checking planes for
the next mission.
On a German
airfield captured
by the Allies, a
mechanic
checks out a
P-51 Mustang.
84
85
Air Power for Patton's Army
Supporting Patton's End Run to the Seine
On the Allied side, General Bradley's decision to allow Patton to oper-
ate in Brittany with minimum forces led to a major change in Allied strategy
that took advantage of collapsing German positions. 2° In light of Third Army's
initial success, on August 4, 1944, Allied ground forces commander General
M ontgomery, with General Eisenhower's approval, directed the Allied armies
to strike east in force to destroy the German Seventh A rmy west of the Seine.
Accordingly, while most of Patton's forces attacked to the east. First Army
troops moved toward the road centers of Vire and M ortain while the British
would attack toward Argentan, and the Canadians in the direction of Falaise
(Map 5). The Germans, meanwhile, had not remained indifferent to the grow-
ing threat of encirclement. Back on August 2, Hitler directed Field Marshal
Guenther von Kluge, his commander in chief in the west, to counterattack the
Allies at M ortain with eight of the nine Panzer divisions available in
Normandy. By doing so. Hitler hoped the Wehrmacht could reach the coast,
regain Avranches, isolate Patton's army, and then move north to destroy the
beachhead. If successful, the Germans could reestablish the conditions of sta-
tic warfare that proved so successful during June and July. Von Kluge planned
to attack by A ugust 6 or 1?^
As Third Army's XV Corps prepared to encircle the German Seventh
Army in the M ortain area from the south during the second week of August,
XIX TAC assumed other support functions and expanded to its full comple-
ment of ni ne groups. 0 n A ugust 6, N i nth A i r F orce I eaders deci ded to i ncrease
XIX TAG'S striking power by dividing the fighter-bomber groups equally
between the two tactical air commands. Until then most had been flying under
IX TAC control. Ninth Air Force officers informed Weyland that XIX TAC
would have operational control of the following nine groups beginning on
A ugust 7: the 36th, 373d, 406th, 371st, 405th, 354th, 358th, 362d, and 3'6MP
These comprised the command's original 100th and 303d Fighter Wings, now
supplemented by the 371st and 405th P-47 groups. Weyland was particularly
pleased to gain the 354th, a crack M ustang fighter group, and the 406th Fighter
Group, whose rocket-firing 513th P-47 squadron had performed so effective-
ly against tanks during the St. L6 breakout. At the same time, Weyland sought
to simplify command and control procedures by having only one wing, the
303d, control all of these groups until the units moved to new airstrips farther
afield.
On the evening of A ugust 7, 1944, Weyland met with General Gaffey and
other members of the Third Army staff to discuss the growing threat of a
German counterattack, which they expected to occur east of Avranches near
M ortain (Map 5). The XIX TAC aircrews had been overflying the Avranches
botti eneck on return f I i ghts si nee A ugust 2, and w ere keepi ng T hi rd A rmy w el I
86
The Battle for France
informed of German concentrations developing in tlie M ortain area. After the
meeting on tlie seventli, Weyland called Quesada, whose IX TAG held prima-
ry responsibility for the area threatened, and offered to divert his fighter-
bombers to the crisis area at any time, and place them under the control of
Quesada's command. Three Panzer divisions did, in fact, attack early the fol-
lowing morning and the IX TAG commander called to accept the offer. He
asked only for the 406th's rocket squadron and P- 51s for top cover. During the
day's fighting, the XIX TAG pilots claimed 18 enemy aircraft shot down and
much German ground equipment destroyed.
By August 7, 1944, General Walker's XX Gorps units had reached the
Loire River and began moving east. The XIX TAG now began its celebrated
airborne "watch on the Loire," although it is not clear precisely when Patton
requested Wey land's forces to guard his flank or when the air commander
responded that he could do so, providing he had good weather. Patton did not
worry too much about the exposed southern flank of the Third Army, noting in
his diary that "our air can spot any group of enemy large enough to hurt us and
I can always pull something out of the hat." Weyland's forces had been flying
armed reconnaissance in the Loire region since August 2, and the 12th Tactical
Reconnaissance Squadron had been doing the same. Once his fighter-bomber
groups and the 10th Photo Reconnaissance Group moved into the Rennes and
Le M ans areas in mid-August, the 10th added to the schedule a daily photo
reconnaissance milk run over the Loire by A-20s of the 155th Night Photo
Squadron. The watch on the Loire became a fixture on the mission charts well
into September as Patton's southern flank grew to nearly 500 miles long—
from Brittany in the west to the M osel River in eastern France."
On August 8, 1944 the Third Army command post moved again, this
time to St. James, eight miles northwest of Fougeres (Map 5). The principle
of collocating headquarters for joint operations continued when Weyland
joined Patton the same day. Weyland left the command's B -echelon in place
with the fighter control center under Golonel Ferguson at Beauchamps, the
previous site above Avranches, until he could be assured of effective commu-
nication. He had good reason for concern. The following morning he learned
that during the evening the enemy had sabotaged his land lines, normally the
most reliable and secure means of communication, in what would become
common practice in the days ahead. Wire and signal equipment shortages also
contributed to the communication problem. Although Weyland could contact
Ferguson by VHF radio, the situation proved far from ideal. The commander
of the tactical air command vowed his advance headquarters would never
again outrun its landline communications net to its forces. M eanwhile, Golonel
Ferguson's small echelon, which had been left behind, maintained contactwith
the groups and controlled air operations.
For Weyland and his staff, the best solution seemed to be to move the
fighter-bomber groups forward to the Rennes area below the fighting at
87
Air Power for Patton's Army
Avranches and closer to Third A rmy's front line divisions that most needed air
support. Being closer to the front lines would provide less flying time en route
and, consequently, more time over target. Furthermore, the weather in Brittany
was better because it did not suffer as much from the fog and mist of
Normandy that often restricted flying in the mornings. Much of General
Weyl and's ti me duri ng the second and thi rd weeks of A ugust i nvol ved arrange-
ments for moving to the Rennes sites as quickly as possible. By A ugust 11, the
engineers had repaired the concrete runway at Rennes (A-27) and the sod field
at a second German site, Gael (A-31) (Map 4). The 354th and 362d Fighter
Groups and 100th Fighter Wing moved in that day, with the 12th Tactical
Reconnaissance Squadron due at Rennes the next day. Conditions proved far
from ideal at these new airfields. The 354th complained about the rough sur-
face at Gael and Weyland agreed with their assessment when he visited there
a few days after the field became operational. He also disapproved of the
hordes of civilians on the field and he took steps to alleviate both hazards. With
communications now secure, he decided to move the command's B -echelon
down to St. James to consolidate operational control at advance headquarters
once again. The fighter control center would remain with the 303d Fighter
Wing at Beauchamps until it could be brought forward to the Le M ans area.
General Weyland had suggested Le M ans as the next site for forward air-
fields during a Ninth Air Force commander's conference on August 9. At that
meeting he asked for a microwave early warning (referred to as M EW) radar,
the new, large, 60-ton ground radar that could track and control intercepts of
enemy aircraft and control friendly airplanes out to distances of 200 miles,
well beyond the range of conventional forward directional post radar. General
Quesada's command obtained one of the five existing M EW radars for use in
Normandy ten days after D-Day. Although Ninth Air Force possessed a sec-
ond radar, it remained in England to assist in defending against the V-1 flying
bombs, which the Germans began launching against England on June 13,
1944. Weyland declared that he, too, needed a M EW radar in view of not only
the renewed German air threat associated with the M ortain buildup, but also
XIX TAG'S widening range of reconnaissance missions. A lack of early warn-
ing, he argued after suffering the loss of several aircraft, was "costing planes,
crews, ground soldiers, and equipment."^^
Civilian technical experts in the European theater took a contrary posi-
tion. Radar, they argued, played a rather small role in the battle of France
because of the speed of the advance and the good weather. Pilots normally
could navigate to their targets even when out of range of fighter control sets,
w hi I e the sets themsel ves general I y I acked organi c transport and w ere not very
sturdy. Although these reasons were doubtless valid. General Weyland, aware
how important General Quesada considered the new radar, remained con-
vinced of the requirement. In fact, IX TAC had the only available M EW radar,
which it credited with playing a large role in helping its fighters destroy 160
88
The Battle for France
enemy aircraft from D-Day to the beginning of September. General Weyland
failed on four different occasions to obtain the M EW radar, but in the third
week of September he succeeded. The XIX TAG received a set for its newly
formed provisional tactical control group in the M etz area just in time for the
Lorraine Gampaign.^^
It is difficult to precisely evaluate XIX TAG'S effectiveness during the
second week of operations. In terms of statistics, its groups continued to add
to their impressive totals of enemy targets destroyed and damaged, while mis-
sion and sortie rates set record highs. These became the first of the heady days
of Third Army's headlong advance that often averaged 20 miles a day. During
the drive, Weyland's airmen flew column cover for the armored spearheads
moving east while continuing to support ongoing operations in Brittany, and
other patrols roamed well beyond Paris searching out the Luftwaffe in the air
and the Wehrmacht on the ground.
A number of special days stand out in the record-setting operation. On
August 7, the Luftwaffe appeared in force for the first time since August 1, and
according to pilot reports of the ensuing engagements, it lost 33 aircraft.
Significantly, the 36th Fighter Group claimed six after the ground controller
released its aircraft from covering the XV Gorps and vectored them to Ghartres
airfield following a reconnaissance pilot's report that he spotted enemy aircraft
at that site. This type of reconnaissance and fighter-bomber teamwork would
continue to improve in the weeks ahead. On another occasion, the 362d Fighter
Group demonstrated in missions east of Paris that, contrary to conventional
wisdom, strafing with .50-caliber guns proved effective against tanks attacked
from the rear (which housed the engine compartment). On August 8, during
their third mission of the day, the P-47 pilots attacked seven Panzer tanks,
claiming three destroyed and four damaged, before proceeding on to other
lucrative targets. Nevertheless, the 362d would have to work much harder to
top the 406th Fighter Group's 513th squadron, the Tiger Tamers, which con-
sistently led the command in claims of Nazi armor damaged and destroyed."
Tactical air power demonstrated flexibility in other ways as well. When
General Gaffey asked Weyland to see whether the 4th Armored Division,
which had moved beyond its H F and FM communications range of headquar-
ters, required help, Weyland obtained the information needed through his air
liaison communications net (it was between 20-25 miles from Brest at the
time) and notified army headquarters. General Patton also often asked the air
arm to check out suspected counterattacks, which Weyland did with alacrity,
scrambling or diverting aircraft to the target area. If the threat did not require
immediate attention, he responded by sending a reconnaissance plane to have
a look, and then followed it with fighter-bombers if necessary. In short, XIX
TAG provided Patton an on call, close air supporting service.^^
General Patton harbored no doubts about the effectiveness of his air sup-
port. Gharacteristically, following a visit from RAF Air Ghief M arshal Arthur
89
Air Power for Patton's Army
Tedder, General Spaatz, and other prominent airmen on August 9, General
Weyland recorded in his diary that Patton seemed "well satisfied" with the
support of XIX TAG. A less happy aspect of the meeting, however, found
these officers expressing renewed interest to Weyland in the seizure of Brest
and other Brittany ports in the near future. Patton and Gaffey discussed this
prospect with Weyland that evening over drinks. N either the Third A rmy lead-
ers nor Weyland were enthused over the prospect of static, siege warfare. The
air commander knew that fixed fortifications represented some of the most dif-
ficult and dangerous targets for fighter-bombers, and his later evaluations of
XIX TAG operations invariably stressed this point. Gherbourg should have
been proof enough for those in doubt. On the other hand, tests at the AAF's
Proving Ground Gommand at Eglin Field, Florida, in January and February
1945, demonstrated that fighter-bombers with 1,000-lb. bombs stood the best
chance against the hardened defenses of the V-1 and V-2s. In the case of
Brest, Spaatz and Tedder clearly reflected the views of General Eisenhower's
headquarters, and although expressing reservations, Weyland "agreed to ren-
der ourselves [XIX TAG] available." It is likely that Patton laterwished he had
argued Weyland's case with the senior airmen.
On August 11, 1944, with the encirclement of the German Seventh Army
near Argentan well underway from the south. General Patton ordered units of
XV Gorps to push on toward Falaise after the capture of Argentan. The XIX
TAG supported the offensive with 36th and 362d Fighter Groups' P-47s, which
provided day-long air coverage of the advancing columns. Both Patton and
Weyland looked forward to a crushing victory. At the same time, Weyland's
forces continued to support the other, ever-widening Third Army fronts: in the
east toward the Seine, in the west in Brittany, and in the south along the Loire.^°
Between August 12-19, the Third Army and the XIX TAG attempted to
close what their historians referred to as the A rgentan Trap. On A ugust 8, the day
after the German counterattack began. General B radley proposed that First A rmy
hoi d at M ortai n w hi I e uni ts of F i rst and T hi rd A rmi es moved north to meet advanc-
ing Ganadian and B ritish forces, thereby preventing a German escape to the Seine.
Bradley worried that Patton's force of four divisions might be too weak to halt the
German retreat, while a failure to establish a clear meeting between the converg-
ing A merican and Ganadian troops could result in confusion and much loss of life.
Gonsequently, in one of the war's most controversial decisions, on August 13,
Bradley ordered Patton to halt XV Gorps' drive and hold near Argentan. Yet when
the Ganadian drive stalled at Falaise on August 16, a 15-mile gap remained
between the two Allied lines. With the jaws of the trap open until August 20, an
estimated 50,000 German troops escaped eastward through the so-called Argen-
tan-Falaise gap. Eventually this force would join 200,000 additional German sol-
diers west of the Seine and the Allies would be unable to prevent their crossing.
Patton, meanwhile, received permission from Bradley to send part of the XV
Gorps to the Seine in an additional attempt to encircle retreating German forces.^^
90
The Battle for France
The Luftwaffe could do little to assist the pell-mell German retreat.
Despite using between 30-40 night fighters and bombers in operations against
Allied ground targets, close support of German Seventh Army forces proved
nearly nonexistent. By mid-August 1944, German air leaders could muster only
75 si ngl e-engi ne f i ghters for dai ly operations on the western front. A I though the
Luftwaffe could still achieve a figure of 250 sorties on A ugust 15, this sortie rate
could not be sustained despite reinforcements that allowed for several full-scale
efforts of 250-300 sorties per day later in the month. The rapid Allied advance
forced the Luftwaffe to abandon bases in France for more secure, more distant
sites in Belgium. By the end of August, the Luftwaffe's single-engine fighter
force in Northwest Europe totaled only 420, 110 of which flew from French
bases. Equally alarming, accumulated losses and insufficient training of new
pilots after early 1944 resulted in a largely inexperienced force that found itself
generally outmatched by Allied aviators. Pilots for XIX TAG reported the
Luftwaffe now preferred to attack only when it clearly outnumbered its oppo-
nent, but the i nexperi ence of the L uftwaffe pi I ots sti II gave the A 1 1 i es the upper
hand.32
With Allied troops holding the shoulders of, and causing severe losses
within, the M ortain-Falaise-Argentan pocket, tactical air had good hunting as
the Germans felt compelled to clog the roads even in daylight in their desper-
ate attempt to flee. For XIX TAG pilots, though, the opportunity proved less
rewarding than they desired. The Ninth Air Force had established boundaries
that focused Weyland's forces on protecting Patton's right flank, where they
could "blast away at armored columns east and south of Paris." One can appre-
ciate the dismay of Gurry's Gougars, who watched other Ninth Air Force units
line up for what became known as harvest time in Argentan on August 17.^^
Weyland, meanwhile, faced a major crisis in joint operations. The dilem-
ma fi rst appeared on August 11 when General Gaffey, Third Army chief of staff,
recommended moving the two command posts forward to Le Mans. Weyland
quickly rejected the idea because the site farther east would not be situated along
the north-south communi cati ons axi s of 100th F i ghter W i ng or near the proposed
location of the 303d Fighter Group (Map 5). If Third Army moved directly to
Le M ans, he said, XIX TAG would have to operate there with a liaison detach-
ment. He suggested Laval as the next location instead. Both air and ground
advance headquarters moved to Laval the following day, on August 12, with
Weyland finally directing Golonel Ferguson's B-echelon to deploy to St. James.
So far so good. Then, given the rapid pace of his sweep to the east, Patton
announced that Third Army's forward echelon had to move to the Le M ans area
on the fourteenth. The army commander had little choice. Spearheads by XII
Corps had already reached Orleans, while XV Gorps arrived earlier at Argentan,
and then sent several units toward the Seine. Meanwhile,XX Gorps was moving
rapidly toward Ghartres. I n the west, VIII Gorps continued to struggle against the
Brittany ports while keeping a modest ground watch on the Loire (Map 6).
91
SOURCE: VincentJ . Esposito, ed., West Point Atlas of American Wars, V. 2, Map 55, (New York: Praeger, 1960)
The Battle for France
Weyland explained that he could notjoin Patton immediately in LeM ans
and still retain effective control of his forces. The Army commander agreed
that X IX TA C 's advance headquarters should not move without adequate com-
munications for command and control. Weyland's makeshift solution was to
move deputy chief of staff Colonel Thompson, another officer, and a small sig-
nals unit to the Third Army's command post as the air command's so-called
X-Ray detachment.^'' This plan called for Thompson's unit to link the two
headquarters through a single cable that had been rushed forward, while retain-
ing the air liaison party VHF radio net as backup. The X-Ray detachment per-
formed a liaison function only; control of operations remained with General
Weyland at the forward echelon in Laval. The headquarters B-echelon, which
controlled the fighters, also would move to Laval from St. James as soon as
effective communications could be established. Now XIX TAC had four sep-
arated headquarters elements— rear headquarters at Nehou and three advance
headquarters echelons at St. James, Laval, and Le M ans— an example of tac-
tical air's flexibility in Europe. Contrary to the emphasis on centralization
called for in air force doctrine, highly mobile operations demanded ever
greater decentralized control of the supporting air resources.
To accommodate this decentralization, the Third Army staff split its air
operations section into two echelons as well.^^ The army's air operations offi-
cer and the administrative echelon remained with Patton's forward command
post. There, the air operations officer posted the daily air situation for General
Patton, coordinated missions for army support, and kept the ground echelon
that remained located at XIX TAC's combat operations center apprised of
General Patton's wishes and intentions. For his part. Colonel Thompson kept
General Weyland informed of the army's intent. Even so, Weyland normally
The Chateau near Laval that served as the command post for
Weyland's rear headquarters.
93
Air Power for Patton's Army
flew from Laval to Patton's command post in Le M ans every other day to con-
fer personally with Third Army's staff. The decentralized system eventually
functioned reasonably well, but at the start it faced major problems.
With decentralization there is always a tendency among the components,
in the friction of war, to act independently. Effective command and control in
these circumstances become more difficultto ensure. General Weyland imme-
di atel y confronted thi s chal I enge. 1 1 i s not enti rel y cl ear w hether T hi rd A rmy 's
air intelligence and operations officers at Le M ans bypassed only Weyland at
Laval, or how much coordination they carried out with Colonel Ferguson atB-
echelon's location in issuing orders to air units, but in Weyland's view they
misused the system. This struck at the core of AAF doctrine on control of air
power and General Patton's agreement with his air commander. Two days after
moving to Le M ans, on August 16, Weyland visited Third Army headquarters
and met with assistant chief of staff M aj. Gen. H . R. Gay (Patton and Gaffey
were away at the time) and the Army air intelligence and operations officers.
Afterward, he reflected, we "straightened out the confusion" of Army intelli-
gence (G-2, Air) and Army operations (G-3, Air) officers who had been "lay-
ing on missions direct." Weyland clearly felt compelled to make his highly
decentralized air command and control system function effectively— under the
air commander's direction.
By August 16, 1944, elements of the Third Army reached the Seine, and
spearheads had moved within nine miles of Paris's western suburbs. The front
lines now stretched 100 miles from Weyland's Laval headquarters and even
farther from his fighter-bomber bases. This meant that Colonel Smyser's engi-
neer battalions already needed to prepare sites in the Le M ans area before they
had finished those in the Brittany group. Two days earlier, on August 14,
Weyland had metwith General Vandenberg and his deputy. Brig. Gen. Richard
E. Nugent, regarding the next airfield cluster needed by the command. The
generals agreed that construction on the first of four Le M ans fields would
begin the next day. Weyland met with his staff on the fifteenth to arrange for
the new deployment. They decided that the 100th Fighter Wing should handle
the forward airdromes at Le M ans, while the 303d Fighter Group would oper-
ate those in the rear area at Rennes. The forward direction post radar system
would be located at Rennes for flying control. The command's operations offi-
cer. Colonel Ferguson, would manage the move. Everything now waited on the
progress of the engineers.^'
The following evening. General Weyland attended his first XIX TAC
joint operations briefing and first combined operations conference in several
days. In fact, it is doubtful whether he found time in the days before separating
his advance headquarters into two and then three echelons to be present at these
evening briefings, since he normally met with General Patton and his staff on
fast-breaking events during the evening hours. From mid-August forward,
however, Weyland routinely attended the XIX TAC evening planning briefing.
94
The Battle for France
Col. Russell A. Berg,
commander, 10th Photo
Reconnaissance Group.
After the evening meeting on August 16, Weyland conferred witli Col. Russell
A. Berg, recently designated commander of the 10th Photo Reconnaissance
Group. The XIX TAC had just gained this group, which would provide much
needed visual and photographic data for the air-ground team. Its arrival repre-
sented an additional challenge to his aviation engineers in their constant effort
to find the optimum operational locations for command units. Weyland want-
ed to locate Berg's group, most of which was then only en route from England,
at Chateaudun, the big German base approximately 150 miles east of Rennes.
However, because the engineers did not expect it to be fully operational until
August 27, the lOth's squadrons would use the Rennes airfield in the interim.
The 155th Night Photo Squadron, flying F-3 (A-20) aircraft, arrived to join the
12th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron on the eleventh, followed by the sec-
ond F-6 (P-51) unit, the 15th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron, on the
twelfth. By August 15, the group reached full-strength with the addition of the
31st and 34th Tactical Photo Squadrons, which flew F-5 (P-38) reconnais-
sance aircraft. 2^
In addition to making Chateaudun the focus of the command's recon-
naissance effort— at least until the command moved forward again— General
Weyland viewed that base as the major roulement site for the entire area.
Chateaudun could provide short-term support and serve as a staging base to
increase the range of the fighter-bombers. The importance of reconnaissance
had risen dramatically since the Normandy Campaign, and the Chateaudun
location would enable the 10th Photo Reconnaissance Group to make a major
contribution on all fronts. Reconnaissance data reported by pilots and acquired
through photography became the primary source of intelligence for command
operations during the summer of intense mobility. A Ithough the fighter control
center provided the tactical air command headquarters radio intercept, or Y,
95
Air Power for Patton's Army
information from tlie 3d Radio Squadron (M obile), DetaclimentC, tlie records
are sl<etcliy on its value before tlie Ardennes Campaign. Nevertlieless,
Weyland realized the importance of his radio intercept source of intelligence
on enemy air movements and refused to release his Y -service to the new XXIX
TAC when the latter became operational in September 1944.^^
Meanwhile, on August 16, the Third Army steamroller overran
Chateaudun, Dreux, Chartres, and Orleans; it reached the Seine at Mantes-
Gassicourt and Vernon northwest of Paris three days later. The XIX TAC con-
tinued to find good targets in the area of German retreat. The 36th Fighter
Group, in fact, had its biggest day of the month here on August 13 when it
claimed the destruction of 400-500 vehicles west of Argentan. Allied officials
estimated that, of the nearly 14,000 German vehicles lost in the retreat from
Falaise, air attacks accounted for 60 to 80 percent.
The command also dealt with what appeared to be a resurgent Luftwaffe.
Once redeployed from its Paris airfields, the Luftwaffe attempted to protect
German ground forces moving toward the Seine. On August 15 and 16, the
Luftwaffe lost 26 fighter aircraft in action near Dreux against the 354th's
M ustangs and P-47s of the 373d and 362d Fighter Groups. Perhaps it was fit-
ting that the 36th Fighter Group, which had been deprived of participation in
the lucrative M ortain corridor attacks, played a key role in the final act to the
west when the first of the fortified ports in Brittany fell on the seventeenth.
Curry's Cougars circled the St. M alo fortress area until the Germans accepted
the surrender ultimatum that day.'^^
The Allies now turned their attention to the Seine River. As early as
August 13, Weyland had requested information from the Third Army chief of
staff concerning likely German crossing points on which his pilots could
focus. Third Army's intelligence assessment concluded that the Germans
would attempt to hold open the corridor to the Seine. Could the U .S. First and
Third Armies arrive in force and in time to prevent the Germans from escap-
ing across the river?
From the Seine to the Meuse
Third A rmy's X V Corps secured a bridgehead over the Seine at M antes-
Gassicourt on August 19, with orders to follow the left bank to Elbeuf and
Vernon and cut off the enemy's escape route. On its right, XX and XII Corps
moved rapidly toward Fontainebleau and Sens, respectively. Meanwhile, VIII
Corps prepared to launch an offensive against the remaining German-held
Breton ports by the twenty-fifth (Map 6). With First and Third Army troops
continuing to pull up to the Seine on August 20, General Eisenhower earlier
decided to abandon the original limits set for the lodgement area. Instead of
waiting to build up the logistic base, American forces would cross the Seine in
96
The Battle for France
force and relentlessly pursue the disintegrating German army and prevent it
from regrouping at the German border. At the same time, the Supreme Allied
Commander rejected General Montgomery's proposal on August 23, for a
"single front" approach in the north, one in which the British general would
direct a methodical advance through Belgium and on into the Ruhr. In its
place, Eisenhower adopted the so-called broad-front strategy that permitted a
second advance led by Patton's Third Army farther south toward the Saar. To
temper Montgomery's disappointment, he added Hodges's First Army to
M ontgomery's northern advance— and accorded it priority for gasoline deliv-
eries over Patton's swiftly moving forces.''^
General Eisenhower based his decision to continue pursuing the
G ermans across the Sei ne parti y on the spectacul ar success of 0 perati on Anvil
(also called Operation Dragoon), the amphibious invasion of southern France.
On August 15, 1944, three divisions of U .5. VI Corps and an attached French
armored force under the command of Lt. Gen. Alexander Patch's U .5. Seventh
Army landed on the south coast of France between Cannes and Toulon.
Seventh Army's objective involved freeing the port of Marseilles for Allied
supply and protecting Eisenhower's southern flank farther north. While French
troops invested the ports of Toulon and M arseilles, American divisions, soon
aided significantly by French resistance forces, quickly fanned out in hot pur-
suit of German troops fleeing north through the Rhone River valley and into
the f oothi 1 1 s of the F rench A I ps. T hi s rapi d A 1 1 i ed dri ve threatened to el i mi nate
German forces in southern France and, by linking with Allied forces in north-
ern France, block German troops in their headlong retreat from reaching the
safety of the German border.''^
As Allied forces attempted to envelop German forces at the Seine River,
XIX TAC continued to provide column cover and armed reconnaissance sup-
port over all of the Third Army's expanding fronts. Yet Wey land's fighter-
bombers were now spread dangerously thin in the east and south, which meant
increased flying distances and less time to loiter. M oreover, the weather turned
sour on August 19, and air operations in the Seine region became severely
restricted. The command could fly only 16 missions on the nineteenth, a more
respectable 36 on A ugust 20, but none on the twenty-first. This came at a par-
ticularly inopportune time because the Allies, rejoicing that the Argentan
pocket at last had been closed on A ugust 20, also knew that the Germans had
been sighted crossing the Vernon Bridge over the Seine that same day. Again,
Ninth Air Force's weak night fighter force limited its ability to interdict grow-
ing and extensive German nighttime movements. In spite of the rain and low
ceilings, XIX TAC's fighter-bombers did what they could by dropping
delayed-fuze bombs at ferry slips.'^"
Some critics contend that Patton and his Third Army could have pre-
vented the escape of the German Seventh Army across the Seine. If, as the
argument runs. Third Army had not been so dedicated to headlong pursuit to
97
Air Power for Patton's Army
the German border and instead elected to confront the enemy directly in what
amounted to frontal assault, it could have destroyed the retreating German
forces, possibly leading to a German surrender all along the line well before
Christmas 1944. To be sure, on August 23, General Patton directed his staff to
prepare two plans, one for pushing eastward below Paris with all due speed,
and another. Plan A, calling for just such a move— a sudden swing north of the
city to Beauvais to entrap the Germans and, in Patton's view, indeed bring the
war to a swift end. Yet, the latter operation meant moving Third Army forces
across the boundaries of the British and Canadian armies, interfering with the
other Allied commands, and threatening General Eisenhower's broad-front
strategy. This strategy called for all of the Allied armies to advance abreast
against the retreating Germans, to share equally in the eventual victory.
Submitted for approval, Eisenhower rejected Patton's Plan A the next day, the
twenty-fourth.'^^
At the Seine, tactical air power, too, played a less than decisive role.
Only a massive, concentrated air assault on the German forces there might
have made a difference, but XIX TAC planners apparently never contemplat-
ed this in view of competing priorities, worsening weather, and perhaps the
command's preoccupation with getting the Le M ans airfields ready. Still, post-
war AAF evaluators of these close air support tactical air operations conclud-
ed: "Allied air forces, with more night reconnaissance and night air attacks,
could have effectively prevented most of [the German equipment] from cross-
ing [theSeine].'"^^
Before Eisenhower disapproved Patton's Plan A, on August 22 Generals
Weyland and Patton met at 12th Army Group headquarters, where they
reviewed the probable course of future operations. With leading elements of
theThird Army moving forward rapidly against M elun, Louviers, and Troyes,
they anticipated the highly mobile campaign would soon move beyond Paris
to the German border. Weyland worried that Patton might not understand the
range limitations that his fighter-bombers faced when called on to operate far
to the east of their soon-to-be completed bases at Le M ans.'*' Even with roule-
ment operations underway at Chateaudun, the great distances involved would
limit the P-47s' effectiveness in supporting operations in eastern France. With
a full bomb load and a 150-gallon belly tank, the Thunderbolt possessed a
combat radius of approximately 350 miles. Yet, the distance from Chateaudun
to M etz totaled nearly 300 miles, which meant precious little time for opera-
tions in the target area. The P-51, with bombs and an external fuel tank, how-
ever, had a combat radius of 600 miles, which made it the obvious choice for
extended fighter sweeps and area patrols in eastern France and Germany.
The prospect of conducting extended operations over greater distances
also meant that the command faced problems of increased strain on pilots, air-
craft, and support agencies. As Weyland told Patton, XIX TAC confronted
major difficulties supporting a continued advance without more advanced
98
The Battle for France
fighter bases, adequate supplies, and establislied communication. Even before
liis groups moved to tlie Le M ans bases, Weyland was lool<ing eastward for
potential airfields. Paradoxically, the extraordinary success of mobile air-
ground operations now imperiled effective air-ground cooperation!
In the Paris region, Weyland responded to a variety of Third Army
requests. The Luftwaffe took advantage of the bad weather on A ugust 21-22 to
attack the 79th Infantry Division's bridgehead across the Seine northwest of
M antes-Gassi court. Responding to the Third Army chief of staff's request for
help. General Weyland promised to triple air coverage in that area. The twen-
ty-second proved to be a particularly good day for the command; its fighters
claimed to have destroyed 20 enemy aircraft while losing only one of its own.
In response to the increased threat from German fighters, P-47 crews preferred
to leave the high-explosive bombs behind and rely on rockets (for the 406th
Fighter Group) and strafing while on column cover assignments. Armed recon-
naissance and armored column cover, meanwhile, continued to comprise the
majority of missions during this period, highlighted by the air support of 4th
Armored Division's Combat Command A, 12 miles east of Sens on August 23.
In this instance, 362d P-47s, after flying armed reconnaissance ahead of the
column, returned to disperse Bf 109s that earlier had strafed the ground troops.
The Luftwaffe also continued to challengeXIX TAC in the forward area, while
the two P-51 groups had success on area patrols east of Paris near Reims.
With the arrival of General Charles de Gaulle's French forces, the liber-
ation of Paris began on August 24. Third Army continued its major thrust east
in the direction of M etz and Nancy, and its staff worried increasingly about its
diminishing supply stocks. In the West, as VIII Corps prepared to attack Brest
the next day, the protection of its southern flank remained the task of XIX
TAC. In spite of bad weather, the command flew 12 missions on the twenty-
fourth, including the 371st Fighter Group's armed reconnaissance flights
between Tours and Orleans, flights that became known as "working on the
railroad." The group claimed more than 200 rail and road vehicles destroyed
or damaged from German forces retreating northward from U.S. Seventh
Army troops. This, however, served only as a prelude to the eventful interdic-
tion missions of early September.''^
General Weyland remained busy with the Le M ans airfield program. He
informed his staff on August 23 that the C hateaudun field was nearly ready for
initial roulement flying, even though the airfields around Le M ans would not
be fully operational for another four or five days. He requested that Ninth Air
Force station a night fighter squadron there with his 10th Photo Reconnaissance
Group, but the initial priority centered on roulement operations, in which he
planned to turn around six fighter-bomber squadrons a day at C hateaudun.
Perhaps Third Army would receive the support it needed farther east after all.
During the final week in August, both Third Army and XIX TAC lead-
ers had reason to be optimistic. On A ugust 25 Patton's forces enlarged bridge-
99
Air Power for Patton's Army
heads across the Seine, while armored spearheads drove east. Units of XII and
XX Corps approached Chalons, while the XX Corps reached M elun and the
XII Corps captured Troyes. In the increasingly distant west, VIII Corps as
promised, launched its long-awaited assault against the isolated Breton ports
on August 25 (Map 7). Only the persistent shortage of gas and ammunition,
and increased maintenance requirements for armor, clouded expectations of
continued Third Army success. Near month's end, the 12th Army Group
issued orders that called for Third Army to proceed to the Rhine and secure
bridgeheads from M annheim to Coblenz.^"
On August 25, XIX TAC played a major role in ending the German
fighter threat in France. Once again the pioneer 354th M ustang group led the
way with claims of 49 enemy aircraft destroyed in a series of fighter sweeps
north and east of Paris. Among those 49 was the record-setting 500th enemy
aircraft shot down by the group since it arrived in the theater in late 1943. That
day. Ninth Air Force forces counted 127 German aircraft claimed destroyed
and 30 more damaged, at a cost of 27 U .5. aircraft. During the aerial fighting,
American pilots observed Bf 109s dropping belly tanks, suggesting that the
enemy had begun flying from Belgium and the homeland as Third Army
approached the last network of German airfields remaining in eastern France.
American pilots also observed increasingly inexperienced foes, who all too
frequently made the fatal mistake of trying to turn with the agile P-51 in pur-
suit. After the shoot-out on August 25, German tactical air forces posed little
threat to T hi rd A rmy 's advance.^^
The next day Weyland initiated roulement operations at Chateaudun for
squadrons of the 36th and 405th Fighter Groups assigned to fly close air sup-
port missions at M elun and Troyes. However, Weyland and his staff remained
well aware of the need for air bases east of Paris. The day after Chateaudun
opened for business, Weyland met with Ninth Air Force officers to plan the
construction and distribution of new sites as much as 50 miles east of the
French capital. Fifty miles represented the typical jump forward for the com-
mand. Once again, Weyland focused on establishing a roulement staging base
as soon as Third Army could secure the area. M eanwhile, his intelligence offi-
cer. Colonel Hallett, drew up a rail interdiction plan to cut off the main escape
route for German troops trapped south of the Loire.^^ On August 26, Third
Army's staff enthusiastically endorsed the plan, and Weyland started the oper-
ation the following day by sending the 371st Group south, where it destroyed
more than 200 enemy vehicles. The key question about the rail-cutting pro-
gram would be whether the command could devote sufficient air power to the
task in view of its other commitments. Reports from Brittany, where the 358th
and 362d flew daily area patrols and furnished ground support, indicated the
Allied siege of theAtI antic ports was progressing slowly. Ground forces there
might require a larger commitment from the tactical air forces. Yet, the weath-
er also threatened to weaken the effort when a cold front moved in from the
100
SOURCE: VincentJ . Esposito, ed., West Point Atlas of American Wars, V. 2, Map 56, (New York: Praeger, 1960)
Air Power for Patton's Army
Atlantic on August 28 and restricted operations for tlie remainder of tlie
montli.
In spite of bad weatlier on August 28, XIX TAC managed to fly its usual
complement of fighter sweeps and close air support operations in the east and
in Brittany. It also sent the 406th Fighter Group south of the Loire, where it had
a good day against enemy air, claiming 14 aircraft destroyed. The next day,
however, operations ceased entirely because of bad weather throughout north-
ern France. Bad weather persisted on the thirtieth, when only two weather
reconnaissance flights could be launched. M eanwhile, on August 29, XIX TAC
moved its advance headquarters from Laval to the Foret de Marchenoir
between Orleans and Chartres (Map 7). The command historian enthused that
with this move "control of operations shifted far eastward. "^^ Certainly a move
of 100 miles proved necessary and helpful, but at month's end Weyland, ever
the "fireman," had to spend most of his time in the East visiting potential sites
for the next move forward. To increase support to the Third Army, he was
determined to get roulement operations started at a Reims airfield immediate-
ly.
On August 28, 1944, Third Army crossed the Marne alongside First
Army on a 90-mile front (Map 7), but its supply stocks were almost gone.
Patton's staff described current supply levels of petroleum as alarming. No
gasoline had been received that afternoon, and delivery was 100,000 gallons
short of operating requirements. Moreover, logistics officers expected little
improvement because General Bradley, 12th Army Group commander,
adhered to Eisenhower's dictum and gave supply priority to the FirstArmy. To
keep up. Third Army enhanced its already notorious reputation for appropriat-
ing available fuel stocks and other supplies wherever it found them.
M eanwhile, C-47s of the Ninth Air Force's IX Troop Carrier Command aug-
mented the severely taxed Allied overland system by flying supplies to Beille
and other airstrips near Le M ans, beginning on August 19 and continuing for
the rest of the month. Although most of these C-47 deliveries ended up with
Third Army, with priorities set otherwise, Patton's supply problems wors-
ened.^'' The XIX TAC did not suffer from the fuel constraints experienced by
Third Army. Although consumption of aviation gasoline and oil increased sig-
nificantly following the Cobra breakout, the pipeline from Cherbourg and
repaired railroad tracks and equipment provided the airfields with bulk fuel
from sizeable accumulated stocks (with 2 million gallons in reserve). Where
bottlenecks occurred or the pipeline and rail network could not keep pace with
the swift advance, XIX TAC relied on deliveries by truck or C-47 aircraft."
Even short of supplies, Patton's forces continued their relentless
advance, now within 100 miles of the German border. On August 30, his intel-
ligence section warned that the Germans would stand at the city of M etz to
enable defenders to reinforce the Siegfried Line. Clearly the army needed to
reach the M osel River and pierce the German line of fortifications before the
102
The Battle for France
defense could entrench itself. Yet, it seemed as if the fates had combined to
thwart Patton at the climactic moment of the campaign. On the thirtieth, he
was told that Third Army would receive no further gasoline shipments at all
until September 3. Bad weather and competing tactical air priorities also con-
spired to restrict armor operations.
By the end of its first month of combat. Third Army had crossed the
Meuse and swept past Chalons, over the American battlefields of the First
World War (Map 7). M oving well ahead of initial schedules, Patton's forces
had conducted widely dispersed mobile operations in France that left "uncov-
ered" a southern flank nearly 500 miles long. Yet, the pace slowed as the army
outdistanced its supply system. In fact, by August 31, XX Corps captured
Verdun, but its Sherman tanks had no more gas. Generals Patton and Weyland
nevertheless remained confident that Third Army and X IX TAC would win the
race against time and break into Germany itself. After all, as one Third Army
staff officer asserted, they had only one more river— the M osel — to cross."
For General Weyland and members of XIX TAC, the great drive across
France in August 1944 would remain the high point of the command's service
in Europe. The very next month, an account of its first month's exploits enti-
tled Twelve Thousand Fighter-Bomber Sorties received wide distribution in
Washington military circles. The command also made available an unclassi-
fied version for the public. Although the end of mobile warfare had not yet
arrived, September would indeed bring a change in the nature of the fighting
in eastern France. At the end of August, however, the participants could not
yet foresee this change. With the promise of more supplies at month's end.
Third Army was poised to launch a major assault against the Mosel River
defenses, while the XIX TAC prepared to concentrate its forces in the East in
support of this army offensive.
Protecting Patton's Southern Flank
H istorians debate the effect of operating responsibilities in the Loire and
Brittany in September on XIX TAC's ability to provide close air support for
Patton's offensive on the M osel. In the East, wasThird Army denied the con-
centrated air support it required? Attention had focused on fuel and ammuni-
tion shortages, but did a shortage of aerial support also contribute to the halt-
ing of Patton's forces?
At the beginning of September 1944, XIX TAC's mission embraced air
support responsibilities on three fronts: in eastern France it flew armed recon-
naissance and column cover missions in support of Third Army's drive toward
M etz; along the Loire River it kept watch on Patton's flank and flew interdic-
tion sorties against German forces retreating from southern France; and, last-
ly, in Brittany it played the key tactical air role in the sieges of the Breton for-
103
Air Power for Patton's Army
tified port facilities. It operated air bases from Brittany to tlieLeM ans area. As
it prepared to move forward again, General Weyland's strike force consisted of
the 10th Photo Reconnaissance Group and two wings of four fighter-bomber
groups each. Only the 363d Fighter Group, the second P-51 group, no longer
appeared in the command's original nine-group lineup of August 7. Given the
Luftwaffe's inability to contest air superiority, the 363d had been redesignated
at the start of the month as the 363d Tactical Reconnaissance Group and was
being reequipped with F-6 aircraft for reassignment to the soon-to-be estab-
lished XXIX TAC.53
Among the three fronts, in terms of operational commitments, the Loire
front proved to be the least burdensome for the command. Weyland dispatched
daily reconnaissance flights and armed reconnaissance missions south of the
river when good targets could be found. To support his intelligence officer's
interdiction plan, he also scheduled a daily rail-cutting mission in the Dijon-
Belfort region, the point of exit for German troops retreating from southern
France. Often his air groups attacked targets of opportunity on these missions
and rearmed and refueled at one of the roulement staging bases, thence to fly
"on cooperation" with the ground forces for the remai nder of the day. A Ithough
the southern flank did not become a major combat front for the army in
September, it remained important because of the potential threat from German
forces remaining in the south. Patton garrisoned the north bank of the Loire
River thinly with elements from VIII Corps and relied entirely on his air arm
to alert him to and blunt any tactical threats from the Germans in this quarter.
The air arm, in turn, greatly benefited from Ultra intelligence on German loca-
tions and movements south of the Loire. From the beginning, the "watch on the
Loire" became largely an air force show, and it marked a historic milestone for
tactical air power.™
September opened with a major victory for XIX TAG pilots flying south
of the Loire. The rapid driveof Third Army beyond the M euse and the advance
of General Patch's Seventh A rmy northward from the M editerranean precipitat-
ed a general German retreat up the Rhone valley toward the Belfort escape
hatch. Asa result, command pilots on armed reconnaissance and fighter sweep
missions in the N ancy and Bourges regions found numerous choice targets in the
Wehrmacht traffic jam. On September 1 the command tallied the largest inter-
diction mission score of the entire campaign in France when its aircrews claimed
more than 800 motor vehicles destroyed or damaged. Curry's Cougars led the
way with claims of 311 motor transport and 94 armored vehicles knocked out,
and an ammunition dump set ablaze for good measure.^^
The XIX TAC kept up the pressure on harassed German troops with its
modest surveillance and armed reconnaissance force. The effort paid divi-
dends early in the afternoon of September 7, when one of the 155th Night
Photo Squadron's F-3s flying the Loire spotted a long enemy vehicle column
near Chateauroux on its way toward the Belfort Gap (Map 7).^^ The 155th
104
The Battle for France
Air Power for Patton's Army
pilot radioed in liis sigliting and tlie 406tli Figliter Group arrived sliortly tliere-
after. Once it expended all of its ordnance and ammunition, the group left to
reload, leaving vehicles overturned and burning. Then the 406th aircraft
returned again to complete the destruction of the column. Final claims totaled
132 motor transport and 310 horse-drawn vehicles destroyed. This mission
served as the most outstanding example of reconnaissance-fighter-bomber
coordination that, by September, had developed into a routine but very effec-
tive system.^^
On September 9, 1944, information reached Army authorities that
Wehrmacht elements remaining in the area south of the Loire would lil<ely sur-
render with a gentle nudge, and U.S. Ninth Army commander Lt. Gen.
William H . Simpson and M aj. Gen. Robert C. M aeon, commander of the 83d
Infantry Division, assumed this responsibility after Third Army had declined
it. That evening Simpson visited General Weyland at XIX TAG headquarters
and outi i ned hi s pi ans to force a surrender, pi ans i n w hi ch the X I X TA C f i g-
ured prominently. Weyland's forces would fly reconnaissance overhead, along
the route of the Germans' march to the Loire River, but would not interfere
with their movement. If the enemy troops refused the surrender terms offered.
Field Marshal Bernard L. Montgomery with
Lt. Gens. Omar Bradley and William H. Simpson.
106
The Battle for France
Some of the 20,000 German prisoners who were surrendered to
General Macon, commander of the 83d Infantry Division, and
General Weyland, XIX TAC, on September 16, 1944, in a formal
surrender at Beaugency Bridge. The surrender was forced largely
by the campaign of isolation by XIX TAC fighter-bombers.
however, then the fighter-bombers would return to attack them. Two days later,
on the eleventh, Weyland learned that the German commander of this hastily
assembled composite force, M aj. Gen. Botho Elster, had agreed to the terms
and marched his troops under U .S. Army escort through country controlled by
the French Resistance to the Loire River and a formal Wehrmacht surrender at
the Beaugency Bridge.^''
General Simpson called Weyland on September 16 and generously invit-
ed him to attend the surrender ceremony at 1500 hours local time. It proved to
be a busy day for the XIX TAC commander. He arrived at Chalons to join
Generals Simpson and M aeon at the Beaugency Bridge on schedule and was
pleased to hear that the XIX TAC's aerial presence overhead received prima-
ry credit for compelling the surrender. Never before had an air commander
been present or received such laurels when one ground unit surrendered to
another. On his return to Chalons, Weyland received a call from General
Vandenberg asking for information and requesting his presence that evening at
Ninth Air Force headquarters in Versailles. Once again the XIX TAC com-
mander took to the air, this time flying westward for dinner with Vandenberg
and his deputy. General Nugent. At a press conference, Weyland described the
role his command had played in convincing the German troops to surrender.^^
The command's own analysis of the Loire victory acknowledged that the
Germans' flight south of the Loire did not result exclusively from the aerial
interdiction missions on September 1 and 7, or from Colonel Hallett's rail-cut-
107
Air Power for Patton's Army
ting program which forced the Wehrmacht onto the highways where it became
even more vulnerable. Equally important, on September 11, the U .5. Third and
Seventh Armies linked up, blocking the Belfortexitto Germany and trapping
these forces. Constant harassment from the French underground also took its
toll on the German troops. Tactical air power, nevertheless, contributed an
important element in forcing the surrender, if it was not a sufficient cause in its
own right. For the first time air forces not only had secured an army's flank,
but aerial pressure and the threat of renewed aerial attack led directly to the
surrender of the enemy ground force. Wehrmacht General Elster made that
abundantly clear afterward. The persistent fighter-bomber attacks, he said, had
been the key factor in the decision to surrender his 20,000-man marschgruppe.
The XIX TAG mission of guarding Third Army's flank and contributing to the
ultimate surrender of opposing ground forces has been lauded as an unprece-
dented example of tactical air power's flexibility and diversity.
A Decision in Brittany
In spite of XIX TAG'S unprecedented achievement on the Loire front.
General Weyland remained convinced that the diversion of his command's
assets in Brittany during this period precluded even greater successes. "The
fruits of the program of interdiction and harassment," he said, "would have
been considerably larger had it not been interrupted by concentration of the
fighter-bomber effort at Brest."^' Indeed, the command's major focus in early
September centered not on the L oi re or M euse fronts, but on B rittany w here the
fortress city of Brest, after many weeks, still represented a major "potential"
port for Allied supplies. Whatever its potential, by this time Brest clearly had
become a secondary Allied objective 300 miles from the main front. Under the
command of an experienced General Middleton, VIII Corps had made little
progress since opening its siege offensive back on August 25. Initially,
Middleton simply had been allocated insufficient forces and ammunition to
succeed against the 30,000 determined defenders— almost twice the number
estimated— who remained well protected within an elaborate defensive com-
pl ex that i ncl uded concrete pill boxes, casements, gun empi acements, and a host
of additional obstacles. After VIII Corps failed to capture the garrison by
September 1, the planned completion date of the siege, military officials decid-
ed that more effort would need to be devoted to the embarrassing problem.^^
On September 2, 1944, General Vandenberg notified the XIX TAG com-
mander that Allied leaders had identified Brest and the other Breton fortified
sites still holding out as an urgent priority. These sites would be attacked by all
available bombers and fighter-bombers. Weyland, Vandenberg continued, had
been named operational commander for the tactical air effort, an effort that
would include not only every fighter-bomber group in his command, but oth-
108
The Battle for France
ers from General Quesada's IX TAG as well. General Vandenberg directed
Weyland to coordinate the Brittany air effort with General M iddleton, the VIII
Corps commander. Earlier, M iddleton had criticized what he considered sub-
par air support from the XIX TAG. Yet, when Weyland raised the issue with
Patton the corps commander denied it, and nothing more came of the incident.
Weyland could have anticipated support from Patton. The Third Army com-
mander judged M iddleton at this time to be a complainer and procrastinator
who, like Montgomery, required more of everything before beginning an
assault. In fairness to M iddleton, his assessment of the tactical difficulties at
B rest proved accurate, and later Patton would come to consider this most capa-
ble infantry leader among his best corps commanders. In any event, in early
September, M iddleton had all the air power he needed, or so it appeared. When
Weyland contacted the VIII Gorps after Vandenberg's call on the evening of
September 2, however, he learned that American ground forces could not fol-
low up immediate fighter-bomber attacks because insufficient supplies of
ammunition made it impossible to mount coordinated air-ground attacks.
The Ninth Air Force operations order for September 3, 1944, nonethe-
less, called for an "all out attack" which, as it turned out, totaled 24 of the 34
missions and nearly 300 of the 500 sorties flown on that day.™ Weyland spent
the day coordinating the effort and trying to obtain updated target lists for his
pi lots from army air intelligence and air liaison officers in Brittany. On the fol-
lowing day, when bad weather forced cancellation of air operations at Brest,
he turned his attention to improving support for Third Army in eastern France.
Leaving the B rest operation in the capable hands of his combat operations offi-
cer, Weyland left on the morning of September 5 for the Third Army front with
three specific objectives in mind: investigate potential new airstrip locations;
discuss air support for the forthcoming offensive; and convince Patton that
XIX TAG planes assigned to Brest would better serveThird Army in the east.
First, Weyland wanted to reconnoiter potential airfield sites in eastern
France personally. Before leaving Ghateaudun, he spoke with Ninth Air Force
headquarters and requested five fields in the Reims area and several near St.
Dizier for his groups then at Rennes and Le M ans, respectively. He also dis-
cussed using two airfields much closer to Third Army's Mosel front—
Goulommiers (A-58) and M elun (A-55) near Paris— as rearming and refuel-
ing strips (Map 4). In fact, on the trip to Third Army headquarters on
September 5, he stopped off to visit his airdrome squadrons in the vicinity.
General Weyland also wanted to discuss Third Army's resumption of opera-
tions with Patton's staff. Because air and ground leaders customarily consult-
ed on upcoming major assaults, Weyland had ample reason to fly to Ghalons
and consult with the staff on the air role in Third Army's joint plan for an
offensive against the M osel defenses.''^
Early on the afternoon of September 5, Weyland conferred with Generals
Patton and Gaffey and with General Haislip, commander of XV Gorps. The
109
Air Power for Patton's Army
Haislip forces would attack in the direction of Luneville on tlie riglit of XII
Corps, wliicli liad tal<en up positions opposite Nancy. Facing Metz, tlie XX
Corps prepared to attacl< tlie next day, on the sixth, in an effort to pierce the
Siegfried Line— provided its forces received sufficient gasoline supplies.
Although operations reports for the first three days of September confidently
alluded to securing bridgeheads and performing active reconnaissance to the
east. Third Army basically had stalled. The situation began to improve when
supply allocation rose and gas allowances increased on September 4. Of the
640,000 gallons requested that day, supply depots delivered 240,265. On
September 5, air and rail shipments of 358,840 gallons proved sufficient for
General Patton to order immediate resumptions of the advance."
During the planning conference with Patton and his staff, Weyland also
raised the third issue. He informed Third Army leaders that air support in the
east would be restricted because all XIX TAC groups were reassigned to the
Brest operation. It is not clear whether he asked Patton directly for help to
reduce this commitment, although such a request probably would have been
unnecessary. From early in the campaign, Patton considered Brittany a back-
water of the war. On September 5, the day of his meeting with Weyland, he
doubtless experienced relief now that VIII Corps and the Brittany Campaign,
on the fifth, had become the responsibility of the newly formed Ninth Army.
Whatever his feelings, higher authorities had committed his fighter-bombers
to support non-Third Army missions. After the meeting, Weyland remembered
that Patton agreed to seek release of the fighter-bombers in Brittany so they
could support Third Army's attack to the east and into Germany. The XIX
TAC commander certainly cannot be faulted for seeking Patton's help to
escape or reduce a commitment that neither favored. Weyland knew perfectly
well that the Brittany fortifications represented high-risk, low-yield targets for
his fighter-bombers, despite AAF evaluations that suggested P-47s would
have better success than medium or heavy bombers. M oreover, the air com-
mander, like the ground commander, considered Brest a costly diversion from
far more urgent military tasks.
General Weyland and his staff always maintained that the command's
commitment to the Brittany Campaign, especially for two pivotal weeks in
early September, prevented it from giving Third Army the vital support it
needed during the final push to the German frontier. Third Army officers felt
the same way. As for the Brest Campaign itself, it is hard to disagree with the
military historian B. H . Liddell Hart, who concluded that "the diversion to cap-
ture the Brittany ports brought [to the Allies] no benefit."" Senior airmen sub-
sequently deplored the use of air power at Brest as "wasteful and ineffec-
tive."'"
There is much merit to the criticism. Despite 31 battalions of allied
artillery available at Brest at the start, as days turned into weeks, the pressure
mounted for more and more air support. One must remember, however, that
110
The Battle for France
army planners in the late 1930s had designed army divisions for speed and
mobility, which meant that medium rather than heavy artillery became the
standard issue. As part of the compromise that would build up the air arm in
the early 1940s, army leaders planned to rely on air power to augment artillery
fire. Air leaders quite willing, even eager, to accept the expansion of aerial
forces later seemed much less willing to accept the trade-off that would
employ the fighter-bombers as flying artillery."
After B rest became N inth A ir Force's primary objective on September 3,
Weyland sent fighter-bombers from the two tactical air commands against
every conceivable target holding up the ground advance there. These included
dug-in troop positions, heavily fortified coastal batteries, and reinforced con-
crete pillboxes and fortress walls. On occasion he resorted to the air umbrella,
the practice frowned on by doctrinaire air force leaders. Weyland'sair umbrel-
la in Brittany provided continuous four-plane air patrols to support each divi-
sion. Nevertheless, VIII Corps ground forces made little progress until
September 14, when accumulated attacks on seacoast batteries, specific targets
in the city center, and constant pressure from the ground forces at last forced
the defenders into the inner ring. Here, in the final assault, P-47s identified
and attacked individual fortified houses in what amounted to house-to-house
fighting.™
The postwar AAF Evaluation Board analysis proved highly critical of
the indiscriminate use of air power at Brest, which it attributed to the absence
of an air liaison or other advisory officer at VIII Corps headquarters. As a
result, planners had inadequate knowledge about the effects of various bomb-
ing techniques, bomb fuzings, and related procedures. The evaluators also
deplored the lack of coordination by target officers to produce an integrated
target plan for the operation. General Weyland's difficulties in obtaining tar-
gets for his aerial forces certainly reflected this weakness. It seems surprising
to find many of the same coordination problems that first appeared at
Cherbourg reappearing at Brest."
The tactical air experience at Brest, however, also revealed a positive
side, at least by the later stages of the operation. Air-ground coordination, in
particular, improved steadily during the campaign. U nlike the Cherbourg oper-
ation, air liaison officers now provided a VHP controller link that proved
invaluable. M issions directed by the division air liaison officer who coordi-
nated the use of fighter-bombers on airborne alert with division artillery bat-
teries proved especially effective. In contrast with air operations in North
Africa, air superiority and sufficient forces allowed the air-ground team to use
the air umbrella effectively. Normally the P-47 groups flew 12-ship squadron-
size missions and relied on three types of ordnance: two 500-lb. bombs, one
1,000-lb. bomb, or napalm-filled tanks. Brest was the first major test of
napalm employed on the continent, and the jellied gasoline bomb rapidly
became a popular and effective weapon when used properly. At Brest, fighter-
Ill
Air Power for Patton's Army
bombers dropped 133.2 tons of the firebombs. Airmen found tliat napalm
proved most destructive wlien used on targets already partially destroyed and
on deep shelters because of its adverse effect on the ventilation system. The
use of napalm in attacks with ground forces in close proximity to the target
suggests that air and ground forces had achieved a high level of coordination.
Near the end of the assault on Brest, which fell on September 18, 1944, the
XIX TAC historian could declare with good reason that "close air-ground
cooperation was paying big dividends."'^
Although the command lost only 12 aircraft during the entire September
operation in Brittany, in terms of future value, the operation proved far too
costly for the Allies. The German defenders destroyed the port facilities when
VIII Corps troops finally overran the fortress complex on September 18. By
that time the main Allied war effort had moved far to the east. Allied leaders
decided not even to rehabilitate the Breton ports, relying instead on port facil-
ities in Antwerp, Belgium. General Weyland, with some justification, could
complain bitterly: "While this enormous air effort was being concentrated on
such a small area. Third Army's eastward-pushing spearheads were covered
very thinly with fighter-bombers.... "™
Back on September 8, 1944, just three days after their joint planning
meeting at Chalons, Generals Gaff ey and Gay asked Weyland for more air sup-
port of Third Army's Mosel crossing. Evidently Patton had been unable to
secure a reduction in XIX TAC's commitment in Brittany, and the air com-
mander explained how SHAEF's current air requirements for Brest affected
the level of air support that he presently could furnish for the ground advance
at the M osel.^° In fact, on September 6, the day after the planning meeting at
Chalons, the command sent six of its eight groups on 33 of the day's 37 flying
missions to Brest. This heavy concentration of air power in Brittany continued
for the next two days. After that, however, the effort would decline to three
groups on September 9 and 10, and normally two groups thereafter until the
fall of Brest on the eighteenth. During this period. Third Army always
received air support from at least two groups, and after September 12, it nor-
mally claimed about two-thirds of XIX TAC's daily mission allotment.
Weather also played a role in allocating the air effort. Bad coastal weather at
Brest could, as it did on the sixth, result in aircraft being diverted to Patton's
front. Then, too, Patton carefully retained his airborne watch on the Loire
River flank. ^1
Third Army probably received more air support than Patton could have
expected after the Brittany assault began in earnest on September 3. Certainly
he could have benefited from additional air support in September, but proba-
bly interdiction, not close cooperation sorties over his columns, would have
proved most helpful. With the pause in mobile operations, his artillery now
could support front line troops preparing to cross the M osel. Tactical air sup-
port to isolate the M osel battlefield seemed likely to produce the greatest div-
112
The Battle for France
idends. Weyland recognized this, and tlie mission logs for mid-September
sliow tliat armed reconnaissance ratlier tlian armored column cover missions
predominated. Itis here, with interdiction targeting, that the Brest commitment
most seriously affected Third Army's potential for success. It is hard to avoid
the conclusion that a major interdiction program in the M osel -Rhine region,
designed to prevent an intensive German buildup along the M osel, offered the
best role for tactical air power at the time. No amount of tactical air power,
however, could move an army that literally had run out of gas at the end of
August, an army that remained largely stationary the entire first week of
September. Logistic constraints rather than insufficient air support proved to
be Patton's real Achilles heel.^^
Final Pursuit to the Mosel River
By September 18, 1944, with Brest captured and the Loire flank secured,
the command could devote its full force and attention to Third Army's M osel
front. As important as the Brest and Loire operations became. General
Weyland realized that his chief objective continued to be one of support for
Third Army's main offensive. This meant moving his groups to Chalons and
St. Dizier airfields in time to concentrate his air power in force on Third
A rmy 's f ront. C oul d X I X TA C rel ocate i ts groups to ai rf i el ds i n eastern F ranee
in time to affect favorably Third Army's operations? Weyland directed the
majority of his time during the month of September to that end and his per-
sonal touch was evident throughout the relocation process. On September 6,
the day after personally examining potential airfield sites, he joined General
Quesada at Ninth Air Force headquarters in Versailles, where they, along with
Generals Vandenberg and Nugent, allocated new airfields between the two tac-
tical air commands.
The XIX TAG received four fields in each region. Weyland approved of
the selection, but later he would lobby— unsuccessfully— to be given the
R ei ms-C hampagne ai rf i el d as wel I . T he mai n probi em was that only two of the
fields, Conde-sur-M arne (A-76c) and St. Dizier (A-64), could be used imme-
diately (M ap 4). Weyland had already chosen these as his roulement and emer-
gency rearming and refueling fields in the forward area, and on the evening of
September 6 he directed Colonel Ferguson to have the command's two air-
drome squadrons move in, and the Ninth Air Force's service command repre-
sentative to stock the fields with sufficient gas.
A s for the other sites, five needed to be surfaced with square- mesh track-
ing material and the remaining two required extensive rehabilitation. The plan
called for the St. Dizier cluster to have two of its fields operational by
September 10, and two more by the thirteenth. The engineers expected the
Chalons sites, with the exception of the roulement base, to be operational by
113
Air Power for Patton's Army
Maj. Gen. Richard E. Nugent,
assistant chief of staff for
operations, Ninth Air Force.
the eighteenth. That schedule, as Weyland learned, however, did not reflect
operational availability. Vandenberg allowed only two of Weyland's groups,
the 371st and 405th Fighter Groups in Normandy, along with the 100th Fighter
Wing headquarters at Le M ans, to relocate to the St. Dizier area on September
10 (Map 7). The remaining six groups would have to remain in place farther
west until the Brest Campaign's conclusion.^''
Weyland also wanted to move his advance headquarters to Chalons as
soon as adequate communications facilities could be established. The 405th
and 371st Fighter Groups would be controlled by the advance headquarters
until the 100th Fighter Wing became operational, while the 303d Fighter Wing
would continue to control groups in the rear area until they moved forward.
Complications arose in early September, when authorities decided to create a
new command, the XXIX TAC, commanded by General Nugent, from units
currently assigned to the IX and XIX TACs. General Nugent's command
would support U.S. Ninth Army operations on First Army's left flank. From
General Weyland's forces, the planners selected the 303d Fighter Wing for
transfer, along with two as yet unnamed fighter-bomber groups. N ugent's new
command would become operational on September 14,^^ and understandably
he wanted the 303d available on the fourteenth. Weyland objected because his
widely separated fields of operation required more decentralized command
114
The Battle for France
and control arrangements than the IX TAC and he declined to give up the wing
as long as the Brest Campaign remained active. As it turned out, General
Vandenberg allowed the 303d to remain with the X IX TAC one more day, until
September 15.
On September 10, the St. Dizier airfield became operational, and the
10th Photo Reconnaissance Group arrived from Chateaudun to fly missions
from its new site. Ninth Air Force agreed to use medium bombers to augment
resupply of the Third Army and declared the bomber resupply mission top pri-
ority. St. Dizier was the field selected. This troubled Weyland because it meant
his own units' operations would be shorted, and the runways would suffer
damage from the heavier airplanes. Yet, Third Army clearly needed special
help for its worsening supply plight. As it was, airmen did not deliver the first
bulk gas to St. Dizier until the twenty-first.^^ September 10 also proved mem-
orable for another reason. On that date XIX TAC moved its advance head-
quarters to Chalons. The command historian confidently proclaimed that this
move finally ended the communications problems between the two headquar-
ters. Although another two weeks passed before the relocation could be com-
pleted, joint planning no longer had to include the X-Ray echelon, and at
Chalons, Patton and Weyland were only 15 miles apart (Map 7).
While Weyland moved his forces to forward airfields as rapidly as pos-
sible, Patton confronted his supply problems. Supply shortages for the Third
Army began to occur in mid-August.^^ The gas situation emerged as the most
serious of all in early September. Even when fuel began arriving for the Third
Army as promised after the third— by air, road, and rail— the stocks never
reached the levels required. Ammunition stocks also had been seriously
depleted, especially for XII Corps divisions attacking in the Nancy area. By
September 12, Third Army had to request its entire airlift allocation be used
for ammunition requirements.
Despite shortages of ammunition and fuel, Patton's forces continued a
limited offensive, and on September 7, XX Corps units reached the Mosel
south of M etz and forced a crossing. By September 9, elements of the corps
established bridgeheads north and south of the city and U.S. artillery had
begun shelling the forts. At the same time, XII Corps launched a coordinated
assault to outflank Nancy. The corps could not capture the city, however, until
September 15, while the M etz forts proved impervious even to shelling by 8-
inch howitzers, medium guns. Even though all three corps had reached the
M osel, determined enemy resistance made itdifficultto maintain bridgeheads.
Progress became slow in all zones of the front.
Weyland realized the urgency of the situation. On September 12, he met
with General Gay and 12th Army Group officers about the requirements
involved in transporting hisair groups to their new locations in eastern France.
They had to come by rail from three different areas (Map 7), he explained, and
it would take four trains to transport ground elements of two groups. The assis-
115
Air Power for Patton's Army
tant chief of staff promised to asl< Patton and Gaffey for rail priority. Given tlie
transportation bottlenecl< and Tliird A rmy's own desperate needs in September,
itwas not surprising tliatXIX TAG ground eclielons improvised tlie move via
a combination of rail, road, and air transport.
The relocation experience of the 36th Fighter Group proved typical. It
had only been at site A-35 on the outskirts of Le M ans for 12 days when, on
September 19, the command notified it to pack up for the journey to Conde-
sur-M arne (A -76), 160 miles to the east (Map 4). The base was already famil-
iar to aircrews as a rearming and refueling base for the longer missions from
Le M ans. Unit personnel performed the now-familiar task of packing up tents
and equipment and splitting into advance and rear echelons. The air echelon
left on the nineteenth, with the rear following in stages. M ostof the equipment
made the journey by train, while the majority of the personnel arrived by C-47
aircraft. The group took nine days to complete the move, which must be con-
sidered admirable given the enormous transportation problems that existed
throughout the Allied area in September. On the other hand, the nine days in
transit loomed large for a command in a race against time.
Solving the enormous transportation problems that existed throughout
the Allied area in September 1944 must be credited to the personnel
of the Transportation Section, rear headquarters, Chalons, France.
116
The Battle for France
The group historian declared the field at Conde-sur-M arne, nine miles
northeast of Epernay, to be a virtual wilderness. What made the most impres-
sion on the new arrivals proved to be the mud, which they considered even
worse than they remembered in England. On the other hand, at least the for-
ward deployment meant better air support for the Army and it ended the prac-
tice of landing at forward fields to refuel, then flying the mission, and later
landing at one of the eastern airstrips because of bad weather. The 354th
Fighter Group historian recounted how, in past roulement operations, half the
group mi ght be grounded at forward bases or at thei r home base because of bad
weather, with some continuing to fly missions from the staging sites for sev-
eral days. For all its hardships, however, the roulement system clearly allowed
XIX TAG to provide air support quickly to front line units, and it ensured the
flexibility and mobility of tactical air power during the exploitation phase of
combat in France.^"
With Brest about to fall on September 17, 1944, General Weyland direct-
ed his combat operations officer, Golonel Ferguson, to have all XIX TAG
groups moved forward and ready by September 25, for "all-out" operations in
eastern France against German forces on the M osel.^^ Yet would there still be
time to make a difference against German defenses growing stronger by the
day? From September 19-25, most of XIX TAG'S missions consisted of armed
reconnaissance flights against transportation targets in the Rhine and Mosel
River valleys. ^2 Despite these mission assignments, there is no record that
General Patton complained thatthe air command now emphasized interdiction
rather than close air support. With his artillery available on an increasingly sta-
tic front, it made good sense to send the fighter-bombers to try to isolate the
battlefield. During this period, however, poor weather interfered with strike
missions, and tactical reconnaissance missions continued to report heavy
enemy traffic moving into the M osel region unhindered.
If General Weyland began to emphasize armed reconnaissance in late
September, he did not neglect close air support missions. M any of these sup-
ported the celebrated 4th Armored Division, now engaged in heavy combat
outside Nancy. Its division commander, however. General Wood, offered
Weyland his only other encounter over command authority. One of XIX TAG'S
communications officers. Lieutenant Kiljauczyk, was temporarily serving with
the 4th A rmo red pending reassignment. General Wood flatly refused to release
Kiljauczyk on the grounds that XII Corps retained authority in such matters.
Weyland, who did not brook lightly challenges to his authority, promptly tele-
phoned the Third Army chief of staff. General Gay, who just as promptly set-
tled the question in Weyland's favor. To their credit. General Patton and his
staff invariably supported their air commander.^^
Appropriately, the operational highlight that closed this period involved
the same 4th Armored Division. Early on September 24, General Gaffey called
Weyland and requested emergency air support for the division's Combat
117
Air Power for Patton's Army
Command B , which had come under heavy armored counterattack near N ancy.
Despite poor weather, Weyland dispatched two squadrons of the 405th Fighter
Group with 500-lb. bombs to rescue the force. Afterward, increasingly bad
weatlier forced them to land at Etain and Weyland took the crews over to meet
with a grateful Third Army staff. The following day, the 4th Armored Division
sent the command a proper message of thanks, confirming that the P-47s had
knocked out six Panzer tanks.
On September 22, 1944, both air and ground advance headquarters began
moving from tents to covered quarters at Etain, which meant that joint opera-
tions would be conducted together for the first time since early A ugust. Circuit
problems, however, cut out communications between Chalons and Etain,
delaying the arrival of the bulk of XIX TAC's advance personnel and commu-
nications equipment until the twenty-fourth. By this time. Colonel Ferguson
had met his commander's directive of having all groups in place for the all-out
effort on September 25. U nfortunately, bad weather made the twenty-fifth the
first totally nonflyable day of the month. That morning. General Patton, with
General Weyland in attendance, addressed his staff, announcing that Third
Army would go on the defensive until sufficient fuel and ammunition could be
obtained.^^ Typical of Patton, this would bean aggressive defense, one in which
limited attacks would be made to improve positions, while the troops prepared
to resume the offensive and attack on the N ancy-Frankfurt axis when ammuni-
tion and supply permitted. The Third Army-XIX TAC team had lost the race
against time and the mobile warfare of the summer and fall came to an end.
The French Campaign Reviewed
0. P. Weyland's report on XIX TAC's performance during the drive
across France boldly asserted that aerial operations on fronts 350 miles apart
proved "entirely practical because of the flexibility and range of air power."^^
The airmen made this possible in large part by decentralizing operations farther
than established doctrine recommended or than planners originally intended. At
one time, XIX TAC had groups based in three different areas and used roule-
ment practices to stage from several others. At the same time, while the com-
mand echelon maintained air force control of its far flung units with diverse
responsibilities, its task became increasingly difficult through late September.
Too often, perhaps. General Weyland found himself a fireman scurrying back
and forth, attempting to maintain control and ensure effective operations.
Air force tactical doctrine prescribed that control of air assets remain
concentrated in the hands of the air commander, especially at the theater rather
than the army level. Except for overall tactical air priorities, however. General
Weyland held that control at the army level, and only occasionally did army
interference demand his attention. During the battle of France, in only two
118
The Battle for France
instances did Weyland consider liis autliority as tlie air commander endan-
gered. One occurred wlienTliird Army operations officers at Le M ans attempt-
ed to direct close air missions; tlie other involved the assignment of the XIX
TAC communications officer serving with the 4th Armored Division. Neither
situation involved Patton or his immediate staff. In both cases, at Weyland's
request, Third Army's chief of staff acted promptly to settle the matter. The
ability of XIX TAC to respond rapidly to Third Army's changing combat sit-
uations during the exploitation phase overcame tendencies by army officers to
extend their authority into the air arena. From the beginning, the battle for
France emerged as a joint operations campaign that required and received a
high measure of cooperation and personal involvement. If the Allies enjoyed
overwhelming air superiority and possessed the organization and forces to
make joint operations function effectively, personal respect and trust among
partners proved decisive, as the XIX TAC -Third Army team demonstrated.
Air-ground cooperation, of course, began at the top. The professional
relationship between Weyland and Patton was one of admiration and mutual
respect. Although Patton's ability to improvise is well documented, Weyland,
too, showed that in the drive across France he could react to and meet chang-
ing situations with an equivalent flexibility of thought and action. However
inexperienced in combat he may have been on arriving in England, Weyland
proved himself a fast learner under fire. The XIX TAC commander emerges
from the record as the tactical air commander in fact as well as in name. When
ground authorities requested supporting action beyond the capabilities of his
forces, Weyland quickly refused, while asking the Ninth Air Force to furnish
the supporting action needed. Normally, these requests involved the use of
medium or heavy bombers and night fighters. Only during the initial assault
against heavily defended Breton ports in late August did Patton appear to dis-
agree actively with his air commander, who opposed the use of his fighter-
bombers in the attack. In this case, however, Weyland's hands were tied by
senior Allied leaders once they set air priorities and decided on maximum use
of air power to accelerate capture of the forts. A few days later, both Weyland
and Patton worked together to free tactical air and reduce its commitment in
Brittany during the major effort against the ports in early September 1944.
During the first two weeks of the campaign, Weyland met with Patton
nearly every day. Normally, the Third Army inner circle consisted of Patton,
chief of staff Gaffey, and assistant chief of staff Gay, although corps comman-
ders attended planning meetings that involved major offensives. Third Army
headquarters also conducted a regular morning briefing that Weyland attended
as often as possible. Beyond this, however, Weyland's diary reflects frequent
conferences and informal discussions with Patton and Gaffey on fast-breaking
developments that called for air force assistance. Weyland normally would
suggest the course of action and, once a course was approved, immediately
contact his combat operations officer, Ferguson, to arrange the details.
119
Air Power for Patton's Army
The fast pace of combat in France in tlie summer and fall of 1944 meant
that planning and decision-mal<ing frequently became more fluid, unstruc-
tured, and highly personalized. Only by mid-August did Weyland regularly
attend the XIX TAC -Third Army nightly joint operations meetings. Even
when the two headquarters were separated after August 14, Weyland did not
rely entirely on his X-Ray liaison unit at the Third Army command post;
instead he daily discussed with Patton and his staff current and future plans by
phone or teletype. As often as possible, he flew his Stinson L-5 light plane or
a P-47 aircraft from a XIX TAC airfield to Third Army's headquarters to dis-
cuss matters personally. Along the way, he invariably reconnoitered prospec-
tive airfield sites and visited his operating units.
If mobile warfare called for flexibility in action on Weyland's part, it
also compelled him to modify doctrine over the course of the campaign.
Although close air support remained third in priority for AAF tactical air
forces, XIX TAC gave "first priority [to] cover of the armored units."
M oreover, that support most often appeared in the form of air patrols dedicat-
ed to specific army units— the exact patrols that were found so objectionable
in North Africa because they prevented the concentration of air power.^^ This
close support of the armored forces and infantry divisions did not diminish the
role of interdiction, as armed reconnaissance mission results demonstrated.
M oreover, A 1 1 i ed ai r superi ori ty, the f i rst aeri al pri ori ty, made possi bl e the dual
emphasis on isolation of the battlefield and close support of the ground forces
in the first place.
If mobile land warfare called forth tactical air power's special capabili-
ties, it also exposed its limitations. The extended lines of communication and
the pace of the campaign put a tremendous strain on all elements of the com-
mand. The technology of the World War II communications network proved
especially sensitive and General Weyland repeatedly had difficulties establish-
ing and maintaining good circuits from advance headquarters to the wing
headquarters and the fighter control center. The signals network depended on
the fate of the airfield siting and construction program; both served to restrict
General Weyland
often flew in a
Thunderbolt from
one headquarters
to another to
coordinate
activities.
120
The Battle for France
XIX TAG'S efforts to keep up with a rapidly advancing Third Army. In
Northwest Europe, as in other Atlantic and Pacific theaters, air power was
built on the ground.
By September 1944, concern over aircraft shortages also arose within the
command. Although theX IX TAG never had to curtail operations because it pos-
sessed too few ai rcraft, it had to adj ust aeri al operati ons to account for the uneven
flow of replacement airplanes. For added flexibility. General Weyland set
squadron size at 12 rather than at 18 aircraft, a 33 percent reduction. M oreover,
the command, which normally possessed eight groups, found that flying more
than two group missions daily (or a total of 72 individual aircraft sorties) could
not be supported adequately, given the aircraft loss rate of 114 in A ugust and 72
in September, when combined with the uncertain arrival of replacements.^^
On the other hand, fighter-bomber groups never lacked for sufficient
numbers of combat pilots during the drive across France. In fact, groups com-
plained that they had too many pilots for available positions. Although aviator
losses for the command totaled 64 in August and 92 in September, the August
and September pilot replacement figures were 162 and 281, respectively.
Fatigue became a concern. The strain of continuous combat encouraged the
command to rotate pilots back to the states for recuperation normally after 200
combat hours. In doing so. Ninth Air Force policy, perhaps reflecting the over-
abundance of fighter pilots in the theater, required that such pilots be reas-
signed to other commands upon their return. Gombat losses, rotation, and the
heavy influx of new, inexperienced pilots led to a decline in the number of
experienced group, squadron, and flight leaders, and this proved the most seri-
ous and persistent problem for the command.
By September 1944, XIX TAG support units also felt the strain of the
long lines of communication and difficulties in transportation. Aircraft main-
tenance seemed less affected than supply. The command's assistant mainte-
nance and supply officer believed that maintenance in the command was the
best in Ninth Air Force because of the coordination between service teams,
depots, and the tactical units. The supply saga proved to be different, howev-
er. For the move to Ghalons, which began on September 10, 1944, and took
two weeks to complete, the supply section found itself short of truck transport
and had to resort to the expedient of pooling group vehicles and of securing
help from available rail and air transport.
On balance, the conduct of mobile warfare on several fronts presented
XIX TAG a challenge it never entirely mastered. Even the air commander's
resort to extremely decentralized command and control and a rearrangement
of mission priorities could not provide all of the air support wanted in Third
Army's blitzkrieg across France. If, as the command declared, it proved capa-
ble of supporting diverse ground operations on widely separated fronts, it
invariably found that concentrating its air power on one particular front caused
a restriction in its coverage on other fronts. This became most evident in
121
Air Power for Patton's Army
September when the Brest Campaign in the west demanded substantial tacti-
cal air involvement at the expense of air operations in eastern France. Even
with command of the air assured and substantial aircraft available, warfare's
competing priorities overtaxed General Weyland's available forces; these
events remind us that tactical air forces represent a costly, limited resource.
Only late in the month could he muster his forces and concentrate them on
Third A rmy's front. By this time, however, the plan of the air-ground team was
thwarted by a combination of bad weather, limited night flying capability.
Third Army supply shortages, and a new type of combat: positional warfare.
General Patton did not always appreciate the limitations of tactical air
power. As General Weyland recalled, after their early successes the Third
Army commander seemed to believe that the XIX TAG was capable of any-
thing. An overstatement, perhaps, but it reflected Patton's faith in the
army-air team, a faith that never faltered. Even when chances of success on
the M osel diminished sharply in late September, he still found time to send an
Associated Press reporter to Weyland to give the XIX TAG the publicity
Patton thought he deserved, and "link 3d Army-XIX TAG as a team.''^^^
Indeed, for the peppery, judgmental Third Army commander, over the course
of the campaign. General Weyland had proved himself and his command in the
face of formidable and constantly changing operational challenges. In late
September 1944, however, both men confronted another, more vexing assign-
ment. Static warfare now would challenge the XIX TAG -Third Army team as
never before. The Lorraine Campaign was about to begin.
122
Chapter Four
Stalemate in Lorraine
Of all U .5. Third Army's World War II campaigns, Lorraine would prove
by far the most difficult and frustrating. In early September 1944, however,
victory fever remained high and both officers and troops believed that Lorraine
would fall quicl<ly in General Patton's drive to the Rhine River. By month's
end, numerous obstacles conspired to thwart the best efforts of Third Army
and the XIX TAG; the air-ground team found itself embroiled in fighting sim-
ilar to the positional warfare of World War I on the western front.^
Autumn's Changed Conditions
In the fall of 1944, Patton's route for invading Germany south of the
Ardennes increasingly claimed less Allied attention. With few key military
objectives, it hardly compared with British General Montgomery's northern
approach through the Ruhr industrial area, and in the context of General
Eisenhower's broad-front strategy (Map 8), Allied leaders viewed Lorraine as
a secondary front. Natural terrain and man-made defenses favored the
Wehrmacht, and because the land rises from west to east, the Third Army
would have to fight uphill throughout much of the region, cross many rivers
and small streams, overrun numerous fortified towns, and breach two major
defensive systems, the M aginot and Siegfried Lines. ^
Among the German defensive systems, the M aginot Line would prove
somewhat less troublesome. The French sited and built it looking eastward.
The Siegfried Line, or West Wall, however, looked westward and remained a
formidable challenge for the invaders. Despite recent neglect, the fortifications
extended three miles deep in places and included numerous interconnected
concrete pillboxes, troop shelters, observation posts, and antitank obstacles.
Moreover, American troops in Lorraine dealt not only with reduced supplies
of ammunition and gasoline, but also with increasingly determined German
defenders able to take advantage of fortified positions and foul weather in the
fall. As if these were not enough challenges. General Bradley's 12th Army
Group, committed to the "northern approach," ordered Patton on September
10, 1944, to overrun the province of Lorraine and penetrate the Siegfried Line
with an army reduced from four corps to two, the XXth commanded by Lt.
Gen. Walton H. Walker, and the X Nth led by Maj. Gen. Manton S. Eddy. The
123
Map 8
European Theater
Reprinted from: Christopher R. Gabei, 'The Lorraine Campaign: An Overview, Sep-Dec 1944," (Ft Leavenworth,
Kan.: U.S. Army Command and Generai Staff Coiiege, 1985), p. 2.
Stalemate in Lorraine
October combat quickly became a stalemate, with Third Army ground forces
fighting limited engagements to improve their positions while building the
supply base for a major offensive in early November that, they hoped, would
take them through the Siegfried Line and on to the Rhine River.^
The Lorraine Campaign encouraged XIX TAC officials to consider the
capabilities, and especially the limitations, of tactical air power. Above all, the
airmen in Lorraine sought to use air power to break the stalemate on land.
Weyland, as commander of the XIX TAC, became the key figure in the plan-
ning of air support in three joint operations undertaken by the Third Army
against German border defenses during this period: first. Operation M adison,
the assault on Metz and the Mosel defenses in early November; second,
Operation Hi-Sug, the first major attempt to break through the Siegfried Line in
early December; and finally. Operation Tink, the most ambitious air and ground
operation of its kind, which the Allies planned to begin at the very time the
Germans launched their Ardennes counteroffensive known as the Battle of the
Bulge. Throughout the nearly three-month period in Lorraine, General Weyland
proved to be a resourceful and pragmatic commander, one intent on providing
maximum support for the ground forces. In that effort, doctrinal pronounce-
ments did not dictate field operations. Air superiority, interdiction, and close air
support received the attention he thought they deserved, but not necessarily in
that order. If the way in which Weyland mixed the mission priorities during the
campaign largely satisfied the needs of the ground commanders whom he sup-
ported, it frequently did not meet the expectations of tactical air purists.
Like Third Army, XIX TAC faced a radical readjustment of operations
in the fall conflict. With army elements drawn abreast in September on a 135-
mile front along the old French fortress line from Thionville to Epinal, most-
ly static action on a single front replaced the mobile operations of summer
(Map 9). The new combat conditions were not entirely unfavorable. The long,
good-weather flying days might be gone, but static warfare meant an end to
decentralized operations that compelled Weyland to support multiple fronts far
from home bases. As mobile as tactical air power could be, he had learned
through experience that the air arm could not keep pace with General Patton's
breakneck advance across France when communications links unravelled.
Now the command consolidated its forces, which enabled communications,
maintenance, and supply echelons to catch up near the M arne River region in
close proximity to Third Army. Air bases could be clustered within 50 miles
of Third Army's front lines, which reduced flying time to the target area by 50
percent. With the ground forces able to bring their medium and heavy artillery
into position, the airmen could leave a large portion of the close support mis-
sion to army gunners and thus devote more of their effort to isolating the bat-
tlefield in a concerted Allied program of air interdiction.''
By late September 1944, the Luftwaffe had become especially ineffective
in Third Army's zone of responsibility. During the month, the A Hied onslaught
125
MONTGOMERY
pRUSSELS^Aj
I A RNHEM
ROTTERDAM
Map 9
Northwestern Europe, 1944:
6th and 12th Army Group Operations,
September 15-November 7, 1944
1 y
so 40 50 60
SCALE OF MILES
OUSSELOORf
\ ' . ' .- ....<„, ■ -: „•••■
_C0L06NC
f LIEGE
15 Sepil.
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imcwiHteH.
12
^ J
♦ CjLUXEMBOUR^
1
VIRTON
BRADLEY
LONCUYON ^11**'
lis stpi.K - I
V POMT Tl
i - •••• ■ -"^
■ HANNMCtM
«»m^L»UTIRN . .
< V
17 Nyy. I
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SANNCCUCWiMf S ^
• iTCnC
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I |1X/ iPL^i."' KNOBELSOORfF ■
|^*'^T"^^-^V |(fif TM)[ .STR»SgOuB(L
L , \ l«- "^"l^ MANTEUFFEL ■
INIMCTCENTH
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: WIESE
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OE TASSIGNY
yy:'<f^..- . Sf I TZERLAND Dc*,
SOURCE: VincentJ . Esposito, ed., West Point Atlas of American Wars, V. 2, Map 59a, (New York: Praeger, 1960)
Stalemate in Lorraine
forced L uftwaffe I eaders to gi ve up ai r bases f i rst i n F ranee and then i n B el gi urn
and to withdraw their remaining forces into Germany. The dislocation pro-
duced by Allied attacks, the loss of unified command and control, poor servic-
ing facilities, and fuel shortages at the new bases in Germany meant that seri-
ous operations would have to await a rebuilding of the force. Moreover, at
month's end. Hitler redirected the air force's primary focus to the overhead
defense of the Third Reich against Allied strategic bombardment, rather than
to support the Wehrmacht on the ground in the west. Asa result, only 350 sin-
gle-engine fighters covered the approaches to the Rhine, while the remaining
western front command's 500 fighters moved to bases in northeast Germany to
help defend Berlin and the oil industry. By transferring aircraft from the east-
ern front as well, the aerial force defending the Reich numbered 1,260 single-
engine fighters, or nearly 65 percent of the total available single-engine fight-
er force.^
As the weather worsened with the onset of winter, XIX TAC's sortie fig-
ures plummeted from a high of 12,292 in August to 7,791 in September 1944,
then skidded to 4,790 in October and only 3,509 in November. Third Army's
slowdow n i n September and the worseni ng weather al so permitted the G ermans
to build up their defenses. For XIX TAG pilots this resulted in the worst flak
concentrations they had experienced thus far in the conflict.^
Like Patton's Third Army, Weyland's command also fought the Lorraine
Campaign with reduced forces. On September 23, 1944, when General
Bradley directed Third Army to assume a "defensive attitude,"' Weyland still
possessed all eight fighter- bomber groups comprising 288 aircraft, as well as
having the 10th Photo Reconnaissance Group from the summer campaign in
place in eastern France. By October 1, however, XIX TAG strength had
declined to five groups and 180 fighters: the Pioneer M ustang 354th Fighter
Group and four Thunderbolt units. The latter included the 358th Orange Tails,
the 362d M aulers, the 405th Raiders (perhaps the command's premier close
support group), and the celebrated 406th Tiger Tamers. In early November, the
command also lost the 358th Fighter Group to XII TAG, which supported
General Patch's U .S. Seventh Army on Patton's right flank in the Alsace area
of France. The only addition made to the command prior to the Ardennes
emergency of mid-December was the 425th Black Widow (P-61) night fight-
er squadron that was assigned on October 7.^
During the Lorraine Campaign, General Weyland directed air operations
from Etain, where XIX TAG advance headquarters moved on September 22,
1944. Administrative and support responsibilities continued to be exercised
through rear headquarters located at Chalons under his chief of staff. Colonel
Browne. The rear headquarters remained at Chalons throughout the fall and
early winter, but advance headquarters followed Patton to Nancy on October
12, where it remained until January 1945 (Map 9). The most significant change
in the fall came not in command organization but in flying control. With win-
127
Air Power for Patton's Army
Gen. 0. P. Weyland
awards an Air Medal
to Col. Roger Browne,
his chief of staff.
ter's weather impending, tlie equipment, organization, and procedures for nav-
igating and bombing assumed central importance for tlie command. Indeed, in
tlie campaign to come, tlieestablislimentin late September of a provisional tac-
tical control group to replace the fighter control center would prove a crucial
decision. 5
Refinements in Command and Control
During the drive across France, a fighter wing operated the fighter control
center far removed from advance headquarters. General Weyland became con-
vinced that this method of command and control was inefficient. Establishing a
tactical control group to perform the functions of navigation and operational
control at Etain solved the problem of divided responsibility, and it brought
together all aircraft warning units, the fighter control squadron, and the Y -ser-
vice radio intercept detachment in a single advance headquarters. Elements of
the group operated from a tactical control center located directly behind the
front, close by advance headquarters. In short, with consolidation of forces at
the Third Army front, decentralization came to an end. Communications now
would be centralized and positioned more directly under the command's con-
trol."
Radar also became important once the command undertook to support
position warfare in bad weather. Earlier, wing personnel at the fighter control
center had used an area control board to plot and handle aircraft movement.
Now, the tactical control center delegated this function to five fighter director
post radar facilities in the XIX TAC flight control system (Chart 4). Each for-
ward director post facility consisted of two British radars with their rotating
128
Stalemate in Lorraine
antenna arrays and control and communications trucl<s. Wliile personnel used
one radar to control aircraft, the other swept the area of coverage to provide
early warning. Field orders passed from joint combat operations centers to the
control group's tactical control center, where communications officers made
flight control assignments for each of the director posts based on their radar
coverage capability and handling capacity. The command sited the director
posts so that close air support coverage could be provided all along the Third
Army front. Data from the forward radars and radio equipment were transmit-
ted back to the tactical control center, which maintained a complete picture of
all scheduled missions and unknown and hostile tracks in the command area.
This control proved especially important for, and effective in, diverting fight-
er-bombers to targets called in by reconnaissance aircraft. In this capacity, the
director post units provided vectors to fighter-bombers on close cooperation
missions to bring the aircraft to a specific point where the ground air liaison
officer took over. Likewise, reconnaissance aircraft could be vectored to spe-
cific targets or general areas designated in the field order. Although these
director posts proved their usefulness late in the drive across France, General
Weyland and his staff considered that their limitations in range, radar resolu-
tion, and in the amount of control facilities available posed serious handicaps
for fall and winter flying conditions.
The answer appeared with the arrival in late September of the American-
built M EW radar AN/CPS-1, which supplemented the four forward director
post radar facilities in the XIX TAG communications network. This huge, 60-
ton radar offered a high-power output (3,000 mc), very short wavelength (10-
cm wave), and a rotating antenna which resulted in superb coverage and excel-
lent capability to accurately locate individual aircraft over a 200-mile front in
all directions. M EW radar operators used two sets of indicator tubes. Half con-
sisted of B-scans, which observers watched to report all aircraft in their
assigned sectors to the tactical control center. Gontrollers handled the remain-
ing tubes, known as planned position indicator tubes, to track assigned close
air support formations from takeoff to landing.
A Direction Finder (D/F) Fixer Station at each radar site identified the
formation and its bearing or position taken on all VHF transmissions. When
correlated with blips on the M EW's planned position indicator tube, the D/F
Fixer M EW could furnish a close air support formation leader with a variety
of flight and target information. With its British height-finder radar, the
M EW also could provide range, azimuth, and altitude of aircraft at ranges
approaching 200 miles. The microwave radar's resolution and inherent accu-
racy were greater than any other Allied search radar. During intermittent
testing in its first month of operation, the XIX TAG controllers found the
new microwave radar to be accurate to a range of one-half mile with an
azimuth error of one degree, which they considered acceptable for initial
operations.il
129
Air Power for Patton's Army
During August 1944, General Weyland had lobbied hard for improved
radar that would provide long-range control of his aircraft far from their oper-
ating bases. Its introduction was delayed by difficulties in finding and con-
verting one of the few alternate systems available. Only one of the five pre-
production models had been modified in the spring of 1944 for mobile opera-
tions in Normandy, but it remained with General Quesada's command. A sec-
ond M EW radar facility was operating as a fixed station on England's south
coast to control nighttime aerial operations and to track incoming V-1 flying
bombs. To answer Weyland's need for an offensive system, technicians made
this model mobile, or at I east transportable in vans, and sent itto the continent
on September 8. After a test exercise at Chateaudun, where it performed well,
the command moved it east to Nonsard, near Etain, on the twenty-second.
Clearly, Weyland also based his decision to reorganize the flight control func-
tion in September on the timely acquisition of this long-range radar.^^
The MEW radar immediately became the key element in XIX TAC's
operations for flight control and as a device to direct reasonably accurate air-
craft bombing in bad weather. Records for October 1944 indicate that it con-
trolled about half of the command's daytime missions and all of the night
photo and night fighter aircraft flights. In nighttime flying, it performed a
ground controlled intercept (GCI) function. The night missions were unprece-
dented for the tactical air forces and only the radar system made possible the
command's new night offensive capability. In a conference with Ninth Air
Force officers on September 27, Weyland learned that the tactical air com-
mands would likely receive night fighter squadrons of P-61s. Although the
Black Widows had been operational since early summer, their effectiveness
was less than desired because the tactical commands did not always know
when or where they would be airborne. With the arrival of the 425th (P-61)
Night Fighter Squadron in early October, XIX TAG controllers now had the
ground equipment needed to operate night defensive patrol and offensive
A P-61 night fighter equipped with roclcets.
130
Stalemate in Lorraine
intruder missions. Better command and control measures could not, however,
alleviate the fundamental and ever-present problem of too few night fighters
available to seriously impede German nighttime movements.
Not surprisingly, the command experienced initial technical and opera-
tor problems with its new and unfamiliar equipment. Asa I ine-of-sight instru-
ment, optimum location of any radar is crucial, a fact made clear at the first
site when communications officers discovered a blind spot to the southeast.
Although siting processes proved to be slow, by November 20, the AN/CPS-1
had been moved five times. Technicians estimated its antenna life would not
exceed ten movements from place to place, which became an incentive to
develop effective siting techniques and procedures as quickly as possible.
Although the command remained enthusiastic about the new M EW radar
and control faci I i ty from the start, the same coul d not be sal d for the SC R- 584,
a 10-cm microwave close control radar system. General Quesada's IX TAG
had experimented with the short-range SGR-584 for close control in a number
of operations in N ormandy. This radar promised to provide more accurate nav-
igation control, what airmen referred to as last-resort blind bombing. The set,
however, with only a 30-mile practical operating range, required more person-
nel than the more powerful MEW radar and it proved more difficult to oper-
ate. When conducting a mission, a formation would rendezvous at a given alti-
tude over a specified point with the lead aircraft positioned 500 feet ahead of
the formation. Once the SGR-584 locked on to the lead plane, the pilot could
take his formation to the assigned target. Gourse deviations en route could be
made without difficulty because a moving spot of light on the underside of a
horizontal map always indicated the plane's position to the controller. Under
static conditions and with adequate operator training, a modified SGR-584
later became a useful addition to winter operations during the Ardennes
Gampaign. During the winter, however, the XIX TAG long-range M EW radar
received an additional close-control modification, after which the command
preferred it to the SGR-584 system for both winter flying and the mobile con-
ditions of the drive across Germany in the spring of 1945.
A fter pay i ng a vi si t to X I X TA G to observe i nstal I ati on of the long- range
microwave radar in late September 1944, David Griggs, a technical advisor
with the U.S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe, urged Wey I and to acquire a num-
ber of new devices, including a ground-controlled (blind) approach (GGA)
system to aid aircraft landing in poor weather, as well as an SGR-584, which
he predicted could achieve blind bombing accuracy of 200 yards at a range of
30-35 miles. He admitted that "we have yet to learn how to make the most
efficient use of it operationally" and recommended the command accept civil-
ian experts from Ninth Air Force's Operational Research Section to monitor
the M EW radar and the SGR-584, when the latter became available.i'^
In early October 1944, Weyland requested that his staff study the Griggs
proposals and recommend a course of action. In contrast to officers at
131
Air Power for Patton's Army
Quesada's IX TAC, those at XIX TAC seemed wary of the civilians, perhaps
because of the extravagant claims made for the new technology. Although
Weyland's chief of staff Colonel B row ne favored the new equipment and civil-
ian operational research personnel, he told General Weyland that the senior
XIX TAC intelligence, operations, and signals officers would accept an "ORS
[Operational Research Section] in this Command as a necessary evil. No one
wants it particularly but we all feel that it may do some good." As it was, the
scientists and engineers proved their worth, especially after December 1, when
British Branch Radiation Laboratory scientist] . E. Faulkner arrived to coordi-
nate all radar-related activities of the command. In any event, with the addi-
tion of the MEW radar, the XIX TAC could now conduct effective long-range
armed reconnaissance and escort missions in Northwest Europe under winter
weather conditions. At the end of September, meanwhile, the XIX TAC pre-
pared for operations in support of Third Army's assault on German defensive
positions in the M osel region.
Stalemate along the Mosel
On the western front in early September 1944, General Eisenhower
believed Allied armies could reach the Rhine River before constraints on
resupply became critical or German defensive actions proved decisive. U nited
States First Army patrols crossed the German border near Aachen on
September 11, 1944, while Allied forces in southern France linked up with
Eisenhower's northern troops in pursuit of what appeared to be a thoroughly
beaten enemy. On the eastern front, Soviet armies had conquered the last areas
of Russian territory from the Germans and slashed into Poland. Overhead,
operating almost at will, British and American strategic bombers pounded
Germany day and night. The Third Reich indeed appeared on the verge of col-
lapse. By the end of September, however, the Allied optimism disappeared.^^
To begin with, M ontgomery's bold plan in the north, labeled Operation
M arket Garden, called for crossing three rivers in the Netherlands to outflank
the West Wall, while employing an airborne-assisted assault. Approved by
Eisenhower, British and American airborne troops were to seize a narrow cor-
ridor 65 miles deep and hold it, while Montgomery's British Second Army
raced through on its way to the Zuider Zee. The airborne portion of the oper-
ation began on September 17 and proved successful. Stiff German resistance,
however, slowed the British ground forces, while nearby German Panzer units
isolated the northernmost British airborne troops at a small bridgehead north
of the Lower Rhine, at Arnhem, the celebrated "bridge too far." Facing an
increasingly desperate situation, on September 25 and 26, 2,000 British para-
troopers, all that remained of an original 9,000-man force, retreated to the
south bank of the Rhine. Though most of these surviving paratroopers man-
132
Stalemate in Lorraine
aged to reach Allied lines, Operation Market Garden failed entirely.
M ontgomery's forces had stalled and they neither outflanked the West Wall
nor achieved a position for a strike against the Ruhr."
Allied armies farther south also experienced the brunt of renewed and
tenacious German resistance. General Hodges's U.S. First Army found itself
too greatly extended to exploit the West Wall penetrations achieved at Aachen
and in the Ardennes. In Alsace, the 6th Army Group made only limited gains
against Wehrmacht troops who used the forested foothills of the Vosges
Mountains to good advantage. Patton's U.S. Third Army drive bogged down
when his troops encountered determined German defenders at the M osel River
and the fortified city of M etz. By month's end, the Allied assault in the west
had stalled everywhere; it became increasingly clear that a sustained, renewed
offensive would have to await replenishment of supplies. Montgomery's
troops captured Antwerp on September 4, 1944, the Belgian port city crucial
to an Allied logistical buildup, but his forces neglected to clear all of the
Schelde Estuary of its German defenders. Despite being surrounded and iso-
lated, elements of Gen. Kurt Student's battle-seasoned F irst Parachute Army
now blocked passage of Allied shipping into and out of the port. Allied mili-
tary leaders, it must be said, at first failed to see the threat that this situation
posed and days passed before General Eisenhower pressured M ontgomery to
clear the Schelde Estuary of its German defenders. Newly promoted to Field
M arshal,^^ M ontgomery in mid-October finally turned his full attention from
Operation M arket Garden to the challenge on the Schelde. M uch to the sur-
prise of the baton-wielding British commander, despite intense assaults, the
tenacious Germans retained control of the port approaches for three more
weeks, until they surrendered on November 8. Even then, until the last mines
were located and cleared from estuary waters, Antwerp's port facilities
remained closed to Allied vessels until November 28, 1944!"
In the south, Omar Bradley's directive in late September 1944, called for
U.S. Third Army to assume a defensive posture and hold its position in
Lorraine until supplies reached levels that would permit a major offensive
(Map 9). Never content simply to hold a position, Patton advised Third Army
leaders on September 25 that a "defensive posture" did not imply an absence
of contact with the enemy. Rather, while consolidating, regrouping, and rotat-
ing personnel. Third Army would pursue "limited objective attacks" against
the enemy. 2° The X IX TAG supported these modest attacks and conducted an
interdiction program against the Wehrmacht, while preparing for the impend-
ing, major joint offensive.
During one of these attacks in late September 1944, General Eddy's XII
Corps found itself engaged in a sometimes desperate tank battle at Arracourt,
while to the north in the Gramecey Forest, a grim, close-quarters infantry
struggle continued for control of the bridgehead there (Map 10). On
September 26, while XII Corps consolidated its position northeast of Nancy
133
Map 10
German Counterattacks Against XII Corps: September 19-30, 1944
Reprinted from: C hristopher R. Gabel, 'The Lorraine Campaign: An Overview, Sep-Dec 1944," (Ft. Leavenworth,
Kan.: U.S. Army Command and Generai Staff Coiiege, 1985), p. 18.
Stalemate in Lorraine
and fought off heavy enemy counterattacks, General Patton ordered General
Walker in the south to capture the fortified town of M etz and sweep to the
Rhine. This would prove much too large a limited objective for two supply-
short infantry divisions and one armored division spread along a 40-mile front.
Earlier, Patton's forces assaulted the outlying forts to the southwest of the city
on a small scale, but using only the M ichelin road maps available to them at
the time, they had no idea of the challenge they faced.
As it turned out, when French archival maps and drawings of the
M agi not Line arrived from Paris in early October, Third Army leaders learned
that the old M etz fortress complex consisted of 43 interconnecting forts sur-
rounding the city on both sides of the M osel River. M any held up to 2,000 per-
sonnel and housed heavy artillery in steel- and concrete-reinforced turrets.
These heavily defended forts also would prove an equally tough targetforXIX
TAG fighter-bombers. On September 26, for example, while Walker's forces
prepared to attack Fort D riant five miles southwest of M etz, the 405th Fighter
Group, the Raiders, flew in bad weather to bomb the fort using 1,000-lb.
bombs and napalm. The results offered little encouragement to those hoping
for a quick victory (Map 11).
On September 27, the first good flying day in several weeks, the 5th
Infantry Division's probing attack at Ft. Driant met fanatical resistance. The
405th Fighter Group's six-mission supporting effort again had little effect in
spite of accurate bombing and correspondingly high praise from the ground
forces. Next day, XIX TAG stepped up its effort by sending squadrons from
four groups against the M etz forts for a total of 13 missions and 156 sorties.
The command preferred using squadron-sized missions and continued this
practice for most of the fall campaign. Under conditions of fewer daylight
hours and limited forces, XIX TAG provided maximum flexibility by allowing
a fighter group to divide its forces, if necessary, among close support and inter-
diction missions. It also became customary at this time for each squadron in a
group to be assigned to support a particular army division.
The M etz mission results of September 28, 1944, did not please General
Weyland. Using pillboxes and turrets as aiming points, his pilots had bombed
accurately, yet had apparently produced little damage. Ninth Air Force became
especially interested in the effect of napalm on the M etz targets and Golonel
Hallett, XIX TAG'S intelligence officer, undertook a study of firebomb results
during this attempt to subdue Ft. Dri ant's defenders. His investigation of attacks
on the twenty-eighth revealed that the 5th Infantry Division reported large fires
lasting as long as 30 minutes. When a reconnaissance patrol attempted to move
forward shortly after the bombing, however, German defenders in the fort kept
it pinned down by heavy and accurate automatic weapons fire. Unfortunately,
Hallett's findings proved typical for fighter-bomber attacks in support of
assaults against fixed, fortified defenses. The only note of encouragement was
that the attacks often stunned the defenders and temporarily silenced the guns.^^
135
Map 11
XX Corps Operations: October 1944
Reprinted from: Christopher R. Gabei, 'The Lorraine Campaign: An Overview, Sep-Dec 1944," (Ft Leavenworth,
Kan.: U.S. Army Command and Generai Staff Coiiege, 1985), p. 25.
Stalemate in Lorraine
General Weyland and his staff expressed their frustration at the evening
briefing on September 28. After assessing mission results, Weyland conclud-
ed that the forts were "not a proper target" for fighter-bombers. As in the case
of Brittany, his arguments focused on the high level of effort and cost for the
limited results achieved. On the previous day the command lost six aircraft to
flak and he expected the flak threat to worsen. For Weyland and his staff vet-
erans, itmusthave seemed likea rerun of theCherbourg and Brest Operations.
They believed the M etz fortifications required bombing by heavy and medium
bombers. General Weyland's air support efforts in the weeks ahead invariably
turned to coordinating heavy and medium bombers of the Eighth and Ninth
Air Forces for his joint air-ground plans.^'^
Later in the evening of September 28, 1944, Patton's chief of staff
Gaffey called Weyland to request priority support next day for M anton Eddy's
XII Corps, whose 35th Infantry and 4th Armored Divisions came under heavy
counterattack at Arracourt. Weyland promised Gaffey a squadron arriving
overhead every hour and he gave that assignment to the 405th Fighter Group.
The Raiders responded with 96 sorties and, in the words of the Army histori-
an of the Lorraine Campaign, "nearly leveled the village and cut up the
German reserves assembling there, thus weakening still further the ability of
the enemy to exploit an attack that had been initiated successfully." The
Wehrmacht counterattack was blunted.
In the weeks ahead. General Weyland found his reduced command
assuming new missions, straining the forces aval I able for each assignment. For
example, the command assumed responsibility for supporting XV Corps,
which had been transferred to the U.S. Seventh Army, on Third Army's right
flank, until aircraft of the XII TAC under Brig. Gen. Gordon P. Saville could
be based closer to the Lorraine front. Support for the 5th Infantry Division at
M etz decreased to only two squadrons of Curry's Cougars in the 36th Group.
A Ninth Air Force directive on September 25, established rail-cutting as the
first priority for fighter-bombers. This interdiction program intensified in
October, but it would be hampered by continuing bad weather and the rela-
tively small number of aircraft that Weyland had available and which he was
willing to commit to the effort. On September 29, the other groups of XIX
TAC flew fighter sweeps against German airfields or armed reconnaissance
against rail interdiction targets. Alongwith close support ofXX andXIl Corps
efforts, these three missions— close air support, interdiction, and fighter
sweeps— comprised the bulk of XIX TAC's flying in the Lorraine Campaign.
Bad weather on the last day of September prevented all flying and the winter
weather ahead threatened an effective interdiction campaign against German
ground forces. With the XIX TAC grounded. Third Army might rely on its
artillery for close support to continue its limited-objective attacks. The inter-
diction rail-cutting program, however, received a setback every day of bad
weather. Only continuous air attacks on transport held the prospect of keeping
137
Air Power for Patton's Army
German supply lines shut and the Third Army battlefield isolated. The
European weather worsened.
General Weyland faced bad flying weather and conflicting aerial priori-
ties throughout the October 1944 buildup. As part of a major Allied bombing
effort, Ninth Air Force announced an expanded interdiction campaign on
October 2 against rail traffic, marshaling yards, and bridges on the Rhine and
Saar rivers. At the same time, XIX TAG was expected to furnish close air sup-
port to the Third Army because, for General Patton, any defensive stance on
the ground involved limited-objective attacks against Germans. In that cause,
M aj. Gen. S. LeRoy Irwin's 5th Infantry Division struggled to take Fort Dri ant
during the first two weeks of October, suffering an incredible 50 percent casu-
alty rate before Patton conceded failure. As early as October 3, with both
Patton and Weyland observing. General Irwin's forces breached perimeter
defenses of the fort assisted by strong air support from the 405th and 358th
Fighter Groups, after medium bombers from the IX Bombardment Division
had first stunned the German defenders." Third Army lauded the support of
both fighter groups.
It was one thing to penetrate Ft. Dri ant's outer defenses and quite anoth-
er to gain access to its underground, interconnected defensive network. German
officer school candidates, who happened to be battle-hardened former NCOs,
led a ferocious German counterattack which halted the American forces.
Intense fighting continued around the fort until October 12, when Patton reluc-
tantly directed his forces to withdraw and maintain a containing operation.
Elsewhere along the front, however, Patton's so-called defensive operations
escalated. The XX Corps' 90th Infantry Division continued methodically to
reduce M aizieres-les-M etz, the town six miles north of M etz that blocked the
only unfortified approach to the city. Other units laid siege to other Metz
fortresses, while forward units pressed ahead to enlarge bridgeheads across the
Saville,
I Air Force
138
Stalemate in Lorraine
M osel north and south of the city. During Third Army's buildup for the planned
N ovember offensive, it continued to rotate troops out of the front line for train-
ing in the reduction of fortifications (Map 11).
General Patton became increasingly frustrated with the lack of forward
progress during October 1944. At the army's morning briefing on October 13
he urged hi s ai r commander to cl obber the D ri ant f ort i n retal i ati on f or the casu-
alties it had inflicted on his 5th Infantry Division. Weyland turned that task over
to his operations officer, Colonel Ferguson, but little aerial retaliation occurred
prior to the major offensive in early November. The command flew only one
bombing mission against the M etz fortifications during the last two weeks of
October. Directed against three small fortified towns south of the city, it
i nvol ved but one squadron from the 405th F ighter G roup on the twenty-second.
Weyland considered interdiction targets more important than the fortifications,
and General Patton, who seemed to have recovered from his frustration, did not
pressure the air arm further.
Both Patton and Weyland could agree that the key to unlocking the M etz
fortress complex lay in a massive bombing effort in conjunction with a major
land attack. Earlier, on October 2, 1944, Weyland and his staff had met with
General Vandenberg, Ninth Air Force commander, to discuss responsibilities
and procedures for use of the medium and heavy bombers in tactical opera-
tions. They decided to request heavy bombers for the planned offensives in the
First and Third Army areas and they agreed on 48 hours' notice to complete
necessary arrangements. Even at this early date in the Lorraine Campaign, air
leaders had begun long-range planning for the joint operations to come.^^
Meanwhile, XIX TAC concentrated on the rail interdiction program,
with General Patton'sfull support. On October 5, Ninth Air Force revised tar-
get assignments for its medium bombers and fighters with inner and outer lines
of interdiction. It divided the targets among tactical air commands according-
ly. The X IX TAG'S allotment consisted of eight rail lines in Third Army's sec-
tor from Coblenz to Landau and ten lines east of the Rhine. On October 7,
Patton lifted the ban on bridge destruction, although it was not until after the
nineteenth, when Ninth Air Force again directed all four tactical air commands
to make interdiction their top priority, that mission results showed a pro-
nounced number of bridge targets attacked. ^° The XIX TAC historian on
October 7, 1944, claimed the "all out campaign against RR traffic was paying
dividends" because the enemy had resorted to barge traffic on the Rhine-
Marne canal. Understandably, policing this canal also became a major com-
mand activity and command pilots achieved good success, especially after the
362d proposed and carried out a lock-destroying mission. Nevertheless, recon-
naissance reports after the first week in October indicated German traffic con-
tinued to be heavy west of the Rhine, which tempered initial optimism.
A rmy chief of staff General M arshall visited Third A rmy headquarters on
October 7, 1944, and praised the accomplishments of theThirdArmy-XIX TAC
139
Air Power for Patton's Army
team. He also attended what General Weyland referred to in his diary as a spe-
cial briefing. In fact, Weyland, too, attended these special briefings either in
General Patton's personal van or the Third Army chief of staff's office prior to
the regular Third Army morning staff briefing. These particular briefings nor-
mally occurred every morning and, as only became known publicly many years
later, involved Ultra communications intelligence. By early October, Patton had
received Ultra assessments for more than two months. Ultra specialist Maj.
M elvin C. Heifers joined Third Army at its Knutsford headquarters shortly after
Patton's arrival in England, but remained on the sidelines and unknown to Patton
until his information, so vital to Third Army operations, was brought to Patton's
attention. Thisoccurred on Augusts, when Ultra forecast a German counterat-
tack in the direction of Patton's troops at Avranches. Armed with this informa-
tion. Major Heifers convinced Third Army's intelligence chief. Col. Oscar W.
Koch, that Patton must be briefed on this German plan. Duly impressed by the
Ultra data, Patton expressed surprise that he had not been informed earlier of
Helfers's intelligence role at Third Army. In any event, the next morning the
General summoned Heifers to personally conduct the first of what became rou-
tine Ultra briefings for Patton and a few other select Third Army officers.
Although General Weyland began attending the Third Army Ultra brief-
ings consistently only in early October, he had been receiving Ultra data on
Luftwaffe plans and dispositions since mid-J une, while he was still in England.
During operations in France, his fireman duties in support of Third Army's
offensive often precluded regularly scheduled briefings from his own Ultra
specialist, M aj. Harry M . Grove. In addition to meeting with General Weyland
when feasible. Major Grove provided the XIX TAC's intelligence chief.
Colonel Hallett, with daily updates on German air force activities. By mid-
October, and with the Lorraine Campaign well underway, Weyland brought
Colonel Browne, his chief of staff, and M ajor Grove to the Third Army Ultra
briefings when Luftwaffe data proved especially important.
There is little disagreement about Ultra's importance in supplying Third
Army with the enemy's ground order of battle information on a regular basis,
but its usefulness for the tactical air arm appears more questionable. General
Ouesada has argued that Ultra's main contribution was "to instill confidence
and provide guidance to the conduct of war... rather than the tactics of the
war." No doubt this came from following changes in the Luftwaffe's air order
of battle. Indeed, Ultra allowed Allied intelligence officers to follow the major
Luftwaffe recovery, redeployment, and first serious use of jet fighters in the
fall. Though one can argue that Ultra's information provided knowledge of
strong enemy concentrations, which meant heavy flak areas to avoid, the air-
men seem to have relied on the Y -service radio intercept operation for their
best intelligence of immediate Luftwaffe plans. Beyond this, tactical and pho-
tographic reconnaissance assured the command of systematic coverage of the
battle zone, weather permitting.
140
Stalemate in Lorraine
Despite a weak Luftwaffe presence on Third Army's front, General
Weyland remained determined to guard against a possible resurgent air threat.
The command's intelligence chief, Colonel Hallett, studied the problem and on
October 6, 1944, he advised the combat operations officer that the presence of
350 German fighters at 30-40 airfields in the Saar represented a force that
could not be ignored. H e suggested that higher headquarters develop a coordi-
nated plan of attack. Failing this, XIX TAG should hit all of the airfields with-
in range of its fighter-bombers. Hallett awaited pictures from the 10th Photo
Reconnaissance Group, whose efforts had been hampered by the weather,
before he prepared the final target folders. U nknown to Weyland's intelligence
chief, the Luftwaffe had already begun building up its forces for a counterat-
tack that Hitler began planning as early as mid-September. On October 8,
Weyland sent three groups against some key German airfields where tactical
reconnaissance reported a major buildup. Led by P-51s of the 354th Fighter
Group, command pilots attacked five airfields with impressive results. They
claimed seven aircraft destroyed in air combat, 19 more on the ground, and
possibly an additional 26 damaged. Although General Weyland continued to
worry about the Luftwaffe threat, hisforcesdid not strike German airfields pur-
posefully again until the end of the month. The command focused on interdic-
tion, but bad weather continued to hamper that effort. Following the attacks
against German air forces on October 8, for example, air operations had to be
scrubbed for the next two days.^''
General Weyland used the nonflying time to deal with support problems.
Airfields, especially, needed attention. The persistent rains of September and
October 1944, along with heavy use of command fields by heavily laden C-47
transports resupplying Third Army, had taken their toll on runways and taxi-
ways. On October 8, Weyland inspected the airstrip at Etain, which he wanted
as the future base of the 362d Fighter Group and the 425th Night Fighter
Squadron. The C-47 landings had ruined the runway, and the previous
evening's rain forced engineers to abandon their attempt to lay Hessian strip,
the bituminous surface used most frequently during the drive across France.
The engineers required three or four dry weather days to complete a runway,
and rain fell nearly every day. General Weyland strongly argued for switching
to pierced steel plank surfacing, but Ninth Air Force refused, citing availabil-
ity and shipping weight. A steel-plank airfield required 3,500 tons of material,
while only 350 tons of Hessian proved sufficient to cover the same field. At
Vitry, rain in October softened the runway to the point where it became unser-
viceable. Consequently, the 358th Fighter Group Orange Tails moved to
Mourmelon, home of the 406th Fighter Group. From the command's view-
point, however, two groups operating from a single base placed an undesirable
strain on personnel and facilities. Weyland also lobbied to have a pierced steel-
plank field laid at a future site near M etz for two groups, and in this case he
succeeded.
141
Air Power for Patton's Army
By late October 1944, pierced steel-plank runways also experienced
rapid deterioration and required considerable maintenance. Officials referred
to reduced operations resulting from these conditions, although the record is
not specific or entirely clear how seriously the problem affected operations.
The engineers knew, however, that the incessant rains loosened the grading
and soil compaction. The solution seemed to be a crushed rock base for all
airstrips, but this meant finding rock in sufficient quantity, crushing it and
shipping it efficiently in spite of its enormous weight. If the rains of October
created one set of operational problems, the cold weather expected in
November would intensify difficulties with the Hessian-surfaced fields
because the cold would crack the tar seal, thus permitting propeller wash to
blow the stuffing loose. Had they been granted three or four more days of good
weather in early October, the engineers declared, they would have been able to
winterize all XIX TAC airfields before the onset of severe weather. The com-
mand's experience in October underscored an oft-forgotten axiom that "air
power begins and ends on the ground. "^^
Despite the rain and mud in October 1944, the command's aircraft main-
tenance operation experienced no major difficulties, something that could not
be said for supply. Although the supply situation improved with the establish-
ment of dumps in the forward area, key problems affected the command
throughout the winter. Back in September, the command reported shortages of
replacement P-51 aircraft and related spare parts, yet repeated requests for
resupply were not met. By November, the 354th Fighter Group, for example.
The lab of the 10th Photo Reconnaissance Group processing recce photos.
142
Stalemate in Lorraine
reported a shortage of 30 aircraft in the group. Given tlie Eiglitli Air Force's
priority claim on P-51s for bomber escort duty, no solution appeared in sight.
The P-51 problem doubtless contributed to a decision in November to convert
the Pioneer M ustang group to P-47s. Although officials attributed this con-
version to the need for more fighter-bomber support and reduced air defense
requirements, the adverse effects of insufficient replacement aircraft on the
XIX TAC mission doubtless contributed to the decision.
The flow of P-47 planes and parts, meanwhile, remained uninterrupted
during October and November. By mid-October, all groups had at I east the pre-
scribed 70 aircraft; by the end of October, the new P-47D-30 model with its
improved electrical bomb release began arriving. Soon it became the dominant
Thunderbolt model in theater. The only subsequent improvement involved
installation of the underwing pylons for rocket launching. The 362d Fighter
Group was next in line after the 406th for five-inch rockets, but a shortage of
parts delayed the conversion. By the end of October, only one squadron of the
362d completed this modification.^^
Finally, theXIX TAC commander had to deal with pi lot replacement. The
problem was not that the command received too few fighter pilots— although
only 99 pilots arrived in October 1944 to fill the 162 vacancies, the surplus of
63 from the month before balanced the allotment. The main difficulty involved
the experience level of the newly arriving airmen. Early in the month the com-
mand historian observed that new pilots had very little flying time in fighters
and appeared especially weak in gunnery and bombing. Furthermore, the com-
mand had neither the facilities nor sufficient gasoline to train these replace-
ments properly. Although General Weyland complained to General Vanden-
berg. Ninth Air Force did little until December 10. That day Weyland evident-
ly had had enough; he refused to accept 11 replacement pilots who collective-
ly had almost no training in fighter operations. Ninth Air Force approved his
decision and promised to look into the stateside training program.
Planning an Offensive
While XIX TAC carried out a variety of missions in support of Third
Army's limited-objective attacks and worked to improve the command's logis-
tics and control functions. General Weyland and his staff joined their col-
leagues at Third Army headquarters in planning a major offensive. The logis-
tic situation remained the key hurdle. During mid-October 1944, while
Patton's forces continued fighting house-to-house in M azieres-les-M etz and
consolidating their positions in theX II Corps area. Third Army supply officers
worked diligently to build up supply depot stocks through a rigorous conser-
vation and rationing program, highlighted by a 25 percent reduction in the
gasoline issue.""
143
Air Power for Patton's Army
While Third Army focused on logistics, the XIX TAC concentrated on
its rail interdiction program. Once the heavy overcast lifted on October 11,
1944, for example, the command followed the practice of designating one
group, usually the 405th Fighter Group, for close air support, while the other
four flew armed reconnaissance missions. After October 23, however, the
command stopped flying scheduled ground force support missions and devot-
ed its entire effort to armed reconnaissance, escort, and at times, fighter-
bomber sweeps of German airfields.
Waiting to take the offensive while his supply base was replenished
offered no comfort to General Patton. On October 18, he advocated a major
offensive even if it had to be undertaken on a shoestring. Atthe morning brief-
ing, his staff suggested two alternative plans for enveloping M etz and pushing
on to the Siegfried Line. Although in attendance, Weyland made no comment
when the Third Army commander called for an immediate offensive, but he
personally considered it ill-advised to attack before all major army elements
were fully equipped and prepared. Despite the co-equal intent of published
doctrine, Weyland and Patton were not on an equal footing in rank and
Weyland never pretended otherwise. In any case, the joint planning process
was officially underway. Armed with Third Army's plans, on October 19,
Weyland prepared a directive for his staff to develop an air plan for the offen-
sive. At the same time, another air plan called for sending fighter-bombers
against the E tang deLindreDam in what would prove to bean impressive XIX
TAC first^i
The dam-busting idea had been raised a few days earlier, on October 13,
1944. The dam lay three miles southeast of Dieuze and right in the path of XII
Corps' proposed line of advance. The corps staff feared that the enemy might
destroy the dam during their assault and cause the Seille River to overflow,
isolating forward elements and forestalling the entire Third Army advance.
This dilemma foreshadowed another that would confront Allied armies in the
north on an even larger scale in November, when First and Ninth Armies on
their way to the Rhine needed to cross the Roer River. Germans on the high
ground at Schmidt in the Huertgen Forest controlled two dams on the upper
reaches of the little river which, if opened, could flood the low-lying plain and
forestall the Allied advance. In Lorraine, XII Corps wanted the Seille River
dam destroyed in support of its limited-objective attack. Because of the preci-
sion required, the planners canceled the original request for heavy bombers in
favor of fighter-bombers.
Weyland assigned the task to Col. J oseph Laughlin, the aggressive com-
mander of the 362d Fighter Group, which frequently received the command's
most challenging missions.''^ Colonel Laughlin and several officers spent
hours at headquarters in Nancy studying large-scale photographs taken by the
31st Photo Squadron and diagrams and specifications obtained from local
records. They even consulted a professor from the University of Nancy. The
144
High-level strategy dictated breaching the Etang de Lindre Dam at
Dieuze, France, before the Third Army offensive in November, preventing
the Germans from releasing the water between Ration's advancing
troops and thereby separate them from supplies after the attack had
begun. The photo below shows the extent of the breach and how
successfully the 362d's Thunderbolts carried out their mission
in spite of a difficult target defended by very heavy flak.
145
Air Power for Patton's Army
preparation paid off liandsomely. On October 20, witli Colonel Laughlin in the
lead, two P-47 squadrons armed with 1,000-lb. armor-piercing bombs, dove
from 7,000 to 100 feet in the face of heavy flak and scored at least six direct
hits. The bombs made a 90-foot break in the dam; the resultant flood waters
engulfed the town of Dieuze and isolated German units in the area. The XII
Corps used the disruption caused by the flood to launch a successful limited-
objective attack three days later.''^
The next day, October 21, 1944, the 405th Fighter Group flew missions
in support of three different corps. One of them, bombing a town and troop
concentrations, assisted XII Corps' 26th Infantry Division in its limited-objec-
tive attack 22 miles east of Nancy that elicited high praise from the ground
controller. General Weyland had to be encouraged when General Spaatz visit-
ed the air command that day and remarked that "the Third U.S. Army-XIX
TAC team is the finest we have yet produced." Even if Spaatz's declaration
was intended only to boost morale, the record of this air-ground team already
merited praise.^"*
Although bad weather severely curtailed flying during the last week of
October, team officials continued to work on the joint plan for Third Army's
offensive. Scheduled to begin on November 5, 1944, the Third Army plan
called for crossing the M osel north and south of M etz, entirely bypassing the
strongest forts, and pushing on to the Rhine River. M etz would be taken later
by XX Corps through encirclement and infiltration.''^ On October 22,
Weyland's intelligence and operations chiefs presented the air plan, which the
air commander discussed the next day in a joint meeting with General Patton,
the Third Army staff, and the two corps commanders. Essentially the air pro-
posal called for a large preliminary air assault to neutralize the forts and
strongpoints. Heavy bombers would pound the outlying Metz forts while
medium bombers hit smaller forts, supply dumps, and troop concentrations in
two key areas. The XIX TAC fighter- bombers would attack all known com-
mand posts in the vicinity as well as fly armed reconnaissance missions
against all road and rail traffic and enemy airfields in close proximity to Third
Army'sfront. (Atthistime, General Weyland did not know whatwould be the
size of the bombing force available for Third Army's use.) Army leaders
expressed satisfaction with the plan, and Weyland indicated he intended to
request two additional fighter groups for tactical support. The planners dubbed
this offensive Operation M adison.''^
Despite the fact that Generals Patton and Weyland had agreed on the
joint plan, the path ahead during the next week and a half was far from smooth.
For one thing, higher authorities reminded them immediately that the Third
Army sector of the Allied front continued to be judged second in importance
to the First Army area opposite Aachen. Originally, Allied plans called for the
main effort against the Siegfried Line to be led by General Hodges's First
Army. Now that Aachen had been secured, Hodges's plan called for an attack
146
Stalemate in Lorraine
toward Cologne south of the Ruhr, also beginning November 5. Politics and
prestige, however, never seemed far removed from Allied decision-making
and Field M arshal M ontgomery delayed returning an American infantry divi-
sion borrowed earlier from the 12th Army Group. Under these circumstances,
General Bradley, 12th Army Group commander, postponed First Army's
offensive and decided to allow General Patton to begin Operation M adison on
the fifth. First Army would then launch Operation Oueen, an attack against the
Roer River defenses, a week after the initiation of Operation M adison (Map
9). At the end of October a decision between the two planned offensives had
not yet been reached.''^
Meanwhile, Third Army's supply shortfalls continued. Even though
ammunition and rations stocks improved, available gas reached only 67 per-
cent of the level requested. General Weyland had his problems, too. M eeting
with Ninth Air Force Commander General Vandenberg on October 27, he
learned that not only would XIX TAC not receive two additional fighter
groups for Operation M adison, but the command instead would lose another
group, this time to General Saville's XII TAC for its operations in southeast-
ern France. M oreover, as the Ninth Air Force commander explained. General
Bradley's focus on First Army in the north meant dividing the fighter groups
that remained: six for General Ouesada's IX TAC and four each for General
Weyland'sXIX TAC and General Nugent'sXXIX TAC.^^
Weyland objected vigorously, but to no avail. The next day, he met with
his wing commander. Brig. Gen. Homer "Tex" Saunders and Colonel
Ferguson, combat operations chief. If the decision could not be overturned,
they recommended relinquishing the 358th Orange Tails. Still upset, Weyland
expressed displeasure to General Patton later that day in a formal memoran-
dum. The proposed fighter group allotment, he asserted, "appears most
inequitable, and if it goes through we are in a bad way." The ratio of fighter-
147
Air Power for Patton's Army
bomber support for the offensive, he averred, penalized Third Army because
the IX and XXIX TAC groups would be supporting proportionally smaller
ground forces. He reminded General Patton that all of the Ninth's 13 bomber
groups remained under centralized control and could be shifted easily to influ-
ence the action in any area. The rapid shifting of fighter support, divided
among three tactical air commands, under the circumstances could not be
depended upon to meet exigencies. He considered it essential that XIX TAC
be allowed at least five groups for Operation M adison. "I contend," he said,
"that First Army can still have priority without robbing us."''^
Patton promptly called General Bradley on the matter. Then he. General
Weyland, and Col. Paul D. Harkins, Third Army's deputy chief of staff, drove
to Luxembourg on October 29 to discuss the issue further with Bradley and
Ninth Air Force officers. Their argument did not prove convincing. As Patton
confided to his diary: "tried to move a fighter-bomber group for Weyland but
lost all the air guys to First and Ninth Armies." The 358th Fighter Group pre-
pared to transfer prior to the offensive, even though XII TAC would not play
a significant role in Operation M adison. In the end. Ninth Air Force allowed
the Orange Tails to fly one last operation for XIX TAC after all. ^°
The bad weather ended temporarily and October 28 and 29 became two
of the best flying days of the month. The command used its good fortune to
concentrate on interdiction targets: rail and road bridges both east and west of
the Rhine. The armed reconnaissance missions brought out the Luftwaffe this
time, and the 354th Fighter Group M ustangs again set the pace in air encoun-
ters. Attacked by more than 100 Bf 109s near Heidelberg, the pioneer group
tallied claims of 24 destroyed and eight damaged in aerial combat, while los-
ing only three of its own. Weather again forced cancellation of the interdiction
program the last two days of the month. By now the command began focusing
on bridges rather than rail cuts, and it ended the month claiming 17 bridges
destroyed and 22 damaged. The command admitted, however, while the
bridges proved to be suitable targets, the program achieved only limited suc-
cess. General Weyland did not question sending squadrons of 12 aircraft, each
armed with two 500-lb. general -purpose bombs, against each bridge. The
bridges, however, proved to be heavily defended by flak batteries and very dif-
ficult targets to hit. As later studies would show, the fighter- bombers would
have had greater success against bridges if they had been armed with the larg-
er, 1,000-1 b. bombs. M oreover, like the rail -cutting program, the airmen need-
ed better flying weather to bomb the German-held bridges consistently. Too
often mission reports revealed that pilots flew against secondary targets
because of overcast conditions in the original target area. When the command
reviewed its flying effort for October 1944, it was not surprised to find that
only 12 days had been completely flyable, 12 partially flyable, and seven total-
ly nonoperational. Forecasters predicted the weather in November would be
worse.^^
148
Stalemate in Lorraine
A s October drew to a close, Weyland looked back on a month in which his
command contended with bad weather, strengthened German defenses. Third
Army's inability to mount a sustained offensive, and requirements that called for
a battlefield interdiction program and a variety of additional missions— and all
had to be managed with reduced aerial forces. At month's end, however, plans
for Operation M adison, aimed at crossing the M osel and driving for the Rhine,
neared completion. Patton seemed determined to attack the Germans entrenched
in Lorraine even though the offensive was viewed elsewhere as a secondary
attack and even though his ground forces were short-handed. Third Army sup-
ply officers still believed a major offensive could not be sustained at this time,
but D-Day remained set for November 5, weather permitting.
From Metz to the Siegfried Line
Throughout the week preceding Operation Madison, General Weyland
met daily with the Third Army staff on matters of coordination, timing, and
target priorities. As the air commander on the air-ground team, he played a
crucial role in the planning and execution of the joint operation. On November
1, 1944, for example, two officers from Eighth Air Force Bomber Command
visited Weyland to discuss M adison targets for their heavy bombers. Next day
he attended a conference at T hi rd A rmy headquarters, w here a vi si ti ng G eneral
Bradley received a detailed review of Operation M adison. Bradley told Patton
that First Army could not be ready to attack until the tenth; Patton replied that
his Third Army could attack on 24 hours' notice. Bradley gave him the "green
light" to launch Operation Madison on Novembers."
During this conference. Third Army supply officers happily noted that the
logistics situation continued to improve, especially as a result of bulk gasoline
shipments delivered by rail. How much of this improvement represented unau-
thorized supplies purloined from other commands remains unclear. Patton sel-
dom interfered with the innovative activities of his supply officers, who contin-
ued to enhance a notorious reputation for "requisitioning" army materiel origi-
nally destined elsewhere. After other ground officers discussed various minor
changes in the assault plan, Weyland presented the air plan to Generals Bradley
and Patton. H e discussed the various adjustments that had been made in terms of
lines of attack and specific targets and he explained realistically what could be
expected from his forces with his command reduced from five to four groups of
fighter-bombers. With bad weather anticipated and the shorter flying days of win-
ter to contend with, the ground forces would receive about 25 percent of the aer-
ial support they had received in the summer. Consequently, the timing of various
parts of the operation would be essential if air support were to achieve its objec-
tives. Clearly Weyland attempted to make a case for receiving air reinforcements
now thatOperation M adison would lead theAllied assault on the western front.^''
149
150
Stalemate in Lorraine
On November 3, 1944, Patton, Weyland, and their staffs conferred again
at T lii rd A rmy lieadquarters on target pri ori ti es and tlie ti mi ng of attacl<s f or tlie
various infantry and tanl< units. L ate tliat morning, General Weyland revised the
air plan to include maximum bomber support. Afterward, Ferguson and Hallett
flew to Ninth Air Force headquarters with the published plan to request full
heavy bomber and medium bomber support from the fifth through the eighth of
November, and possibly to the ninth, as well. The air proposal called for heavy
bombers to attack ten forts commanding the road approaches to M etz and the
medium bombers to strike four forts in the M etz area, eight supply dumps, and
German troop concentrations in the Bois-des-Secourt and Chateau Salins areas
about 12 miles east of Nancy. Fighter- bombers would attack nine command
posts using 500-lb. general -purpose bombs with delay fuzes and napalm, where
available. Additionally, the fighters would bomb eight German airfields on D-
Day. Weyland considered this plan extremely ambitious, especially for the
fighter- bombers, and he continued his effort to obtain more groups."
If the weather proved unsuitable on November 5 and no improvement
occurred by November 8, the ground forces would attack early on the eighth
without initial support from the heavy and medium bombers. Although the
Third A rmy staff always preferred to attack with air support, it would delay, but
seldom cancel, an offensive if the air arm proved unavailable. Nevertheless, if
bad weather persisted, the air leaders would still attempt to have bomber sup-
port available for later use against specific forts, well out of range of the
advancing troops.
With the onset of static warfare during September 1944, the emphasis on
reconnaissance had shifted from visual or tactical reports to photographic cov-
erage. By the end of the month, the F-5s (P-38s) of the 31st and 34th Photo
Reconnaissance Squadrons were working overtime flying daily photo cover to
a depth of nine miles behind enemy lines, as well as obtaining vertical and
oblique coverage of M osel River crossing points and pinpoint photos of forti-
fications. In addition, the F-5s continued their program of bomb damage
assessment and airfield coverage missions."
In October 1944 the challenge for the 10th Photo Group's F- 5s increased
markedly as poor flying weather created a large backlog of requests and the
group lost its 34th squadron to the 363d Reconnaissance Group; this left only
one squadron to handle the load. The 31st Photo Reconnaissance Squadron's
historian provided a good description of the effort. "One day in October, when
the weather broke, the unit flew 36 missions totaling 80 targets and 4,000
square miles of mapping." This occurred in only five hours of photo daylight.
By the end of October, the overworked squadron completed 90 percent of the
air-ground basic photo coverage plan, which consisted of a combination of
areas and routes in a zone from the front lines to the Rhine River.^^
Before the November offensive, the reconnaissance pilots provided pho-
tos of each M etz fort as well as photo coverage of the terrain that surrounded
151
Air Power for Patton's Army
the city of M etz. The photographs and interpretation reports were included in
the target folders that XIX TAC sent to the bomber commands for study.
Patton took a personal interest in this process. When he learned, on October
31, that bomber crews had not received the required target folders, and with
the unhappy consequences associated with the short bombing in Operation
Cobra vividly in mind, he had intelligence officers prepare to rush them by car
to Ninth Air Force and the IX Bombardment Division headquarters in
Luxembourg. The XX Corps also received vertical and oblique shots of all
planned crossing points, and all targets scheduled for attack by the fighter-
bombers were photographed and analyzed as well.^^
With everything ready. General Weyland flew off to Mourmelon on
November 4 for a farewell address to the 358th Orange Tails. Bad weather in
the target area on N ovember 5 and two subsequent days, however, forced can-
cellation of the strikes planned for medium and heavy bombers. M eanwhile,
although the XIX TAC could only fly on the afternoon of the fifth, it made the
most of its attacks on German airfields. The 354th Fighter Group racked up the
day's top score with claims of 28 German aircraft destroyed and 16 damaged
with no loss of its own.
The Allies, meanwhile, consolidated XII TAC and a recently equipped
French First Air Force into a new tactical air force, the First Tactical Air Force
(Provisional). Its commander, former Ninth Air Force deputy commander.
General Royce, arrived at Nancy on November 5 to complain personally to
Weyland about what he considered the lack of cooperation from XIX TAC.
Apparently he expected to receive atXIl TAC the 405th Fighter Group that he
preferred rather than the 358th that Weyland had assigned him and he made
plain to Weyland his profound displeasure. He also criticized the proposed
basing arrangement for his air force. Weyland patiently explained that the ini-
tial mix-up, whereby Ninth Air Force had mistakenly assigned the 405th to
Royce, had been sorted out and that Royce's command would receive new
152
Stalemate in Lorraine
orders assigning tlie 358tli Figliter Group to tlieXII TAG. Weyland told Royce
tliat liis command liad been cooperating extensively with XII TAG in support
of XV Gorps. In fact, Weyland declared, "we have been doing their missions."
Nothing further occurred over the unit transfer issue, although the question of
support for XII TAG resurfaced later in November and again in January, when
the Germans launched a diversionary offensive in Alsace. This incident
involving Royce remained one of the few instances of overt disagreement
among the tactical air commanders. Such isolated cases do not detract from the
cooperation that generally characterized relations among the airmen.™
Air defense against the debilitated Luftwaffe became another issue of
special concern to General Weyland. As the officer responsible for air defense
of the Third A rmy area, prior to the offensive he convened a meeting to discuss
coordi nati on of anti ai rcraft arti 1 1 ery f i re i n the so-cal I ed i nner arti 1 1 ery zone, the
designated area within which Third Army gunners could fire freely at uniden-
tified aircraft. Participants included the chief of Third Army's anti arti 1 1 ery units
and several XIX TAG officers: Gol. Don Mayhew, the tactical control center
commander, Golonel Ferguson, the operations officer, and representatives from
the night fighter and night photo squadrons. They wanted to assure themselves
that everyone concerned had detailed information on all aircraft scheduled to
pass through the artillery zone and obtain agreement on the proper safeguards.
All too often army gunners fired on friendly aircraft because air defense per-
sonnel had not been forewarned or because an aircraft had not conformed to
flight plans. At the same time, no one wanted to waste valuable, limited night
fighter sorties on intercepting what frequently turned out to be friendly aircraft,
unknown to the ground controllers flying in the area. Air-ground coordination
required constant attention, and the challenge to the air defense system became
especially acute later during the Battle of the Bulge in December 1944.
The XII Gorps opened the M adison Offensive at 6:00 a.m. on November
8, despite the lack of bomber support and the misgivings of General Eddy, who
was ordered by Patton to either attack or "name his successor." By the end of
the first day, Eddy's troops progressed two to four miles along a 27-mile front
in absolutely atrocious weather and against stiff German resistance (Map 12).
Later that morning the weather improved enough for limited fighter-bomber
operations and the XIX TAG made the most of it. Enemy nerve centers attract-
ed over half of the day's 471 sorties. Highlighting these command post raids
was an attack by the 405th Raiders that scored direct hits on the 17th SS
Panzer Division headquarters at Peltre, southeast of M etz. Subsequent interro-
gations and investigations revealed that a number of high-ranking officers had
been present when the fighter-bombers demolished the structure, and German
operations suffered disruption for two weeks following the attack. The other
groups also had good success on the eighth, although at day's end XIX TAG
squadrons found themselves scattered at bases all over the forward area as a
result of the weather.
153
Reprinted from: Christopher R. Gabei, 'The Lorraine Campaign: An Overview, Sep-Dec 1944," (Ft Leavenworth,
Kan.: U.S. Army Command and Generai Staff Coiiege, 1985), p. 26.
Stalemate in Lorraine
Maj. Gen. Ralph Royce,
commander,
First Tactical Air Force
(Provisional)
The cost to XIX TAC, however, proved high. The 362d Fighter Group
suffered most when a German force estimated at 40 FW 190s bounced one of
its 12-ship squadrons. A Ithough the M auler pilots shot down 11 enemy aircraft,
they lost three of their own. A nother of the group's aircraft crashed on a straf-
ing run in extremely poor weather. The command had established poor-weath-
er flying parameters at a minimum 3,000-foot ceiling with broken clouds and a
visibility of three miles. For takeoff, the XIX TAC considered a 1,000-foot ceil-
ing acceptable. Now, however, much of the target area had ceilings down to
1,500 or 1,000 feet. That evening at the command briefing, Weyland acknowl-
edged the problem, but he asserted, given the importance of the offensive, that
the command would take "calculated risks on weather" as a matter of policy.
General Weyland's expressed concerns about fighter resources and the
postponement of Operation Queen, the Allied plan for First Army in the north to
attack toward the Roer River defenses, convinced Generals Bradley and
Vandenberg to provide Weyland with additional fighter support for M adison. On
N ovember 8, the XIX TAC received three fighter groups and the return, for one
week, of its old 358th Fighter Group. In fact, despite its administrative transfer to
XII TAC on the fifth and Royce's displeasure. General Weyland might well have
been the beneficiary of further tactical assets after November 11 had the poor
weather held. This was not to be, and when the weather improved on November
16 and Operation Oueen began, additional fighter-bombers could not be spared.
On November 7, 1944, General Vandenberg convened a conference at
Luxembourg City on how to best use the medium bombers. Army and air
155
Air Power for Patton's Army
officials in attendance decided to stril<e at tanl< obstacles in the Siegfried
L i ne. 0 n N ovember 9 1 arge numbers of heavy and medi urn bombers attacked
in force. To prevent the bombing of friendly troops, Third Army used radio
marker beacons to identify its forward positions, and artillery lobbed two
flak lines of red smoke 3,000 feet below the bombardment formation. The
medium bombers had the most difficulty with the weather. Only 74 of the
514 bombers dispatched actually bombed their assigned targets, which were
German troop concentrations, barracks, and tank obstacles. Of the 1,223
heavy bombers attacking, 679 used seven forts as aiming points in the 5th
Infantry Division zone south of M etz, 47 attacked Thionville, 34 others hit
Saarlautern, 432 bombed the Saarbruecken marshaling yard, and 31 attacked
targets of opportunity. Patton considered the attack "quite a show and very
encouraging to our men." He also attributed the participation of the heavy
bombers on his army's front to the good relations he shared with the leading
airmen. Generals Spaatz and Doolittle observed the bombing with him, and
Patton told his diary that "the show was largely a present to me from
them. "6"
156
Stalemate in Lorraine
A cutaway of a German FW 190.
M ost of the heavy bombers had to bomb through an overcast ranging
from 6/10 to 10/10 cloud cover. Evaluators considered this a major reason why
the forts themselves received little material damage. In early December 1944
ordnance and engineer officers conducted a study for the AAF Evaluation
Board of the air attacks during the November campaign. Relying on photo-
graphic records, personal examination of the forts attacked, and interviews with
American and German ground force personnel in the assault area at the time,
the survey determined the air attacks did very little material damage to the forts,
but the bombing destroyed other strongpoints, disrupted communications, cut
roads and railways, and generally left the enemy confused and dazed.
As the study of Phase III close air support operations concluded, "It was
the intensity of the attack, rather than the pin-point accuracy, that achieved the
results of materially aiding the attacking ground forces. "^^ The lesson once
again proved that ground forces had to move forward as rapidly as possible
after the bombardment to take advantage of the enemy's shocked condition.
The same problem recurred a few days later, in Operation Queen, when Allied
ground forces withdrew to a safety zone two miles from the target area and
could not move forward fast enough to prevent the German defenders from
reestablishing their positions after the war's heaviest air bombardment in sup-
port of ground forces. The Cobra syndrome and fear of short-bombing contin-
ued to haunt A Hied air-ground operations."
157
Air Power for Patton's Army
Operation Madison proved successful from tlie air force's standpoint.
Assisted by tlie air assault, XX Corps bypassed the M etz fortifications and
pushed across the M osel River. On the second day of the offensive, XX Corps
attacked north and south of M etz, after the M osel flooded its banks and left
mud ankle-deep in most places. Despite the hostile elements, the Americans
established bridgeheads over the M osel and captured eight more villages. The
next day, 11 more towns fell, and Patton's troops forced the surrender of the
important Fort Koenigsmacher, southeast of Thionville. For Third Army per-
sonnel, the w eeks of pati ent trai ni ng i n 0 ctober pal d off . T he tacti cs of by pass-
ing the strongest fortified positions and reducing them later with high explo-
sives and gasoline proved very effective.^^
By the third day, on November 10, 1944, the enemy began a general but
"fighting" withdrawal in the region. The movement offered good targets for X IX
TAC fighter- bombers, which provided effective support through November 11.
In most cases Weyland's fighter groups supported a specific frontline division
and with only group-sized missions. During the initial drive of Operation
M adison, fighter-bomber pilots perfected what they termed village busting tac-
tics. Standard practice soon called for successive waves of an attacking squadron
in flights of four to carry three different types of ordnance: four aircraft came
each armed with two 500-lb. general purpose bombs; four came with fragmenta-
tion bombs; and four came with napalm. The flights attacked targeted villages in
that sequence, w i th the f i rst wave openi ng up the houses, the second creati ng ki n-
dling in the structures, and the napalm dropped by the third ignited the material
exposed by the bombs. As one command official dryly observed, "this [bomb]
combination worked quite successfully," and ground controllers offered lavish
praise. Unfortunately, the operational reports are silent on whether civilians or
soldiers occupied the houses attacked, or to what extent the airmen experienced
moral qualms about attacking the villages. Following the attack, bad weather set
in to restrict air support on November 10 and 11, and made the following three
days totally unfit for flying.
Mission Priorities and Aerial Resources
With Third Army's offensive off to a good start. General Weyland
returned to one of his favorite concerns, the Luftwaffe threat to the Third
Army's area. He had good reason to worry. Throughout October and November
1944, Ultra analysts continued to monitor the Luftwaffe buildup, which result-
ed in a single-engine fighter force that expanded from 1,900 to 3,300 aircraft
by mid-November.™ This represented an increase of nearly 70 percent over the
numbers available in early September. Weyland attempted to enlist the aid of
heavy bombers in the counterair mission. Even before the Eighth Air Force
bombing on November 9, he had convinced officials to direct bombers against
158
Stalemate in Lorraine
16 airfields identified by his intelligence section on Novennber 10. The result,
however, proved disappointing: pilots hit only 2 of the 16 fields. Nevertheless,
he repeated his request for the heavy bombers and also lobbied for the use of
Eighth Air Force fighters.
The seriousness of his concern was perhaps best demonstrated on
November 12, when he convinced General Patton to relieve all fighter-
bombers that day from close air support missions, which permitted them to be
applied againstcounterair targets. Weyland could never implement the consis-
tent program of pressure on the Luftwaffe he desired. The weather, the limited
availability of medium and heavy bombers, and the continuing high-priority
rail and road interdiction program took precedence. Although it is tempting to
speculate on whether a more sustained effort against the Luftwaffe might have
crippled it for the future Ardennes assault, such a diversion of resources might
well have rendered the interdiction program ineffective.''^
As it was, interdiction received only 50 percent of the effort that Weyland
devoted to close air support of Patton's Third Army. The statistical record for
N ovember suggests that scheduled close support sorties totaled 1,387, while the
figure for armed reconnaissance was 697. The command flew armed reconnais-
sance missions against what officials termed targets of opportunity. On the other
hand, they recorded pinpoint targets separately and the figure for this third cate-
gory reached 532 sorties. Statisticians, however, reported all three in official
command statistical summaries under the heading "dive bomb." Understandably,
the vast majority of close air support missions in November occurred in con-
junction with Operation Madison. It is also clear, in spite of Third Army's
reliance on its own artillery for a significant portion of its close fire support, that
fighter-bombers continued to play a major role, especially in large offensives.
Once again, competing mission priorities made it difficult, if not impossible, to
make interdiction the overwhelming priority on a consistent basis. ''^
Then, too, the effectiveness of the interdiction program is enormously
difficult to measure. Too often bad weather in the target area prevented accu-
rate aircrew reporting or later assessment of bomb damage results by means of
reconnaissance flights. In any case, at this stage no one could expect a fighter-
bomber pilot to achieve the kind of pinpoint bombing in bad weather often
unachieved by aircrews of a later generation with much improved technology.
Although mission reports increasingly mention that pilots dropped bombs
through the overcast under the direction of ground control, the targets normal-
ly proved to be large area concentrations beyond the bomb line. Although the
M EW system could direct aircraft within range of the target, the pilot still
needed to acquire it visually for accurate bombing. After December 1944,
accuracy would improve markedly when the command acquired the SCR-584
and a close control device for the M EW system."
Bad weather days in mid-November compelled General Weyland to deal
with a number of mission support issues. The problem of soggy airfields now
159
Air Power for Patton's Army
headed the list. Rainfall amounted to twice the norm during the month, and on
two occasions the M osel overflowed its banks. The 354th Fighter Group had
the most difficult situation. October rainfall made its airfield at Vitry largely
unserviceable and a second flood on November 8 effectively eliminated all
operations from the site. Asa result, the group flew from St. Dizier after
November 13, until the engineers readied the field at Rosieres (A-98) later in
the month (Map 4). The most shocking news for the M ustang group, howev-
er, came on the thirteenth, when it learned that P-47s would replace its P-51s.
To say that group pilots were not pleased is an understatement of the first
order. The group's historian termed November 13 a "Black Letter Day," and
morale took a nosedive. Three months later, the group historian asserted that
the pilots, for the most part, still preferred the P-51 because of its additional
speed and better handling qualities.'"'
General Weyland had little choice in the fate of the 354th Fighter Group.
In mid-November his job was to convert the group as soon as possible.
Transition training began immediately, one squadron at a time. At Weyland's
insistence, the P-47s were to arrive before all the P-51s left so at least two
squadrons would remain operational at all times. Training lasted about a week
and a half for each squadron, with the last squadron finishing on December 17,
1944. Although one might expect the new P-47 group to be less proficient
than its sister groups, operations records do not bear this out. The 354th
Fighter Group came in for its share of praise over the next two months and
Weyland thoughtfully commended the group on its first outstanding P-47
group mission. Whether the XIX TAG benefited in the winter fighting by hav-
ing a P-47 rather than a P-51 unit is doubtful. In any event, when the air-
ground team prepared for mobile operations in M arch 1945 the spare parts
availability for the P-51 aircraft again improved, and the 354th reconverted
back to the P-51s. Even so, one officer asserted that the reconversion occurred
largely because of the serious morale problem in the group."
The severe November rain and mud, meanwhile, forced other groups to
change bases as well (Map 13). On November 5, the 362d Fighter Group
began its move from M ourmelon to Rovres, near Etain and Verdun, where it
was joined by the 425th Night Fighter Squadron. Later in the month the 10th
Photo Group, with one exception, moved its squadrons and photographic facil-
ities from St. Dizier to Conflans to escape the elements. The exception proved
to be the 155th Night Photo Squadron whose A-20s could operate more safe-
ly on St. Dizier's concrete runways in bad weather. Although the command
made the moves in response to the terrible weather, it now had all three groups
positioned farther forward and better able to support Third Army operations.
The ground advance in Operation M adison had widened the distance from the
M arne bases to the front lines from 50 miles in September 1944, to as much as
a 100 miles in November. Fortuitously, these groups also would be well-sited
to support the Ardennes counterattack in December.''^
160
LOCATION AND MOVEMENTS
OF MAJOR XIX TAG UNITS
NOVEMBER 1944
to 5 o 10 20 3« 40 50 mtitt
358TH FIGHTER 6P RELIEVED FROM XIX TAC 8 NOV. 1944
9TH PHOTO TACTICAL 6P RELIEVED FROM XIX TAC
3 NOV. 1944.
Map 13
Location and Movements of Major XIX TAC Units: November 1944
Reprinted from: XIX Tactical Air Command, "History," Operations, November 1944, AFHRA.
Air Power for Patton's Army
General Weyland still found the aircraft replacement situation in
November unacceptable. The critical P-51 shortage could be alleviated
through the conversion program, but the single squadron of P-61 Black
Widows had declined to 14 aircraft from its authorized strength of 18, and
prospects for replacements in the immediate future seemed poor. Asa result,
he proposed to Ninth Air Force that A -20 Havoc light bombers be exchanged
for their P-70 night-fighter variant for intruder operations. Ninth Air Force
disapproved the request. Weyland also failed to convince Ninth Air Force
headquarters to support another ambitious plan. To compensate for winter con-
ditions, he asked General Vandenberg in a November 14 letter to increase the
number of aircraft authorized for fighter groups by 25. In a lengthy argument
he noted that bad weather and shortened daylight hours had reduced the sortie
rate to less than 50 percent of the summer figure. At the same time, the groups
now received a steady flow of pilot replacements in numbers capable of sus-
taining a much higher loss rate. Each squadron, he said, could man 24 aircraft,
or 72 per three- squadron group. M oreover, because of the low sortie rate under
winter conditions, available maintenance personnel could support a 100-air-
craft group, which meant that 72 aircraft could be sent on missions when
weather permitted."
Ninth Air Force declined to raise the number of authorized aircraft, cit-
ing the eventual need for additional logistics personnel in assembly and main-
tenance at the base air depot as well as in the tactical and service squadrons.
Headquarters Ninth Air Force had little interest in trying to change authoriza-
tion for maintenance personnel, let alone aircraft, and instead it suggested
reducing the flow of replacement pilots rather than increasing the number of
airplanes. Although Weyland's proposal seems imaginative and reasonable for
the situation in the fall, he could not foresee the strain an emergency such as
A- 20 Havoc at a Ninth Air Force Base in France.
162
Stalemate in Lorraine
the Ardennes Offensive would put on his facilities and personnel. Indeed, late
in December 1944, his command maintenance and supply officers described
maintenance as poor. Asa result of the heavy battle damage suffered by most
ai rcraft i n the i ntense effort to halt the G erman attack, depots and servi ce teams
became overburdened with no end in sight. ''^
The nonflying days in November also provided General Weyland time to
confer with XII TAG to the south on support requirements. Here the coopera-
tive spirit and the theme of flexibility predominated. He agreed to a request
fromGeneral Savi He that the XIX TAG assistXIl TAG with two groups to sup-
port Seventh Army's planned offensive on November 15-17, with the proviso
that XIX TAG receive help from Ninth Air Force to the same extent. When
Ninth Air Force authorities in Luxembourg did not approve this arrangement,
Weyland declined to send his two groups, but he still promised Saville help if
he got "in a jam." Unexplainably, when Ninth Air Force subsequently agreed
to provide Saville's command four groups instead of two, XII TAG declined
them because it "expected bad weather on the 14th."™
Autumn weather in Lorraine was awful. One member of the 362d
Fighter Group described the move to Rouvres on November 5 in terms remi-
niscent of the First World War:
When the last remnants of the Group splashed up the quag-
mire roads into this churned up sea of mud that was to be our
new site and possibly our winter home, the unanimous opin-
ion was expressed that web-feet and fins would be requisi-
tioned next... Living conditions in the immediate future
looked very dismal and bogged down.^°
The slow pace of the campaign and the many days when the weather prohib-
ited flying led to inactivity and boredom that could be relieved only slightly by
contact with the dour Lorrainers. Typical was the attitude of the 405th Fighter
Group historian who concluded his commentary on his outfit's experiences in
November by noting that "all in all, it was an unremarkable month, character-
ized only by its dreariness and monotony."^i
The weather finally improved somewhat on November 15, 1944, and the
command sent a squadron each from the 405th, 406th, and 362d Fighter
Groups to support XII and XX Gorps as well as fly armed reconnaissance.
General Eisenhower visited the command that day and, like many before him,
dutifully paid tribute to the outstanding partnership of XIX TAG and Third
Army, and to General Weyland personally. Also on this day the 358th Fighter
Group departed officially for XII TAG, which left the command with four
fighter groups, its lowest number since it became operational.^^
Fair weather— a ceiling of 5,000-7,000 feet and visibility between two
and three miles— made November 17 the biggest day in the air in a number of
163
As the Ninth Air Force-Third Army operations advanced, air-ground
teamworic became more sophisticated. Air and ground coordinators
shared VHF radio facilities in relay stations near the front (top) and were
also installed in mobile radio stations in 3/4-ton trucks (bottom), receiving
messages from communications officers (top, opposite page).
164
Air-ground operations and liaison
officers directed figfiter-bombers
directly overfiead to targets from
information relayed to them (center).
165
Air Power for Patton's Army
weeks. Weyland sent all groups on two missions, totaling 317 sorties. Two
groups furnished Third Army close air support, with the 406th Fighter Group
flying in support of the 10th Armored Division in its push beyond Fort
Koenigsmacher and the 405th Fighter Group supporting the 6th Armored
Division in the XII Corps zone. Weyland tried to visit Third Army's corps and
division headquarters as often as time permitted. On November 17, he hap-
pened to be visiting the 6th Armored Division, where he conferred with an
appreciative General Eddy. Weyland also encountered his disputant. General
Wood, commander of the 4th Armored Division, soon to be relieved after the
stress of combat proved too severe. Their earlier disagreement over control of
a XIX TAG officer seemed behind them, and indeed, Weyland had little trou-
ble in Lorraine with the corps and armored division commanders who under-
stood the constraints imposed by the weather, and invariably appreciated XIX
TAG aerial assistance when the weather made flying possible. Even most
infantry division commanders, whose troops generally received less air sup-
port than their armored division counterparts, expressed satisfaction with XIX
TAG'S effort on their behalf.
On November 18, General Weyland visited XX Gorps, which had near-
ly completed its encirclement of Metz with the able support of the 406th
Fighter Group. With the 405th Fighter Group assigned expressly in close sup-
port of XII Gorps units, only the 354th and 362d Fighter Groups could attack
interdiction targets. The 354th and 362d had a field day. Tactical reconnais-
sance had reported heavy rail traffic west of the Rhine, and the two groups
combined to destroy nearly 500 railroad cars, the highest number of claims in
the command's history. According to reports, they also counted destroyed
nearly 300 motor vehicles, 26 armored vehicles, 74 locomotives, 42 horse-
drawn vehicles, 32 gun positions, and 19 buildings.^''
N ovember 19, 1944, proved to be another good day, but a costly one. A s
Third Army cut the exits from M etz, fighter- bombers swooped down to with-
in a hundred yards in front of the American patrols to strafe the retreating
enemy. The command lost 13 aircraft and 8 pilots, and officers now considered
Third Army's zone of operations the worst for flak concentrations since Gaen
back in the early stages of the Normandy fighting. The command lost 62 air-
craft shot down in November, exactly twice the October figure. Ironically,
despite the higher losses, theXIX TAG took important steps to reduce the flak
menace. For one, the command's intelligence section maintained a detailed
flak "library" and display map showing all known flak concentrations. The
daily intelligence report also described each new flak sighting to pilots.
The major development, however, proved to betheantiflak program ini-
tiated by the ground-pounders of XII Gorps. As General Weyland explained at
a press conference in December 1944, "this was not at our request, but that
started i n the X 1 1 Gorps— I did not even think of it, but somebody in the XII
Gorps saw that when bombers came over, the [XII Gorps] artillery would open
166
Stalemate in Lorraine
on the flak positions. Undoubtedly, this saved many planes and lives." Indeed,
the Army directed antiflak artillery to fire on all known enemy gun positions
when fighter-bombers operated in their area. The new procedure called for the
artillery to be alerted when aircraft assigned to close air support missions in
the area were airborne, then a liaison plane served as artillery spotter and
directed fire on the German flak positions. In one of the XIX TAG combat
reports, an official judged the XII Gorps artillery support very effective and
"most popular with the pilots. "^^
The effectiveness of counterflak artillery fire increased as the result of a
major advance in air-ground teamwork that occurred during the latter part of
the M etz operation, when Third Army corps and divisions adopted the "com-
bined operations office" used at the command. Now, air and ground officers
shared the same room and received facilities and equipment previously
unavailable. Technicians furnished VHF air-ground equipment for the new
offices, which provided good integration of the air effort into the ground oper-
ation. Ground personnel, for their part, ran a land line to the artillery fire direc-
tion center, which made target marking and, especially, antiflak fire consider-
ably more effective. Even with improved air-ground cooperation, however, the
massive concentration of light flak on the Siegfried Line and the increase in
close support missions in November produced a high fighter-bomber casualty
figure for the month.
After November 19 the weather closed in again for five straight days, as
Third Army forces led by the 95th Infantry Division (a unit comprised of those
Patton liked to call "the Iron M en of M etz") completed mop-up action inside
the ancient city on November 22. Third Army officers proudly boasted that
they commanded the first military force to capture M etz since 451 AD. Some
might criticize the length of the operation and remind Americans that the
Prussians had occupied Metz during the Franco-Prussian War, but Third
Army's two-month siege remains impressive in view of the region's worst
flooding in 20 years and limited air support. Gritics, including German offi-
cers, have been less kind to Patton for following his own broad-front strategy
of di vi di ng hi s armor and usi ng it as i nfantry support rather than formi ng i t i nto
a concentrated battering ram to break through the M aginot and Siegfried Line
defenses in early November. As it was, after M etz fell, six forts still remained
in German hands and General Patton made the decision to invest them while
continuing eastward. By the end of November, his forces had crossed the Saar
at Saarlautern and Dillingen against stiff resistance to hold a continuous front
of 25 miles inside Germany, while only four of the Metz forts remained in
enemy hands (Map 14).^^
The high Third Army casualty rate of 22,773 attested to the grim fight-
ing in Lorraine, 90 percent of which came from infantry units. Losses in
infantry units became so severe that draftees from noncombat positions had to
be involuntarily retrained as infantry. The cold and soggy November fighting
167
Map 14
Third Army Operations: November 19-December 19, 1944
Reprinted from: C hristopher R. Gabel, 'The Lorraine Campaign: An Overview, Sep-Dec 1944," (Ft. Leavenworth,
Kan.: U.S. Army Command and Generai Staff Coiiege, 1985), p. 29.
Stalemate in Lorraine
also produced a trenchfoot problem of monstrous proportions. Fully 4,587
cases appeared at division clearing stations, and an estimated 95 percent of the
individuals afflicted proved useless to the Army until the following spring.
For General Weyland's forces, it became the same old story of limited fly-
ing. After Metz fell, the command had only two more good flying days in
November. On November 25, XIX TAG pilots flew 220 sorties divided general-
ly between the two groups supporting advancing ground units and two flying
armed reconnaissance/interdiction in the Rhine and Saar valleys. The next day
only the 406th Fighter Group flew ground support missions, but its targets
included 14 towns that subsequently fell to XX Gorps' assault. In a perceptive
comment on air-ground effectiveness on N ovember 21 General Patton observed,
"The impetus of an air attack [for ground forces] is lacking due to [the] fatigue
of [the] men. I have attempted to get at least an infantry division out of action
for a rest." The brutal conditions of fighting in Lorraine seemed to hamper the
air-ground team at every turn.^°
While weather prohibited flying the last four days of the month,
Weyland turned his attention to the problem of the Siegfried Line defenses.
The XX Gorps found, to its unpleasant surprise, that cities like Saarlautern had
actually become part of the West Wall. American forces discovered the
Siegfried Line to be unlike the M etz or M aginot Line systems of huge under-
ground forts and artillery positions. Third Army now confronted a line of
Dragon's Teeth— tank obstacles, extensive barbed wire, well-positioned pill-
boxes with overlapping zones of fire, and fortifications that included cities
such as Saarlautern and Dillingen. Even though the German forces opposite
Third Army were reduced to one-quarter the size of the American attacking
force, the tenacious defenders remained in well-prepared positions and fought
hard to protect their homeland. Fighter-bombers could only offer modest assis-
tance against such fortified defenses.^^
The key problem was how to get Third Army forces across the swollen
Saar River in the face of the entrenched Siegfried Line defenders. Given Third
Army's situation. General Weyland again decided to coordinate heavy air
bombardment with the advance of the infantry units. Planners termed this plan
"Hi-Sug." An earlier attempt to breach defenses at M erzig through an aerial
assault on November 19 failed overwhelmingly. There, XIX TAG employed an
air plan that called for eight groups of medium bombers to soften up the
bridgehead area. Only four groups completed their bombing runs, however,
and although accuracy proved good, the 9th Bombardment Division lost 13
aircraft and eight pilots. Once again, for fear of short bombing, the ground
troops had been positioned so far back from the Saar River that they failed to
attack the German defenses until 48 hours after the bombing. Weyland judged
the air effort as "absolutely wasted. "^^
The lesson repeated in the M erzig bombing proved a telling one in the
Northwest European campaign. When medium or heavy bombers carpet-
169
Air Power for Patton's Army
bombed a defensive area, the ground forces needed to move forward immedi-
ately after tlie last bomb had fallen and close with the stunned defenders. For
the Hi-Sug plan, Third Army decided to cross the Saar River near Saarlautern
at the end of November, with forces directed to move forward to within 2,000
yards of the river prior to the air bombardment. The bombers would carpet-
bomb the eastern side of the river in the proposed bridgehead area.^^
General Weyland served as the major liaison figure for air support in the
joint planning process. On November 27 he requested of Ninth Air Force
heavy as well as medium bomber strikes. Although he did not get the heavy
bombers for the assault. Ninth Air Force promised full use of the medium
bombers. During Third Army's morning briefing on November 29, General
Patton approved Weyland's plan to have medium bombers strike the Siegfried
Line. As always, air-ground coordination and timing would be critical.
Weyland assured the ground leaders that medium bombers could be employed
as soon as Third A rmy ground forces were ready, and Patton's staff responded
by saying XX Corps was prepared for the assault any time from November 29
to December 2. Patton wanted to attack the following day, but later on
November 29 his staff notified Weyland that XX Corps would not be ready for
the bombardment until December 1. Although this meant that targets in the
northern area of the offensive had to be scratched, the plan still looked promis-
ing (Map 14).34
On November 30, the air-ground team held a joint planning meeting at
Third Army headquarters where it reviewed the plan to use medium bombers
and further exami ned and estabi i shed I ast- mi nute ti mi ng changes i n detai I . T he
XX Corps would lead off, with the 95th Infantry Division's Iron M en attack-
ing across the Saar River in the vicinity of Saarlautern, while the 90th Infantry
Division performed a holding action. In the XII Corps zone, the main effort
would be made by the 26th Infantry and the 4th Armored Divisions, with the
80th Infantry Division to follow. If XX Corps encountered trouble on its front,
it would hold the enemy's key forces while X 1 1 Corps troops broke through the
gap below Saarlautern in the enemy's weakened sectors.
The air plan called for medium bombers employed over three days, with
the first day's bombing of Siegfried Line defenses to be accomplished visual-
ly before 2;00 p.m. Should bad weather occur on the second and third days.
Third Army agreed to continued bombing using the Oboe radar blind-bomb-
ing method. That evening, at the XIX TAC briefing. General Weyland ex-
plained that the entire 9th Bombardment Division force would be allocated to
the Siegfried Line breakthrough operation now scheduled for the following
day, December!. He also told his staff that Third Army, reflecting confidence
in the bombers as well as the urgency of the operation, had overcome its
doubts and now agreed to accept Oboe bombing at any time.
General Patton's willingness to permit use of a blind-bombing system,
which was more effective against large area targets, suggests how important
170
Stalemate in Lorraine
aerial bombardment support had become for the Army commander. Even so,
his troops would attacl< without air support if necessary. Before that evening's
XIX TAC briefing, Patton met with Generals Gaff ey. Gay, andWeyland on the
subject of the air plan. Although he desired air support, Patton declared that
the 90th and 95th Infantry Divisions would attack on December 3, with or
without the benefit of aerial bombing.
General Weyland remained confident that Operation Hi-Sug, his third
joint operation of the Lorraine Campaign, could overcome the stiff German
defenses, the bad weather, and the friction of war to burst open the Siegfried
Line and permitThird Army to move rapidly on to the Rhine River. If so, he
could put behind him a frustrating period for his command.
Assault on the Siegfried Line
The air-ground assault in Lorraine in early December 1944, was the only
major Allied offensive on the western front at that time. First and Ninth Armies
in the north continued to clear the Huertgen Forest after many weeks of grim
infantry fighting and high casualties and labored to build up their forces along the
Roer River for a major offensive in mid-December. The river would remain a
major barrier until American troops could wrest control of the dams on its upper
reaches from the Germans. In Alsace, Lt. Gen. Jacob L. Devers's 6th Army
Group achieved greater success, forcing retreating Germans from French soil and
reaching the Rhine River. Only a large bridgehead of enemy forces west of the
Rhine near Colmar, the Colmar pocket, remained to impede the Allied drive.^^
General Patton's high expectations for Operation Hi-Sug rested in large
part on the massive bombing assault scheduled for December 1, and he. General
Weyland, and their respective staffs devoted considerable effort to ensure that
air-ground coordination proved successful. At midmorning on December 1,
1944, Weyland called the Third Army commander to tell him that eight groups
of medium bombers were on their way. The XX Corps had been notified as
well. Shortly thereafter. General Patton called back requesting that XX Corps
receive priority from the fighter-bombers, too, and Weyland informed him that
this had already been done. Indeed, XX Corps units began crossing the swollen
Saar River supported by three of four bomb groups that flew 96 of the 123 total
sorties for the day.^'
By midafternoon the early optimism began to fade. Because of radio fail-
ure, Weyland learned that only four of the eight bomb groups had bombed their
targets. The air commander then conferred with General Patton and Colonel
H arki ns, hi s deputy chi ef of staff, w ho i nf ormed hi m that, i n any case, XX C orps
had not been in position that morning to follow-up the bombing and establish its
bridgehead on the east bank of the Saar. Despite the laborious planning of the
past days, ineffective air-ground coordination once again prevented success.
171
Air Power for Patton's Army
General Weyland agreed to try again the next day and Patton promised
to get tlie necessary target information and current front line locations from
XX Corps by 7:30 p.m. that evening. Weyland then contacted Ninth Air Force
to again request the bombers and to assure bomber pilots that the target infor-
mation would be delivered at about 8:00 p.m. Director of operations at the
Ninth, Col. George F. McGuire, responded favorably but suggested that,
because 12th Army Group established flying objectives for the medium
bomber effort, itwould help if Third Army contacted General Bradley's head-
quarters. Weyland, determined to avoid repeating the first day's mistake, never
hesitated to call on General Patton for crucial assistance, and he considered
assistance crucial in this instance. He asked the Army commander to "needle"
higher headquarters to ensure the support of Ninth Air Force and Patton said
he would call Bradley immediately. As these machinations on December 2
illustrate, the medium bomber force also had other competing priorities and
represented a limited resource.^^
At that night's XIX TAC briefing, the airmen announced that 10 groups
of medium bombers, approximately 360 airplanes, would strike the Siegfried
Line the following day, while the fighter- bomber force would be strengthened
by the loan of two groups from IX TAC and XXIX TAC. They assigned to the
fighters armed reconnaissance missions and other missions to disarm strong-
points and blunt counterattacks in support of the ground advance.^^
During the Hi-Sug attack on December 2, 1944, the TAC commander and
his combat operations officer (using call signs Ding Bat 1 and Ding Bat 2)
observed the medium bombing from a P-47 and P-51, respectively. This time
all medium bomber groups struck the targets assigned and General Weyland
found only one group that appeared to have bombed off-target. This time XX
Corps troops had moved to within 2,000 yards of the Saar River and followed up
the bombing effectively, despite heavy resistance. The 95th Infantry Division's
crossing on December 2 received air support only from the 406th Group,
although the group did good work against what the army considered the highest
concentration of enemy flak it had ever faced. However, the 406th Fighter Group
achieved its bombing claims at a high cost: five aircraft lost to flak. Using
napalm and fragmentation bombs, the 406th fighter-bombers struck artillery
positions under the close control of the air liaison officer who maintained con-
tact with the division artillery officer. The latter directed effective artillery smoke
to mark targets in the Siegfried Line and the pilots claimed five gun positions
destroyed. It represented another example of a successful air-ground cooperative
effort that turned on placing the combat operations office at division level. ^™
Despite the close support from medium bombers and fighter-bombers,
the 95th Infantry Division came under intense enemy artillery fire from the
Siegfried Line fortifications for the next few days as its forces struggled to
cross the overflowing Saar River. In the face of severe winds, the veteran
405th Fighter Group failed repeatedly to lay smoke bombs on the hilltops and
172
Stalemate in Lorraine
enemy observation posts to screen the crossing. General Weyland followed the
events closely and held out hope that the army would make the grade. The ten-
uous bridgehead did hold, but the XX Corps became bogged down in house-
to-house fighting in Saarlautern that would last for two weeks. M eanwhile, XII
Corps pushed steadily, if slowly, northeast toward the Saar, while at the same
time mopping up enemy activity in Saar-U nion.^^^
While close air support of the advancing infantry units accelerated on
December 2, XIX TAC also decided to support Third Army's drive with a
renewed interdiction program against rail targets on December 2. The air-
ground team did not doubt the need fora major effort. Weyland remained con-
vinced that he could cover the ground troops sufficiently and also engage in
interdiction operations to isolate the battlefield. Tactical reconnaissance pilots
reported heavy rail traffic west of the Rhine since late October. Third Army
intelligence specialists, meanwhile, began to monitor and analyze rail traffic in
their area in mid-November. Observations and reports of rail traffic for the
period November 17 to December 2 showed, among many sightings, 300
trains active on November 17, 84 on November 18 and 19, and 46 on
November 26. This rail traffic, intelligence officers concluded by December 2,
suggested "a definite buildup of enemy troops and supplies directly opposite
the north flank of Third U .5. A rmy and the southern flank of First U .5. A rmy."
Subsequent analysis of rail traffic on December 9, 14, and 17, cited a contin-
uing, heavy volume of traffic directed toward the Eifel region, a hilly, densely
wooded region of Germany north of the M osel River between Trier and
Coblenz. In early December, Third Army intelligence officers began to warn
of a possible German spoiling offensive in their sector or from the Eifel.
The XIX TAC interdiction program in early December, however, could
hardly do more than minor damage to the enemy. Even though it received prior-
ity attention, mission reports from December 1-16 show the command flew
i nterdi cti on and cl ose ai r support mi ssi ons i n equal proporti on. A s the N ovember
program demonstrated, the competing priorities of the command made concen-
tration of aerial forces on any single mission next to impossible. The ferocity of
the fighting in the Siegfried Line called for flying ground support missions on
every day possible.^"^ While the interdiction and close support missions assisted
the slow-moving offensive, it became clear that Operation Hi-Sug had not
achieved the overwhelming breakthrough sought by the air-ground team and the
military stalemate on the Siegfried Line continued. Weyland immediately began
working on plans for a more elaborate operation, a massive air assault that would
require even closer coordination between XIX TAC and Third A rmy forces.
On December 5, 1944, Weyland attended an important conference at
Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF) in Paris. Allied
conferees addressed the question of how best to use air power against the
Siegfried Line. Particular interest centered on the potential effectiveness using
strategic bombers in a tactical role, a proposition long considered doctrinal
173
Air Power for Patton's Army
heresy by strategic airmen. Predictably, attendees representing strategic bombers
opposed using lieavy bombers for anytliing except strategic bombing. First and
Nintli Army representatives wanted to divert lieavy bombers for use against
dams on the Roer River. Weyland argued that if the heavy bombers were made
available, they would be effective in a tactical role, in coordination with a major
offensive in which the ground forces would be moving forward. Evidently his
argument helped, because Eisenhower requested that General Spaatz, comman-
der of United States Strategic Air Forces in Europe (USSTAF), assist Third
Army with the support of heavy bombers even though Allied leaders continued
to view Patton's front as secondary. At the same time, it was clear Third Army
would have to make substantial progress against the Siegfried Line or go over
on the defensive. The Ninth Air Force commander. General Vandenberg, con-
curred and when Spaatz said he would visit Nancy, Weyland assured him that
X IX TAG already "had a plan to use the heavy bomber effort."!""
The next day, December 6, General Spaatz and General Doolittle, com-
mander of Eighth Air Force, arrived atXIX TAG headquarters to confer with
General Weyland and his staff. Weyland explained the Third Army's situation
on the Siegfried Line and the air plan to get them through it, while Colonel
Hallett discussed the targeting objectives for the heavy bombers. Spaatz and
Doolittle accepted the plan in principle, after which they met with General
Patton and together approved Weyland's joint plan of attack. Unlike previous
heavy bomber operations, this plan called for attacks on the Siegfried Line in
the vicinity of Zweibruecken by the heavy and medium bombers for three con-
secutive days. Troops from XII Corps would move forward while bombing of
deeper targets continued. Five target areas would be hit initially by heavy
bombers and safety would be assured by detailed coordination with antiaircraft
artillery units, the use of marker panels, and by Eighth Air Force radio com-
munications. Fighter-bombers would be employed to keep the enemy off bal-
ance and break up any counterattacks.^"^
General Weyland considered his plan the best solution to date for solv-
ing the dilemma of the time lag between the carpet-bombing and infantry
advance. Previously, Operation Queen, and initially Operation Hi-Sug, failed
because the infantry took too long to reach the target area after the bombing.
Clearly coordination, timing, and a host of other potential problems had to be
clarified for Weyland's plan to succeed. For example, the planners needed to
coordinate operations with Seventh Army and XII TAG, and Doolittle and
Spaatz agreed to visit General Devers, the 6th Army Group commander, and
General Royce, his air commander. Both accepted the XIX TAG plan "in prin-
ciple." Meanwhile, General Weyland set to work on other requirements such
as developing target folders with current photos of the targets and coordinat-
ing air defense measures. The latter became an issue because of the proposed
move to the M etz airfield of the command's 100th Fighter Wing in the near
future. Weyland always favored keeping the same army antiaircraft units to
174
Stalemate in Lorraine
defend the same air units when they moved to a new airfield. For the upcom-
ing offensive, he sought to ensure that air defense units would be provided
adequate communi cati ons for control of the i nner arti 1 1 ery zone or, fai I i ng that,
that these zones would be curtailed for the offensive. He met with l<ey air
defense officers from 12th Army Group and Third Army on December 8 and
they promised to have their ground antiaircraft controllers well-briefed.^"^
Meanwhile, the Hi-Sug ground offensive continued. At Metz, Fort
D riant fell to XX Corps troops on December 7. Now only Fort Jeanne d'Arc
remained in enemy hands. General Walker's troops also continued to enlarge
their bridgeheads at Saarlautern and Pachtern. In the XII Corps sector, troops
engaged in house-to-house fighting in the southern part of Saargumeines and
corps artillery shelled Saarbruecken (Map 15). The XII Corps received prior-
ity ai r support at thi s ti me and Wey I and's command conti nued its general prac-
tice of assigning one group to cover one particular front line army division. On
December 8, for example, the 405th Fighter Group supported the 35th Infantry
Division's attempt to consolidate its four Saar River crossings near
Saargumeines, attacking towns and marking artillery targets with smoke, while
the 362d Fighter Group repelled counterattacks threatening the 80th Infantry
Division. Both groups received letters of appreciation from XII Corps for their
Generals Spaatz, Patton, DoolitUe, Vandenberg, and Weyland (left to right)
at the advance headquarters In Nancy, December 1944.
175
LUXEMeOURG*
FIRSr I
^.^^^ ^ THIRD -
''///////
\
V
^Grevenm
Map 15
Third Army
Last Phase of Lorraine Offensive,
December 3-19, 1944
_ _ _ Front line, evening 2 December
Front line, evening 19 December
Maginot line
Toul
m Boy on
Bodonvilier
/9ofntf9rvi/lersi
SOURCE: H.M. Cole, The Lorraine Campaign, Map 49, (Wasliington, D.C.: GPO, 1950)
Stalemate in Lorraine
aerial assistance, but progress proved slow in the face of German delaying
actions which included land mines, booby traps, persistent counterattacl<s, and
the ever-present mud and rain.^"'
Bad weather set in again on December 9, 1944, and XIX TAG severely
curtailed air operations for the next three days. Even so, with the 90th Infantry
Division in trouble, the command responded despite the poor weather. On the
ninth, for example, it flew only 56 sorties, including a 362d Fighter Group
mission to drop blood plasma in wing tanl<s to troops of the 90th pinned down
in their Saar River bridgehead. Invariably, during December two fighter-
bomber groups flew close air support missions for the same corps: the 362d
supported XII Gorps operations while the 406th provided coverage of XX
Gorps units. Meanwhile, the 405th Fighter Group, which had flown more
ground support missions than any other group during the Lorraine Gampaign,
now assumed the burden of flying armed reconnaissance missions. The
Raiders had no trouble adjusting to this role.^"^
Not surprisingly. General Weyland concentrated on the forthcoming
combined operation during the lull in the air war. Perhaps a measure of his per-
sonal association with the joint operation is expressed in the name adopted for
it:Tinl<, his wife's nicl<name. Itwasabusy time for the planners. On December
10, Seventh Army and XII TAG officials visited Third Army, where all
acknowledged that the forthcoming XIX TAG-Third Army offensive would
have first priority. Another coordinated attacl<, termed Operation Dagger,
would follow in the Seventh Army area within four days of the start of
Operation Tinl<. They further agreed that Generals Savilleand Weyland would
go to SHAEF to receive final approval for their plans, while General Patton
would meet with his Seventh Army counterpart. General Patch, on December
13 to decide final timing of the attacl<ing forces. After the December 10 meet-
ing, Patton described the expectations of the Allied planners. Previous tactical
carpet-bombings, which had been confined to a single day, had not proved
entirely effective. Allied leaders believed that the three day air blitz on
Zweibruecl<en planned in Operation Tinl< would catch the enemy off guard.
On December 11, officers from Strategic Air Forces Headquarters in
England arrived to discuss Operation Tinl<, after which Weyland called Spaatz
to request RAF Bomber Gommand's support as well. General Spaatz promised
to attend the meeting at Third Army headquarters scheduled for the thirteenth.
On December 12, the XIX TAG'S chief of staff flew to London with the air
plan, issued only that day, to coordinate the Eighth Air Force bomber contri-
bution. "D-Day" was set for December 19.
Improved weather on December 12 also brought a request from Patton
and General Walker, XX Gorps commander, for special support for his troops
closing in on the final M etz fort. Bombing of the fort by six groups of medi-
um bombers was originally scheduled, but it had to be scrubbed because of bad
weather. Weyland promised an extra effort from his forces to take up the slack,
177
Dicing, or low-level, photo taken across the Saar River at the
Siegfried Line (top) by a 10th Photo Reconnaissance Group F-5 provided
vital information needed for Ration's troops in breaching the
formidable defenses (bottom).
I
178
Stalemate in Lorraine
and the 406th Fighter Group responded with five missions on the twelfth. Fort
Jeanne d'Arc finally surrendered that day.^^"
The next few days were filled with various planning meetings for
Operation Tink. Generals Patton and Patch together with Generals Vandenberg,
Weyland, Saville, and a number of other key figures met on December 13 to
examine air-ground plans and procedures in detail. Although Tink remained
first priority, Seventh Army would attempt to sneak through the German
defenses in the Vosges under Tink's momentum, assisted by Ninth Air Force's
medium bombers (Map 9). All air support for XII TAG and Seventh Army
would be coordinated though XIX TAG, thereby ensuring that centralized con-
trol of the air forces would be maintained.
With the plan in good order. General Weyland spent December 14 and
15 visiting his units. On the sixteenth, he arrived back at Nancy, where he con-
vened a meeting for representatives from all participating air organizations to
confirm reconnaissance areas and towns selected for interdiction attacks. In
the evening of December 16, General Weyland, in what appears to have been
little more than an afterthought, penciled a brief notation in his diary about
events reported to the north of Third A rmy, "German offensive started in First
Army area." One can only speculate whether at this early point he appreciated
the significance of the assault and what it might mean for Operation Tink. The
weather was good on December 16 and aircrews happily described a "field
day" flying against German targets west of the Rhine, reports reminiscent of
those in the heady days of August in France.^^^
At the Third Army morning briefing on December 17, 1944, army
briefers reported that First Army and VIII Corps were "very surprised" at the
German counterattack in their zone. Not only had the Wehrmacht caught them
off guard, the enemy marshaled a larger striking force than anyone had expect-
ed. General Weyland promised to send two fighter groups north to support
Generals Patton
and Patch
179
Air Power for Patton's Army
A squadron commander in the 354tli Fighter Group cliecl<s last-minute
details with his flight leaders before a mission against German supply lines.
VIII Corps throughout the day. In fact, December 17, with a total of 356 sor-
ties, turned out to be the busiest flying day for the command since November
8, when Operation Madison began. All four groups flew in support of the
beleaguered VIII Corps troops in the Ardennes region near Bastogne."^
TheXIX TAC issued the revised airplan for Operation Tink on December
17. It confirmed that this attack would be the largest tactical air operation of its
kind yet attempted. M edium bombers from the IX Bombardment Division and
heavy bombers from Eighth Air Force and RAF Bomber Command would
bomb both specified areas and 34 individual targets during three consecutive
days. M oreover. Eighth Air Force fighters would fly 14 armed reconnaissance
routes and bomb 26 supply depots. Fighter- bombers from XIX TAC would
attack all communications centers behind the point of assault immediately fol-
lowing the main bombardments. In the confusion, the ground forces expected to
be able to move forward with less opposition. Tink, indeed, was an ambitious
plan.113
Bad weather on December 18 restricted flying to two groups, the 354th
on loan to IX TAC and the 362d in support of XII Corps. General Weyland
now confided to his diary that "First Army is in a flap" over the German coun-
terattack and that his Siegfried Line assault. Operation Tink, had been post-
poned from December 19 to 22. After the briefing next morning, on December
19, a special meeting took place atThird Army headquarters. General Patton's
staff announced that the 4th Armored and 26th Infantry Divisions had been
ordered to move north, if required, to relieve VIII Corps. In that event,
Weyland concluded. Operation Tink would be canceled because Third Army
would have insufficient forces to exploit an air bombardment. Patton was to
180
Stalemate in Lorraine
meet that day with Eisenhower and Bradley at Verdun and would subsequent-
ly advise Weyland of the final decision. ^i''
That afternoon General Weyland called General Vandenberg. He urged
the Ninth Air Force commander to continue with Operation Tink and hoped
that it would be unnecessary to divert ground forces. Yet, early the same
evening Patton called to say that "Tink was scrubbed." Official notice from
SHAEF arrived later, and with the severity of the situation in the Ardennes
becoming clear to all, Weyland immediately requested three additional fighter
groups and a second reconnaissance group to help Third Army pull the "First
Army's chestnuts out of the fire."^^^
Although Operation Tink never occurred, it offered perhaps the best
coordinated air proposal for propelling ground forces through German
Siegfried Line defenses in the Lorraine Campaign. It also provided a good
means of assessing General Wey land's role as its key planner and liaison offi-
cer for air support. Operation Tink could have represented "what might have
been" for Generals Weyland and Patton. On December 20, however, the air
commander had little time to brood about cancellation of his plan. The
Ardennes emergency required everyone's full attention.
Lorraine in Retrospect
The Lorraine Campaign ended in mid-December 1944. General Patton
captured the sentiments of those he led for Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson
in one of his own colorful epigrams:
I hope in the final settlement of the war you insist that the
Germans retain Lorraine, because I can imagine no greater
burden than to be the owner of this nasty country where it
rains every day and where the whole wealth of the people
consists in assorted manure piles.
General Weyland certainly was no less frustrated by the three months of stat-
ic warfare. The high hopes of September 1944 had unquestionably turned sour
and the unpleasant weather seemed to match the progress of the campaign.
Nothing that Weyland could command in the air seemed able to alter that stale-
mate. In terms of the weather, the terrain, the forces, and the fortifications, the
Lorraine Campaign in many ways represents a case study in the limitations
rather than the capabilities of air power.
All the while, in response to requests from Generals Patton and
Vandenberg, Weyland assigned and shuffled mission priorities to meet the
most crucial needs as he perceived them. With air supremacy seldom contest-
ed by the Luftwaffe, he directed most of the command's flying toward inter-
181
Air Power for Patton's Army
diction and ground-support targets. For air power purists, he may liavefavored
close air support missions too often at tlie expense of interdiction.
Nevertlieless, Weyland always responded first to the needs of Patton's troops
in combat. Normally he handled this responsibility with two fighter groups,
which left the other groups free to apply against the remaining missions. M ost
of these consisted of armed reconnaissance sorties, but bomber escort, leaflet
dropping, fighter sweeps, and at times, air alert required attention. Force size
continued to be a constant headache. To be sure, commanders seldom, if ever,
believe they have sufficient forces. Yet, given the competing responsibilities,
and with the exception of supporting the infantry and armor units, Weyland's
command was far too small to concentrate on any assignment in force. In
Lorraine, the command had sufficient resources to cover the ground support
mission only because Third Army itself had to fight with reduced forces and
suffered from the tyranny of logistics.
M ost of all, with the size of his command, Weyland found it impossible
to defeat the weather, which became the air-ground team's worst enemy. A lia-
bility for the Allies, the abundant bad weather was always a comfort to the
enemy. On bad-weather days, the fighter-bombers did not fly effectively;
sometimes they did not fly at all. This left the German defenders free to move
supplies to the forward area and dig in from M etz to the Siegfried Line, ably
protected by heavy flak concentrations. Even in the best of times, with more
air firepower, the dug-in and reinforced strongpoints often proved impervious
to fighter- bomber attack. Weyland knew this, and so did the enemy. Little
could be done until both air and ground forces received reinforcements, and
their mission in Lorraine became more urgent. This was the promise of
Operation Tink and the reality of the Ardennes emergency.^"
On the other hand, tactical air operations made gains during the cam-
paign. Air-ground cooperation improved considerably as a result of counter-
flak procedures and the combined operations offices situated at Army corps
and division headquarters. The air arm also demonstrated that it could be
effective in aiding the advance of the ground forces in spite of unfavorable
conditions. Numerous letters of appreciation from the ground units attest to
aircrew success in attacking German strongpoints, repelling counterattacks,
and creating better tactical mobility for the troops.
Radar and communications developments during the three months
accounted for much of the gains. Like so many aspects of the command, air-
base movement became routi ne, i n spi te of the w eather, while tacti cal ai r pow er
proved itself able to react immediately and adjust to new situations. Such
adjustments, for example, might involve the rapid movement of an entire group
from one base to another, or involve reconnaissance aircraft leading fighter-
bombers to an immediate target and coordinating army antiflak artillery fire.
Early in the campaign Weyland recognized that larger air attacks were
required to break the stalemate on the ground. For him the answer lay in long-
182
Stalemate in Lorraine
range, jointly planned offensives propelled by a heavier concentration of air
power. If the four air-ground operations he helped develop— Operation
Madison, Merzig, Hi-Sug, and T ink— proved less than completely successful,
they nevertheless were well-conceived. In December, he became absolutely
convinced he had found the answer to the stalemate and a return to mobile
warfare in Operation Tink. Although it was a complex plan, requiring closer
coordination among the various air and ground participants than any previous
offensive, Weyland remained confident that thorough preparation, teamwork,
and close cooperation would ensure success.
Above all, through all the frustrating experiences of the Lorraine
Campaign, Weyland and Patton maintained close cooperation between the air
and ground forces. Although other Allied air-ground teams cooperated effec-
tively in the fall campaign, XIX TAC and Third Army developed a special
relationship under adverse conditions. The official Army historian of the cam-
paign declared, "one outstanding feature of the Lorraine Campaign was the
cooperation between the XIX TAC and the Third Army.''^^^
Near the end of the Lorraine experience. General Patton met the press
with his air commander. He explained the Third Army's "method of air-ground
tactical cooperation" for the correspondents assembled so that they might
describe it accurately for the public back home:
No operation in this army is contemplated without General
Weyland and his staff being present at the initial decisions.
We don't say that we are going to do this and what can you
do about it. We say that we would like to make such an oper-
ation— now how can that be done from the air stand point?
Third Army staff members. General Weyland added, understood "not
only the capabilities... of air but also [its] limitations.... Third Army does not
look upon the XIX Tactical Command as a cure-all." He then turned to the
heart of their relationship. "Our success is built on mutual respect and com-
radeship between the air and ground [team] that actually does exist. You can
talk to any of my boys about that... My boys like the way the Third Army
fights. M y kids feel that this is their army [emphasis added]. "^2° The mutual
respect, even affection, that promoted this kind of cooperation, coupled with
Weyland's pragmatic approach to using tactical air power, surely accounted for
much of the air-ground team's success.
The cooperation between theXIX TAC and Third Army air-ground team
had grown and prospered, remarkably under the most disconcerting conditions
of static warfare in Lorraine. That cooperation would be put to the test under
far more desperate circumstances in mid-December 1944— in the Ardennes.
183
Chapter Five
The Ardennes
The German surprise attack in tlie early morning liours of December 16,
1944, quicl<ly turned into far more tlian tlie spoiling action about which Third
Army intelligence officers had worried for the past several weeks. Instead,
three Nazi armies launched a 20-division assault along a 60-mile front oppo-
site the Ardennes forest region in southern Belgium and northern
Luxembourg. Defenders of this area held by First Army's VIII Corps was
comprised of, as one observer phrased it, "dirt farmers and shoe salesmen."
The success of the German onslaught ended General Eisenhower's own ambi-
tious plan for a winter offensive. Planned offensives by First Army in the
direction of Cologne and by Third Army in the Saar had to be abandoned to
combat the German menace at the Allied center, a bitter struggle that became
known as the Battle of the Bulge.^ When Eisenhower met with key Allied offi-
cers at Verdun three days after the initial German attack, he declared the grave
military situation to be "one of opportunity for us and not [one] of disaster."
A Ithough his audience may have found it difficult to embrace such a view at
that moment, Eisenhower's perception proved absolutely correct In the end,
Germany's Ardennes Offensive, Operation Herbstnebel (Autumn Fog), ended
in overwhelming defeat, leaving West Wall defenses woefully depleted before
a renewed Allied attack. ^
The Ardennes Offensive also provided Allied air power with an oppor-
tunity to demonstrate its capability in a defensive emergency. Never before in
northern Europe had tactical military forces been called on to meet a major
threat without benefit of extensive prior planning between air and land com-
manders. It would prove a test worthy of tactical air power and of the air-
ground teamwork demonstrated a few months earlier in France. Although the
Allied aerial response was applied theaterwide, Weyland's XIX TAC faced
challenges at the cutting edge of Patton's celebrated counterattack to relieve
Bastogne and drive German forces out of the Bulge.^
Weyland played a pivotal role in directing tactical air operations in the
southern half of the Bulge. Yet, popular attention is fixed most often on
Patton's dramatic 90-degree turn north, and in the air, on Ouesada's direction
of air support in the northern area of the Bulge. Nevertheless, for both Third
Army and its air arm, the Battle of the Bulge in many ways represented their
greatest triumph of the European Campaign.
185
Air Power for Patton's Army
Operation Autumn Fog
On December 16, 1944, in the initial confusion and fog of battle, the true
nature of Operation Autumn Fog remained unclear. If Allied leaders had cor-
rectly identified Adolf Hitler rather than Field M arshal Gerd von Rundstedt as
the architect, they might have better reacted to a surprise attack of such a size
and stunning boldness. Since September, Hitler had brooded about a German
counterattack out of the Ardennes against Allied forces reminiscent of
Operation Fall Gelb, the invasion of France in mid- 1940. If in late 1944
German forces could reach the Belgian port of Antwerp, 100 miles in the dis-
tance, they would split the Allied line and be in position to destroy American
and British troops to the north by trapping them against the English Channel
and North Sea. If less than completely successful, so audacious an assault
would neverthel ess gai n preci ous ti me and di srupt the anti ci pated A 1 1 i ed off en-
sive against the Siegfried Line.''
Operation Autumn Fog called for the main attack to be delivered in the
north along the M almedy-L lege axis to A ntwerp by the Sixth Panzer A rmy, led
by SS Gen. Sepp Dietrich. It had the narrowest front of the attacking forces,
and much would depend on access to the road network to sustain the drive
(Map 16). In the center. General von M anteuffel's Fifth Panzer Army had the
task of seizing the key road communications centers of St. Vith and Bastogne,
and of pushing on to the M euse River before turning north. To the south, the
Seventh Army, commanded by Gen. Eric Brandenberger, would provide flank
Field Marshal
Gerd von Rundstedt
with Adolf Hitler
186
SOURCE: VincentJ . Esposito, ed., West Point Atlas of American Wars, V. 2, Map 61, (New York: Praeger, 1960)
Air Power for Patton's Army
protection to the Fifth and expand into northern Luxembourg. To further the
drive, the Germans formed special parachute units to seize l<ey road junctions
and serve as blocl<ing forces, while Lt. Col. Otto Skorzeny's U .5. -uniformed
guerrillas would sow confusion behind Allied lines and take control of the
Meuse bridges. The Luftwaffe's aerial striking force, meanwhile, had been
secretly expanded to some 2,400 tactical aircraft for the campaign and moved
to bases in the Rhine valley. The mission was to provide close air support for
the attacking armored and infantry units in the breakthrough area. Whether an
air force by now trained largely in air defense interception tactics could
achieve success in ground attack operations without first attempting to gain air
superiority remained to be seen. Like the entire operation, much would depend
on deception, surprise, and the weather.^
The failure of Allied intelligence to comprehend the marshaling of
German forces has remained one of the most controversial aspects of the cam-
paign. Although it is difficult to avoid blaming American and British com-
manders and thei r i ntel I i gence off i cers, one m ust admi re the G erman decepti on
operation that included a massive buildup in theEifel region without the Allies
suspecting its true nature. The Allies identified Dietrich's headquarters near
Cologne in the fall, and the Germans made every effort to give it a defensive
Gen. Hasso von
Manteuffel,
commander, Germany's
Fifth Panzer Army
188
The Ardennes
appearance against First Arnny's expected offensive. Then, at tlie last minute,
Dietricli'sSixtli Panzer lieadquarters secretly moved to the Eifel. Similarly, the
Fifth German Army moved into the heavily wooded Eifel under a cover plan
that called for counterattacking the First Army's offensive to the north. Only
top-level Wehrmacht officers knew the true nature of the plan, while their
forces developed elaborate measures of camouflage and followed strict radio
discipline. By mid-December 1944, sufficient fuel and supplies had accumu-
lated and forecasters predicted a spell of much-needed foul weather. In the
course of three nights, the attackers quickly moved into place and prepared to
strike. The deception achieved complete success.^
In hindsight, many indications from Ultra and other intelligence sources
pointed to an impending German offensive. In mitigation, it is often argued
that bad weather prohibited sufficient air reconnaissance of the buildup area,
especially on the eve of the assault. Despite terrible weather, however, tactical
reconnaissance flights from at least one of the two photo reconnaissance
groups covered the Eifel and the Rhine River valley on all but one day pre-
ceding the attack. On five of those days, including December 14 and 15, all
flights reported heavy road and rail traffic into the region. As for the XIX TAG,
it experienced only two days before the sixteenth when flying proved impos-
sible, and its focus on armed reconnaissance missions provided sufficient
opportunity to appreciate the heavy rail traffic west of the Rhine. Even with
inconsistent reports, there could be little doubt of a major deployment taking
place. Third Army analysts had studied rail movement since mid-November
1944, and understood the direction and general size of the rail transport activ-
ity, but they thought about the movement mainly in terms of a German spoil-
ing attack that might be launched from the Eifel against either the First or the
Third Army front. M oreover, the Germans communicated over land lines and
avoided the radio. Thus, Ultra intercepts remained silent on the Germans' true
purpose for the buildup, and with a traditional army officer, von Rundstedt,
assumed to be in charge, it made perfect sense to overlook the Ardennes as the
center of German interest. Not only did its hilly terrain seem especially unsuit-
able for armor operations in winter, but the Germans could hardly be expect-
ed to attack through the Ardennes a second time.''
Given the inability of the Allies to be strong everywhere on the western
front, they weakened what appeared to be the most secure sector, the center. It
would havetaken more to alter Allied preconceptions about German intentions
than the intuition of General Patton, who in late November 1944, recorded in
his diary, "the First Army is making a terrible mistake in leaving the VIII
Corps static, as it is highly probable that the Germans are building up east of
them."^ Indeed, as one authority on the Ardennes Offensive remarked, "the
Americans and British had looked in a mirror for the enemy and seen there
only the reflection of their own intentions."^ In fact, on December 16, 20 divi-
sions from three German armies confronted only four Allied divisions
189
Air Power for Patton's Army
deployed along an 80-mile front between M onschau on the north and Trier on
the south. When it struck that day, the Wehrmacht directed the brunt of its
attack against the line held by a combination of recently arrived green or else
battle-weary troops of General Middleton's VIII Corps (Map 16). German
artillery barrages followed by a heavy infantry assault broke the line of the
Allied defense for rolling armored spearheads. The next few days became des-
perate ones for the A I lies.
The Allied Response
On December 16, 1944, Allied air forces possessed a significant numer-
ical advantage over the Luftwaffe. Ninth Air Force had deployed in the field
nearly 1,000 fighters and fighter-bombers in three tactical air commands; two
were mostly to the north, in Belgium, while the XIX TAG was south of
Luxembourg, in France (Map 17). Fighters from other Allied air commands
brought the Allies' total to just over 4,000 available front line fighter aircraft,
nearly double the available Luftwaffe deployment. M uch would now depend
on how Allied air leaders used their superior force.^^
The official N inth A ir Force account of the campaign asserts that the tac-
tical air forces pursued three objectives in reacting to the German offensive on
December 17: first, maintain air supremacy and prevent the Luftwaffe from
supporting German ground forces; second, destroy the enemy's main combat
elements, such as the tank and artillery forces that propelled the advance; and
third, strike at the enemy's means of supply, including bridges, rail yards, sup-
ply depots, and communications centers to isolate the breakthrough area. This
final objective drove enemy supply lines farther back from the battle area and
made them more vulnerable to subsequent Allied air assault.
In the emergency, close air support, which claimed third- priority in the
tactical mission hierarchy, took precedence over interdiction.^^ One might
argue that, at first, close air support even held priority over air superiority in
the desperate attempt to blunt the German drive and confine it to manageable
proportions. At the same time, the Ninth Air Force did not need to specifical-
ly target the German air force in the Ardennes region because the Luftwaffe's
determination to provide cover to its attacking forces reopened the contest for
air supremacy in the battle zone. Thus, close air support missions almost
invariably resulted in first-priority counterair contests as well.^''
This was certainly the case for General Weyland's forces on December
17. His response to the call for assistance was immediate and overwhelming.
Taking advantage of unexpected good weather, every group in the command
flew what they termed ground-force cover missions in support of VIII Corps
units. At day's end, the fighter-bombers had flown half of their 356 total sor-
ties in support of ground forces in the A rdennes breakthrough area, west of the
190
Map 17
Air Assignments for the Ardennes Counterattacl< December 1944
Reprinted from: Col. William R. Carter, "Air Power in the Battle of the Bulge: A Theater Campaign Perspective," Airpower
Journal, III No. 4 (Winter 1989): 23.
Air Power for Patton's Army
Our and Sauer rivers along the German border. The remaining sortie figure
reflected close support and interdiction missions in support of limited-objective
operations by XX Corps and XII Corps, which at this time continued prepara-
tions for the soon-to-be canceled Operation Tink.^^
The Luftwaffe made a strong presence on that December day with an
estimated 600 sorties flown in support of the armored breakthrough and air-
borne landings. Both sides suffered high losses. Weyland's fighters claimed 24
enemy aircraft destroyed for a loss of nine of their own. General Ouesada's
forces, which had major responsibility for supporting First Army operations,
claimed 49 destroyed and another 35 damaged. Even the reconnaissance pilots
got in on the action when the 15th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron's crack
pilot, Capt. John H. Hoefker, returned with three and a half planes claimed.
Ground air defense units tallied an additional 54 aircraft shot down. The next
day, the L uftwaffe appeared i n force agai n at the A rdennes front and once more
suffered heavy losses— 50 to Allied fighters and 51 to antiaircraft fire. After
December 18, the Luftwaffe would never again attempt another large-scale air
support effort for its ground forces in the Bulge.^^
The Allies achieved immediate air supremacy in the battle zone less by
conscious design than as a by-product of the close support missions. N ot that
the German Air Force did not remain a menace. Instead of fighter-bombers.
Allied air leaders assigned medium and heavy bombers the counterair mission
of striking nearby Luftwaffe bases. Nevertheless, fighter-bombers frequently
attracted Luftwaffe attention while supporting ground forces or while on inter-
diction missions beyond the Ardennes. In fact, the experience of the 406th
Tiger Tamers proved representative. Its 513th Fighter Squadron, flying a
ground support mission on December 17, received orders to assist P-38s in a
dogfight with six FW 190s. After jettisoning their bombs, the Thunderbolt
pilots entered the fray and claimed three enemy aircraft destroyed. Of course,
this encounter meant that the 513th aircraft did not bomb targets in support of
ground forces, a dilemma that persisted throughout December when the
Luftwaffe remained most active.^'
The outstanding aerial effort on December 17, however, could not be
repeated for the next five days because the Germans received the bad weather
that facilitated their plans. Like Lorraine, weather became a determining fac-
tor in the air portion of the Ardennes Campaign. Only a squadron-sized mis-
sion on December 18 and 19 by the 354th Fighter Group broke the frustrating
pattern. Yet, the 354th Pioneers found the Luftwaffe dangerous on both occa-
sions. On the eighteenth, one of its squadrons attacked a force of 12 FW 190s
bombing First Army troops east of Duren. Although it claimed four of the
enemy aircraft destroyed, it lost two P-47s of its own. The next day an esti-
mated 70 FW 190s attacked another Pioneer squadron after bombing a mar-
shaling yard, and the American pilots counted nine enemy fighters down at a
cost of three of their own. Despite the losses. General Weyland was pleased
192
The Ardennes
with the performance of his newly equipped P-47 outfit; that evening he laud-
ed the Group "on [a] fine beginning with P-47s." All further flying by the
command until December 23 supported XII Corps, which remained in position
opposite the Zweibruecken area prior to its emergency redeployment north.
While bad weather during the next five days prevented effective aerial
operations, Allied leaders developed their strategy, prepared the necessary
command and control measures, and readied their forces for a counteroffen-
sive. On December 18, General Eisenhower alerted Patton to postpone
Operation Tink and be prepared to counterattack against the expanding
German salient. The situation on the ground quickly became critical for VIII
Corps, as a German Panzer corps rapidly moved to reach the key communica-
tions center of Bastogne before the 101st Airborne Division arrived there in
4th Armored Division veliicles move past wrec Iced American
equipment, Bastogne (above); tanl<s of tlie 4tli Armored Division
in the Luxembourg area used as artillery fire on
German positions (below)
193
Air Power for Patton's Army
force. The Germans lost that close race the next day, the nineteenth, but they
captured Houffalize 18 miles to the north. By December 21, they would sur-
round the 101st Airborne Division, elements of the 10th Armored Division,
and various other units at Bastogne.^^
Early on the morning of December 19, Patton directed his 4th Armored
and 26th Infantry Divisions to begin moving into the III Corps area 30 miles
north. 2° Later that day, hejoined Eisenhower and Bradley atVerdun, where the
Supreme Commander outlined his plan, first to blunt and then turn back the
assault (Map 16). The western tip of the German attacking force was to be pre-
vented from crossing the M euse. With the northern and southern shoulders of
the salient confining the width of the breakthrough, the Allies would seal the
northern part of the Bulge and counterattack in the south. Allied leaders adjust-
ed the boundaries accordingly. General Devers's 6th A rmy Group would move
up to replaceT bird Army's XII Corps in Lorraine, while Patton assumed com-
mand of VIII Corps and headed north with two attacking corps. Once his
forces had secured Bastogne, he would attack northeast in the direction of
Houffalize and eventually cut the salient in two.^^
At this meeting, Patton electrified those present by promising to move
his forces northward and be positioned to counterattack within 48 hours.
Although he had directed his staff to prepare for this eventuality, it nonethe-
less meant shifting an entire army, solving enormous logistics problems, and
arranging complex movement schedules during brutal winter weather. Patton
and the men of his command succeeded, and the move remains today as one
of the great feats of military history. As his biographer observed, "it was an
operation that only a master could think of executing. "^^
General Weyland did not react as swiftly. On that day, December 19, he
still hoped to salvage Operation Tink. Like many others, he had been slow to
appreciate the gravity of the German attack. One can also understand his reluc-
tance to abandon the plan he had helped fashion and believed would lead to a
breach of the Siegfried Line. Certainly his conversation with General Ouesada
that afternoon, when they used special encrypted communications for the first
time, could have left him in little doubt about the seriousness of the situation.
That evening, after General Vandenberg notified him of Operation Tink's can-
cellation, he requested reinforcements for his command— three additional
fighter groups and another reconnaissance group. He soon received nearly all
of the forces that he requested."
Ninth Air Force planners, meanwhile, continued developing an air plan
based on requests from 12th Army Group, which focused on attacking German
armored elements, isolating the Ardennes-Eifel region from rail support,
harassing road traffic inside and outside the Bulge, and eliminating resupply
facilities immediately beyond the Ardennes. This basic plan would remain
unchanged. It called for medium bombers to concentrate on supply facilities
such as bridges, railheads, and communications centers with the objective of
194
The Ardennes
forcing enemy supply points baci< to tiie Riiine River. Altliougli figliter-
bombers would lielp, tlieir main assignment would be close support to meet the
immediate threat, the front line Panzer force; they would also fly armed recon-
naissance against road and rail targets from the Ardennes to the Rhine River.
The planners viewed air superiority as essential and likely to need more atten-
tion because of the increased Luftwaffe presence, although they did not at first
address this issue specifically. Eventually, they relied on Eighth Air Force
bombers and fighters to handle much of the Luftwaffe counterair threat (Map
17). 24
With the cancellation of Operation Tink, December 20, 1944, proved to
be the key planning day for a counterattack by the Third Army-XIX TAC
team. At a morning conference at the Third Army command post, Patton dis-
tributed the new order of battle: XX Corps would remain deployed along the
Saar; XII Corps would reinforce the blocking force at Echternach; VIII Corps
would strike the salient from the west; and while III Corps attacked from the
south with 4th Armored Division advancing north to Bastogne, the 26th
Infantry Division would move toward Wiltz, and the 80th Infantry Division
toward Diekirch. Third Army units, Patton explained, had already begun to
regroup to wheel the army's axis of advance from northeast to the north.
Armed with Patton's plan, Weyland met with key staff members and
decided to revive X -Ray, the command's small mobile command post that per-
mitted close air-ground coordination, and move it with the Third Army com-
mand post from Chalon to Luxembourg City the next day. This time, chief of
staff Col. Roger Browne would head X-Ray, while Colonel Thompson
remained in command of the rear headquarters at Chalon. General Weyland
would operate advance headquarters from Nancy with his combat operations
officer. Colonel Ferguson. M uch, of course, would depend on the pace of the
battle and General Patton's location.
At the same time, Weyland directed his signal officer. Col. Glenn
Coleman, to work with Ninth Air Force to extend land lines from the M etz air-
field, already scheduled to become operational later in December, to the
Luxembourg City headquarters and other X IX TAC bases. They also discussed
additional communications problems, especially new radar locations, and they
decided to leave the M EW radar at its present location at M orhange, east of
Nancy, until Third Army shifted the bulk of III Corps forces north. Then the
MEW radar, which offered the best range and precision of available radar sys-
tems, could serve as the primary navigation and warning radar for the com-
mand's operations in the Bulge."
T hat eveni ng SH A E F i nformed Weyl and of the new ai r and ground com-
mand arrangements based on Eisenhower's decision to divide the Ardennes
sector into northern and southern halves for better command and control. Field
Marshal Montgomery would command Allied forces in the northern sector,
while in the south. General Bradley retained control of Patton's Third Army
195
Air Power for Patton's Army
along with a sprinkling of First Army units. In the north, the two American air
commands, IX and XXIX TACs, would be subordinated to the British Second
Tactical Air Force commanded by Sir Arthur Coningham (Map 17).
Coningham, however, left General Quesada free to apply both British and
American fighter-bombers as he saw fit. This arrangement for the air forces
avoided the l<ind of friction that developed later between Montgomery and
American ground commanders over the British Field Marshal's methodical
and extended preparations, and over his subsequent claims to have "saved the
American side" in the Ardennes emergency.^^
I n the press of events, when Weyland contacted the N inth A ir Force chief
of staff on December 20, 1944, regarding reinforcements, he learned that his
request the previous evening had not reached Vandenberg. Weyland stressed
its importance in light of the SHAEF message, and a short time thereafter he
spol<e to Vandenberg personally. The N inth's commander did not commit him-
self at this point, but suggested they meetin Luxembourg City in two days, on
December TIP
Once again General Weyland turned to General Patton for assistance.
The next day he drove to Luxembourg City and, after assuring himself that his
staff had XIX TAC's "Spitfire X-Ray" ready for operations, conferred with
Patton on the aerial reinforcement issue. Patton readily agreed to prime
Bradley, and he delivered on his word. Next morning, on December 22 at 12th
Army Group headquarters in Luxembourg City, Bradley, Patton, Vandenberg,
and Weyland reached agreement on Weyland's request for additional units.
Since Third Army would make the main effort against the Germans in the
Bulge, Weyland argued, tactical resources needed to be divided more equitably
among the air commands.^°
The outcome pleased General Weyland. Within the week he expected to
receive three fighter-bomber groups from IX TA C : the 367th (a P- 38 group) and
the 365th and the 368th (two Thunderbolt groups). The 365th would go to the
M etz airfield when the engineers had it ready, and the other two groups would
go to Juvincourt, at least temporarily. Two tactical reconnaissance squadrons
from XIX TAC would join the 10th Photo Reconnaissance Group atConflans.
This would bolster the reconnaissance capability of the command by 50 percent,
and the air leaders expected the emergency to call for a maximum effort from
these units. At this early date, the planners at 12th Army Group Headquarters
discussed the likelihood of each tactical air command temporarily receiving a
P- 51 group f rom E i ghth A i r F orce to handl e escort duti es and perform counterai r
missions. The XIX TAC group was later identified as the 361st Fighter Group, a
P-51 unit, and the command based it at St. Dizier. With these additional units,
XIX TAC would have a striking force of eight groups totaling 360 airplanes-
its most potent arsenal since the summer campaign in France. Moreover, the
locations of the new bases improved the effectiveness of the force because all
were within short striking distance of the Ardennes and the Saarland.
196
The Ardennes
Yet, the transfer of these aerial units had not been cleared beforehand
with IX TAG'S commander, General Quesada, the primary loser in the realign-
ment. When Weyland saw Vandenberg the next morning, he learned that both
IX TAG and Second TAF (RAF) vigorously protested the transfer. In view of
the deteriorating situation on the ground in the northern sector at that time,
Quesada's dismay was understandable. Nevertheless, Vandenberg explained,
the transfers would take place as planned. Despite the disagreement,
Quesada's objections did not alter the close personal relationship between the
two American air commanders or affect tactical air power's effective
response. The rapid transfer of units between commands demonstrated its
flexibility.32
The basic command, control, and organizational arrangements were com-
pleted on December 22, 1944, the sixth day of the German offensive. General
Weyland immediately began coordinating support for the new air units with his
maintenance and supply officers, and he approved a new tactical reconnaissance
plan that comprised ten areas generally encompassing St. Hubert within the
western portion of the Bulge, Gologne, M ainz, and St. Avoid in Lorraine.
The command's preparations for a counterattacl< during the initial week
of the offensive proceeded smoothly. Weather remained the major uncertainty.
Group histories for this period reflect the intense preparations to attack and the
frustration and anxiety of waiting for the weather to clear. M oreover, for the
first time on the continent, the command also had to worry seriously about
Luftwaffe air raids. By December 22, Third Army reported 78 Luftwaffe raids.
M ost seemed to be nuisance strikes, such as the attacks on Rosiers and M etz,
two of the XIX TAG airfields. Although these raids caused little damage, they
nevertheless heightened the tension and compelled planners to take action to
thwart the air threat in their rear area.^"*
M eanwhile, despite the bad weather, German ground forces experienced
problems executing all phases of their plan. In the north, U .S. V Gorps troops
P-38 of the 367th Fighter Group
197
Air Power for Patton's Army
exercised unexpectedly stiff resistance along the Elsenborn Ridge, and
Dietrich's armored forces found themselves delayed and confined to only two
of the four needed roads. Li l<ewise in the south, VIII Corps grimly held on for
three days opposite Echternach, thereby delaying the Seventh German Army's
drive to break through to the southwest. In fact, both northern and southern
shoulders continued to resist and confine the width of the German attack. As
a result, the Fifth German Army in the center assumed the main burden of the
offensive, as it had more success breaking A merican defense along the Schnee
Eifel ridgeline with its two Panzer corps in the lead. Even here, tenacious
pockets of resistance delayed General von Manteuffel's forces. St. Vith held
out until December 23, forcing the Germans to deal with severe traffic con-
gestion and supply backups. For an offensive scheduled to reach the Meuse
River while operating on two and a half days' worth of supplies and five days'
rations, these delays proved critical.
By December 22 at XIX TAG, officers and enlisted men realized that
German forces had encircled Bastogne and were regrouping for a fresh assault.
Although 4th Armored Division's three combat commands moved northward,
their pace slowed in the face of heavy snow and ice, and the German forces in
their path. The fighter groups eagerly sought to get into the battle— none more
so than the 406th Fighter Group that had developed such good rapport with the
101st Airborne Division when these paratroopers arrived atM ourmelon in late
September 1944 to recuperate after their rough experience in Operation
M arket Garden. The 406th Fighter Group expected to take the lead at Bastogne
just as soon as the weather broke.^^
Paratroopers of the 101st Airborne Division, supported by
firepower of the 4tli Armored Division, Bastogne
198
The Ardennes
Victory Weather
Seven days after the Nazi breakthrough, on December 23, 1944, the
Allies awoke to a Russian High, a high pressure system from the east, which
brought clear skies and cooler temperatures throughout the region.^^ N ow the
planes could fly and tanks could roll during whatthe A merican side would call
five days of victory weather. For Weyland's forces, the next five days, from
December 23-27, proved the most active in the command's operational expe-
rience and provided a superb example of tactical air power's effect on a land
battle under emergency conditions.
On December 23, the XIX TAC swung into action, lacking only the
361st Fighter Group, which Eighth Air Force had yet to deploy to the conti-
nent. The airplanes flew in close support of VIII Corps forces at Bastogne and
of Third Army's advancing armored columns, by now within six miles of the
beleaguered town, although facing increasingly stiff German resistance. The
362d Fighter Group flew six missions in support of the III Corps forces, but it
also supported XII Corps with two missions and, for good measure, sent 15
aircraft to escort C- 47 Dakotas on a mission to drop supplies in parapacks to
the American troops isolated at Bastogne. Characteristic of flying during the
Bastogne period was the 362d Fighter Group's high mission rate. The XIX
TAC's average of 57 missions per day for the five-day period was among the
highest in the command's history.
During the emergency operation, ground support personnel serviced,
reloaded, and returned the aircraft to action as fast as they possibly could.
Tactical reconnaissance pilots played a particularly crucial role, keeping all
roads and railroads entering the Bulge under continuous surveillance. It
became increasingly routine for these pilots, having called in targets to the
control center, to lead fighter-bombers to them. This saved time, allowing
more fighter-bomber missions to be flown during these short December days.
Sortie figures for the tactical reconnaissance squadrons reflect their important
contribution. They flew 26 successful sorties on the 23rd, but with the addition
of the two squadrons from XXIX TAC, they averaged 70 for the remaining
four days. No unit proved more important than the night photo squadron,
which flew 99 sorties in December, its largest number to date, acquiring
urgently needed nighttime photos of highway traffic and communications tar-
gets.39
The missions of the other groups on December 23 included escort for
263 C-47S to Bastogne, specific close support, armed reconnaissance of the
B uige and the Eifel region near Trier, and coverage of the weakened Saar front
opposite XX Corps. M oreover, because Third Army leaders worried aboutXIl
Corps' right flank, the 10th Photo Reconnaissance Group flew a daily mission
in the Trier-Merzig area looking for any signs of a buildup and excessive
199
Air Power for Patton's Army
bridge-building. In effect, tlie command again protected Patton's right flanl<
mucli as it did in France tlie previous summer.''"
Tliese five mission types cliaracterized tlie entire Ardennes period. Of
tlie f i ve, cl ose ai r support i n tlie B ul ge recei ved tlie most attenti on as A 1 1 i ed ai r
forces attempted to slow the German drive and protect American units under
attack. During the five days of victory weather, close support sorties outnum-
bered armed reconnaissance sorties by two to one (1,124 to 509). Again, how-
ever, the wartime records defy precise analysis. M any aircraft that initially set
out on a ground support mission ended flying armed reconnaissance after
being released by the ground controller. Likewise, pilots flying armed recon-
naissance often had targets in the St. Vith, M almedy, and Bastogne areas in
close proximity to friendly ground forces. Then, too, fighter-bombers on escort
duty for bombers and C-47 transports frequently bombed and strafed targets
of opportunity after completing their escort missions.''^
Targets of opportunity abounded. Following the Bulge Campaign, in
February 1945, the command's operational research section analyzed the effort
devoted to targets of opportunity from December 15, 1944, through January
31, 1945. They included in this category targets attacked on armed reconnais-
sance missions and on missions that originally had assigned targets but that
ended attacking targets of opportunity. During the five-day Bastogne emer-
gency, the command's daily sortie rate for targets of opportunity averaged 71
percent of the total 2,846 sorties flown. In view of the emergency, controllers
often diverted aircraft to "hot targets." Researchers reminded the command of
the difficulty of compiling precise and accurate information, and cautioned
that "the number and type of such targets cannot be determined... [precise-
ly]... , since operations following December 15 have involved the attacking of
such a wide variety of targets, most of which might well be classed as targets
of opportunity."''^
Both the scramble and escort missions also demonstrated that the airmen
still considered the Luftwaffe a major threat. During the Ardennes Offensive it
became standard procedure to escort and fly cover for all medium bomber
flights. At times, the fighters and bombers failed to properly rendezvous, how-
ever, and the bomber-force leader then had to decide if the importance of the
target required that his unit proceed unprotected. That option ceased on
December 23, 1944, when a large force of about 500 B-26 Marauders and
A-20s, after failing to contact their fighter escort, chose to fly on and strike
vital bridges west of the Rhine. On this mission that force lost 37 aircraft, 31
to enemy fighters and 6 more to flak.''^ The arrival of P-51s from the Eighth
Air Force on December 24 relieved the XIX TAC of a considerable escort
responsibility, and from that date until the end of the Ardennes Campaign, the
P-51-equipped 361st Fighter Group flew the majority of medium bomber
escort missions, allowing the rugged P-47s to concentrate on what they did
best— bomb and strafe.""
200
The Ardennes
The command's concerns about the Luftwaffe threat during the fight for
Bastogne were well-founded, as the B-26 losses on December 23 made plain.
The urgent need of forward Wehrmacht troops for aerial protection from the
massive Allied fighter-bomber assault during the five days of late December
brought the Luftwaffe out in force. It averaged nearly 600 sorties per day and
a further 200-250 at night from an assortment of night fighters, fighter-
bombers, and bombers. The desperate situation now faced by German troops
in the Bulge required the Luftwaffe's entire effort, which meant that Allied
bombers could attack rearward supply and communications sites virtually
unmolested. Indeed, the vigorous appearance of the Luftwaffe on December 23
and resultant loss of B-26 medium bombers prompted Ninth Air Force to take
swift counterair action. It possessed one division of heavy bombers on loan
from Eighth Air Force for use in its interdiction program east of the Rhine
River. On December 24, Ninth Air Force dispatched them to carpet-bomb 14
airfields in the Frankfurt and Cologne areas. ''^
By month's end the Allied heavy bombers and fighters had exacted a
severe toll from Luftwaffe forces. From the approximately 1,000 enemy sorties
flown over the battle lines west of the Rhine on December 23, Allied airmen
forced that daily rate steadily downward until December 27, the last good-
weather day of the period, when the Luftwaffe managed only about 500 sor-
ties—some 50 percent of the number flown four days earlier. Moreover, it
became increasingly difficult for Luftwaffe aircraft to penetrate Allied defens-
es and reach the A rdennes area from bases i n the R hi ne val I ey. T he A meri can
air counteroffensive had pushed German air support, like other supporting ele-
ments for German ground forces in the Ardennes, steadily eastward away from
the front lines. The Luftwaffe withdrawal put greater strain on its already
depleted fuel supply. Although the Luftwaffe might inflict severe losses on the
Allies, it could neither protect the Wehrmacht ground troops, especially during
daylight hours, nor blunt the Allied air and ground counterattack. M oreover,
the massive Allied air response during the days of good weather resulted, for
the first time, in widespread reports of Luftwaffe pilots using any excuse avail-
able to return early from their missions.'^^
Claims of aircraft destroyed by XIX TAC for this five-day period were
the highest in its history. On December 23, command pilots counted an impres-
sive 34 enemy aircraft shot down in air encounters. Although claims of so
great a number of enemy aircraft vanquished in a single day would not again
be made, by the twenty-seventh, when the weather began closing in once
again, the command could claim a total of 84 enemy aircraft killed and 35
damaged. During the same five-day period XIX TAC also suffered its highest
loss rate. Of 93 aircraft lost in combat during December, 47 occurred during
the period from December 23-27. The worst losses occurred on December 26,
the day after Christmas, when the X IX TAC lost 14 aircraft, although six pilots
parachuted safely into friendly territory. By the end of December, General
201
Air Power for Patton's Army
Weyland once again had to discuss tlie rate of tlie flow of P-47 replacement
aircraft with General Vandenberg.'*^
Participants described the concentration of flak in the Ardennes as the
greatest in the war to date. Allied intelligence explained that two large, self-
propelled flak units had been sent forward under fuel and movement priority
to secure key towns and crossroads. By the time they reached the point of far-
thest advance, five miles from the M euse River, all communications junctions
had heavy flak protection. Understandably, the command suffered most of its
losses from flak. Of the 93 aircraft lost in December, flak accounted for 42 and
probably 22 more as well. Injanuary 1945 the statisticians attributed 35 of the
50 aircraft shot down to flak.'^^
202
The Ardennes
M ost of the tactical air command's losses during the Bastogne operation
occurred among the P-47 groups, the 362nd, 405th, and 406th Fighter Groups,
which flew the majority of close air support missions and had the highest sor-
tie rates. These three groups accounted for 42 of the 69 pilots lost in December,
and 47 of theSl aircraft I ost in combat. What atfirstis most surprising are the
aircraft abort statistics. Although the figure for the month was 6 percent, that
for the period, December 21-31, was only 4.23 percent. M oreover, the record
shows mechanical reasons responsible for only 1.59 percent of the aborted
flights. Yet this record occurred during the most intense flying period of the
month, which suggests that the emergency elicited a special effort from the
maintenance and support people, and that the command permitted aircraft to
fly with problems not otherwise tolerated.''^
Along with 11 aircraft lost on December 23, one other disturbing inci-
dent occurred on that day. Intelligence officers reported that pilots of 362d
Fighter Group P-51s, in a dogfight near Trier against what they later claimed
were enemy FW 190s, tangled with and shot down one of the Orange Tail
P-47S from the 358th Fighter Group. By the end of the month, the problem of
what authorities referred to as friendly fire incidents involving both aircraft
and artillery units would become a major issue of concern for Ninth Air Force
and 12th Army Group.^"
Support Facilities and the Aerial Relief of Bastogne
While XIX TAG pilots pressed their attacks during the days of victory
weather. General Weyland spent much of the period dealing with a variety of
operational support issues. On December 23, the topic of airfield status head-
ed the list, with discussion focused on the M etz airfield. Wey land's chief engi-
neer. Colonel Smyser, promised to have the M etz field ready for one fighter-
bomber group on December 25, and for another one on January 1. As usual,
the engineers' hopes proved too optimistic. By this time, they constructed all
fields with pierced steel-plank to avoid the damage from weather that forced
the command to abandon six airfields in the fall. Even with pierced steel-plank
runways, however, the engineers needed to lay a rock base first. They also had
learned from experience that they could not declare a field operational when
only the runway and little else had been completed. An operational airfield
needed useable, all-weather hardstands, service roads, and taxiways before the
aircraft arrived.
The M etz airfield, which lay within 25 miles of the Saar valley, was clos-
er to enemy lines than any other XIX TAG base. For this reason General
Weyland wanted to ensure that it had adequate air defense units in place. He
203
Air Power for Patton's Army
called Ninth Air Force's air defense chief about protection for the three new
fighter-bomber groups that were on their way to XIX TAC. Weyland learned
that M etz already had an antiaircraft battery in place, and the air defense chief
promised to checl< on Juvincourt and put a battery at Mourmelon. By
December 25, Weyland had arranged for two antiaircraft batteries at each air-
field. Third Army continued to report nightly visits from the Luftwaffe, and
Weyland could not afford to take the aerial threat lightly.
On December 24, with the air defense situation apparently well in hand.
General Weyland and his staff turned their attention to airfield facilities. That
day he visited J uvincourt, where he found that the 367th Fighter Group had just
arrived, "glad to join XIX TAC." Although the group's sincerity is not to be
doubted, the unit could hardly be pleased with the new field. The 368th Fighter
Group had been scheduled to move from J uvincourt to the M etz complex, but
itflew from M ourmelon until the M etz field could be readied. Hardstand prob-
lems at M ourmelon required that the group remain at J uvincourt along with the
367th. The heavy flying of the nextfew days considerably strained the support
facilities of a base not designed to service two groups simultaneously.
After conferring on December 24 with his 100th Wing commander. Brig.
Gen. "Tex" Sanders, Weyland decided to establish what he referred to as a rear
wing at the command's rear headquarters at Chalons. This, he explained,
would improve operational control of the groups in the M arne area, while the
100th Wing, which had moved to M etz, would handle support for the forward
bases in Lorraine. The command declared the rear wing operational on
December 27, 1944, which in effect, meant that Weyland had further decen-
tralized command and control. Despite the shorter flying distances, the new
arrangement proved similar to the one used for mobile warfare in France.
Extremely decentralized tactical air operations had been associated with wide-
ly separated facilities or fast-paced mobile warfare in France. Now, however,
although the front was relatively stable, Weyland established three headquar-
ters echelons and two wings. He could rely on experience, good communica-
tions links, and his tactical control group located with the advance headquar-
ters to ensure efficient command and control."
The next four days proved relatively quiet along the Saar and Mosel
fronts as the batti e for B astogne, farther to the north, i ntensif i ed. R esponsi bi I i ty
for the city's aerial defense belonged to Weyland's command, and relieving
Bastogne would always retain a special place on the command's honor roll.
The Bastogne mission illustrates the various ways the tactical air force could
contribute to support troops in a defensive situation. None proved more impor-
tant than the escort mission to protect Allied transports supplying the garrison.
In this instance, no one questioned the number of sorties that might have been
used for other missions. Bastogne, which held up the X LV 1 1 Panzer Corps, had
to be defended at all costs. Led by the 406th Fighter Group, three groups flew
a total of 95 sorties on December 23 when escorting 263 C-47 cargo craft to
204
The Ardennes
the city. The size of the escort force varied from one to two squadrons, depend-
ing on the number of transports that required protection. Frequently, the fight-
er-bombers flew armed reconnaissance or close support missions after com-
pleting the escort assignment. This, for example, occurred on December 23,
when a squadron from the 362d Fighter Group performed its escort responsi-
bilities and then went on to strike a German command post and bivouac area.^''
A single squadron provided escort protection on December 24 to a trans-
port force flying to Bastogne because the transports numbered only 161. Yet the
squadron from the 354th Fighter Group failed to rendezvous with the transports
and went on to attack its secondary target, a marshaling yard near M ayen, 16
miles west of Coblenz. The next day, a four-plane flight from the 405th Fighter
Group flew the only escort mission, one that proved significant. In the initial
fighting east of the city, mostof the 326th Airborne M edical Company had been
captured. With medical needs critical, a Third Army physician volunteered to go
into the besieged perimeter in a L-1 light plane. He did so without incident
under the protection of the 405th Fighter Group. The number of escort missions
increased to five on December 26, the day the Third Army broke the siege, and
to three on December 27, before the weather turned nasty again. If the results of
the operation are measured in losses, as well as how well they ensured the sur-
vival of the garrison, the relief operation succeeded. Of the 901 C-47s involved
over the five-day period, 19 from the IX Troop Carrier Command were lost.^^
Along with the escort mission, much of the command's close support
effort during this period focused on Bastogne, either in support of VIII Corps
troops surrounded inside the town, or in support of III Corps forces driving
north to rescue the trapped VIII Corps units. Attacks on close-in targets that
defenders could not shell because of ammunition shortages proved particular-
ly effective. While all groups participated at one time or another during the five
days. General Weyland assigned specific groups almost exclusively to these
two corps. The 362d Fighter Group covered the advance of the III Corps' 4th
Armored Division, whilethe 406th FighterGroup flew the close support mis-
C-47 used for supply drops to besieged troops at Bastogne
205
Air Power for Patton's Army
sion for VIII Corps in the Bastogne area. During tlie lieiglit of tlie battle, from
December 24-26, the 406th Fighter Group averaged 17 missions a day in sup-
port of VIII Corps. Losses were heavy, with seven 405th Fighter Group aircraft
shot down on December 26 alone. Although the 362d Fighter Group suffered
fewer losses, none was more difficult to accept than the death of M aj. Berry
Chandler, commander of the 379th Fighter Squadron, inadvertenly shot down
on December 26 by III Corps antiaircraft fire. That same day Weyland received
a personal call from M aj. Gen. John M illiken. III Corps commander, thanking
the 362d Fighter Group for its magnificent support in breaking through to the
city's defenders. Weyland promptly passed the corps commander's message on
to the group hoping it would help atone for the loss of M ajor Chandler.
The Luftwaffe appeared again in force on December 26, mostly in the IX
TAC sector. Even though General Weyland's Y service, the command's intel-
ligence communications intercept operation, had predicted an air attack on
Bastogne consisting of between 400 and 500 aircraft, nothing of the sort
occurred. Later command reports affirmed that the Y service made a valuable
contribution during the Ardennes Campaign, but the record shows little more
than two Y reports, both of which proved to be false alarms."
The Bastogne emergency also elicited a major effort from the 10th Photo
Reconnaissance Group. Responsibility for battlefield coverage of the area fell
primarily to F-6 (P-51) pilots of the 15th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron,
who proved adept at spotting enemy armor columns preparing to attack the
perimeter, leading fighter-bombers to attack targets, and at adjusting artillery
fire for the gunners. Normally the F-6s, rather than the unarmed F-5s (P-38s)
of the 31st Photo Reconnaissance Squadron, flew photo missions in high-flak
areas. Bastogne was not, however, a routine situation for the group. The 101st
Airborne Division trapped in Bastogne requested photos of the area in order to
conduct accurate counterbattery artillery fire. A P-38 pilot volunteered to fly
in the photos, which the group gathered from its photo library and delivered in
a drop-tank. The pilot had to come in low and slow to drop the tank accurate-
ly to the encircled troops. Although he succeeded, the 101st wanted more cur-
rent prints. The next day the 31st Photo Squadron flew 20 missions to get
them. Again, volunteers came forward to fly the dangerous delivery mission,
but two separate drop attempts ended in failure when German flak downed
both planes. The experience of the P-38 pilots well represents the extra effort
airmen displayed during the Bastogne emergency.^^
Only in the area of night fighter support of Bastogne did air power prove
deficient. Generally, IX TAC's single night fighter squadron patrolled the
Bulge area, while XIX TAC's 425th Night Fighter Squadron flew patrol and
intruder missions in the Eifel and Saar regions. Reviewing the operation, the
12th Army Group Air Effects Committee concluded that "generally, night
fighter activity within the area was inadequate."^^ Yet this was a major the-
aterwide weakness of the tactical air forces.
206
The Ardennes
On December 26, Third Army broke the German encirclement at
Bastogne. At 1:00 p.m., General Patton called Weyland to request a maximum
effort in front of the 4th Armored Division for its final push to Bastogne.
Weyland immediately directed his combat operations officer. Colonel Ferguson,
to lay on extra missions. That afternoon, the 362d Fighter Group flew nine mis-
sions in support of III Corps, while VIII Corps forces received eight from the
405th Fighter Group and 18 from the 406th Fighter Group. The extra effort paid
off. Elements of the 4th Armored Division made contact with the 101st
Airborne Division at an outpost two miles south of the city later that day. By
December 27, the last day of victory weather, the task became one of keeping
the Bastogne corridor open. That did not promise to be easy.™
F-6s, 10th Photo Reconnaissance Group (above); tank commander of an M-7
tank directing fire from a self-propelled 105-mm outside of Bastogne (below)
207
Air Power for Patton's Army
Protecting the Corridor, Dealing with Friendly Fire
By the end of December 1944, the German drive in the Ardennes had
stalled and the most forward units were forced back (M ap 18). Panzer forces had
reached Celles, within five miles of the M euse, as early as December 24, before
stiffening resistance from B ritish and A merican troops and a lack of fuel halted
their advance. Atyear's end. Third Army was involved in heavy fighting in the
III Corps area where Patton's corridor into Bastogne had been widened to
approximately five miles and the Bastogne-Arlon highway cleared. In the VIII
Corps sector, units advanced to within three miles of linking up with First
Army's forward elements, and they fought hard to repel counterattacks west of
Bastogne. The XII Corps units, meanwhile, conducted a seesaw battle for
Echternach at the southern hinge of the Bulge, where their pace slowed in the
face of bad weather, rough terrain, and German artillery concentrations. While
Field M arshal M ontgomery continued to gather forces in the north in prepara-
tion for his major offensive planned for January 3, 1945, General Patton acted to
protect the Bastogne corridor and readied his forces to move farther northeast to
St. Vith by way of Houffalizeto cutoff German units to the west. Bad weather
and German intransigence combined to slow progress everywhere.
Bad weather in late December certainly weakened XIX TAC's efforts to
cover ground units in the Bulge and to undertake an ambitious interdiction
program to cut the enemy's lifeline. Along with directing the air campaign to
support the Third Army, General Weyland also confronted issues of air
defense that stymied his best efforts. From December 26, 1944, until J anuary
3, 1945, when bad weather forced a two-day cancellation of flying, Weyland's
forces continued to support the Third Army corps as much as possible and in
the same manner as it had done so previously. The 362d and 406th Fighter
Groups largely flew in support of III Corps and VIII Corps operations, respec-
tively, while the 405th Fighter Group covered the XII and XX Corps fronts.
This left the three new groups and the 354th Fighter Group available to focus
almost exclusively on the interdiction program developed by Ninth Air Force.
Although in later years General Weyland provided no special reason for this
division of labor, one must assume that he considered the command's longest
serving P-47 groups best qualified to fly close air support missions because
they were more accustomed to working with Third Army's units and their air
controllers. Nevertheless, all four groups flew "cooperation" missions with the
ground forces on occasion, especially in late J anuary 1945, when the Germans
on the hitherto static Lorraine front increased their pressure on Saarlautern in
XX Corps' area and began a mass exodus from the Bulge.^^
T he theaterwide interdiction plan developed by Ninth Air Force and 12th
Army Group sought to break down the German forward supply system by
reducing the enemy's road capacity in the Bulge itself, while simultaneously
208
The Ardennes
destroying the road and rail system in tlie Eifel and communications centers
east of tlie Rliine. Tlie planners divided bomber targets geographically into an
inner and outer zone to be attacked by medium and heavy bombers, respec-
tively. By the end of December the interdiction effort began to produce results.
Towns in the A rdennes had become favorite targets as chokepoints and reports
of rubble blocking traffic became commonplace. In the Eifel, where the XIX
TAC and the IX Bombardment Division had been concentrating on rail bridges
and marshaling yards, intelligence analysts considered the rail network use-
less. U I tra intercepts confirmed their assessment, which described the chaos on
both sides of the Rhine River. Shipments of German materiel faced delays of
a week or more now that supplies had to be off-loaded at the Rhine for move-
ment westward. With the rail system in the Eifel largely destroyed, the fight-
er-bombers turned their attention to the road network, while the medium
bombers used larger bombing formations to attack key bridges. This aerial
interdiction effort gradually isolated the battlefield.^^
M ission assignments reflected renewed emphasis on interdiction for the
seven-day period beginning December 27 when the new groups began flying
in force for Weyland's command. Except for one 368th Fighter Group seven-
plane attack on a tunnel on January 2, 1945, the three new fighter-bomber
groups exclusively flew armed reconnaissance. Nearly half of the 361st
Fighter Group's missions were fighter sweeps that produced attacks on targets
of opportunity. For the six flyable days during this period, interdiction sorties
averaged 78 percent of the total for the command. As always, operations of the
tactical air arm reflected the ground situation, and after Bastogne, the XIX
TAC could afford to cover the ground forces with fewer missions and devote
a larger share to interdiction targets. Its flexibility enabled itto adjustwith ease
to the new requirements.^''
Although the Luftwaffe seldom appeared during the final days of
December 1944, Third Army continued to report nightly German air raids.
During the five days of victory weather, the raids rose to more than 100 per
night, but they declined to approximately 50 by month's end. Although air-
fields occasionally reported attacks, damage never proved severe, and Third
Army air defense units always reported destroying at least a portion of the
attacking force. Nevertheless, the German strikes made air leaders like
Weyland sensitive to a threat he could do little to contain. Certainly his night
fighter force was woefully inadequate for the task.^^
General Weyland's single P-61 night fighter squadron, like IX TAC's,
could only be described as understrength, short of spare parts, and battle
weary. Altogether, the squadron flew only 111 sorties during the last week of
the month which accounted for 14 enemy aircraft destroyed at a cost of 3 of
their own. The 425th Night Fighter Squadron seldom could sustain a consis-
tently high sortie rate. One night the number might be 20 and another night 5;
the bad weather and hazards of night flying combined with equipment short-
209
I : iU :s i. 2
SOURCE: VincentJ . Esposito, ed., West Point Atlas of American Wars, V. 2, Map 62, (New York: Praeger, 1960)
The Ardennes
ages to limit the Black Widow's effectiveness. Even with theXIX TAC con-
trolling all night flying with its best radar, the MEW system, periodically
either the controller or pilot would fail to make positive contact with one
another, or the aircraft's radar would malfunction. A part from this, the airmen
found the counterair intruder mission especially challenging because enemy
airbases often proved too widely dispersed or beyond the range of available
AAF aircraft. Nighttime disorientation and uncertainty could kill, too. The
most unfortunate example of this occurred on December 27, 1944, when
General Weyland learned that a Third Army air defense battery shot down a
P-61— the second such incident. Although the gunners bore part of the blame,
in this case the pilot mistook another base for his home one and inadvertently
wandered into the army's inner artillery zone.^^
Despite the handicaps, however, neither tactical air command wanted to
give up its night fighters. With their enormous fire power of four 20-mm can-
non, napalm bombs, and eight 5-inch rockets, when properly applied, the
P-61S had a terrifying effect on enemy morale. For air leaders, the answer lay
in more aircraft and spare parts. On the last day of the month. Col. Robert M .
L ee, operati ons deputy at N i nth A i r F orce, cal I ed to ask w hether the X I X TA C
would be interested in a British Mosquito squadron from the Mediterranean
theater to supplement its night force. Weyland gladly accepted the offer, but
when he heard that a P-61 squadron would become available as well, he sug-
gested that IX TAC receive the M osquito squadron because of its proximity to
RAF bases. Ninth Air Force disagreed, and the M osquitoes of the 421st Night
Fighter Squadron arrived at Etain to join the 425th Night Fighter Squadron on
January 13, 1945. TheXIX TAC night fighters remained, however, a small but
gallant force arguably faced with the most demanding mission in the com-
mand. Their small numbers limited them to a harassment role having little
impact on German operations."
This issue of friendly fire— of A merican gunners on the ground mistaken-
ly shooting at American aircraft overhead, or American aircraft mistakenly
attacking other Allied aircraft or bombing or strafing American forces on the
ground— became so serious it could not be ignored. Losses to friendly fire per-
sistently occurred during the Allied campaign in the Mediterranean, and the
problem never had been solved. If carpet bombing errors by heavy bombers
employed in tactical operations such as Cobra produced the most spectacular
and notorious mistakes, the problem proved even more acute in the far more
numerous fighter-bomber close support operati ons. During fighter-bomber bom-
bing and strafing in proximity to friendly ground forces, opportunities for error
were ever-present. Large- or quick-reaction military operations like the Arden-
nes Offensive demanded greater close air support, attracted more attention to
real or imagined Luftwaffe intruders, and magnified the problem across the front.
Pilots frequently complained about trigger-happy infantry gunners, whilethe lat-
ter reported that too often Allied fighters attacked them instead of the enemy.
211
Air Power for Patton's Army
Although General Weyland's responsibilities included air defense of the
Third Army area, he did not control all air defense units. In the tactical control
center, the air force controller worked closely with the liaison officer of the 38th
Antiaircraft Artillery (AAA) Brigade (which protected the airfields) to coordi-
nate night fighter patrols, inner artillery zones, and the so-called blank check
areas, for which the controller specified certain times for firing. A rmy-controlled
air defense units, however, remained coordinated with, but not fully integrated
into, the air force warning system. General Weyland sought to answer the prob-
lem by stressing positive identification and radar control of fighter-bombers, and
enforcement of procedures governi ng I ocal ai r defense. This meant ensuri ng that
all elements in the system received comprehensive aircraft movement informa-
tion. All too often, for example. Eighth Air Force aircraft, flying through friend-
ly artillery zones, were surprised when fired upon, and were then chagrined to
learn that the artillery controller had no knowledge of their flight plan.^^
The air defense problem demanded constant attention. Every major joint
operation required detailed coordination on air defense procedures, while each
time one of his air units moved to a new location, Weyland needed to confirm
that the site had adequate protection from the Third Army's 51st AAA
Brigade. His challenge increased in winter and during the intense Ardennes
fighting. Heavy snows made target identification more difficult, especially in
the breakthrough area where airmen worried about an imprecise bomb line,
about friendly troops positioned on three sides of the enemy bulge, and about
the fake target-marker panels deployed on the ground by the Germans.
TheXIX TAG thoroughly investigated every friendly fire incident report-
ed. Its records for the winter months on the subject are reasonably comprehen-
sive and show an inadvertent firing-at-aircraft incident nearly every day in the
month of December 1944. Perhaps Third Army gunners can be forgiven when,
for the first time in the conflict, they experienced substantial and recurrent
Luftwaffe raids. On the ground, most friendly fire reports originated with Third
Army units and concerned strafing attacks by friendly aircraft. Normally the
battalion headquarters sent these field reports to the commander of the 38th
AAA Brigade, who passed them on to Colonel Ferguson atXIX TAG. He usu-
ally turned them over to the command's capable inspection team of Lt. Gol.
Leo H. Johnson, Air Inspector, and his chief investigating officer, Ghief
Warrant Officer (GWO) Samuel L. Schwartzberg. On occasion. Ninth Air
Force also contacted General Weyland with a request to investigate an incident
that might have involved the command's fighter-bombers. The inspectors'
investigation reports reveal an impressive comprehensiveness and objectivity.
Not unlike contemporary air accident investigation procedures, the inspectors
collected reports from all parties, examined various types of evidence includ-
ing film when available, reconstructed the missions of all groups that flew on
the day of the incident, and interviewed all parties concerned. If XIX TAG
pilots proved to be at fault infrequently, the friendly fire investigative reports
212
The Ardennes
Col. J ames Ferguson (far left) and General Weyland (far right)
at a press briefing
nevertheless appear thorough and convincing. Throughout the Allied drive into
Germany, friendly fire continued to bedevil the air-ground team's best efforts
to eliminate it.™
The problem of friendly fire had been building for some time, as
Weyland's concern over the losses of M aj or Chandler, the night fighter, and the
362d Fighter Group incidents attest. The issue came to a head for both the air
and ground leaders during the last two days of December 1944, when
Luxembourg's capital served as the advance headquarters site for Generals
Bradley, Patton, and Vandenberg. Apparently on December 30 Ninth Air Force
controllers called for help when two German Bf 109s appeared overhead. Two
P-51 and two P-47 aircraft arrived five minutes after the German aircraft left.
In spite of attempts to identify themselves, anxious American gunners guard-
ing a bridge on the city's outskirts shot down a 405th Fighter Group P-47 and
the pilot perished. The incident deeply disturbed General Weyland, who sent a
sharp message from his Nancy headquarters to Colonel Browne atX-Ray. He
"requested" all Allied antiaircraft batteries be prohibited from firing on any air-
craft except those positively identified as belonging to the enemy and clearly
observed to be strafing or bombing.
The following day, on December 31, the P-47 affair at Luxembourg City
took center stage in an exchange of messages among key air and ground lead-
ers. Its seriousness became evident when Weyland reported that General
Vandenberg had taken the matter to B radley, and that B radley or Patton would
213
Air Power for Patton's Army
send a message of regret to the 405th Fighter Group because, as General
Weyland pointed out, we "do not want bad feeling[s]." Later that morning,
Vandenberg called Weyland about a report from Third Army concerning a
P-47 strafing attack on one of its convoys between Thionville and
Luxembourg City, asking him to investigate the charge. In this instance
Vandenberg identified the 362d Fighter Group as the probable culprit, but sub-
sequent investigation showed the M aulers to be elsewhere at the time of the
incident. ''2
In the early evening. Colonel Browne informed Weyland that Generals
Spaatz, Doolittle, Patton, and he had conferred that afternoon at Third Army
headquarters in Luxembourg City about the issue of army firings on Allied
planes and of fighter- bomber attacks on U .5. ground forces and installations.
In the first case, they believed the chief culpritto be a rumor circulating wide-
ly in the Third Army area to the effect, that in the words of General Patton,
"the Germans are flying our P-47s." Besides official refutation, the conferees
had no solution to this problem, but they reiterated that there would be no
bombing whatever permitted within the bomb line except under control of an
air support officer. Air units also needed to do a better job of crew briefing and
always rely on radar control. Most interesting and portentous of all, they
From left to right: General Weyland; Col. Roger Browne, XIX TAC chief of staff;
Brig. Gen. Homer L. Sanders, commander, 100th Fighter Wing; and General
Patton
The Ardennes
decided to prohibit all flying operations the following day, January 1, 1945, in
the XII and XX Corps areas, where the most recent incidents had occurred.
Evidently they thought this would help cool tempers and allow everyone time
to review procedures."
Yet friendly fire incidents continued throughout the Ardennes
Campaign. In mid-January 1945, it would reach a point where the XII Corps
commander wrote personally to General Weyland. He worried that if acciden-
tal aerial attacks on his forces continued, relations between the air and ground
units would collapse. Only the end of the campaign and the intense flying
associated with it seems to have reduced, but not eliminated, the difficulty.''''
By New Year's Eve, 1944, certainly both air and ground leaders were alert to
the issue. The fighter-bombers would not fly over the XX Corps area the next
day, and Third Army gunners were admonished to be less trigger-happy. The
Luftwaffe could not have chosen a better time for an air assault against XIX
TAC and Third Army installations.
The Luftwaffe Responds
At 10:30 a.m. on January 1, 1945, while XIX TAC's forces carefully
avoided flying in the XII and XX Corps zones, 15 Bf 109s attacl<ed the M etz
airfield. They approached at low-level, "on the decl<," in flights of three and
strafed the field from all four directions of the compass. Their assault destroyed
20 command aircraft and damaged 11 more, but the Germans suffered severe
losses as well: the Metz air defense battery claimed 12 of the 15 attacl<ers;
Third A rmy units reported that they shot down 6 of 10 other fighters over the
M etz area during the airfield attack. The fog of battle, however, produced a
number of less praiseworthy incidents elsewhere in the Third A rmy area. In his
diary that evening. General Patton noted three P-47s had chased a staff car
with General Gaffey, 4th Armored Division commander, into a ditch, while his
own Third Army antiaircraft gunners took aim and holed the airplane in which
AAF Generals Spaatz and Doolittle were returning to First Army headquarters
at Liege, Belgium, after their December 31 meeting that addressed the friend-
ly fire problem!"
A Ithough the Luftwaffe struck only the M etz airfield in the X IX TAC area
of France, this attack was part of a coordinated strike of between 750 and 800
fighter aircraft against 16 Allied airfields in Belgium and Holland. The Allies
counted 134 ai rcraft destroyed and a further 62 that required major repair, while
German fighter chief Gen. Adolf Galland reported a loss of 220 aircraft in the
operation. The Luftwaffe's bold New Year's Day raid originally had been
planned to begin the Ardennes Offensive. Coming as it did this late in the cam-
paign, the attack provided hard-pressed Wehrmacht forces in the Bulge no relief
and it further decimated the Luftwaffe. Afterward, Hitler directed his attention
215
Air Power for Patton's Army
Damage caused by the Luftwaffe raid on J anuary 1, 1945
to the 6th Army Group front in Alsace. To support the German offensive north
of Strasbourg during the first weel< in January, the Luftwaffe diverted between
400 and 500 aircraft from the Ardennes Operation south, opposite the Alsace
region. Along with a host of aircraft serviceability problems, bad weather dur-
ing much of the first half of January prevented the Luftwaffe from flying more
than about 250 sorties per day in both operational regions.
The poor reaction of air defenses to the Luftwaffe raid at M etz troubled
Weyland and his staff the most. Despite significant claims against the attack-
ing force, none of his planes on five-minute alert got off the ground and the
Ripsaw microwave radar control provided no warning until just a few minutes
before the low-flying Bf 109s struck. Although not mentioned, the Y service
intercept operation appeared equally ineffective against an enemy that
required only six minutes' flying time from German-held territory and came in
on the deck under radio silence.™
In light of the Luftwaffe's tactics, the inability of the air defense units at
Metz to respond more rapidly does not seem surprising. Nevertheless, the
Luftwaffe threat called for immediate countermeasures. At 1:00 p.m. that after-
noon, Weyland chaired a conference with his staff to discuss ways to improve
the air defense system. The group decided on a number of specific changes,
including keeping two flights on air alert and warning all units to be aware of
possible repeat air attacks as well as parachute landings. Members of the
command needed little encouragement, and the unit histories are replete with
stories of one immediate response: the digging of slit trenches to protect per-
sonnel against air attack."
Weyland did not want the 368th Fighter Group to make its scheduled
move from Juvincourt to M etz until Ninth Air Force had a third air defense
battery in place at the latter base. After the M etz attack, it became standard
practice for all airfields with two groups assigned to be protected by three air
216
The Ardennes
defense batteries. As for the lack of adequate warning, lie wanted General
Sanders, the 100th Wing commander, to work with the tactical control group
on measures to improve early warning effectiveness.™
How active was the early warning radar on January 1, 1945? At the
beginning of the German offensive, the M EW radar operated at M orhange,
east of Nancy. When Third Army shifted north, however, the radar facility also
moved to Longwy, 12 miles southwest of Luxembourg City, to provide cover-
age over the Bulge. The site was selected by Weyland and key technical offi-
cers using maps and a transit. They even had one of the SCR-584 radars set
up to check permanent echoes. The expert from the operational research sec-
tion later stated that the new location gave superb low-level coverage of the
target areas and bases, and the command considered it the best of all
microwave radar locations on the continent. Yet this move, which began in late
December 1944, took five days to accomplish; the new site could not be occu-
pied until January 4. Although the M EW radar's precise status on the morning
of January 1 remains unclear, it is likely that it was not completely operational,
and other radars with less range had to provide coverage."
Weyland and his staff also addressed a fundamental weakness in the air
defense network. The air commander explained that he wanted to examine the
possibility of incorporating what Third Army called the Mosel inner artillery
zone— the entire army artillery system— into the air force warning net.
Significantly, after this incident coordination through the tactical control group
improved. Yet problems continued, and air force analysts believed the system
could not be entirely effective until all air defense units, including those at the
front, could be brought under air force control. On the basis of postwar analy-
sis of this problem, Weyland seems to have had more success than most air
commanders. An important Ninth Air Force report, for example, described the
controversy between air and ground forces resulting from lack of clear respon-
sibility for AAA in certain areas. It advocated integrating all AAA into the air
force defense system as well as air force control of all air defense components.^"
Weyland did not remain content with improving defensive measures.
That evening he urged General Vandenberg to have the Ninth Air Force's
medium bombers strike German airfields in the southeast with fighter-
bombers to follow later that night or the next morning. The Ninth Air Force
commander, however, decided that the "time was not ripe" and suggested that
the P-51S be used for the attack as an alternative. He also recommended that
Weyland consider operating 361st Fighter Group P-51s farther east and giving
P-38s more of the bomber escort mission. Unless the P-51s got more shoot-
ing, he said. Eighth Air Force wanted them back. Weyland accepted the pro-
posal, and the 367th Fighter Group P-38s flew escort missions on 10 of the
remaining 14 flyable days in January.
The day after this discussion, the 361st Fighter Group flew fighter
sweeps along the Rhine in addition to an escort mission. The command, how-
217
Air Power for Patton's Army
Radar installation established by XIX TAC Signal Section
ever, targeted specific German airfields only on January 5, and the 354th
Fighter Group attacked them with disappointing results. The 361st Fighter
Group may not have had many opportunities to fly fighter sweeps and area
cover missions at that time. It flew escort missions on seven of the remaining
operational days in January, and its interdiction and counterair missions
occurred largely in the same Rhine and M osel River region rather than farther
east, as Vandenberg had suggested. On the other hand. Eighth Air Force's crit-
icism might have been muted because much of the XIX TAC escort effort sup-
ported Eighth Air Force bombing missions.
The discussion of P-38 and P-51 roles reflects the command's concern
for the Luftwaffe threat as well as the dilemma of escort duty. Although the
XIX TAC planned to have the 367th P-38 Group converted to the more
durable P-47D, it was not unhappy with the performance of the P-38s in the
Ardennes Campaign. Almost exclusively flying armed reconnaissance mis-
sions outside the breakthrough area, the P-38s avoided the higher flak con-
centrations in the Bulge. With five aircraft lost in December and three in
January, the group had a lower loss record than any of the command's P-47
groups, and it was second only to the 361st Fighter Group in this respect.
Ultimately, the command divided the escort mission between the two groups,
while also assigning P-51s to the counterair role and both groups to interdic-
tion missions. Neither flew close support "cooperation" missions until
January 22, when the 367th Fighter Group joined a shoot-out at the Dasburg
bridge.^^
Did General Weyland overreact to the surprise attack on January 1,
1945? In hindsight, perhaps yes. At the time, however, air superiority
218
The Ardennes
remained the key mission priority, and doctrine recommended repeating coun-
terair attacl<s and maintaining "air defenses in tlie tlieater... continuously to
provide security from liostile air operations. "^^ Weyland was especially sensi-
tive about the Luftwaffe threat from the time of the Lorraine Campaign, when
raids in Third Army's area increased, and Ultra and tactical reconnaissance
began observing the buildup at airfields in the Rhine valley. His responsibili-
ties for air defense in the Third Army zone made him particularly anxious to
plug possible holes in the defensive system.
On the other hand, Weyland allowed the German air threat to become a
key focus in command tactical air planning and operations long after it clearly
had become little more than an annoyance. In fact, January 2, 1945, proved to
be the last day for which Third Army reported Luftwaffe raids of any conse-
quence. Beginning on January 5, army records show only reportsof V-1 and M e
262 sightings, but no attacks on Third Army positions. For its part, the Luftwaffe
appeared in strength on only two additional occasions during the month, once
on January 14, and again two days later. In both instances, the action occurred
well to the east of theThird Army front, responding to Allied interdiction mis-
sions in the Eifel. Moreover, tactical reconnaissance pilots observed the first
signs of German withdrawal from the Bulge as early as January 5, and by the
second week in J anuary, U Itra confirmed that armored forces were being with-
drawn and moved eastward to confront the Soviet offensive launched in Poland
on January 12, 1945. In effect, the Luftwaffe could be expected to devote even
less attention to attacks in the Bulge and, especially, in the Allied rear areas.^''
Nevertheless, the daily air alert and air defensive patrol missions
remained prominent until the end of January. The 405th Fighter Group began
patrol I i ng on J anuary 2, with 16 ai rcraft f lyi ng i n f I i ghts of four throughout each
day. Bad weather on all but two of the days from January 3-13, delayed full
implementation of the patrol program, but after J anuary 13, patrols flew every
flyable day until January 26. Although all but one of the P-47 groups partici-
pated, the 405th flew the vast majority. Usually flights of four aircraft carried
out the mission, repeating itfrom three to five times during the day. Seldom did
they return to base with anything to show for their efforts. During this period
the equivalent of twelve, 12-plane squadrons performed aerial patrol duty and
could not be assigned ground support or interdiction missions. Whether these
flights would have made a substantial difference in the interdiction program is
questionable. Nevertheless, frequent bad weather and competing priorities lim-
ited interdiction missions in any case, and argued for devoting maximum
emphasis to isolating the battlefield on the few good days available.^^
Furthermore, given the concern of Weyland and other air leaders about
the Luftwaffe's continuing potency, it would seem to have been more profitable
had they redirected much of this defensive patrol effort into offensive opera-
tions by attacking airfields in the Rhine valley. Doing so may have helped fill
the gap left by the Eighth Air Force bombardment division, which in the first
219
Air Power for Patton's Army
week of January 1945, had been withdrawn from supporting Ninth Air Force
to supporting 6th Army Group requirements in its area. Even if the XIX TAC's
counterair missions proved uneventful, the fighter-bombers could still strike
targets of opportunity. As understandable as General Weyland's concerns
were, this diversion of scarce aerial resources does little to enhance his repu-
tation as an otherwise highly capable commander. Weyland, like many others
during the Ardennes Offensive, seems to have overcompensated, impelled "by
a nervousness far greater than the transient emergency warranted. "^^ A Ithough
AAF doctrine supported taking adequate defensive measures, in this instance
Weyland's use of combat air patrols unwittingly confirmed another doctrinal
proposition: an "air umbrella in orbit over friendly forces is wasteful."
Certainly aircraft assigned to defensive patrol responsibilities would have been
more effectively employed elsewhere after early J anuary 1945.^'
Consolidating Support Elements and Flight Operations
While providing support to Patton's troops farther south in the Saar and
flying interdiction missions, the XIX TAG continued supporting Third Army's
slow, difficult drive to link up with Allied troops in the northern half of the
Bulge. Although the German drive was blunted by the first of the year, the
Allies knew there would be no headlong retreat from the Bulge. Their atten-
tion the first week in J anuary 1945, centered on the western Bulge area and the
lower Saar (Map 18). On Third Army's Bastogne front, VIII Corps continued
its attack from the west, while III Corps widened the corridor to Bastogne and
fought off counterattacks as it slowly pushed northeast farther into the German
flank. On January 3, First Army launched Montgomery's long-awaited offen-
sive against the northern flank of the salient. The best advance occurred north-
east of Vi el sal m, where the 82d Airborne Division attacked on a six-mile front.
Like Patton's drive northward, it made slow but steady progress in the face of
dug-in German armor, horrendous ice and snow, and extreme winter tempera-
tures of nine degrees Fahrenheit.^^
Farther to the south, the Germans launched a diversionary attack on 6th
Army Group's front in Alsace-Lorraine in conjunction with the New Year's
Day air strike (Map 19). Forewarned by Ultra, General Eisenhower, under
great pressure from French General De Gaulle to hold the city of Strasbourg,
planned to fall back to prepared defenses in the northern sector as French
forces defended the Alsatian city. Despite initial German gains, the Allied
troops held. Soon neither side found itself strong enough to make any signifi-
cant progress until the Russian offensive forced Hi tier to move several German
divisions from the western to the eastern front.
American reinforcements for General Devers's 6th Army Group consisted
primarily of increased air support. Ninth Air Force, meanwhile, protested
220
SOURCE: VincentJ . Esposito, ed., West Point Atlas of American Wars, V. 2, Map 64a, (New York: Praeger, 1960)
Air Power for Patton's Army
SHAEF's decision to direct bombers soutli from tlie Eiglitli Air Force lieavy
bomber division, wliicli liad been playing a l<ey role bombing targets in the outer
interdiction region, to support operations in the 6th Army Group sector. To ana-
lysts at 12th Army Group and Ninth Air Force, "this diversion [to support 6th
Army Group] was of secondary or even minor importance, and it was with dis-
may... [that we]... saw SHAEF transfer top priority for bombardment to that
area." From the standpoint of the Ninth Air Force and 12th Army Group, this
diversion seriously threatened the success of their interdiction program. At the
same ti me, Vandenberg asked Weyland on J anuary 2 what he could spare for X 1 1
TAG, and that day the XIX TAG commander diverted four squadrons to help in
the Saar and Palatinate regions with armed reconnaissance missions.^"
The Ninth Air Force air plan continued to target enemy armor and pur-
sue an elaborate interdiction program focusing on bridges and supply centers.
Weyland's forces had just begun flying intensive interdiction against bridges
on the first two days of January 1945 when freezing drizzle and rain, along
with a 600-foot overcast and 1-2 miles of visibility, shut down operations for
two days. Between January 3 and 14, the XIX TAG pilots could fly on only
two days; they flew 191 sorties on January 5 and 325 on January 10. The
remaining days were socked in. The heavy snow that arrived on January 3
helped make the January snowfall in northern Europe the heaviest in 175
years. All told, the XIX TAG had only seven operational days in the month
compared to 13 for December. U nder these conditions it became impossible to
maintain a consistent interdiction effort.^^
On January 5, 1945, operations continued with the 362d Fighter Group
supporting III Gorps and the 406th Fighter Group backing VIII Gorps, while
the command flew four armed reconnaissance missions for XII TAG. That day
also witnessed one of the most spectacular flights of the Ardennes period.
General Patton had been concerned for some time about the XII Gorps' right
flank and the XX Gorps' area opposite Saarburg, in the M erzig-Saarbruecken
region. Reports appeared with increasing frequency that German engineers
had a major bridge-building program underway in this thinly held sector. To
study the strong points and bridges and to assess the severity of the threat, the
Third Army commander asked for photographs of the area.^^
Thus a low-level F-5 (P-38) dicing run in a high-threat area was ordered.
Gapt. Robert J. Holbury of the 31st Photo Reconnaissance Squadron volun-
teered to fly the mission despite a ceiling of less than 600 feet of solid overcast.
After a particularly hazardous flight that included flying below 25 feet and
dodging high-tension wires as well as flak, Holbury returned on one engine,
with a vertical stabilizer shot off and with his aircraft peppered by shell holes.
He also returned with 212 superb pinpoint and oblique photos showing three
traditional bridges, a pontoon bridge, and barges strapped together. Although
this threat did not require reinforcing the XX Gorps front. Third Army wanted
the German bridgework destroyed whenever the weather permitted.
222
The Ardennes
After an U Itra briefing on J anuary 9, Patton became increasingly concerned
about M erzig-Saarbruecl<en as a possible site of another major German offensive,
and General Weyland agreed to have his fighter-bombers attack the region as
soon as weather permitted. Consequently, when the weather improved on J anuary
10, the 362d Fighter Group flew three squadron missions against the bridges,
piers, and barges that had been photographed on J anuary 5. The pilots achieved
only mediocre results, and though claiming one direct hit and a number of
approaches damaged, the bridges remained serviceable. Soon a spirited contest
developed between Weyland's fighter-bombers and Ninth Air Force medium
bombers to see which group could knock out the heavily defended bridges.^''
General Weyland took advantage of the nonflying period to move his
headquarters closer to the action. Procedures called for moving in two stages
in order to maintain communications. Weyland and the initial A headquarters
party arrived in Luxembourg City on J anuary 8 where they setup communi-
cations with Third Army and Ninth Air Force headquarters' command posts
and Weyland's units early the following morning. Colonel Ferguson, however,
remained at Nancy and maintained control of operations throughout the ninth.
That evening he closed up shop and moved his B party to Luxembourg the
next day. The plan worked to perfection. The absence of flying made the com-
munications transition much easier because there were no flight operations to
handle. Now Third Army and the XIX TAC had their air and ground head-
quarters again completely collocated.
On January 11 and 12, 1945, atrocious winter weather forced the com-
mand to cancel most missions. During this period Weyland used the time to
good advantage. On J anuary 10, he learned that his command would receive a
radar ground-control approach system by February 1. (His initial request was
made in early October 1944.) One of the specialists, an SCR-584 expert, wor-
ried about the command's slow progress with the two modified SCR-584 sys-
tems, termed battle area control units (BACUs), which it had received in late
December. Atthistime the command's BACUs functioned only as navigation
devices. Operators of the two systems worked with the air liaison officers
assigned to Third Army's XII and XX Corps. The system vectored close air
support flights either to a target selected by the liaison officer at corps head-
quarters or to a point forward where the air control officer operating with the
ground unit took control and directed the attack.
Only in February 1945 did the command begin what it referred to as last-
resort blind bombing with the SCR-584 radar, after it received two additional
sets that had been modified earlier for ground control intercept operations. The
SCR-584, however, proved difficult to operate effectively. As one of the
research technicians assigned to the command stated, "picking up the correct
aircraft formation, locking on and staying locked on, and controlling the air-
craft through a good bomb run was difficult and the crews and controllers had
insufficient training to do thejob well.""
223
Air Power for Patton's Army
Dicing mission plioto of thie Saar River
After much practice, the system proved useful as both a navigation and
an area blind bombing aid in late February and M arch, when static conditions
and little movement prevailed. After M arch 1945, however, fast-paced mobile
conditions would make it impossible for the SCR-584 radar equipment to
keep within range of the bomb line, and Weyland ordered it withdrawn. In fact,
the command continued to prefer the M EW radar, especially after it received
a close-control unit for the system at the end of December 1944. Along with
its ease of transport and longer range, microwave radar procedures proved far
simpler for the controllers to master.^^
On January 12, 1945, Weyland accompanied General Gay on a visit to
units of VIII Corps and to the headquarters of both VIII and III Corps.
Weyland and his officers visited army commanders in the field periodically to
discuss air-ground issues, particularly as part of the joint planning process and
to promote good relations. In this instance, Weyland discussed plans for future
operations with Generals M iddleton and M illiken, who reported that enemy
counterattacks had diminished amid more signs of withdrawal. Indeed, by
January 15, 1945, VII Corps in the north had cut the key St. Vith-Vielsalm
road, and Patton's forces and First Army units had also severed the St. Vith-
Houffalize road and converged on Houffalize (Map 18). To the east. III Corps
had taken W i I tz and now approached the C I erf R i ver I i ne, w hi I e X 1 1 C orps sti 1 1
battled for the town of Echternach and exerted pressure on the German line of
224
The Ardennes
withdrawal. Although German forces fell back on St. Vith, they continued to
counterattack fiercely. Allied forces also confronted the by now customary
impediments of heavy snow and ice, mines, road blocks, and booby traps.
Nevertheless, the outlook appeared promising. Intelligence analysts predicted
that the Germans would attempt to move the armored forces out of the B uige
for duty in either Alsace or on the eastern front and replace them with infantry
units. If so, the Allies expected to turn the retreat into a rout.^™
Clearing the Bulge
During the last half of January 1945, the XIX TAG enjoyed one of its
most successful operational periods of the entire campaign. A month after the
G ermans began the A rdennes Offensive, the A 1 1 i es f i nal ly had them on the run.
Although Ultra picked up the first signs of a German retreat on January 8, only
when the weather cleared on January 13, did the Allies fully realize that the
Germans had decided on a general withdrawal from the Ardennes salient.^"!
The question became whether German delaying tactics and the winter weath-
er could prevent the Allies from isolating substantial parts of the enemy's
forces before they could withdraw into the Eifel. The retreating Germans had
to travel during daylight hours on main roads that became increasingly con-
gested. Fleeing under these conditions, the Wehrmacht offered ideal targets to
Weyland's fighter-bombers. Four consecutive days of good flying weather
provided more than one-third of the month's total claims of 10,525 ground tar-
gets destroyed or damaged in operations reminiscent of the previous summer.
In terms of the number of sorties flown, January 14 was, in the words of the
XIX TAG commander, the "biggest day since summer." His command flew 61
missions and 633 sorties both within and outside the breakthrough area for
what proved to be the second-best claims day of the month. With the 354th and
406th Fighter Groups seeing most of the action in the III and VIII Corps areas,
the remaining groups flew armed reconnaissance missions against bridges and
command posts throughout the Eifel region. The day's score included 410
motor vehicles, 174 railroad cars, and 45 buildings destroyed.
Although the command's claims remained unsubstantiated, the effort
that resulted in them nevertheless contributed significantly to the Allied cause.
The coordination between ground and air that occurred during this four-day
period, and between reconnaissance and fighter-bomber aircraft and artillery
counterflak units, reached a new level of effectiveness. One of the best exam-
ples of this teamwork occurred on January 14, 1945. Two F-6 (P-51) pilots of
the 12th Reconnaissance Squadron, flying an artillery adjustment mission at
Houffalize, spotted 50 armored vehicles entering the city. After observing good
results from the artillery fire, they called the tactical control group, which vec-
tored a squadron of 354th Fighter Group P-47s to the scene. The reconnais-
225
Air Power for Patton's Army
sance pilots then led the fighter-bombers to the targets and directed artillery
counterflak fire on enemy gun positions while the P-47 pilots completed their
bombing runs. During the ground advance, XIX TAC fighter-bombers again
charted the way from village to village in operations reminiscent of the
Lorraine Campaign. Although the type of teamwork displayed onjanuary 14
occurred periodically in France and more frequently during the Lorraine fight-
ing, by early 1945 it had become commonplace among all the tactical air and
ground commands. When First and Third Army linked up at Houffalize on
January 16, Third Army gave much of the credit over the previous three days
to the air support of the airborne village destroyers.
The only significant variation in aerial operations appeared in the ord-
nance loads. By this time 500-lb. incendiary and 100-lb. white phosphorus
bombs had been added to the inventory. The fighter-bombers dropped both
napalm and incendiary bombs in record numbers, especially during the five
days of victory weather in December. Often armorers replaced the fragmenta-
tion bomb with a 500-lb. general purpose bomb that was fuzed to detonate
instantaneously. It combined good fragmentation effect with outstanding
shock effect and proved to be the best answer for concealed armor, vehicles,
and personnel. Later, with the enemy on the run in the open, fighter-bombers
flew strafing missions loaded only with .50-caliber ammunition. ^'''^
0 n J anuary 15 and 16, 1945, the command focused on attacki ng G erman
front I i ne troops i n the B ul ge and on any movement al ong the road and rai I net-
works leading out of the salient. Except for the heavily defended Saar River
bridges, which continued to defy destruction, XIX TAC pilots achieved
i mpressi ve resul ts. T he overal I obj ecti ve remai ned to i sol ate the batti ef i el d and
disrupt any attempt at orderly withdrawal. Colonel Hallett, the command's
intelligence officer, developed his own interdiction target plan to supplement
the Ninth Air Force target listing. It proved especially useful when aircrews
needed secondary targets to attack.
The intense effort during the four-day period from January 13-16
brought out the hard-pressed Luftwaffe. With 14 German aircraft claimed
destroyed and 3 more damaged, the sixteenth proved to be the command's best
day of the month in the air against the Luftwaffe. It lost five of its own in these
encounters, an improvement over the results of two days earlier when it expe-
rienced 11 losses in air combat. The 368th Fighter Group, with six losses, suf-
fered the most. On that day, some 50 Bf 109s and FW 190s attacked ten air-
craft from the 397th Fighter Squadron returning from an armed reconnaissance
mission near Neustadt. Normally the American fighters managed to out-duel
the Luftwaffe even when severely outnumbered and surprised. During the
Ardennes Campaign, however, American pilots reported Luftwaffe aviators
fought aggressively and often with greater skill in defense of the homeland.
Although these reports referred primarily to the first two weeks of the
A rdennes Offensive, even in mid-J anuary, after the transfer of 300 aircraft to
226
The Ardennes
the Russian front and the increasing use of inexperienced pilots, the Luftwaffe
could still mount an occasional large and dangerous foray.
In the January 16 incident, 397th Fighter Squadron pilots apparently
became complacent and violated one of Weyland's cardinal maxims for air com-
bat: "The iron law of a flight is that the element will be maintained, for the lone
bird is the dead bird." If, as some commentators explained, the enemy air attacks
on January 13 and 16 represented the last desperate flailing of a Luftwaffe in
extremis, they also reinforced Weyland's belief that Luftwaffe capabilities
required him to retain his air defense patrol missions unchanged. As events tran-
spired, these would be the only occasions during the month when the Luftwaffe
appeared in strength to menace Allied fighter-bombers.^°^
On January 17, 1945, the XIX TAC historian asserted that the "Belgian
Bulge had been reduced to a mere bump. "^"^ Although correct, judging from the
map, another week passed before the Allies eliminated the Bulge completely.
The German position admittedly had become desperate. During this last phase
of the battle, German forces made every effort to disengage and withdraw with-
in the Siegfried Line defenses, hoping to hold Allied forces in place in the west
while the Panzer forces shifted to the east. The British, American, and French
forces, of course, remained equally determined to prevent thei r escape.
After the two U .S. armies metat Houffalize, First Army units pressed on
toward St. V i th. 0 n T hi rd A rmy 's front, V 1 1 1 C orps and 1 1 1 C orps forces forged
German Bf 109
227
Troops of the 4th Armored Division in tlie Ardennes (above); 101st Airborne
Infantry Division troops move tlirougli Bastogne towards Houffalize (below);
Enemy tanks and motor vehicles destroyed by Ninth Air Force fighter-bombers
(facing page)
228
62294 AC.
Air Power for Patton's Army
Staff, XIX Tactical Air Command
ahead toward the CI erf River with their goal the Our River that separated
Luxembourg from the Eifel (Map 20). To create more pressure on the south-
ern shoulder and narrow the escape route at the base of the breakthrough area,
XII Corps started an offensive on January 17 in miserable weather and with-
out the protective shield of air power. Air support for the corps' right flank
became a major priority, and when the weather cleared on January 19,
Weyland's forces flew five armed reconnaissance missions in the Echternach
area and three more in the Trier area. By January 20, XII Corps units came
within two miles of Vianden at the international border between Luxembourg
and Germany. Bad flying weather on January 20 and 21, however, once again
restricted the level of air support to two armed reconnaissance squadron flights
near Trier. Meanwhile, as Patton had supposed, XX Corps encountered a
determined German counterattack against the 94th Infantry Division at
Saarlautern. In this situation, corps artillery provided most of the close support
firepower, while the 365th Fighter Group contributed by flying armed recon-
naissance along the Saar River from Saarbruecken to M erzig.^"^
General Weyland spent January 19 and 20 visiting his units before
returning to Luxembourg City the next day. There he discussed current opera-
tions and force movements with General Quesada and Maj. Gen. Samuel E.
Anderson. At this meeting, the air leaders decided to transfer the 365th Fighter
Group back to the IX TAC, and the 361st Fighter Group to an Eighth Air Force
wing. This decision to readjust unit strength certainly reflected the confidence
the commanders had in the current state of the air war. Weyland explained to
his colleagues that he also intended to move the 406th Fighter Group farther
forward to replace the 365th Fighter Group at M etz, and likewise, to move the
230
SOURCE: VincentJ . Esposito, ed., West Point Atlas of American Wars, V. 2, Map 63, (New York: Praeger, 1960)
Air Power for Patton's Army
367th Fighter Group to St. Dizierto replace the departing 361st Fighter Group.
N one of the moves, however, transpired before the end of the month, after the
Ardennes Campaign ended.
For its part Ninth Air Force sent medium bombers and every fighter-
bomber available against bridges along the Rhine and M osel rivers, but espe-
cially those over the Our River, at the point of initial German penetration into
Belgium. With the enemy retreat accelerating and Allied ground forces work-
ing to narrow the escape routes, the vital Our River bridges became the focus
of Ninth Air Force attention. On January 22, medium bombers obliterated
the approaches to the Dasburg bridge, creating a monumental bottleneck for
the Germans, and a magnificent opportunity for Weyland's fighter- bombers.
An unexpected break in the weather on January 22 enabled the command to
fly 57 missions and 627 sorties primarily against clogged traffic west of the
Our River. At 1:00 p.m., reconnaissance pilots reported heavy transport traffic
in the Bulge in front of XII Corps, and every available fighter-bomber flew to
the area with reconnaissance pilots leading the way. Weyland, on hearing this
news, informed Generals Vandenberg and Patton of the evidence of a general
withdrawal. In the words of the command intelligence officer, "the last rem-
nants of the Ardennes bulge [were] collapsing like a punctured tire."^^^
Flying four missions in support of the 4th Infantry Division, the 368th
Fighter Group achieved the day's best score. It, too, reported that the destruc-
tion of the Dasburg bridge had created a massive traffic jam on the west side
of the Our River. Pilots said the congested scene provided a better shooting
opportunity than the one encountered in the final closing of the Falaise Gap.
The 368th Fighter Group was joined by squadrons from all other groups
except the 406th and 361st Fighter Groups that were attacking rail targets near
Trier, and the 365th, which supported the 94th Infantry Division against the
ongoing German counterattack. Only the five planes lost from the 362d
Fighter Group dampened the day's enthusiasm.^^^
Aerial claims processed onjanuary 22, 1945, totaled 1,177 trucks, tanks,
and other motor vehicles destroyed and another 536 damaged, twice the figure
for the previous high day on September 1, 1944. The XIX TAC's record day
for claimed destruction of enemy transportation became a major news story
picked up and broadcast by the BBC and NBC. Congratulatory messages
arrived immediately from Generals Arnold, Spaatz, and Vandenberg.
General Weyland told his officers and airmen:
For information on who did it, look in your own ops flashes.
Germans claim great strategic withdrawal with only one army
NY R [not yet reported]. Yesterday was [a] beautiful example
of tactical cooperation between recce, fighter control, ground
control and fighters. I am plenty proud of you all.^^''
232
The Ardennes
The good hunting continued through the morning of January 23, before
snow and low ceilings reappeared. Of the four groups not grounded for
weather, three returned to the scene of the slaughter for even more impres-
sive claims. Because the intensity of the flak in the Dasburg area now proved
to be some of the heaviest in the Bulge fighting, the 354th Fighter Group
reported that it had to bomb at 5,000 feet. Meanwhile, the 365th Fighter
Group again flew in support of XX Corps, conducting armed reconnaissance
in the Trier and Neunkirchen areas and flying two air patrol missions near
M etz.115
A special mission to test the efficacy of a new reconnaissance target-
spotting method setup by General Weyland proved less successful. During the
euphoria of January 22, he proposed that his reconnaissance aircraft lead 16
A-26 Invaders to strafe targets at low-level in the Dasburg area of the Bulge.
A replacementairplanefor the twin-engine Douglas A -20 Havoc, the Douglas
A-26 medium bomber had arrived in the European theater late in 1944. On
January 23, Lt. Howard Nichols of the 15th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron
rendezvoused w i th the f i rst f I i ght of f i ve bombers at L uxembourg and I ed them
to the target area 28 miles to the north. The units arrived too late to master the
weather and the flak, and two of the bombers took hits and crashed behind
Allied lines. Nichols returned to lead six more bombers back, but he prompt-
ly observed two more shot down and several others severely damaged by flak.
The mission was a disaster. Although officials knew the A-26 should not be
risked in low-level operations against heavily defended targets, Weyland
apparently believed that surprise and good work by his reconnaissance "spot-
ter" aircraft would overcome the problem.
Even though the experiment of using light bombers on a low-level mis-
sion failed in this instance, the reconnaissance pilot performed as planned.
Reconnaissance pilots not only served as the eyes of the ground forces and the
intelligence section, they also functioned as airborne controllers much like the
Horsefly light-plane controller operation that Americans first developed in the
Italian theater. There the largely static front proved more conducive for light
planes employed in this role. In northern Europe, Weyland and his fellow com-
manders preferred to rely on fighters for tactical reconnaissance and airborne
control operations.^"
During the next six days, from January 23-28, 1945, Allied ground forces
slowly overcame tenacious German defenses to close up to the Our River and,
on January 26 created a bridgehead on the east bank inside Germany. The XIX
TAG operations continued with major emphasis on interdiction intheEifel near
Prum and close air support for XII Corps troops facing German forces attempt-
ing to flee across the Sauer River. As usual, inclement weather limited the sor-
tie rate and prohibited operations altogether on January 27. On January 28,
American patrols crossed the Our River in force, and General Weyland record-
ed that the "reduction of the Ardennes was officially completed." The next day,
233
Air Power for Patton's Army
he said, XIX TAC would resume the offensive. Four days earlier he with
Patton, his staff, and corps commanders had attended a conference at Third
Army headquarters to discuss forthcoming offensive operations. Together, the
XIX TAC -Third Army team prepared for the final drive.^^^
Ardennes in Retrospect
Reflecting on the Ardennes Campaign, the Ninth Air Force historian
declared that "here, as never before, was the chance to apply sound principles of
tactical air power.''^^" H e referred to the demonstrated deployment and employ-
ment of tactical air power quickly, in force, in an emergency. General Bradley
echoed these sentiments in a report of his own. "A ircraft claims during that peri-
od [Bastogne] are impressive," he said, "not alone for the havoc created, but
because they demonstrate the potential flexibility which permits the rapid mass-
ing on a limited target area."^^^ Fighter- bomber response, indeed, proved to be
swift, concentrated, and instrumental in helping first to blunt the offensive, then
to force German troops back, beyond the Our River.
The aerial response, in fact, seemed drawn directly from a textbook and
performed to perfection. The early days of the assault, however, reflect a some-
what less organized reaction to the crisis. With troops overrun or in retreat and
the entire Allied center in danger of collapsing, air leaders faced a dire emer-
gency. They responded on December 16 and 17, 1944, without FM 100-20
(1943) in hand for guidance. The theoretical priorities of air superiority, inter-
diction, and close air support were set aside in favor of bringing all available
fighter-bombers to bear as quickly as possible in bombing and strafing the
enemy. This is the very essence of tactical air power's flexibility. If the
Luftwaffe put in an appearance, so much the better. During the course of the bad
weather before December 23, the planners had time to prepare an air plan for
victory and give proper attention to allocating effort among the three missions.
The initial reaction of General Weyland and his command also demon-
strated just how much the applied doctrine, organization and procedures, and
experience of the airmen had developed since the North African Campaign. In
the Ardennes' crucible, Weyland's forces demonstrated the maturity tactical
airpower had achieved. With hardly a pause, he and his staff redirected com-
mand forces from a focus of operations along the Siegfried Line to the
A rdennes regi on w i th the smoothness of a wel I -f uncti oni ng machi ne. A i rpl anes
flew north to cover Patton's fire brigade and east to harry German supply lines,
while Weyland resurrected his X -Ray liaison command echelon to ensure close
coordination with the ground forces. Meanwhile, he marshaled support ele-
ments to make an extraordinary effort in maintaining the air assault. The
urgency of the situation proved sufficient incentive to elicit an outstanding per-
formance from all his forces up and down the line.
234
The Ardennes
Certain problems and constraints could never quite be overcome. The
w i nter w eather made f I y i ng i mpossi bl e at cruel al poi nts 1 n the batti e and 1 1 pre-
vented a consistent harassment of enemy communications. It also delayed the
well -orchestrated interdiction program to isolate the battlefield. Winter weath-
er magnified the major weakness in the Allied tactical air arsenal— the night
fighter force. This small, if heroic group of night flyers simply did not possess
the assets or technology needed to consistently interrupt German movements
of supplies and defensive reinforcements during the long hours of darkness.
Without a significant night operational capability, the Ardennes Offensive was
prolonged and the flak concentrations became the most hazardous of the war
for Allied flyers. Air leaders understood the deficiency, but without sufficient
resources little more could be done before the advent of the all-weather, fly-
by-wire fighter-bomber of the future.
The winter weather and the urgency of the defensive operation also pro-
voked friendly fire from anxious Allied personnel on the ground and in the
sky. General Weyland acted promptly to improve communications between air
and ground personnel, but better coordination among air defense agencies
could only limit the problem as long as the flying hazards and tension associ-
ated with action in the Bulge continued. Even with better coordination,
wartime conditions ensured that the friendly fire problem continued through-
out the campaign, if at a lower level of concern.
As always, teamwork and cooperation among leaders of goodwill ulti-
mately prevented any serial recurrence of the worst of the friendly fire inci-
dents, as they did most other problems. Clearly the mutual respect and under-
standing between Generals Patton and Weyland continued unaltered. From the
start of the battle it was a joint operation and remained so. Weyland or his X-
Ray chief attended every Third Army morning briefing, and the integrated
combat operations staff ensured continued joint planning and operations.
Teamwork and cooperation also occurred in the combined operations office at
corps and division level, as well as in the smooth and effective coordination
that developed among and between reconnaissance and fighter aircraft, ground
controllers, and artillery units. M oreover, Weyland always gave first priority to
ai r cover for Patton's army, w hether or not formal doctri ne favored such exten-
sive measures. Patton, in turn, never interfered with the basic air plan to sup-
port his forces in the Bulge and participate in Ninth Air Force's interdiction
program. Only occasionally did the army commander request special recon-
naissance or air support for troops in trouble, and Weyland's forces always
responded.
Certainly, the XIX TAC could respond to Third Army requests more
effectively with eightfighter-bomber groups instead of four. Unlike conditions
in the Lorraine Campaign, Weyland possessed a force capable of decisive
intervention in the battle zone. Yet, his responsibilities correspondingly
increased, too. While three groups always provided close air support, three
235
Air Power for Patton's Army
Destroyed self-propelled gun near Dasburg, Germany
more concentrated on interdiction. Tliis left two groups to fly escort, coun-
terair, defensive patrol, and to strike the pinpoint targets that seemed to need
attention on a regular basis. These six aerial assignments could and did
change, but they limited the concentration of effort the command could apply
to any single one.
Ninth Air Force, of course, continued to decide major force allocations.
In the official recounting of the campaign, its historian reflected on the con-
stant challenge of balancing competing priorities:
There was always the difference of opinion on the tactical
employment of air power. A request might call for immedi-
ate cooperation against a close target when overall commit-
ments dictated continuation of a longer-range program.
M any requests were beyond [our] capabilities.^^^
In hindsight. Ninth Air Force analysts concluded that perhaps too much
initial effort had been devoted to bomber escort duties at the expense of close
support. One might also question whether the airmen, given the intelligence
information at hand, accorded more attention than the threat warranted to
236
The Ardennes
potential Luftwaffe attacks after the German drive liad been blunted. If the
actions of the XIX TAC commander clearly reflected the conventional wisdom
of contemporary airmen, that wisdom ordered numerous aircraft on air com-
bat patrol that otherwise might have been applied to offensive missions.
Whatever the decisions on air priorities, the Allied tactical air power available
then in northern Europe provided sufficient concentration of force for decisive
intervention on the battlefield.
237
Chapter Six
The Final Offensive
The final offensive— which would strike at the Siegfried Line, and, if
successful, press forward across the Rhine River— could be expected to differ
considerably from either the Lorraine Campaign or the Battle for France. First
and foremost. General Weyland's XIX TAC possessed important advantages
not previously available. Above all, the command could rely on overwhelm-
ing air superiority— far more than at any time during operations in Northwest
Europe. Weyland's aerial force numbered nearly 400 fighter-bombers in this
Third Army sector alone. Intelligence estimated the Luftwaffe possessed at
most only 700 fighters arrayed against all of the Allied armies and air forces
deployed along the German border in the west. (Nazi war records later proved
this Allied estimate to have been remarkably accurate.) Because of severe fuel
constraints and the Luftwaffe's large-scale redeployment to the eastern front at
the end of 1944, the Germans stationed only 600 single-engine fighters in the
west. Moreover, not until early March 1945, when the Allies pressed their
drive to the Rhine, did the overall German sortie rate increase from the late
January figure of 250 to 300-400 per day, weather permitting. Even a major
effort to protect airfields with turbojet aircraft and overworking J u 87 aircraft
in missions at night failed to slow the inexorable Allied advance.^ With uncon-
tested air superiority, Weyland could be expected to devote the bulk of his fly-
ing effort to the second- and third- priority aerial missions of interdiction and
close air support, respectively.
The ground situation seemed equally favorable. After the Ardennes
defeat. Third Army intelligence officers learned that units from both General
von Manteuffel's Fifth Panzer Army and General Brandenberger's Seventh
Army were moved to reinforce the eastern front and bolster German forces
defending the Cologne area where the main Allied thrust was expected.
General Patton's intelligence section predicted that enemy forces facing them
in the Eifel region amounted to no more than five American-strength divi-
sions. ^ In addition to numerical superiority, the Third Army-XIX TAC air-
ground team also possessed the advantage of experience gained during six
months of combat in all kinds of weather and terrain in northern Europe. It
could be expected to react confidently to the challenges of fighting under con-
ditions of mobile and static warfare, especially against a rapidly weakening
enemy.
Nevertheless, the Siegfried Line defenses of concrete bunkers and pill-
boxes presented formidable targets for fighter-bombers. The airmen could
239
Air Power for Patton's Army
expect little cooperation from the weather as the Eifel region was noted for its
wretched winters. Weyland also knew, in the event of a breakthrough of the
Siegfried Line, he would again face the formidable tasks of moving supplies
and establishing forward airstrips rapidly enough to maintain pace with Patton's
armored spearheads. All the while, the air-ground team would contend with an
overarching Allied strategy that assigned only a supporting role to the Third
Army with concomitant priorities in the climactic drive against Nazi Germany.
With the Ardennes emergency officially ended on January 28, 1945,
General Eisenhower and his advisors returned to their grand plan for breach-
ing the Siegfried Line, hurdling the Rhine River barrier and plunging Allied
armor into the heart of Germany.^ The Supreme Allied Commander favored
advancing to the Rhine along a broad front, then holding at the river with a
small force while the British 21st Army Group pressed the main Allied assault
north of the Ruhr industrial area, under the direction of doughty Field M arshal
M ontgomery. A secondary attack led by General Patton's Third Army would
f ol I ow to the south i n the F rankf urt area. W hen the B ri ti sh and A meri can chi ef s
of staff met on the island of M alta in late January and early February 1945,
they endorsed Eisenhower's plan, but only after the Supreme Commander
allayed British fears that he might wait to cross the Rhine until the entire west
bank had been cleared. M oreover, to avoid unwanted procrastination mounting
the offensive in the north. General Eisenhower promised to reinforce
M ontgomery's 21st Army Group with sizeable American air and ground units
so it might be ready to cross the Rhine "in force as soon as possible.'"^
Although Allied leaders had their eyes on a northernmost Rhine cross-
ing from the Low Countries, the immediate challenge in early February 1945,
was to overcome the still formidable Siegfried Line defenses in the Rhineland.
To achieve this objective, SHAEF developed plans for a series of consecutive
Allied attacks from north to south that would bring the armies to the banks of
the Rhine (Map 21). The main assault, termed Operation Veritable, would be
led by Montgomery opposite the Ruhr. To give the offensive more punch,
Eisenhower gave Montgomery, who had temporary command of General
Simpson's N i nth A rmy si nee the B attle of the B uige, units from H odges's F i rst
and Patton's Third Armies.
General Bradley received permission to allow Hodges and Patton to
continue attacking in the Eifel region only until February 1. Then priority for
supplies and personnel would again shift to Montgomery's area to meet
Operation Veritable's deadline for the attack on the eighth. Once the British
field marshal's forces reached the Rhine and began preparations for the cross-
ing. General Bradley could resume his Eifel offensive, now termed Operation
Lumberjack. Shortly thereafter. General Devers's 6th Army Group in the
south would launch an assault in the Palatinate, Operation Undertone.
Despite Eisenhower's assurance to British leaders that M ontgomery would
lead the way, his broad-front strategy, which called for all Allied armies to
240
SOURCE: VincentJ . Esposito, ed., West Point Atlas of American Wars, V. 2, Map 64b, (New York: Praeger, 1960)
Air Power for Patton's Army
close to the Rhine before attempting to cross that barrier, seemed as much
intact as ever.
UndertheSHAEF plan, M ontgomery would cross the Rhine to the north
in the Wesel area as soon as possible and proceed along the main invasion
route north of the Ruhr, sweeping across the north German plain (Map 21). He
would be followed by the two American army groups, which would make sec-
ondary crossings in the M ainz-Frankfurt region and attack northeast through
the so-called Frankfurt-Kassel Corridor. Once the two Allied forceslinked up
east of the Ruhr, Germany's industrial heartland would be encircled, and all
hope of forestalling the Allied offensive eliminated. Understandably, Hitler
appreciated the vital importance of the Ruhr, and the growing Allied threat
served to reinforce his natural inclination to defend the area west of the Rhine
with fanatical determination. Closing the Rhine would not be easy and the
vagaries of winter weather, short supplies, and contemporary technology com-
plicated the assignment.^
Operational Challenges and New Tactics
The need for improved accuracy in bombing and for bomb damage
assessment was underscored in an incident involving destruction of the Bullay
Bridge over the M osel River. For months this structure eluded the best efforts
of medium bombers and fighter-bombers to destroy it. Then, on February 10,
1945, a squadron from XIX TAC's 368th Fighter Group scored direct hits with
several 500-lb. bombs. Despite Ninth Air Force's initial skepticism, recon-
naissance later confirmed that the center span had collapsed into the river. At
this point, an ebullient General Weyland could not resist sending photographs
to General Anderson, commander of the IX Bombardment Division, with a
suggestion that any targets he found too difficult for his medium bombers be
referred to XIX TAC fighter-bombers. In an equally mordant reply. General
Anderson asserted that his bombers had weakened the bridge for Weyland's
"pea shooters," and he had photographs to prove it. Operational research spe-
cialists, he told the XIX TAC commander, had shown that fighter claims for
bridges and rail cuts were actually inflated 70 percent.^
Later that month Nicholas M . Smith, chief of XIX TAC's newly formed
operational research section, considered methods employed in the aerial bomb-
ing of bridges. He analyzed the probability of destroying double-trussed
bridges with various size bombs and different fuzes. Initially he thought that
bridge targets might require bombs too heavy for fighter-bombers; further
study, however, suggested these aircraft might have better luck with the small-
er bombs using different fuzing. Smith's analysis demonstrated that the prob-
ability of destroying trussed bridges with their numerous small redundant
trusses increased with a larger number of smaller bombs fuzed contrary to the
242
The Final Offensive
parameters used by the medium bombers. The bridge study was one of sever-
al important technical investigations undertaken by Smith and an associate,
radar specialist A mold C. M clean, to improve the command's operational per-
formance.^ Two other studies carried out by the command's operational
research section in the late winter and early spring also deserve special atten-
tion. 0 ne i nvol ved an i ntensi ve effort to produce a bomb stri ke camera, and the
other to develop an accurate blind bombing radar system. Their stories illus-
trate the promise, as well as the limitations, of technology applied at the front.
The bomb strike camera offered the prospect of improvements in bomb
damage assessment and bombing accuracy, which might end the turmoil over
pilot claims. Ninth Air Force had been interested in such a project since the
I ate fall when the studies mentioned by General Anderson indicated that fight-
er-bombers made one rail cut in every eight or nine sorties rather than one in
every three as claimed by the pilots.^ Smith, the XIX TAG research chief,
worked closely with Gol. George W. Goddard in Ninth Air Force's Office of
Technical Service after the Ardennes Offensive to develop more effective
mounting arrangements and test various oblique cameras on P-47 aircraft. The
key problem proved to be finding a workable mounting system. Hanging a
The Bullay Bridge, destroyed by the direct hits of the
368th Fighter Group
243
Air Power for Patton's Army
K-25 short focal-length, wide-angle, rear-facing camera from a wing support
had to be abandoned after tests by pilots from the 371st Fighter Group showed
that its field of view remained too small. The pilots also complained about the
external mount and the need to fly straight and level after hitting the target. A
belly camera mount experiment proved equally unrewarding, and research and
testing continued throughout the spring.
Inearly May 1945, with thewar nearly over, Smith andaXIX TAG intel-
ligence officer exchanged visits with their counterparts in the M editerranean
theater where fighter-bombers successfully used an oblique camera mounted in
a faired compartment in front of the left bomb pylon. At the same time,
Golonel Goddard began experimenting with 70-mm cameras mounted in split
vertical pairs. They were activated by the bomb release mechanism in order to
obtain photographs in conjunction with the bomb bursts. Although the scien-
tists could not produce an effective bomb strike camera system before the end
of the European Gampaign, their work continued and the outlook appeared
promising.
The other major project studied by the operational research section dur-
ing the last offensive focused on the SGR-584 ground-based blind bombing
system discussed earlier in Ghapter 5. According to conventional wisdom,
when modified for close control, the SGR-584 could serve as an effective
blind bombing system during important operations like the Ardennes coun-
teroffensive. Its radar equipment would position the fighter-bomber over the
target with sufficient precision to bomb effectively through cloud cover or at
night.5 Such was not the case, however, and like the search for a good bomb
strike camera, accurate blind bombing remained out of reach throughout the
campaign. As has so often occurred with new technology, the SGR-584 story
is a fascinating tale of a technical system that never quite lived up to the ini-
tial predictions of its developers. ^°
W hen, i n earl y N ovem ber 1944, the X I X TA G recei ved the f i rst SG R - 584
radar system, a BAGU, officials decided to use it mainly as a navigational
device to position aircraft close enough over a target to enable the pilot to
acquire it visually. They assigned this unit and subsequent SGR-584 flying con-
trol units to the tactical air liaison officer at army corps headquarters, which had
good land line communications. The system's first mission did not occur until
December 2, and by December 10 it had controlled only ten missions, all nav-
igational. At that time, a second unit had been installed near M etz, which was
moved north to cover the Bulge in early January 1945. Between December 4,
1944, and January 10, 1945, it controlled a total of 16 separate missions, only
two of which represented blind bombing runs. In fact, of the 26 missions con-
trolled by the SGR-584 during this period, 10 could not be completed because
of controller error; 14 of the remaining 16 proved to be navigational, not blind
bombing, missions. Moreover, the average error in positioning the aircraft
accurately amounted to an unacceptably high 3,500 feet.
244
The Final Offensive
In early January 1945, the command decided to employ the M EW and
director post radars for close navigational control and to use the modified
SCR- 584 for blind bombing almost exclusively. Ninth Air Force, which strong-
ly supported efforts to improve the system, wanted each tactical air command to
have its scientific-military team work independently to improve system accura-
cy. It seems that the Ninth Air Force also received motivation from reports com-
piled by other tactical airforcesthatindicated better performance than theNinth
had been able to achieve. General Lee, Ninth Air Force deputy for operations,
became concerned over statements made by General Saville, commander of the
XII TAG. General Lee told General Weyland in a January 5 letter that Saville
claimed aircraft in his command used theSCR-584 to bomb accurately through
overcast within 100 yards of friendly troops without fear of hitting them. Given
the difficulty of achieving this kind of accuracy even in daylight under optimum
conditions, Weyland and his Ninth Air Force colleagues were more than a little
skeptical. Yet the Saville report focused attention on improving the system, and
testing continued from J anuary until the end of the campaign.
U pon investigation, M cLean, the command's radar expert, determined that
equipment limitations and inadequate controller procedures made it impossible
to develop accurate control of aircraft for blind bombing with great accuracy.
M cLean introduced radar siting procedures that called for survey measurements
to obtain proper station grid coordinates and antenna alignment. Healso instruct-
ed controllers to compute range and bearing information mathematically rather
than rely on large-scale maps. In all, the research technician discovered 12 com-
mon problems associated with the two types of plotting boards and three meth-
ods of blind-level bombing in use. M ost could be minimized through an exten-
sive training program for controllers. Indeed, SCR -584 system accuracy
improved considerably by the time a third control unit arrived on February 27.
After evaluating all available bombing data, M cLean reported an aver-
age bombing error of 1,745 feet for the command. He advised Ninth Air Force
that current accuracy and the size of bomb patterns made it unsafe to bomb any
closer than 2,000 yards, or slightly more than a mile from front line troops. In
early M ay 1945, after collecting reports from the other tactical air commands.
Ninth Air Force research officials concluded, despite Saville's claims to the
contrary, that itfound no appreciable difference among the three commands in
operational techniques and equipment used or in the results attained. As for
other commands. Ninth Air Force consultant R. W. Larson disputed figures
used by the British Second TA F specialists, who asserted that safe blind bomb-
ing could be done within a thousand yards of friendly troops. He also report-
ed that M editerranean theater testing now indicated that accuracies of 500 feet
could be attained, butthe authorities there had not yet issued a formal report.^^
By war's end, N inth A ir Force recommended using the SCR- 584 only for
navigational purposes, not to direct blind bombing missions. Officials nonethe-
less expected much progress in future blind bombing through the use of radio
245
Air Power for Patton's Army
beacons, or identification friend or foe (IFF) transponders, some already
installed in General Quesada's aircraft as the fighting came to a close. The
Ninth also directed that controller training continue after the war. Although
important breakthroughs would have to await further developments in technol-
ogy, the efforts of the airmen, scientists, and engineers represented an important
element in the program to improve combat effectiveness for tactical air power.
Like the Lorraine experience, static warfare along the Siegfried Line in
February 1945, nonetheless offered XIX TAG several advantages that mitigat-
ed poor flying weather and heavily defended targets. The command now could
test the cumbersome, ground-based SGR-584 blind bombing radar system.
Indeed, communications in general remained uniformly excellent throughout
the month and into M arch because neither the headquarters nor any of the fly-
ing groups changed station. In fact, only one fighter group, the 367th (which
subsequently again changed locations on March 15), redeployed from St.
Dizier to Gonflans, bringing it 60 miles closer to the Third Army front lines.
Other operational considerations benefitted from the static situation as
well. For example, flying distance from air bases in France to the target areas,
normally less than 50 miles, increased loiter times over selected targets. The
stable front and well-established bases also made it easier for the command to
solve logistic challenges. By mid-February, however, the XIX TAG'S heavy
flying commitment threatened shortages of both 500-lb. general -purpose
bombs and .50-caliber ammunition. Because 500-lb. bomb stocks could not be
replaced immediately, armorers used a substitute, RDX Gomposition-B, a
British-made, high-explosive bomb consisting of a mixture of TNT and wax.
M ore popular with the aircrews and ground forces, however, was the M -47
100-lb. white phosphorous bomb, first used by the command at this time. Its
50-foot burst and shower of burning particles made it a superb antipersonnel
incendiary, and its smoke provided airmen a good protective screen against
flak. Although attacks west of the Rhine at Freillingen and Mayen during
February produced excellent results, transportation problems also affected the
supply of white phosphorous bombs, and the command decided to conserve a
minimum for special missions.^^
High consumption of the universally used .50-caliber ammunition creat-
ed greater concern when priorities in ground transport were claimed by
Montgomery's forces. The command increasingly relied on air resupply to
alleviate the deficit both in February and in M arch 1945, when the situation
again became acute with the advent of more mobile ground operations. By
mid-M arch, ammunition stocks were nearly exhausted. On M arch 18, in fact,
the 371st Fighter Group alone fired a record 300,000 rounds while flying in
close support of XX Gorps. In response to the ammunition crisis, the IX Air
Force Service Gommand flew in 2 million rounds to the 1907th Ordnance
Depot Gompany. Even though the command stressed conservation of ammu-
nition, it could not hope to reduce strafing operations when the war became
246
The Final Offensive
P-51 Mustangs of the 354th Fighter Group
more mobile and fighter-bombers often flew with reduced bombloads.
However, at no time in February 1945 or later did ordnance shortages adverse-
ly affect flying operations.
The relatively static situation in February eased the burden of aircraft con-
version for two XIX TAC groups. With earlier experience to follow, the com-
mand had no trouble providing the 367th Fighter Group with P-47s in place of
P-38S, and the 354th Fighter Group with P-51s in place of P-47s. In fact, both
conversions occurred faster than the 354th's conversion from P-51s to
Thunderbolts back in November 1944." For some time the command had con-
sidered standardizing its fighter-bomber force by reequipping its lone Lightning
group with the more durable P-47s. Despite the P-38's superior low-level
speed and maneuverability, the command preferred the Thunderbolt for dive-
bombing and close support in the final offensive. The reconversion of the 354th
Fighter Group from P-47s to P-51s no doubt became a consideration as well.
Beginning in December 1944, each of the 367th Fighter Group's three P-38
squadrons had four P-47s assigned. When no more arrived in January 1945,
group members thought there would be no conversion. But on February 11, the
group's 392d Fighter Squadron received 13 P-47sand by the sixteenth, was fly-
ing combat missions with the new aircraft. The remaining two squadrons
became operational after only four and three days, respectively. By February 26,
the 367th Fighter Group operated as a fully equipped Thunderbolt outfit.^^
The 354th Fighter Group's conversion proved equally speedy, but per-
haps more interesting, in view of the problems attendant on its original con-
version to P-47S. According to the group historian, when the P-51 news
reached the 354th Fighter Group's headquarters on February 4, it proved to be
the "signal for the beginning of a celebration unapproached in spontane-
ity... by any previous reveries of the Group and it lasted unabated for two
days." The M ustangs began arriving on February 10, and the group celebrated
247
Air Power for Patton's Army
its return, or reconversion, to P-51s on February 16 by downing four Bf 109s
over Trier and Oberlalinstein witliout sustaining a loss.^^
Tlie group liistorian tliouglit tlie P-51s returned because tlie command
needed a superior, long-range figliter tliat could perform counterair and inter-
diction missions well into Germany. At the same time, however, theAAF in
Europe now had received sufficient P-51Ds to make the conversion possible
and provide needed replacements. Whether the Pioneer M ustang group per-
formed more effectively with P-51s is unclear. Loss rates, for example, were
high if not higher during comparable periods when the group flew P-47s. On
the other hand, comparisons are difficult. In spite of flying close support mis-
sions on February 16, the 354th Fighter Group now assumed the more tradi-
tional fighter responsibility of fulfilling air superiority and long-range inter-
diction requirements. With the return of the M ustangs, the group "started right
away to climb back to its own proud place in the sun."^"
Into the Siegfried Line
At the end of the Ardennes operation in late February, the Third
Army-XIX TAG team returned to the question: how best to break through the
Siegfried Line. The theatrical General Patton was not at all content to end his
pursuit and pin down German troops in the Eifel while the cautious Field
M arshal M ontgomery claimed center stage in the Allied advance. He preferred
to give "active defense" the widest possible interpretation. Because General
Bradley interpreted General Eisenhower's order of February 1 as authorizing
Patton's army to "continue the probing attacks now in progress," General
Middleton's VIII Corps could maintain its offensive at the German border
(Map 20). 2^ Patton increased M iddleton's responsibilities during a meeting on
February 3 with his corps commanders and General Weyland. He explained
that VIII Corps would protect First Army's right flank as ordered by SHAEF,
and also launch a major assault on the West Wall, or Siegfried Line, with its
objective being the capture of the town of Prum. This would be coordinated
with General Eddy's XII Corps, which would attack through the Echternach
region, the old southern hinge of the Bulge, on February 6 or 7; cross theSauer
River; and move northeast to take the major road center of Bitburg. With both
Prum and Bitburg in Third Army hands, Patton hoped to convince Bradley and
Eisenhower to allow Third Army to continue attacking eastward to the Rhine.
By launching the Bitburg Offensive without permission, Patton knew he would
be "taking one of the longest chances of [his] chancy career." He informed his
corps commanders that the offensive would end four days later, on February 10,
1945, if sufficient progress toward the two towns had not been made.^^
Following the February 3 planning conference. General Weyland joined
the other TAC commanders at Ninth Air Force headquarters to allocate the air
248
The Final Offensive
effort for the upcoming offensives. To provide Nintli Army witli sufficient tac-
tical air support in tlie A aclien region, General Nugent'sXXIX TAG received
units from the IX and XIX TAGs. Asa result, on February 8 Weyland lost two
of his longest serving fighter groups, the 405th Raiders and 406th Tiger
Tamers, leaving him with four fighter groups— the 354th, 362d, 367th, and
368th— until February 15, when the 371st Fighter Group returned from theXII
TAG to help support Third Army's increasingly "aggressive defense."
Although General Weyland had requested the 358th Fighter Group, the 371st
soon distinguished itself in combat operations as the most efficient in the com-
mand. To support Third Army's drive through the West Wall and on to the
Rhine, XIX TAG now had five fighter-bomber groups, totaling 225 aircraft, as
well as the 425th N ight Fighter Squadron and the 10th Reconnaissance Group.
Like Third Army, Allied leaders reduced XIX TAG'S forces with the north-
ward shift in their combat priorities.
For both Third Army and XIX TAG, the February 1945 assault on the
Siegfried Line by VIII and XII Gorps troops brought back bittersweet memo-
ries of the Lorraine Gampaign, in which bad weather, formidable terrain,
swollen rivers, reduced forces, and stiff resistance thwarted the progress of the
air-ground team. Both army corps forces had to cross rivers now swollen to
twice their normal widths and press forward into the cliffs of the West Wall
defenses. M oreover, the heavy winter snows not only contributed to the slow
pace of the ground offensive, they also prohibited any air support for the open-
ing assault. Once beyond the initial bridgeheads over the Our and Sauer rivers,
Third A rmy forces crossed a series of creeks and streams as they attempted to
advance along roads made almost impassable from German use and the win-
ter thaw. M uch to Patton's pleasure, however, during the first week in February
his troops made slow but steady progress.
Air operations in early February also can be characterized by one word:
weather.^'' When the 405th and 406th Fighter Groups left the command on the
eighth, they had flown on only two days in February because of poor weather.
Between January 30 and February 8, fog and drizzle prohibited air support
every day except on the second, when the 354th Fighter Group flew four 12-
plane missions for VIII Gorps. Although February's flying weather proved to
be better than January's, it nevertheless restricted operations on fully 22 days
of the month; 4 more days were totally nonoperational and 3 were limited to
fewer than 40 combat sorties each. The command, however, gave a strong
account of itself by flying a total of 5,749 sorties for an average of 205 per day
in February, 500 more than it achieved in January when it possessed three
more fighter-bomber groups.
Weather caused the command to adjust flying priorities. The bad weath-
er in the Eifel in early February forced Weyland to modify the command's top-
priority program— interdiction. The basic air plan called for fighter-bombers
to interdict German units attempting to reinforce the Prum-Bitburg area from
249
Air Power for Patton's Army
the east. The command historian asserted, however, that bad weather during
the first 12 days of February compelled the fighter-bombers to fly armed
reconnaissance missionsfarther east in the Rhine valley instead. Even so, XIX
TAC airmen flew nearly half of their armed reconnaissance missions in the
original Eifel target area. Characteristically, Weyland's pilots often disregard-
ed minimum weather flying conditions to support a Third Army offensive.
A Ithough interdiction was a key priority, the airmen did not neglect close
air support. On February 8, 1945, the day Weyland was promoted to major
general, weather allowed his fighter-bombers to provide close air support to
hard-pressed XII Corps forces precariously holding their Echternach bridge-
head across the Sauer River. That day the 362d M aulers and 368th Thunder
Bums each flew seven missions to protect the corps' bridgehead and ward off
German counterattacks. On the eighth. Third Army's active defense already
found VIII Corps within a half mile of Prum and III Corps widening its bridge-
head beyond the Our River north of Dasburg. Farther south. General Walker's
overextended XX Corps attacked the heaviest defenses of the entire Siegfried
Line southeast of Trier in what Americans termed the Saar-M osel Triangle
(Map 22).
Despite the horrid weather, stiff defenses, and additional units transferred
away from his command, Patton's forces pressed forward. They measured their
success in the number of pillboxes taken each day and in small unit penetra-
tions of the West Wall. Even though bad weather prohibited close air support
on February 12, 17, and 18, fighter-bombers covered Patton's divisions on
every other day. The 362d M aulers, for example, flew every day in support of
XII Corps units until the troops finally breached the Siegfried Li neon February
25. For the other two corps attacks, the 354th and 368th Fighter Groups shared
the close support missions until the seventeenth, when the 354th Fighter
Group, now flying P-51s again, concentrated on armed reconnaissance and
fighter sweeps. Then the 368th and 371st Fighter Groups picked up the army
Ninth Air Force fighiters entrenclied in snow
250
»«««« .
BR. I
ASKOWITZ
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CRERAR
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Map 22
West-Central Germany
and Belgium, 1945:
Rhineland Campaign Operations
February 8-March 5, 1945
S 10 IS 20 25
=t- I Tl I I
MONTGOMERY
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ESSEN
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SOURCE: VincentJ . Esposito, ed., West Point Atlas of American Wars, V. 2, Map 65a, (New York: Praeger, 1960)
Air Power for Patton's Army
"cooperation" mission, or wliat air leaders increasingly termed close air sup-
port.26
During the West Wall assault in February, the command followed its
practice of assigning specific fighter-bomber groups to cover specific army
corps. That permitted the aviators to become entirely familiar with the meth-
ods of particular ground controllers and with special combat conditions in a
given area. In the Eifel, the 362d Fighter Group normally supported XII Corps
and the 371st Fighter Group covered XX Corps. General Weyland, however,
preferred to retain flexibility in mission assignments. The VIII Corps, for
example, received close air support from all but the 367th Fighter Group,
which generally flew armed reconnaissance missions. Moreover, individual
squadrons from the same group often supported different corps on the same
day, then followed their cooperation mission with armed reconnaissance or
bomber escort flights. In short, the command continued to adjust its priorities
and assignments as rapidly as circumstances dictated."
Gradually, close air support sorties began to outnumber those for armed
reconnaissance/interdiction. In fact, even during the first 12 days of February,
the command flew the same number of sorties for both close air support and
interdiction missions. Thereafter close air support became the command's pri-
ority program until the breakthrough to Prum on February 25. Although the
statistical record does not always clearly distinguish between mission types,
operational records indicate that from February 12-25, XIX TAC pilots flew
1,494 close air support and 1,315 armed reconnaissance/interdiction sorties.
For the entire month of February, close support outnumbered armed recon-
naissance sorties by 1,976 to 1,884. Third Army ground forces' offensive
requirements meant that close air support, normally last on the doctrinal-mis-
sion priority scale, became the first and most important mission in early 1945.
The high level of close support flying might suggest that Weyland's
pilots flew many missions against the pillboxes that dominated Germany's
West Wall defenses. The air commander always considered this type of target
better suited to attack by army artillery or medium and heavy bombers in spite
of earlier evaluations that suggested fighter-bombers armed with at least
1,000-lb. general -purpose bombs stood the best chance against this type of
heavily defended target. How much effort did General Weyland accord West
Wall pi 1 1 boxes and river defenses? In this period of static warfare, did his fight-
er-bombers replace artillery against these difficult targets in the immediate bat-
tle zone? Records suggest that most close air support targets involved attacks
on troop concentrations, convoys, rail yards, and fortified towns near or at the
front line. In fact, when the 362d Fighter Group reported attacking a pillbox
on February 16, it proved to be the only recorded occasion in the entire
Siegfried Line offensive of February when command fighter- bombers struck
such targets. Although General Weyland willingly gave close support require-
ments priority during ground offensives, he remained uncompromising about
252
The Final Offensive
what he deemed proper targets for his forces and Patton invariably supported
him. Pillboxes and casemented guns never appeared on General Weyland's list
of approved targets— unless the ground forces faced an emergency situation.
He much preferred to leave these to Third Army's artillery batteries and spe-
cial assault teams. Relying on previous experience in Lorraine, the airmen
concentrated on repelling enemy counterattacks and protecting bridgeheads.
In February the weakened state of the Luftwaffe encouraged Weyland to
experiment with new tactics. Indeed, the Luftwaffe seldom appeared during the
February attack on the Siegfried Line. During the first 12 days of the month,
fighters destroyed only one plane in the air and ten on the ground. From that
time until February 25, even better weather did not bring out the Luftwaffe in
force. Asa result, command claims were a modest 18 aircraft destroyed in the
air and four on the ground. The Luftwaffe's relative inactivity convinced
Weyland to forego squadron-sized missions and initiate four-plane close air
support flights, the command's major tactical adjustment for the spring of
1945. On February 20, the 371st Fighter Group flew four-plane sweeps over
XX Corps divisions continuously from first light to sunset. Although the small
flights had been flown occasionally in the past in lieu of the normal eight- or
twelve-plane squadron mission, the 371st Fighter Group began what immedi-
ately became common practice for all close air support flying during the next
three and a half weeks. ^°
General Weyland considered conditions especially good for using the
four-plane flight. The modest Luftwaffe threat meant that the command could
risk low-level bombing and strafing runs without the protection of a top cover
flight. Flying close to the home base allowed tactical control radars to monitor
the area and alert the flights should Luftwaffe aircraft suddenly appear. In late
February, Weyland also expected the ground action to become more fluid.
Under Third Army's incessant pressure, retreating enemy forces would be
forced into the open, where they would become excellent targets for the air-
men. In short, four-plane missions now could be flown safely and profitably.
M oreover, they proved popular with airmen and field troops alike. From the air
side, it meant that each flight had more time to concentrate on ground targets
because they lost no time coordinating two flights working together. Then, too,
the smal I er f ormati on gave new pi I ots practi ce f I y i ng as m i ssi on I eaders. A s f or
Patton's ground forces, they enjoyed what amounted to the proverbial, albeit
doctrinal ly proscribed, air umbrella as they came and went throughout the day.
Although the airmen considered the four-plane missions more produc-
tive than the larger formations, the statistical record is not entirely clear on the
issue. Indeed, the whole question of tactical air power's effectiveness as it was
applied in this manner remains next to impossible to determine with precision.
The ground force elements receiving this air support, however, harbored no
doubts whatsoever. They judged XIX TAG aircraft as having played a crucial
role in the spring offensive. Nearly every day, the flying command's intelli-
253
Air Power for Patton's Army
gence reports referred to complimentary messages from ground units tliat
received "excellent cooperation" and "splendid support" from XIX TAC fight-
er-bombers that blunted counterattacks or destroyed enemy positions. General
Weyland, too, never entertained second doubts over his decision to supply this
kind of air coverage at this point in the war. By February 20, 1945, he could
look forward to mobile warfare in the near future. From previous experience
in the Battle for France, he knew Patton's artillery would have difficulty
advancing rapidly and providing front line coverage by itself. Command of the
air permitted Weyland to take liberties with tactical air doctrine, a doctrine that
favored concentrated use of air power and frowned on penny-packet combat
air patrols. Use of the four-plane flight, however, demonstrated the inherent
flexibility of tactical air power and the ability of the airmen to adapt to chang-
ing needs and circumstances. Although Weyland's airmen believed the small
formations represented the most productive and efficient method of flying in
February, a stronger enemy would have required squadron- or group-sized
missions with perhaps a corresponding decline in efficiency. In short, battle
conditions guided the XIX TAC commander's actions and determined the
command's aerial operations.
Through the Eifel to the Rhine
While the aircraft conversions took place in mid-February, operationally
the command continued to support Third Army's slow movement through the
Siegfried Line. On February 20, 1945, with the 371st Fighter Group providing
continuous four-plane coverage, XX Corps' divisions began clearing the Saar-
M osel Triangle in earnest. In two days of stiff fighting against the Wehrmacht's
weakened Army Group G, Third Army troops secured the area, and Patton's
troops poised themselves for the final drive toward Trier. M eanwhile, the 362d
Fighter Group attacked convoys, tanks, and gun positions in the VIII Corps
zone, where General M iddleton's forces finally cleared Dasburg and eliminat-
ed the Vianden Bulge (Map 22).
On February 21, the 368th Fighter Group led the command in achieving
a new five-group record of 504 sorties. It divided its 25 missions between XII
Corps' 5th Infantry Division and units of VIII Corps just to the north, then
making the Third Army's fifth complete breakthrough of the West Wall. The
group also added two armed reconnaissance missions in the Rhine valley for
good measure. As for the other groups, the 362d and 367th Fighter Groups
flew armed reconnaissance/interdiction missions east of the Rhine as far as
Wuerzburg, while the 371st Fighter Group continued its support of XX Corps'
mopping up operation southwest of Trier.
February 22 proved to be a more important flying day, even though
morni ng fog grounded G eneral Weyl and's ai rcraft unti I mi dday and I i mi ted the
254
The Final Offensive
command to 33 missions and 358 sorties. On tliis day tlie command partici-
pated in Operation Clarion, one of tlie greatest air sliows of tlie war. For
Clarion, SHAEF planned a massive, theaterwide air assaulton Germany's key
rail and water transportation network launched in conjunction with Operation
Grenade, Ninth Army's two-week delayed drive to the Rhine. On the twenty-
second, more than 8,000 Allied aircraft dropped 8,500 tons of bombs on more
than 200 German targets. The day's claims included 15 locomotives, 404 rail-
road cars, 16 barges, 44 buildings, 18 marshaling yards, 78 rail cuts, and 65
Luftwaffe aircraft shot down. ^2 In Clarion, XIX TAC escorted 25 formations of
medium bombers attacking bridges and marshalling yards east and west of the
Rhine in front of Third Army. At the same time, Weyland ensured Patton's
Dicing sliotof Saarburg, Germany
255
Air Power for Patton's Army
front line ground units received sufficient air cover. Tlie 368tli Figliter Group
flew just one squadron-sized mission for VIII Corps, wliile tlie 362d Fighter
Group flew two missions for XX Corps and one for XII Corps. The fighter-
bombers also flew armed reconnaissance in conjunction with the bomber
escort missions, once they made sure their big brothers were safe.
Allied planners hoped that the disruption produced in one day by
Operation Clarion would overwhelm German railway repair capabilities and
force the enemy to rely temporarily on motor transport. Their assessment
proved absolutely correct. German vehicles clogged the roadways on February
23, making themselves ideal targets for the fighter-bombers. While the 368th
and 371st Fighter Groups provided what Third Army leaders termed splendid
air cooperation, the other three groups flew armed reconnaissance in the Rhine
region and eastward along key communications routes. A final total of 269
tanks and armored vehicles and 1,308 railroad cars represented a command
record for the number of enemy vehicles claimed destroyed or damaged in a
single day. The total of 527 sorties flown surpassed the month's previous high
set just two days earlier.
A few days later, on February 25, 1945, Third Army forces were com-
pletely through the Siegfried Line; on the twenty-sixth Bitburg fell to XII
Corps' 4th Armored Division. With the WestWall defenses breached, the time
had arrived for General Patton to exploit his position, provided he could con-
vince reluctant superiors that a Third Army offensive had the best chance
against the enemy. Yet Allied attention in late February still focused on the
northern sector where, under Montgomery's command. General Simpson's
Ninth Army had crossed the Roer River and began the drive to the Ruhr (Map
31). The Eifel remained a secondary front. Patton wanted to drive his army
forward, seizing every opportunity that promised rapid gains. His immediate
objective became the city of Trier. In Versailles, General Eisenhower remained
unconvinced that a major thrust should occur in the Eifel. Then, on February
25, General Bradley arrived at Third Army's Luxembourg City headquarters
and notified Patton to cease attacking and prepare to designate and hold one
infantry and one armored division as SHAEF reserves. Appalled, General
Patton, his corps commanders, and his air commander importuned Bradley oth-
erwise. Weyland expressed the frustration felt by all in his diary that evening:
If this episode could be truly written up, it would be a remark-
able historical occasion. An Army commander. Tactical Air
Commander, and 3 corps commanders pleading for permis-
sion to continue to fight against the German Army they had
defeated 1 34
Their entreaties caused Bradley to relent and, perhaps contrary to the
orders he received, to allow Patton to proceed against Trier, but under severe
256
The Final Offensive
time limits for use of tlie lOtli Armored Division. Originally assigned to
SHAEF reserve, the division was on loan to Patton only until that day,
February 25. During the conference at Luxembourg City, Bradley agreed to
extend the loan of the 10th Division for another 48 hours. M eanwhile, 4th
Armored Division spearheads, which led the way, were gaining up to ten miles
a day as pressure mounted on both Bitburg and Trier. Three days later, at the
end of February, Bitburg was cleared, and elements of the 76th Infantry
Division were within three miles of Trier. Direct air support for the offensive
continued to come primarily from the 368th and 371st Fighter Groups, while
the other groups flew armed reconnaissance along the Rhine.^^
With Third Army returned to mobile operations at the end of February
1945, the airmen looked forward to propelling its troops on to the Rhine River.
Yet bad weather and the rapidity of the ground advance eventually conspired
to limit the effectiveness of the air arm. During the first three days of M arch,
however, with good weather, the 368th and 371st Fighter Groups provided
excellent cooperation to XII Corps' 76th and 5th Infantry Divisions near
Bitburg and to XX Corps' 10th Armored Division, which spearheaded the
drive on Trier from the southwest (Map 22). On each of the three days close
air support accounted for over half of the missions flown, and the 368th Fighter
Group established a new record for the command with 124 close air support
sorties on M arch 3. Ground forces continued to shower XIX TAC pilots with
praise.
By March 3, 1945, Trier had fallen and the XX and XII Corps joined
forces at the M osel River. General Patton now planned an VIII Corps attack
across the Prum River and a strike for the Rhine at Brohl, with the 11th
Armored Division in the lead. The major thrust, however, would come from
XII Corps, which would attack from its Kyll River bridgehead and send the 4th
Armored Division racing along the north bank of the M osel to intersect the
Rhine at Andernach. Meanwhile, XX Corps would send one division north
along the M osel as far as Bernkassel while consolidating its positions around
Trier (Map 22).^^
U nfortunately for the X IX TAC, the next five days repeated those of early
February. Low overcast, drizzle, snow showers, and generally poor visibility
grounded the air arm almost completely and Third Army began its offensive
toward the Rhine without air support. Weather for the remainder of March
proved generally good and, compared with February's weather, certainly offered
much better flying conditions. In fact, the command flew a total of 12,427 sor-
ties in M arch, the highest monthly figure for the entire campaign.^'
With Operation Veritable proceeding in the north. Third Army resumed
its drive to the Rhine as a part of Operation Lumberjack, which involved a
coordinated assault by First and Third Armies. Lumberjack called for First
Army's VII Corps, which had been protecting Ninth Army's right flank in late
February, to turn toward Cologne. Once there, part of its forces would wheel
257
Air Power for Patton's Army
southeast and head for the Rhine near its junction with theAhr River, then con-
tinue south to meet Patton's forces (Map 23). On M arch 5, 1945, VII Corps
forces entered the bombed-out city of Cologne and XII Corps jumped off in
force on a solid 15-mile front with 4th Armored Division in the lead. Late on
M arch 7, it was poised on the last ridge before A ndernach, while remnants of
nine German divisions scrambled to escape south of the M osel or across the
Rhine. The poor roads and rugged countryside now presented a greater prob-
lem to Patton's troops than did enemy resistance. On M arch 8, the day after
F i rst A rmy troops made the f i rst A 1 1 i ed crossi ng of the R hi ne at R emagen, el e-
ments of the 4th Armored Division reached Andernach, culminating an
advance of 52 miles in 58 hours!^^ Sidelined by the weather, the airmen com-
pared the swift drive through the Eifel to the Brittany Blitz of the previous
summer. With the enemy disorganized and in rapid retreat, Patton's armor
could advance rapidly without benefit of air cover.
On M arch 9, 1945, shortly after he returned from a week's rest on the
French Riviera, General Weyland met with General Patton and his staff to dis-
cuss the course ahead. Although the Third Army commander did not hide his
eagerness to cross the Rhine, he decided against taking undue risks. Ultra data
indicated that the Germans expected him to attempt a Rhine crossing between
Niederlahnstein and Ruedesheim. Asa result, after first securing the West
Bank, he planned to cross the Rhine 20 miles farther south, after crossing the
M osel above Trier and ensuring protection of his supply lines. He also request-
ed that Weyland's fighter-bombers protect XII Corps' right flank, especially
along the M osel. The air commander immediately passed these instructions to
his reconnaissance officer and Colonel Ferguson.
Meanwhile, the 4th Armored Division continued south along the west
bank of the Rhine and moved on Coblenz in conjunction with VIII Corps
forces. Infantry formations from the two corps, which had been leftfar behind,
continued to mop up and secure territory north of the M osel. The XIX TAC
now concentrated on column cover for the armored spearheads, but it provid-
ed little cover for the infantry. The rapid pace of the armored advance created
a "series of pockets too small to permit employment of air power" to support
infantry units. Without air liaison officers or a clear separation between
Patton's troops and the enemy's, Weyland chose not to fly close air support for
the infantry. Instead, the fighters focused on armed reconnaissance, while tac-
tical reconnaissance P-51s kept a close watch on the M osel River. Although
infrequent in the XIX TAC -Third Army experience, instances like this help
explain why officers serving in armored divisions generally expressed much
more satisfaction with XIX TAC air support than did infantry officers.'"'
With the ground assault gathering momentum in March, Weyland pre-
pared to test the mobility of his command once again. He considered using
Trier's airfield for two fighter-bomber groups, but that required extending the
runway on both ends with pierced steel planking to achieve the needed fight-
258
SOURCE: VincentJ . Esposito, ed., West Point Atlas of American Wars, V. 2, Map 65b, (New York: Praeger, 1960)
Air Power for Patton's Army
er-bomber length of 5,000 feet. It is unclear whether the time needed to prepare
a longer runway caused the air commander to change his mind. In any event,
he altered course immediately and earmarked the airfield for the 10th Photo
Reconnaissance Group, whoselightly loaded aircraft did not require thelonger
runway. The first tactical reconnaissance squadron arrived on M arch 15 to pro-
vide coverage of the M osel flank. The remainder of the group arrived on the
twenty-ninth. Weyland had no immediate plans for additional airfields west of
the Rhine, but he already had his sights on bases farther east in the Frankfurt
area.''^ Indeed, by M arch 12, 1945, Third Army forces had eliminated all orga-
nized resistance along the western bank of the Rhine. They now prepared for a
new operation that would create a disaster for Gen. Hans Felber's Seventh
German Army, Operation Undertone, which centered on a drive by General
Patch's Seventh Army from the Siegfried Line near Saarbruecken to the Rhine
at M ainz.
In early M arch 1945, General Patton passed to General Bradley an even
more audacious plan, one that gave to Third A rmy a larger role predicated on
the position achieved in its recent gains. In this plan, the 4th Armored Division
would continue south along the Rhine to sever German communications and
eventually link up with U .S. Seventh Army units, while other XII Corps forces
would attack southeast across the lower M osel from Coblenz to Trier. To com-
pl ete the trap, XX C orps w oul d sw i ng southeast of T ri er and stri ke the G erman
First Army troops, still in theSigfried Line defenses, from the rear. That would
ease pressure on Seventh Army troops attempting to force their way through
the West Wal I and destroy the bul k of the G erman forces remai ni ng west of the
Rhine (Map 24).
In deciding in favor of this plan, both Generals Bradley and Patton rec-
ognized that the greater operational commitment for the Third Army would
prevent its transfer either to Field M arshal M ontgomery's 21st Army Group in
the north or to General Devers's 6th Army Group in the south. M oreover, it
was a bold, well-designed plan. If it worked, the entire German First and
Seventh Armies, then positioned west of the Rhine, would be trapped between
the Saar, Mosel, and Rhine rivers. Weyland hoped the good weather would
permit maximum support from his fighter-bombers.
Springing the Saar-Mosel-Rhine Trap — and
Across the Rhine River
On March 13, 1945, Patton launched his offensive with the 4th Armored
Division attacking across the Mosel toward Mainz, while VIII Corps' divi-
sions moved on Coblenz. From itsTrier bridgehead, XX Corps assaulted West
Wall defenses with three divisions. What the Allies termed the Saar-Mosel-
Rhine trap began to close on the German First and Seventh Armies almost at
260
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Map 24
West-Central Germany
and Belgium, 1945:
The Rhineland Campaign
Operations, March 11-21, 1945
^ 10 20 ?^
SOURCE: VincentJ . Esposito, ed., West Point Atlas of American Wars, V. 2, Map 66a, (New York: Praeger, 1960)
Air Power for Patton's Army
once. Blessed with a series of good weatlier days for a cliange, tlie XIX TAC
also began what became perhaps the most outstanding ten-day period in the
command's history. Relying on proven fighter-bomber-tactical reconnaissance
coordination, it would provide wall-to-wall air support that seemed limited
only by the difficulty of keeping pace with the ground forces. At the same time
it suffered exceedingly high aircraft losses.'^^
Once the morning fog cleared on March 13, the 371st Fighter Group
covered the XX Corps' front near Trier throughout the day with 16, 4-plane
close support missions, while the 362d Fighter Group supported both the VIII
Corps and XII Corps sectors with six 8-plane and two 16-plane armed recon-
naissance missions throughout the afternoon and early evening. This left the
remaining three groups available to provide armed reconnaissance, to fly
escort and leaflet missions, and to strike pinpoint interdiction targets. The fol-
lowing day, the same pattern prevailed with the 362d and 371st Fighter Groups
each flying 20 close air support missions for XII and XX Corps, respectively,
yet able to fly armed reconnaissance as well.
T hi rd A rmy 's sudden advance unhi nged the enti re G erman defensive I i ne
south of the Mosel from Trier to Coblenz. Realizing Patton's intentions, the
Wehrmacht began a frantic mass evacuation to escape the rapidly closing trap.
The resultant congestion of surface traffic reminded airmen of similar turkey
shoots that had occurred in France and again late in the Ardennes Battle. In the
words of one XIX TAC official, it was a "fighter-bomber's paradise." Tactical
reconnaissance aircraft continued the well-established practice of spotting
retreating columns and calling in fighter-bombers, then leading them to the tar-
gets. For the first time in the war, German columns, often consisting of as
many as 1,000 closely packed vehicles, preferred to pull over, show the white
flag, and surrender rather than risk further strafing attacks. Pilot claims of
German transport destroyed were understandably high. Because the retreating
columns contained little armor, the pilots normally abandoned bombs and
napalm in favor of strafing and rocket attacks. Mindful of the Brittany
Campaign the previous summer, they also realized that any bombs dropped
would only crater the roads and slow the Allied advance. Vehicles destroyed
by strafing, however, could be quickly pushed aside. The 362d and 368th
Fighter Groups shared honors as "the rocket groups," and they had a "field
day" against the German massed withdrawal intheXII Corps zone.'*''
On March 15, 1945, Weyland proudly announced that his forces had
compiled the highest mission rate ever attained for a five-group command in a
single day. Of the 101 missions (involving 643 sorties) flown, fully 58 were in
di rect support of the ground forces. A Ithough the command did not surpass the
101 mission figure to the rest of the campaign, the daily sortie rate for a five-
group command continued to climb and break existing records. On M arch 18,
for example, the command achieved a record 714 sorties and claimed 1,022
vehicles destroyed in whatThird Army officers called magnificent air cooper-
262
The Final Offensive
ation. On that day alone, the 371st Fighter Group flew 144 close support sor-
ties, while the 362d Fighter Group, which the 4th Armored Division request-
ed by name, flew 178. Such high figures proved typical of operations from
M arch 15-23, as German forces struggled to escape the trap. By M arch 18,
VIII Corps had nearly cleared Coblenz, while rampaging columns of the 4th
Armored Division neared M ainz and Worms and sliced through the Palatinate
farther west.''^
With the remaining German forces west of the Rhine facing annihilation,
XIX TAG prepared to counter any effort mounted by the Luftwaffe. A bout one-
third of the approximately 400 daily Luftwaffe sorties were directed against the
Remagen bridgehead. Earlier, on M arch 7, elements of General Hodges's 9th
Armored Division reached Remagen just south of Bonn in time to prevent
German demolition teams from destroying that bridge across the Rhine. This
span permitted the first Allied bridgehead on the East Bank and compelled
General Eisenhower to reconsider his original plan that conceded the main
thrust in northern Germany to M ontgomery's forces.''^ Despite the Luftwaffe's
focus on the Remagen bridgehead. Third Army continued to report German air
activity, and General Weyland's pilots eagerly sought out encounter missions.
The 354th Fighter Group's P-51s gained the lion's share of enemy aircraft
destroyed, but poorly piloted Luftwaffe aircraft proved no match for the P-47s
either. On March 16, for example, the 354th and the 362d Fighter Groups
accounted for 13 enemy aircraft shot down in air combat.
The command lost only one aircraft to enemy air action from March
13-24, yet its heavy air commitment during the Third Army Rhine Offensive
led to a loss of 59 for the month. Only December's toll was higher, and in that
Troops of the 90th Infantry Division crossing the Mosel River
263
Air Power for Patton's Army
month the A rdennes Offensive was at its height. The command lost 34 of these
59 aircraft in the effort to spring the Saar-M osel -Rhine trap; most were downed
by flal<. This is not surprising because more light flak units now joined the
retreati ng convoys. A I though the command and N i nth A i r F orce took great care
to report aircraft losses accurately, only half of the M arch total is identified with
flak. "Unknown" is the category cited for most of the remaining half. Other
losses were incurred due to crashes and a midair collision. One must presume
that enemy flak claimed the majority of aircraft lost to "unknown" causes.''^
In relating losses to particular mission types, unit records show thatXIX
TAC lost more than twice as many aircraft on close air support missions than
it did on armed reconnaissance/interdiction missions. Air force doctrine
judged Priority III Close Air Support missions to be the most dangerous and
least cost-effective in terms of results and losses. Pilots on armed reconnais-
sance and close air support missions, however, attacked remarkably similar
targets, most of them trai ns, marshal i ng yards, and road convoys. I n any event,
low-level strafing represented the common denominator for both missions.
Here the fighter-bomber was the most effective but also the most exposed to
enemy surface defenses and likely to suffer high losses.'^^
Loss figures should be used with care when measuring the success or
effectiveness of particular fighter groups. The 362d Maulers provide an
example. Long considered one of the command's top groups, the Maulers
A tank destroyer of the 4th Armored Division crossing a treadway bridge over
the l^osel River.
264
The Final Offensive
were showered with praise in the last three months of the war for their out-
standing worl< with XII Corps' 4th Armored Division. Unfortunately, the
group also lost 21 airplanes in M arch, one of the more unhappy records of the
campaign. Little in the documentary record explains the 362d Fighter
Group's high losses. Operational reports cite a variety of causes, with
"unknown" and "flak" recorded approximately equally. Although the group
flew close air support missions for the most part, so too did the 371st Fighter
Group, which lost a mere four aircraft in M arch. On the other hand, former
371st Fighter Group pilot Lieutenant Burns recalled that the M aulers had a
reputation for aggressive, if not occasionally reckless, flying. Its comman-
ders, he recalled, allowed 362d pilots great latitude in flying operations.
Commanders of the 371st, on the other hand, demanded that pilots avoid
excessive risks. Despite the M aulers' loss rate, nothing suggests that the com-
mand viewed this group with less confidence or more concern. H owever high
its losses, the 362d Fighter Group also claimed more unit and individual
records than any other. ''^
The command counted aircraft losses per 1,000 sorties as its unit of mea-
sure. During February, M arch, and April 1945, a XIX TAC average of 5.2 air-
craft lost per 1,000 sorties was the lowest for the entire campaign. If losses
appear high, the command also had a high sortie rate. Colonel Hallett's
Intelligence Flak Section continued to publicize all known flak locations in spe-
cial reports and the daily intelligence summaries. His section also distributed
photographs of flak sites, took care to brief this information to pilots, and rec-
ommended attack headings to minimize the threat. Even so, XIX TAC com-
mand lost nearly as many aircraft in April when it targeted heavily defended
Luftwaffe airfields for a knockout blow against the remaining German air
force.^°
By mid-M arch 1945, the fast-moving U .S. First and Third Armies at the
Rhine River dominated Allied discussion and planning. As Third Army's
advance across the Mosel and down the West Bank of the Rhine gained
momentum. Allied leaders reassessed the roles first planned for the 12th and
6th Army Groups. In a meeting with General Eisenhower at Seventh Army
headquarters in Lunevill eon M arch 17, General Devers, commander of the 6th
A rmy Group, agreed that Patton's troops could cross his group's boundary line
in their quest for maximum destruction of the enemy. Patton, however,
remained obsessed with crossing the Rhine before either M ontgomery in the
north or Devers in the south. Earlier, Eisenhower authorized only Devers's 6th
Army Group to establish Rhine bridgeheads in the south, a decision that ran-
kled Patton. With his army advancing rapidly, a Rhine crossing had become a
real possibility, especially when it would upstage the slow-moving, methodi-
cal preparations of Field Marshal Montgomery in the north. On March 19,
Patton got the word he wanted: General Bradley ordered him to take the river
on the run. Two days later the Supreme Commander confirmed Bradley's
265
266
The Final Offensive
injunction, autliorizing botli Tliird and Seventli Armies to cross whenever the
opportunity presented itself. These directives, along with Ultra's confirmation
of weak German defenses, were all that Patton needed.
On M arch 20, 1945, while Third Army continued to harry the enemy and
insured that bridging equipment would be ready for a crossing. General
Weyland directed flying cooperation missions to attack German convoys fran-
tically fleeing eastward toward Speyer, the only West Bank crossing point
remaining to the enemy. That day the 362d and 371st Fighter Groups, assisted
by two squadrons from the 367th Fighter Group, turned the attack on surface
forces into a slaughter. Next day, on M arch 22, Weyland accompanied General
Patton on a jeep tour that extended from Saarburg eastward well beyond
Kaiserslautern. The X IX TAG commander described the enormous destruction
of surface convoys from air action as "terrific," and commented on the thou-
sands of refugees and unarmed Germans that now clogged the roads. One of
the most vivid scenes occurred along the Bad Durkeim- Frankenstein road east
of Kaiserslautern. Here, XX Corps headquarters reported that Allied officials
witnessed the remains of an entire German division "massacred by the Air
Corps." The "twisted mass of death and destruction... is so enormous that the
mind cannot measure it!"^^
Patton's mobile operations once again challenged the tactical air forces
to keep pace with a swiftly advancing ground offensive, a challenge accentu-
ated by the increasing distance from the flying fields. By the third week in
M arch, the flying distance to Rhine valley targets required an hour's time in
each direction for aircraft flying armored column cover, and longer for armed
reconnaissance flights east of the Rhine. The tactical control center's radar
Generals Patton, Eisenhower, and Devers
267
Air Power for Patton's Army
found it increasingly difficult to keep these flights on the radar scopes, and
land line communications had to be abandoned in favor of FM radio links.
Even though the command believed that an emergency supply of long-range
fuel tanks solved the air support problem, it is clear that shorter en route dis-
tances would have permitted significantly more loiter time in the target area.
Although the fighter-bombers achieved great success interdicting a retreating
enemy, if even more effort had been devoted to this mission, air power might
have prevented more of the Wehrmacht's First and Seventh Armies from
escaping across the Rhine.^^
As Third Army forces approached the Rhine on March 21, General
Weyland executed a well-prepared air plan to support a successful crossing.
For several days, both reconnaissance aircraft and fighters flying armed recon-
naissance missions kept the potential crossing area near Mainz under close
observation to monitor any buildup or defensive construction. Beginning on
the twenty-first, Weyland altered the reconnaissance plan to permit constant
reconnaissance of the front lines. This included six missions along the
Darmstadt-Frankfurt-Aschaffenburg route and five on either flank. At the
same time, armed reconnaissance/interdiction, performed primarily by the
368th and 367th Fighter Groups, focused on communications centers east of
the river that might be staging sites for potential reinforcements. A I though tar-
gets included important motor transportation facilities and ordnance and sup-
ply depots, the fighter-bombers targeted the railroad system in particular. The
368th and 367th Fighter Groups flew 29 squadron-sized rail-cutting missions
in an arc from Limburg south to M annheim. Claims for the two days totaled
an impressive 112 rail lines severed (Map 25). To preclude any interference
from the Luftwaffe, Weyland directed continuous day and night air patrols on
M arch 22 and 23. Command P-51s flew 19 patrol missions on M arch 22 and
31 area cover missions on M arch 23, while P-61 Black Widows provided the
same coverage at night. Moreover, beginning on March 21, an Allied air
assault against German airfields took place all along the front, which rendered
many Luftwaffe bases unserviceable.
Patton's forces indeed hit the river on the run, and the 5th Infantry
Division crossed the Rhine near Oppenheim on the night of M arch 22, 1945,
meeting only token opposition. The following day the Luftwaffe did mount a
serious effort to destroy this Third Army bridgehead. Although it flew an
impressive 150 fighter sorties on M arch 23 the Germans lost 22 aircraft in the
attacks. Unlike the Rhine crossing next day, on the evening of the twenty-third,
by Field Marshal Montgomery's enormous force to the north in Operation
Varsity, the XIX TAC-Third Army team needed no massiveair or artillery bar-
rage preparations. Third Army's rapid offensive had destroyed any significant
opposition that might have defended on the east bank of the Rhine, while fight-
er-bomber attacks against German forces on land and in the sky "gave General
Patton confidence that no dangerous force could be brought against him."^^
268
SOURCE: VincentJ . Esposito, ed., West Point Atlas of American Wars, V. 2, Map 68, (New York: Praeger, 1960)
Air Power for Patton's Army
Once More: "Blitz Warfare U.S. Style"
On March 21, 1945, the day before the 5th Infantry Division crossed the
Rhine and established a bridgehead at Oppenheim, General Patton told his air
commander that the XIX TAG and theThirdArmy "have again been commit-
ting treason in reverse as we did so happily in August and September. By this
I mean that instead of giving aid and comfort to the enemy, we have been giv-
ing him pain and discomfort, and doing it in a big way. Let us keep it up!"^^
General Weyland relayed Patton's words to his air units, adding, "XIX
TAC-Third Army again is showing the world what a perfectly coordinated
fighting air-ground team can do. I knew that you would be with me to a man
when I assured General Patton that we would 'keep it up' with the Third
Army." By the spring of 1945, the cooperative spirit established in France had
spread from the leadership throughout the lower echelons of the air-ground
team."
Like the rapid dash across France, the planned drive into the heart of
Germany promised to stretch the lines of communication and again challenge
Weyland's forces to keep pace with the swift ground offensive. A rmored col-
umn cover and armed reconnaissance would certainly be the primary missions
against lucrative enemy targets on the roads. General Weyland knew that the
speed of the advance once again would likely require air cover for Third
Army's exposed flanks and greater reliance on reconnaissance. The air com-
mander also realized, without the pernicious distraction of a Brittany, that the
airmen did not have to protect an extended front expanding in opposite direc-
tions. Moreover, the Allies were better supplied to confront an enemy that,
despite fighting on his homeland, seemed on the brink of collapse. Perhaps
most important, air and ground forces both brought months of combat experi-
ence to the final offensive.
On the evening of March 23, 1945, while Field Marshal Montgomery
initiated Operation Varsity in the north, featuring two entire airborne divisions
leading the air assault portion of his highly publicized and elaborately pre-
pared Rhine crossing. General Patton readied his forces for an advance from
the Oppenheim bridgehead on the Rhine to the M ain River, 30 miles to the
northeast. The next day armored columns of the hard-driving 4th Armored
Division bypassed Darmstadt and dashed toward Hanau and Aschaffenburg.
On M arch 25, they seized bridgeheads at both of these sites on the M ain River,
while other XII Corps forces closed on Frankfurt. Further north, VIII Corps
units made two additional Rhine crossings south of Coblenz on the twenty-
fifth and moved toward Limburg on the Lahn River. General Walker's XX
Corps troops crossed two days later, then moved north to join VIII Corps units
and encircle Wiesbaden before driving toward Giessen and a planned link-up
with FirstArmy (Map 25).
270
The Final Offensive
The speed and relative ease of the ground advance now owed as much to
the air support provided by General Weyland's fighter-bombers as it did to
enemy collapse. Good weather prevailed until March 29, when Third Army
had all three army corps across the Rhine and well on their way northeast.
Following past practice, General Weyland assigned a specific air group to sup-
port each of the army corps. The 367th Fighter Group's P-47s provided
armored column cover for General Eddy's XII Corps pacesetters exclusively,
and drew rave reviews from the corps commander. The VIII and XX Corps
crossings and breakouts received air cover from the 368th and 362d Fighter
Groups, respectively.
With the 367th Fighter Group leading the way, the 371st, 362d, and
368th Fighter Groups flew armed reconnaissance in front of the advancing
troops as far east as G lessen and Schweinfurt. The fighter-bombers found the
roads congested with German convoys fleeing eastward as Third Army's
rapidly moving armored forces allowed no time for the German Seventh
Army to organize defenses. On M arch 27, in spite of restrictive flying weath-
er, the airmen claimed more than 1,000 motorized vehicles destroyed or
damaged. Claims for M arch 23-28, before bad weather set in, were impres-
sive: 3,100 vehicles, 211 locomotives, and 2,954 railroad cars. Yet the pilots
eagerly looked ahead to the following month when longer days and the
weatherman's promise of better weather offered prospects of the campaign's
best flying.
The command's Mustangs had an equally important role. The 354th
Fighter Group's P-51s flew eight-plane area cover missions over the Rhine
Third Army crossing tlie Rliine River
271
Air Power for Patton's Army
and Main bridgeheads, readily accepting any Luftwaffe cliallenge. Altliougli
tlie enemy directed its primary effort against M ontgomery's forces tlireatening
tlie R ulir i ndustri al regi on, i ts 150 sorti es f I ow n agai nst tlie 0 ppenliei m bri dge-
liead on M arcli 23 represented an impressive effort. It could not, however, sus-
tain that level of response. Heavy casualties restricted its attack to 60 sorties
on M arch 24 and all Luftwaffe opposition along the Rhine ended when Third
Army troops overran its bases in the Frankfurt area on M arch 25.^^
Anticipating a wide front and extremely fluid situation in the weeks
ahead, the XIX TAC's 10th Photo Reconnaissance Group introduced an
important reconnaissance key system on March 28 to uncover potential
enemy attacks. Group and Army intelligence personnel plotted 33 squares,
each representing 20 square miles of territory. Planners gave each square a
name, and the key allowed them to change the air-ground reconnaissance plan
daily by combining two or more squares into the desired area. Once Third
Army overran the squares, a new base line would be established and the key
moved over it. Coverage could be changed merely by a telephone call. The
key system eliminated the need for providing the corps new reconnaissance
overlays every day and gave tactical reconnaissance planners much greater
flexibility.59
In the air-ground arena, fighter-bomber and reconnaissance pilots
achieved new levels of coordination with ground forces through their tactical
air liaison officers. To respond rapidly to the changing situation, tactical recon-
naissance aircraft, on March 24, received permission to talk over fighter-
bomber channels directly with the division air liaison officer, rather than with
his counterpart at corps headquarters. The tactical control center only moni-
tored the VHF transmissions. This procedure enabled a division to request
reconnaissance directly from the pilots and, after receiving the reports, imme-
diately divert fighter-bombers in the vicinity to any reported targets.
In this change, which decentralized air-ground operations even further,
air leaders advanced another step down the road of providing dedicated air
support for ground forces. To be sure, AAF air liaison officers retained opera-
tional control of the aircraft, but the change meant that fighter-bombers could
be diverted by controllers at the front rather than by those in the tactical con-
trol center where the information was often outdated. It also became common
practice for fighter-bombers on armed reconnaissance missions to first check
with the corps air liaison officer to learn of any immediate targets before fly-
ing his assigned route. Such were the needs of mobile warfare and the prag-
matic solutions that tactical air officers adopted to meet the problems they
faced. Although such procedures might have proved of value in static situa-
tions, air leaders in those circumstances preferred to rely on more traditional
methods of centralized control.^"
While Weyland, in late M arch 1945, considered the challenge of moving
his aircraft to bases farther forward, he became aware of a Third A rmy opera-
272
The Final Offensive
ti on that proved to be one of the most controversial of General Patton's career.
On March 27, a security blackout affected all activities concerning the 4th
Armored Division which, as Weyland recorded in his diary, had senta combat
team of more than 300 men 50 kilometers east of Aschaffenburg to a POW
camp. Rather than send a large, heavily defended force, Patton elected to send
a smal I task force far behi nd enemy I i nes to I i berate a camp near H ammel burg
that A Hied intelligence knew contained many Americans, including, most like-
ly, Patton's son-in-law. Col. John Waters. Unfortunately, a German observa-
tion plane spotted the A merican force as it approached the camp. Shortly after
liberating many prisoners and setting out on the return journey, German forces
cut off and decimated the rescue force. Critics ever since have charged that
Patton, for personal reasons, recklessly jeopardized the main task force in a
very risky operation of questionable value.^^
Whatever the validity of these accusations, given the impressive air-
ground coordination in evidence by late M arch 1945, one must ask why Third
Army planners failed to provide for air support in this operation? Intended as
a highly secret, quick-strike mission, no ground controller was assigned to the
task force to call on F-6sand P- 47s in case of emergency. Even the bad weath-
er on M arch 29-30 would not have prevented Weyland from sending his air-
craft to help. One can only speculate whether air-ground coordination would
have been sufficientto savethe mission. Such a contingency seems not to have
been considered by Patton, who apparently planned and executed the opera-
tion without consulting his air commander.
While General Patton dealt with the abortive rescue mission, his three
rampaging armored divisions pushed northeastward deeper into Germany.
Typically, 4th Armored Division led the assault. By M arch 31, its forward ele-
ments approached the Fulda River, more than 100 miles northeast of their
Rhine bridgehead. Indeed, by the end of the month. Third Army had cleared
the Rhein-M ain triangle and had linked up with First and Seventh Armies on
its flanks. M eanwhile, after crossing the Rhine in force, M ontgomery prepared
to lead the Allied assault to the Elbe, then on to Berlin. To his profound dis-
pleasure, Eisenhower decided to shift the main effort in the north from
M ontgomery's to Bradley's group, thereby de-emphasizing the drive toward
Berlin. By month's end, the unhappy field marshal would lose Simpson's
Ninth Army to Bradley's 12th Army Group and occupy a supporting role
guarding Bradley's northern flank (Map 26).
As the Third Army advance continued. General Weyland acted prompt-
ly to bring his own command forward. When Third Army moved its command
post on M arch 27, from Luxembourg City to Idar-Oberstein, 30 miles east of
Trier, the air commander sent along his X-Ray liaison detachment, again
directed by Wey land's chief of staff Colonel Browne. In this manner, the air
arm maintained close coordination with General Patton until the XIX TAC
advance headquarters arrived. This occurred shortly thereafter, when Weyland
273
SOURCE: VincentJ . Esposito, ed., West Point Atlas of American Wars, V. 2, Map 69, (New York: Praeger, 1960)
The Final Offensive
sent the advance elements to Oberstein in two echelons to maintain communi-
cations and operational continuity. By the end of the month, advance head-
quarters operated from Oberstein, and rear headquarters personnel began mov-
ing from Chalons to Luxembourg City.^^
M oving the flying groups forward proved more difficult. At the Third
Army morning briefing on March 26, General Weyland learned that the
ground forces had already liberated several airfields in the Frankfurt area. He
acted promptly to claim them for XIX TAC. That same day he conferred with
his chief of staff for operations. Colonel Ferguson, and his chief engineer.
Colonel Smyser, who continued as commander of the IX Engineer
Command's 2d Brigade. Weyland had an experienced team facing a familiar
challenge.^'' Both the engineers and the operations officers wanted to base the
groups in a cluster of airfields, which would maximize command and control
and ease the burden of maintenance and supply. On the other hand, in view of
the speed of the ground offensive, the engineers decided that they would
improve existing German sod and hard-surfaced airfields rather than build new
ones. General Weyland willingly accepted the use of British steel-meshed
track for surfacing instead of the heavier American pierced steel-plank to
accelerate the conversion of German fields.^^
Indeed, Weyland tried to operate from fields east of the Rhine the very
next day (M arch 27), even though the city of Frankfurt remained unsecured.
He realized the futility of his effort when he visited two of the airfields and
examined the condition of the runways. The Rhein-Main field south of
Frankfurt had been damaged the most, and engineers optimistically estimated
that at least two weeks of work would be required before flying groups could
move in. General Weyland contented himself with making sure the three
Frankfurt sites would go to XIX TAC. On the morning of M arch 27, after first
clarifying the rapidly changing army group boundaries to make sure the air-
fields remained within Third Army's jurisdiction, he called General
Vandenberg to protect his "air interests." The next day. Ninth Air Force
approved the three airfields in the vicinity of Frankfurt for use by the XIX
TAC, and by month's end, the mobility planners were hard at work preparing
for the imminent move.^^
Defeat of the Luftwaffe
Once General Eisenhower decided, on M arch 28, 1945, to shift the locus
of the Allied thrust to General Bradley's 12th Army Group's central position,
the forces of Bradley and M ontgomery had encircled and overrun the Ruhr.
This change meant downgrading the priority assigned to M ontgomery's area,
much to the dismay of the British field marshal, and it bespoke Eisenhower's
275
Air Power for Patton's Army
commitment to a broad-front offensive all along the line. Third Army forces
continued to advance at a breakneck pace, out in front of the other Allied
armies: they cleared Gotha, Kassel, and M ulhausen on April 4 and Eisenach
and M einingen on the fifth. Supported by its tactical air force, Third Army's
thrust into Germany in early April reminded the XIX TAG historian of the
sweep through France the previous August (Map 26)." Eisenhower's broad-
front strategy, however, did not mean an offensive free-for-all. Now, with his
armor moving into good tank country on the Thuringian plain, Patton had to
rein in his army and hold his forces in position, at least until General Hodges's
First Army troops caught up. If, in the north, the British field marshal resent-
ed Eisenhower's strategy, in the south, the Third Army commander chafed
under restrictions that held him in place (Map 27).^^
During the drive northeast in early April, General Weyland maintained
his close air support assignments. For the first eight days of the month, the
367th Fighter Group flew 87, eight-plane missions (including 513 sorties) in
support of X II Corps despite bad weather on three of the days. With the excep-
tion of two missions on April 6 for VIII Corps troops clearing Eisenach, the
367th Fighter Group flew every mission for General Eddy's troops. Likewise,
the 362d Maulers flew every day during the period exclusively for General
Walker's XX Corps. The 362d Fighter Group played a key role in blunting the
only serious German counterattack of the final weeks at M ulhausen. On
April 5, armored elements of XX Corps' 6th Armored Division cleared the
town of M ulhausen, 20 miles north of Eisenach, freeing 4,000 British POWs
in the process. Then German forces counterattacked two days later, and for
two days the fighting raged fiercely.
In the emergency. General Weyland elected to maintain dedicated sup-
port for the XX Corps and armed reconnaissance in advance of the forward
elements, which meant that the 362d Fighter Group alone dealt with the
German counterattacking forces. During a two-day period, it flew 22 close
air support missions (including 264 sorties) for the corps, achieving impres-
sive results. On April 7, for example, corps officers on the scene credited the
362d with destroying 69 armored and 173 motorized vehicles. The best mea-
sure of its achievement, however, came from Maj. Gen. Robert W. Grow,
commander of the 6th Armored Division, who claimed his division received
the "finest air cooperation in its history." The M ulhausen counterattack
proved to be the only significant effort the Wehrmacht mounted against Third
Army in April.™
Luftwaffe remnants, too, reeled under the constant pressure of the air and
ground assault. TheXIX TAC set the tone for the month on April 1, when two
fighter groups, the 367th and 371st, attacked two German airfields and
claimed 39 enemy aircraft destroyed on the ground and another 38 damaged.
Next day, two P-51s on a weather reconnaissance mission dispersed a forma-
tion they estimated at more than 90 FW 190s and Bf 109s after shooting down
276
SOURCE: VincentJ . Esposito, ed., West Point Atlas of American Wars, V. 2, Map 70, (New Yorl<: Praeger, 1960)
Air Power for Patton's Army
two with no losses to themselves. Together with other air encounters the next
day, XIX TAC fighters claimed a total of 17 Luftwaffe planes destroyed and
five damaged with a loss of only one P-47.
General Weyland considered the final destruction of the Luftwaffe in the
Third Army operational area the command's major achievement during April.
During the month his fighters engaged the Luftwaffe every day but one, while
simultaneously maintaining consistent assaults on Luftwaffe bases. As the
month progressed, the Luftwaffe found itself unable to find a safe haven for its
aircraft. Third Army units continued to overrun airfields at an alarming rate
on the ground, and in the air Weyland's fighter- bombers left no airfield free
from attack. Together with the ever-growing shortage of aviation fuel, the
Luftwaffe, which after thefirst of April had declined to 400 serviceable flying
machines on the western front, often could mount no more than 150 sorties
daily.^i
The command's aggressive pilots sought combat with the Luftwaffe in
traditional aerial encounters whenever possible. Weyland, however, became
unhappy with the growing number of encounters that involved reconnaissance
aircraft. Despite an existing policy that directed them to avoid combat, on
A pri I 8 reconnai ssance pi I ots cl ai med ten enemy pi anes shot do w n on w hat the
command historian touted as a "banner day." General Weyland thought other-
wise, responding with terse messages to the 12th and 15th Tactical Recon-
naissance Squadrons directing pilots to avoid unnecessary combat. One recon-
naissance pilot even came close to a court-martial for participating in a dog
fight. Despite the injunction, however, reconnaissance pilots seemed unable to
avoid air combat as Luftwaffe pilots sought, in particular, to thwart their mis-
sions. Although the high incidence of air combat is borne out by the statistical
record for April, these claims should be used with caution. The 10th Photo
Group claimed 41 enemy aircraft destroyed, four probably destroyed, and nine
more damaged for the confirmed price of five of its own lost.^^
As part of the Allied air plan in April, General Weyland designated the
Luftwaffe the command's primary target, with destruction of Germany's trans-
portation system running a close second. While the 367th and 362d Fighter
Groups provided close air support to ground units, all fighter groups partici-
pated in the effort to destroy the Luftwaffe. The 354th, 368th, and 371st Fighter
Groups specialized in daily interdiction missions against a desperate, retreat-
ing enemy. Although the April figure of 9,325 motorized vehicles destroyed
fell short of the 9,869 claimed in M arch, the figures for locomotives and rail-
road cars were much higher. The command considered this especially signifi-
cant because of the cumulative effect on the enemy's rapidly disintegrating
transportation system."
While his forces continued to lead the way for Third Army's armored
spearheads at the beginning of A phi 1945, Weyland oversaw the move of X IX
TAC aircraft to the Frankfurt bases. On April 1, following a meeting with
278
The Final Offensive
Third Army officials on tlie ground plan, he outlined his movement plan. His
command met this timetable for the most part:'''
Group
L ocation
Proposed Date
Actual Date
10th P/R
OberOlm (Y-64)
ASAP
Apr 3
371st
Eschborn (Y-74)
ASAP
Apr 4
354th
OberOlm
after A pr 15
Apr 9
362d
Rhein-Main (Y-73)
Apr 8
Apr 16
368th
Rhein-M ain
Apr 15
Apr 16
367th
Eschborn
Apr 10
Apr 10
Rhein-M ain airfield proved to be the only problem. Its concrete runway,
severely damaged in a campaign to decimate bases housing turbojet aircraft,
required constant maintenance to remain operational. The air commanders soon
preferred the sod stri ps for thei r eff i ci ent drai nage and consi stent operati on, but
only after they acquired a layer of square-mesh track.
On April 3, Weyland reviewed logistic requirements for the move with
Colonel Thompson, commander of the rear headquarters. They decided to
request maximum airlift, which they calculated to be 100 C-47 transports for
a ten-day period. That same day Weyland chaired a conference with his com-
munications and operations officers concerning the best locations for the
Winners and losers: P-51 of the Pioneer Mustang Group, the first plane to be
serviced east of the Rhine, at a field in the Frankfurt area, in the background,
destroyed FW 190 in the foreground.
279
Air Power for Patton's Army
ground radars. They decided to position tlie forward director post radars to
ensure coverage of tlie airfields as well asThird Army's exposed left flank. In
this regard, they chose to locate the tactical control group and the M EW radar
in the vicinity of Hersfeld, over 125 miles northeast of the Frankfurt area. The
distance, however, did not proveto be a problem and the command maintained
good communications links throughout April."
On April 4, 1945, General Weyland flew to Luxembourg City for
another meeting on the status of the airfields. N inth A ir Force officials assured
him first priority on movement and stocking the new fields. Yet, General
Weyland received only five C-47s for each group for three days. Once again
airfield movement required ground transport. The IX Service Command chief
arranged for 60 trucks to supplement the command's vehicles. U nfortunately,
during the move 27 broke down and replacements could not be found. As the
368th Fighter Group historian recounted, unit personnel used whatever trans-
portation could be requisitioned, including captured German vehicles.™
Although this movement occurred with far less difficulty than similar
moves the previous summer, supply bottlenecks and front line shortages on
April 12 convinced Ninth Air Force to prohibit further movement of aerial
units to the Frankfurt airfields until it gave formal approval. By then, howev-
Generals Patton; Spaatz, Commanding General, USSTAF; Lt. Gen. J ames
Doolittle, Commanding General, Eighth Air Force; Lt. Gen. HoytS.
Vandenberg, commander. Ninth Air Force (behind Doolittle); and Weyland.
280
The Final Offensive
er, only the Rhein-Main airfield remained unoccupied." With arrangements
for the move to new airfields in hand, General Weyland stayed over in
Luxembourg City on the fourth and the next day flew— not to Oberstein but to
Frankfurt— to join the initial A party of his advance headquarters. This became
the first of three headquarters moves in April. By April 10, General Weyland
had his forces positioned to provide Third Army effective support when it
altered its line of advance from the northeast to a more easterly direction, and
headed for a bridgehead on the Elbe River and a rendezvous with Soviet
forces. With his groups now operating from the Frankfurt area, Weyland
already had his sights set farther east, on N uremberg, as the next basing area
for his command.™
Advance to the Mulde River
Despite the impressive gains for Third Army and theXIX TAG dur-
ing the first 10 days of April, both commanders chafed under the restraints
placed on their offensive. On April 10, Patton's Third Army attacked east on
a broad front with all three Corps in line (Map 27). In the center, VIII Corps
headed toward Plauen and Chemnitz. On the left, XX Corps drove toward
Jena and Dresden, while X II Corps on the right flank moved southeast in the
direction of Hof and Bayreuth. Taking advantage of good flying weather,
fighter-bombers supported the offensive from first to last light, and the
armored forces made sweeping gains all along the front. By the thirteenth,
Weyland's pilots reported the 4th Armored Division to be on the outskirts of
Chemnitz, while the 6th Armored approached Altenburg and the 11th neared
Bayreuth.
On April 11, 1945, Generals Eisenhower and Bradley arrived at Third
Army headquarters to view captured gold reserves and visit Ohrdruf, the first
concentration camp overrun by Patton's troops. Conditions at the camp
shocked and disgusted Weyland and the army officers. A XIX TAG officer
declared afterward that the obvious evidence of Nazi atrocities gave the air-
men added incentive to redouble their efforts. At a meeting the following day
Eisenhower explained to a bewildered Patton that the Third Army drive would
not continue to Berlin. Berlin, Eisenhower observed, had no tactical or strate-
gic value, and its capture would burden American troops with responsibility to
care for overwhelming numbers of people. Patton objected, but he would obey.
Later that evening he heard a radio broadcast that reported President Franklin
Roosevelt's death. At the morning briefing on April 13, Patton told his staff
that the SHAEF commander had ordered Third Army to change course and
move south after securing its present objectives."
T he halt I i ne descri bed by G eneral E i senhower extended general ly al ong
the Mulde River from Leipzig to Chemnitz (Map 27). This had been the
281
Air Power for Patton's Army
boundary line established for reconnaissance flights on April 10 by SHAEF at
the start of the eastward drive. On that day, Ninth Air Force told General
Weyland that tactical air would be restricted to a line running along the M ulde
River from Leipzig through Chemnitz to Prague, because of "possible conflict
with Russian air." Weyland, too, objected. His tactical reconnaissance aircraft
had been patrolling east of the front lines every day in early April to observe
possible German moves to reinforce their troops with forces drawn from the
eastern front. He called General Vandenberg immediately to recommend that
the area be extended eastward to the Torgau-Dresden-Prague axis, which he
considered absolutely essential for reconnaissance. In this instance, the XIX
TAG commander was successful in his quest.^"
Operationally, good weather on the first three days of the drive east
found the first fighter-bombers taking off into darkness before the last night
fighter had landed. Continuing the same basic air support assignment pattern,
the 371st and 362d Fighter Groups provided the majority of column cover mis-
sions for the armored forces, while the three remaining groups concentrated on
interdiction targets. On April 10, the command claimed 1,075 railroad cars and
455 motor vehicles destroyed, and figures for the next two days were nearly as
impressive. Even three days of restricted weather, from April 13-15, failed to
halt the wholesale destruction of German transportation facilities and equip-
ment.
The aerial assault also continued against the Luftwaffe. During the
three-day period from April 15-17, the command targeted 18 remaining air-
fields in central Germany and Czechoslovakia and broke the back of the
remaining Luftwaffe. The best results occurred on April 16, when the 367th
and 368th Fighter Groups claimed 107, setting a new command record with
84 enemy aircraft destroyed and 74 damaged on the ground. The Luftwaffe
also lost an estimated 21 that were destroyed in air combat, mostly to the
354th Pioneer Mustangs. April 16 was a big day against the Luftwaffe all
along the front as Allied claims totaled 50 destroyed and 9 damaged in air
combat and 1,000 destroyed and 581 damaged on the ground. The command
also had one of its best missions involving coordination between fighter and
reconnaissance aircraft. On April 16, a reconnaissance pilot led P-47s from
the 371st Fighter Group to eight different targets: six trains and two marshal-
ing yards.
By mid-April, fighter-bombers flying close air support were normally
armed only with .50-caliber ammunition for strafing. Although the low stocks
of 500-lb. general -purpose bombs doubtless contributed to this choice, the
shortage of bombs in April proved I ess severe than it did in M arch. In any case,
just half of the fighter-bombers on close support missions carried one 500-lb.
bomb, while aircraft flying armed reconnaissance received two 260-lb. frag-
mentation bombs. The central problem became ensuring that sufficient .50-
caliber armor-piercing incendiary ammunition remain available. Once again
282
The Final Offensive
emergency resupply, this time by rail to Franl<furt, alleviated the potential
shortfall. 82
By April 16, 1945, with his last two fighter-bomber groups consisting of
90 aircraft in place at Frankfurt's Rhein-M ain airfield. General Weyland began
preparations to secure airfield sites in the vicinity of Nuremberg. He asked
General Patton, who left for a meeting at SHAEF that day, to protect "our
interest" in the Nuremberg airfields. In what now was routine procedure, he
met with key staff members and his group commanders to work out the details
of the next move as well as the next ground offensive. On April 17, Weyland
attended an important conference at Third Army headquarters. He and Patton
discussed the new army- air plan that called for an attack south in the direction
of the so-called German National Redoubt, with the objective of isolating
German resistance and linking up with Soviet forces advancing from Vienna,
Austria (Map 28)P
The new axis of attack required conference attendees to discuss bound-
aries and force realignments. Third Army relinquished VIII Corps to First
Army; in return it received III Corps, commanded by the aggressive M aj. Gen.
James A. Van Fleet. This redeployment also involved the air command,
because a portion of the command's 39 tactical air liaison officers needed to
be shifted, as well. Moreover, General Weyland requested Ninth Air Force
send him two additional fighter-bomber groups and another tactical recon-
naissance squadron, to be based closer to the expected route of advance on
N uremberg. A Ithough the X IX TA C commander received the units he request-
ed, the fighter groups did not arrive until near the end of the campaign, after
General Quesada could be confident he no longer needed them in the north.
Their late acquisition had little impact on XIX TAC operations. The 162d
Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron, on the other hand, arrived from XII TAC
on April 24, and helped considerably in meeting reconnaissance requirements
during the drive down the Danube valley (Map 28).
Down the Danube Valley to Austria
The last phase of the XIX TAC's operations against an all but defeat-
ed enemy involved effective, if routine, cover for the fast-moving ground
forces and superb coordination between reconnaissance and fighter-bomber
aircraft. At last, on April 17, Third Army received top priority from SHAEF
for its offensive. While its newly acquired III Corps regrouped southeast of
Nuremberg, XII and XX Corps, positioned between Hof and Nuremberg,
jumped off toward the southeast on April 19 (Map 28). Aided by good air
cover, the 11th Armored Division led the dash down the Naab River Valley
toward Regensburg, 40 miles to the southeast. Inthree days' time,XII Corps,
now commanded by M aj. Gen. S. Leroy Irwin, was across the Czech border
283
SOURCE: VincentJ . Esposito, ed., West Point Atlas of American Wars, V. 2, Map 71, (New York: Praeger, 1960)
The Final Offensive
and had captured Asch. The XII Corps received support throughout this drive
from its own 362d Fighter Group, while on its right, the 367th Fighter Group
covered XX Corps' advance to the Danube at Regensburg. Patton's offensive
proceeded rapidly against a disorganized and dispirited enemy, by now able to
do little more than mount roadblocks and ambush rear echelons.^'' At the same
time. General Weyland's fighter-bombers continued their merciless assault on
German transport and especially, airfields. They bombed seven airfields on
April 19 and ten the next day— their offering on Hitler's 56th birthday.
A fterw ard the command's i ntel I i gence secti on esti mated that the A 1 1 i es had the
Luftwaffe remnants confined largely to the Regensburg, M unich, and Prague
areas, which now became key targets.^^
On April 21, Patton announced that the following day the Third Army
would begin a new phase of the offensive, with all three corps attacking
southeast and south. Given the state of enemy defenses, he was unconcerned
that only two armored divisions would lead the advance. Third Army's com-
mand post would move to Eriangen on April 22, to be closer to the action.
At the same briefing General Weyland explained his air plan to support the
ground offensive, calling for armored column cover and protection of XII
Corps' exposed left flank in Czechoslovakia. As it did in the watch on the
Loire during the Battle of France, the command's 10th Reconnaissance
Group provided the flank-cover mission. To handle the wide front and fluid
situation, the group revised the key system it had introduced the previous
month. Now, smooth coordination between reconnaissance aircraft, fighter-
bombers, and air liaison officers was routine. In effect, the improved flexi-
bility of the reconnaissance program enabled the 10th to provide rapid and
accurate coverage 50 miles deep within Czechoslovakia along a 120-mile
front.87
The 10th Reconnaissance Group's mission became easier when it relo-
cated to Fuerth, near Nuremberg. Officially, the XIX TAC declared it opera-
tional at the new base on April 28, but its tactical reconnaissance flight eche-
lons had begun flying with the newly arrived 162d Tactical Reconnaissance
Squadron four days earlier. From Fuerth, reconnaissance aircraft could fly 50
rather than 36 missions daily nearly 100 miles closer to the front lines. In addi-
tion, during the drive down the Danube valley, the 31st Photo Squadron's F-5s
(P-38s) using a new nose-mounted oblique camera mapped all of the Bavarian
Redoubt region in addition to filling normal pinpoint requests and providing
river reconnaissance missions.
Only once did a possible threat emerge on Third Army's left flank, and
reconnaissance pilots reacted quickly. At 8:00 a.m. on April 29, while rain and
sleet limited most operations, they spotted and radioed the position of a con-
voy estimated at 1,000 vehicles and 30 tanks located approximately 40 miles
southwest of Prague. At the Third Army briefing that morning. General
Weyland declared this convoy to be the top fighter-bomber priority and
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Air Power for Patton's Army
promised to "attack with all forces as long as weather permits." Three groups
answered the call and flew more than 200 sorties in the Pilsen area against the
convoy, the remnants of which sought cover, and against other targets in the
region. At the end of the day, they claimed nearly 500 vehicles destroyed and
reported that no more moving vehicles could be found. General Weyland
recorded cryptically, "threat to Army flank considered wiped-out."^^ The very
next day, inan underground Berlin bunker, with RedArmy artillery shells rain-
ing down on the city in a fitting Goetterdaemmerung, Reich's Chancellor
Adolf Hitler put the barrel of a pistol in his mouth and pulled the trigger.
Germany's thousand-year Third Reich had ended in little more than one one
hundredth of the allotted time promised by its demented Fuhrer.
By the end of April, German opposition was essentially nonexistent. It
soon became apparent that the National Redoubt was no more than emotional
propaganda. Now Third Army numbered 540,000 men— its largest force in the
European campaign— and continued to move south at will. Its forces drove
across the Danube and Isar rivers on April 30. Ninety miles from Third Army's
front lines XIX TAG reconnaissance pilots now reported Russian columns
moving in their direction from Vienna (Map 28). The mobile offensive con-
tinued into May, while the XIX TAG put the destructive finishing touches on
the German transport system in its zone of operations. Between April 18-30,
the command claimed as destroyed or damaged a total of 3,308 motorized
vehicles, 633 locomotives, and 3,730 railroad cars. Most of the attacks
occurred along the Straubing-Linz and Pilsen-Prague armed reconnaissance
routes, where pilots routinely reported good scores against little opposition.
The Luftwaffe was impotent, unable to mount more than 150-200 sorties
daily throughout the entire European theater. M ost occurred in Third Army's
southern area as the other Allied armies gradually ended offensive operations.
The command's best results occurred on April 25 and 26. On the twenty-fifth,
the 371st Fighter Group attacked several remaining German-controlled air-
dromes clogged with aircraft. When the fighter-bombers finished, command
claims totaled 55 aircraft destroyed on the ground and 65 more damaged. The
next day the Luftwaffe mounted its last significant attack in the west against
Third Army forces. Pilots of XIX TAG reported they lost 18 aircraft in air
combat and an additional 9 damaged, at a cost of 52 German aircraft claimed
destroyed on the ground and a further 39 damaged. Ground claims for the
entire Allied front were only 61 destroyed and 61 damaged. By this time, sur-
viving Luftwaffe pilots seemed less intent on combat than on flying their
planes to American bases in the west to escape the approaching Russians. In
April, XIX TAG as a whole claimed 214 enemy aircraft vanquished in air
combat, 722 destroyed on the ground, and 767 more probably damaged,
against 59 losses of their own, for a total of 1,703 enemy aircraft destroyed or
damaged— a number eight times greater than the M arch figure, previously the
command's highest.™
286
The Final Offensive
Yet the command bled in the process. On April 25, for example, XIX
TAC lost 8 aircraft, and during Third Army's drive south, between April
18-31, its losses numbered 21 aircraft. Why so high a loss rate flying against
a foe that was all but beaten? The command attributed this to an increasing
concentration of flak batteries at the few remaining German airfields. The
record does reflect more aircraft lost on airfield target missions as the enemy
moved to reinforce its existing defenses. For the month, at least 16 XIX TAC
losses can be directly associated with attacks on airfields. On the other hand,
many occurred during armed reconnaissance missions against road and rail
transportation targets. In such situations, it seems likely that light flak weapons
became a part of the retreating convoys and, together with the traditional men-
ace of flak rail cars, continued to pose a significant threat to the fighter-
bombers. Indeed, the command's loss total for April reached 59, only 2 fewer
than the previous month's total.
By late April, General Weyland's groups were operating 200 miles from
their Frankfurt bases and once again facing the challenge of providing sufficient
support in the target areas. Ninth Air Force solved part of the problem by assign-
ing to Weyland's command an additional group. The 405th Fighter Group
rejoined the command on April 28 and flew armed reconnaissance missions
from its base at Kitzingen. A second group, the 48th Fighter Group, joined on
M ay 1. L ike the 405th, it operated from the N uremberg area, closer to the front
lines. The command continued its preference for using auxiliary fuel tanks on
long missions rather than resorting to disruptive staging operations at the
N uremberg bases.
Despite the additional support, Weyland planned to bring his fighter
groups forward to the Nuremberg area as quickly as possible. His advance
headquarters had followed Third Army's forward command post from
Hersfeld to Eriangen, 12 miles north of Nuremberg, on April 24. Three days
earlier, Weyland and his operations chief. Colonel Ferguson, had visited eight
airfields in the vicinity of Nuremberg to decide on suitable sites. During the
remainder of April, the XIX TAC followed the same planning that had worked
so well in the Frankfurt move. With the exception of the 10th Photo
Reconnaissance Group, however, the command could not schedule a move of
the Frankfurt-area fighter groups until early M ay. With the war clearly at an
end, one can ask why the air commander remained intent on deploying for-
ward once again when he could provide sufficient support in spite of the long
flying distance? The available evidence suggests that SHAEF and Ninth Air
Force looked ahead to securing the best deployment for a postwar occupation-
al air force, and decided in favor of American bases located farther east
Besides overseeing operations and redeployment of his command, as the
senior airman General Weyland interviewed all captured high-ranking
Luftwaffe officers and Allied airmen who had reached Third Army lines after
escaping from POW camps. Although the German officers provided interest-
287
Air Power for Patton's Army
ing impressions of tlie effectiveness of Allied air power, they did not offer
intelligence of value for current operations. The American airmen proved dif-
ferent. Weyland viewed his discussions with former POWs as important both
for the morale of the individuals concerned and for the information they pro-
vided on current POW locations. M any Allied prisoners had been moved far-
ther east, and the air commander made it a point to have his tactical reconnais-
sance crews track down every rumor. He wanted all his pilots to be on the look-
out for POW camps. He especially enjoyed sending fighters to buzz known
locations, such as the M oosburg camp located near M unich. On April 18, the
command had sent a P-38 escorted by P-51s from the 354th Fighter Group on
a photo mission of the camp and it became a primary objective for the advanc-
ing ground forces. On April 28, Weyland dispatched four P-51s purposely to
perform slow rolls over the camp, which Third Army liberated the following
day. This camp contained some 27,000 American airmen, including many XIX
TAG pilots.31
The end of April found both Patton and Weyland in euphoric moods—
Patton because of Third Army's record-setting campaign, and Weyland
because of the smooth functioning of the air-ground team. On only one occa-
sion in the final stages of the conflict did the two commanders differ over the
use of air power. On April 28, Patton asked his air commander to cut major
bridges over the Danube at Passau to help isolate enemy forces and prevent
possible reinforcements from crossing. General Weyland objected to a mission
he considered impractical for fighter-bombers. In his opinion the four large
bridges and the adverse terrain made them too difficult to destroy. General
Patton deferred to his air commander, who, in turn, promised to have his recon-
naissance pilots closely monitor the Passau area for potential trouble.^^
The personal and professional relationship between these two comman-
ders remained excellent. As the campaign neared completion. General Patton
pondered the future with Weyland and liked nothing better than to praise the
XIX TAC-Third Army team before distinguished visitors. On April 28, for
instance, AAF Generals Spaatz, Doolittle, and Vandenberg visited Patton's
headquarters and "received [the] full Third Army treatment." This included
not only a review of the team's battlefield prowess, but also a briefing on the
importance of keeping the air-ground team together for transfer to the China-
Burma-India theater once the Germans surrendered.^^ Although General
Patton often spoke to his air commander about taking on thejapanese. General
Weyland recalled that, in a moment of candor, Patton confided privately, both
he and General M acArthur were showmen, and the Far East had room for only
one.94
288
The Final Offensive
Victory
The final eightdaysof the European war proved to be little more than
a victory parade for both air and ground forces. After Hitler's suicide on April
30, 1945, and despite his orders to German commanders to continue the war,
Nazi forces simply were in no position to resist much longer. The month of
May opened with Third Army units driving rapidly southeast through Austria
and east toward Prague, Czechoslovakia. On M ay 4, when other Allied armies
stood down, Patton's forces accepted the surrender of the entire 11th Panzer
Division and at their commander's direction continued pressing southeast
along a front that now extended more than 290 miles. White flags announcing
the surrender of German forces appeared on every hand, every day. On M ay 8,
V-E Day, ground operations ended with Third Army spearheads seven miles
from Prague and 30 miles southeast of Hitler's birthplace, Linz, Austria, where
appropriately, they met the Soviet Third Ukranian Army.
For XIX TAG the final days in M ay proved anticlimactic. Bad weath-
er curtailed flying. On M ay 2 the 386th Thunder Bums got only 16 sorties near
Straubing while all sorties had to be canceled on M ay 5 and 6. For the remain-
ing five days the command averaged well below 200 sorties per day. M oreover,
few enemy armored vehicles and gun positions remained to attack and most
missions involved strikes against routine targets such as motor transport and
marshaling yards. At least the reconnaissance pilots could cover activity in the
B renner Pass, monitor the Russian advance, and search for POW camps.
On M ay 4, the command's fighter-bombers responded to reconnaissance
reports of several thousand enemy vehicles heading eastward, away from the
battle area near Linz in northern Austria. Subsequent attacks resulted in claims
of 425 motorized transport and 42 horse-drawn vehicles destroyed or dam-
aged. Action continued even after the surrender document was signed on M ay
8. In separate dogfights over Regensburg and near Pilsen that day, tactical
reconnaissance pilots reported downing five enemy aircraft in what amounted
to the last aerial combat of the war.
During the final week of the war. General Weyland continued to super-
vise the movement of his groups from the advance headquarters at E riangen to
the Nuremberg area. Although General Patton's command post had moved to
Regensburg, Weyland remained atErlangen and sentColonel Browne'sX-Ray
detachment instead. The XIX TAG commander considered the course ahead
too uncertain to warrant moving the advance headquarters again. On M ay 8,
General Weyland flew to Wiesbaden for a conference among senior airmen to
discuss redeployment, disarmament, and the occupational air force. At this
meeting, he learned that he would assume command of the Ninth Air Force
when General Vandenberg left for Washington later in the month. The next
day, M ay 9, he joined General Patton in signing victory messages to the offi-
289
Air Power for Patton's Army
cers and men. Each recounted the exploits of theThird Arnny-XIX TAC team.
Patton complimented the airmen, "our comrades... by whose side or under
whose wings we have had the honor to fight." General Weyland paid tribute to
the "aggressiveness of our great comrade-at-arms." Each commander gave
special thanks to the men of his command. If Patton's words were the more
inspiring, the air commander's were equally appropriate. Weyland concluded
with an expression of appreciation to his airmen for "all that each of you has
done to make possible this victory. Your prowess and devotion are a credit to
our country— and there is no higher praise."^^
Throughout the final offensive, Weyland's aerial forces demonstrated
unusual ingenuity and flexibility in support of Third Army's record-setting
offensive. Although Weyland would acknowledge official AAF doctrine that
decreed priorities, his priorities met Patton's needs of the day. With air superi-
ority in hand, interdiction and close air support requirements clearly prevailed
at this stage of the war. The air plan worked. During the final offensive,
Weyland and his airmen introduced four-plane flights after the Siegfried Line
breakthrough, and in March they introduced the reconnaissance key system,
examples of the innovation that continued to characterize air-ground opera-
tions. Most importantly. General Weyland willingly stretched doctrinal pro-
nouncements in terms of command and control. When the air-ground team
faced more fluid conditions after the Rhine crossing, air controllers and their
army counterparts devised new means to decentralize control of armed recon-
naissance and close air support missions in the field.
The final offensive of mobile armored warfare demanded increasingly
decentralized aerial operations, unlike static positional warfare which favored
more centralized command and control of air assets. It also underscored the
fundamental importance of air superiority to success in military operations of
this nature. The sheer size of the Allied air forces allowed Weyland to take lib-
erties with air force doctrine to support Patton's ground forces better, liberties
that included assigning specific fighter groups to cover specific army units.
Indeed, the decentralized close air support orchestrated by the XIX TAC in the
spring of 1945 wentfar toward providing Third Army corps and divisions with
thei r 0 w n ai r arm . T hat ki nd of cl ose ai r support far exceeded the prescri pti ons
laid down by the aerial authors of FM 100-20 (1943).
Weyland's new procedures provided ground commanders with a very
rapid response from the air arm. Weyland unquestionably considered the ben-
efits in improved air-ground operations well worth the doctrinal compromise.
M oreover, by this stage of the war he could rely on the experience, trust, and
confidence of the air-ground team from the leaders at the top to the lowest ech-
elons of command. As did most other commanders of tactical air forces in the
Second World War, General Weyland remained ever the pragmatist. The XIX
TAG'S performance in the final offensive demonstrated the soundness of his
approach to providing air power for Patton's Army.
290
Chapter Seven
An After Action Assessment
At the close of hostilities in Europe, General Weyland could look back
on the preceding nine months and eight days with great satisfaction. In the
euphoria of victory, he told his officers and men that the XIX TAC-Third
Army team had brought "air-ground cooperation to new heights of combat
efficiency and beaten the enemy at every turn. The air commander was right.
Through four challenging campaigns, Weyland's tactical air forces demon-
strated the soundness of their organization and operations, as well as their abil-
ity to minimize the limitations of air power.
During the first campaign in France, the command proved tactical air
forces both operationally mobile and capable of employing new and effective
tactics such as responsive cover to armored forces. At the same time, the pace
of the ground advance and competing priorities prompted Weyland to conduct
extremely decentralized operations on widely separated fronts. Attacking
every challenge, his forces found it difficult to concentrate with sufficient
force against the enemy in eastern France because of commitments 300 miles
away in Brittany, where a large fighter-bomber force confronted heavily forti-
fied port facilities, targets long considered unsuitable for fighter- bombers in
close air support operations.
The battle in France provided Third Army and the XIX TAG the oppor-
tunity to mold a first class fighting team. After besting the enemy, the air-
ground team entered the inhospitable region of Lorraine to confront a very
different situation. Here, static warfare characterized by stiff defenses, bad
weather, and serious materiel shortages hobbled tactical air power's key
advantage: the ability to swiftly concentrate forces against targets. Although
proximity to the front eliminated many problems presented earlier in France,
Weyland's forces, under conditions similar to those of World War I, proved
unable to blast a path for Patton's army through the Siegfried Line. If
Weyland appeared overly optimistic about the capabilities of his air arm at the
outset of the Lorraine Gampaign, he soon realized that his light tactical aeri-
al force required help from medium and heavy bombers to crack the Siegfried
Line.
Inexorably, the challenge of operating in Lorraine compelled closer joint
planning between air and ground force officers to use their limited resources
to maximum advantage. This proved to be one of the central developments in
air-ground cooperation. Responding to Lorraine's challenges, Weyland and his
291
Air Power for Patton's Army
P-47s with occupation stripes during tlie postwar period
fellow officers adopted a flexible approach in solving problems associated
with the three tactical mission elements— air superiority, interdiction, and
close air support— prescribed by AAF doctrine. Weyland, however, neither
abandoned doctrine nor operated with absolute control of his forces outside the
framework of established Army structure. Mistreatment of doctrine as a guide
rather than as dogma merits praise. Flexibility rather than rigid priorities
became the major ingredient of successful tactical air operations in Lorraine
and would come to characterize the entire campaign in Northwest Europe.
In theArdennes Campaign, the third major operation fortheXIX TAC,
tactical air power came closest to affecting enemy movement by itself.
Assigned a counterattack role. General Weyland showed that, with sufficient
forces, tactical air power could rapidly concentrate to first blunt and then help
repel a powerful enemy assault. His forces achieved this in spite of weather
delays, a small nightfighter force, and heavy enemy flak defenses. Atthesame
time. Ninth Air Force units slowly, but effectively, isolated theArdennes bat-
tlefield from the German supply base.
The final offensive, which carried the Third Army-XIX TAC team
through the Siegfried Line and into Germany, combined elements from earlier
mobile and static operations. Here, Weyland's experienced forces continued to
improve procedures for better reconnaissance and air-ground coordination,
relying more extensively on decentralized command and control arrange-
ments. Strongly supported by ground logistics elements, XIX TAC pilots
showed that air power had become an effective and important ingredient in
propelling and maintaining the Third Army's offensive momentum.
Considering XIX TAC's achievements in four major campaigns, it
remains difficult to measure the effectiveness of tactical air power with preci-
sion. Postwar evaluators concluded that air power successfully achieved and
maintained general air superiority and isolated the battlefield effectively from
292
An After Action Assessment
enemy aircraft, but without sufficient niglit figliters, it was somewliat less
effective if measured in terms of preventing resupply. Tliey also declared—
perhaps over enthusiastically— that close air support operations were "indi-
vidually and collectively, both deadly and decisive in their effectiveness.
Beyond these general assertions, the basic question remains one of deter-
mining how to accurately judge the contribution of tactical air power in spe-
cific campaigns or battles. In the Ardennes, for example, air power certainly
played a key if not decisive role in blunting the German drive in the B uige area
and later in isolating the battlefield through intensive interdiction operations.
It is also possible to point to air power's support in specific bridgehead oper-
ations, such as XX Corps' desperate fight to hold its Saarlautern bridgehead in
the Lorraine Campaign. During mobile operations, tactical air power also
helped generate momentum and permit greater tactical mobility. Yet a more
precise attempt to measure performance in these operations invariably raises
the problem of using statistical or equivocal evidence and argument.
As with other commands in the European theater, XIX TAC had a statis-
tical control section that kept a running account of aircrew and aircraft perfor-
mance. Although its records provide useful data about the command's opera-
tions, when applied to performance or effectiveness such data must be inter-
preted with caution. Further obscuring the issue, little or no distinction is drawn
between operational effectiveness and operational efficiency. Efficiency can be
measured precisely in terms of sortie rates, accident statistics, quantity of bombs
dropped, and other operational categories. Efficient operations, however, may
not necessarily be effective operations. Effectiveness should be evaluated from
the standpoint of air power's impact on the enemy, which is usually subjective
and unquantifiable, thus beyond the pale of assured statistical analysis.
Did the XIX TAC become more efficient over the course of the cam-
paign? One might assume so, but the record is unclear. For example, during the
three months from February-April 1945, the command averaged an aircraft
abort rate of 2.8 percent of all aircraft dispatched. Although this represented
the lowest figure for any three-month period, much of the difference resulted
from the relatively few flight cancellations in the spring because of improving
weather. On the other hand, a comparison of August 1944 and M arch 1945, the
two months of mobile warfare with the most sorties flown, shows the com-
mand with a one-third lower aircraftabort rate in M arch. In this case, the com-
mand cited mechanical problems nearly 70 percent more often in August, only
60 days after D-Day, than it did in M arch 1945. Although improved logistics
and aircraft maintenance practices likely made the command more efficient by
March, this cannot be determined from command maintenance reports or
available statistical evidence.^
Not surprisingly, the issue of aircraft accidents also turns on weather
conditions. During M arch and April 1945, the command averaged the low fig-
ure of one operational accident per 100 flying hours. While the two-month
293
Air Power for Patton's Army
average suggests efficient operations, tlie low number represents the result of
better flying weather in the spring, not the culmination of a steady trend. In
fact, during comparably good weather in August and September 1944, the sta-
tistics show a lower accident rate. A s expected, the accident rate remained con-
sistently higher during the winter months.
Similarly, statistics for aircraft losses point to February, M arch, and April
1945, as the XIX TAC's best months. Their average of 5.2 aircraft lost per
1,000 sorties was significantly lower than comparable figures for the previous
summer. Weather proved much less of a factor in this instance. Although the
winter months show a higher loss per sortie ratio, the low figure also reflects
the more intense flying associated with the Ardennes Operation. Cautiously,
one might conclude that pilots proved themselves more efficient under mobile
warfare conditions in the spring of 1945, than they did in similar circumstances
the previous summer. Nevertheless, comparisons are difficult given the many
variables, and the statistical evidence can only be suggestive.
Measuring operational effectiveness in terms of target destruction is
much more challenging because this data is difficult to correlate with specific
enemy action, especially when the data itself is not always verifiable. Indeed,
most of what the command termed battle or bomb damage assessment infor-
mation came from pilot reports that normally could not be substantiated. Even
the clearest examples are difficult to interpret with precision. In M arch 1945,
for example, XIX TAC claimed 267 enemy planes destroyed which, up to that
point, had been exceeded only by the A ugust 1944 figure of 293. Then, in A pril
1945, the command's claims skyrocketed to 1,703! Likewise, in April it
reached an all-time high of 24,634 ground targets claimed as destroyed, dam-
aged, or probably destroyed. W hat do the figures mean? Even though the num-
bers cannot be confirmed, they do not seem wholly unrealistic in view of the
enemy's condition late in the spring. However, it remains difficult, if not impos-
sible, to determine the specific impact of these losses on the German forces.
They demonstrate only that command pilots operated efficiently and attacked
an all -but-defeated enemy at will.
General Weyland confronted the issue of pilot reporting accuracy early
in the campaign, but it remained a controversial subject throughout the nine
months of operations. From his standpoint, critics questioned the integrity of
his pilots on the basis of unreasonable reporting expectations. The issue
became a subject of major concern throughout Ninth Air Force in the winter
of 1945. In early February, SHAEF planners expressed concern about the
accuracy of fighter- bomber claims of armored vehicles destroyed during the
A rdennes Campaign. U nderstandably, the planners found it difficult to design
operations against an enemy whose strength in armor either had been elimi-
nated or could not be verified. Despite the fact that General Vandenberg
responded immediately by affirming the "almost impossible task of obtaining
accurate confirmation of our claims by actual count in captured or overrun ter-
294
An After Action Assessment
ritory," he asked his tactical air commanders to report on their approach to the
problem."
In his response, General Weyland reviewed current reporting directives
and the measures his pilots and intelligence officers took to encourage the
greatest possible accuracy. In fact, he argued, his command's emphasis on
objective reporting resulted not only in the most accurate claims possible in
light of "inherent difficulties," but in conservative figures as well. For exam-
ple, because of the earlier practice of claiming half-tracks along with armored
vehicles, he directed his pilots to claim "no results observed" when they
bombed concealed armor concentrations in woods, even when they observed
smoke rising from the target area afterward.^
Weyland identified the inherent difficulties of all claims reporting.
Investigation on the ground, he reminded SHAEF, had been unable to distin-
guish between armor destroyed by air or ground action or by enemy demoli-
tion. M oreover, the enemy worked an impressive salvage system that would
distort claims. Finally, information gleaned from POWs seldom proved credi-
ble. Weyland argued that:
[t]he credibility of P/W [prisoner of war] statements is
doubtful and, although a thorough study has been made of all
available P/W reports of the effect of air action on tanks and
armored vehicles so many discrepancies have existed that
again neither conclusive proof nor disproof of claims has
been forthcoming.^
Weyland concluded by referring to ground forces that "take credit
for... vehicles that were actually knocked out by air attack." In this instance,
he told his staff that General Patton "stated informally that as 3rd [sic] Army
advances, they also claim the tanks and vehicles destroyed by [fighter-
bombers]." If this had no bearing on the veracity of air claims, he said, it nev-
ertheless made it difficultfor SHAEF planners to maintain accurate estimates
for enemy armored forces. In the end, authorities must accept the integrity of
the claims or conclude that his pilots were "deliberately falsifying" them. For
Weyland, the latter was unthinkable.^
General Quesada agreed. His command analyzed various factors that
would influence an accounting, including smokeand fire in the target area, air-
craft performance, and the diversity of weapons used. It determined that pilot
claims were "not excessive, but if anything... underestimates of the actual
damage inflicted." Significantly, Quesada's report argued that the major prob-
lem involved the reporting system itself, which required accurate numbers
under all circumstances. The IX TAG recommended that the planners forego
their insistence on numbers and be willing to accept estimates and agree to a
pilot confidence factor for accuracy. This did not happen.^ The problem of air-
295
Air Power for Patton's Army
crew reporti ng accuracy serves as a useful remi nder about the tyranny of num-
bers. The predilection for specific numbers as the standard for combat effec-
tiveness proved as fallible in the Second World War as it did a generation later
in the Vietnam conflict. Even then, bomb strike cameras did not end the diffi-
culty of verifying aircrew claims.
In the final analysis, ground forces are often the best judge of tactical air
power's effectiveness. In response to an AAF Evaluation Board questionnaire,
army officers agreed that fighter- bombers consistently assisted ground opera-
tions, even when bad weather forced them to fly interdiction missions beyond
the army's front line positions.^ General Walker, XX Corps commander, wrote
General Weyland in mid-April 1945, that "without your efficient and well
planned operations we would have suffered far greater casualties and taken a
much longer time to reach our objectives."^" He did not need statistical evi-
dence for his conclusion; with the assistance of General Weyland's aircraft he
was there and had seen his ground forces achieve their objectives.
If it is fair to conclude that tactical air power proved effective in
Northwest Europe, the question of its decisiveness remains to be considered.
M ight air power have achieved more decisive results if it had been employed
differently in that locale? General Quesada, for one, thought that a massive,
long-range fighter-bomber assault on key strategic targets in the German
homeland during the winter of 1944-1945 would have brought Germany to
her knees. Others have suggested more conventional proposals, such as more
efforts devoted to interdiction or close air support.
The question of air power's decisiveness relates to the army's effective-
ness. One authority has argued that military leaders created an "army of mobil-
ity at the expense of power." M ateriel superiority, for example, did not trans-
late into heavy firepower and better equipment to confront the Wehrmacht's
lumbering Tiger tanks and 88-mm flak/antitank guns. Paradoxically, while
leaders committed the U .5. A rmy in N orthwest E urope to "a power-drive strat-
egy of head-on assault," they did not use its mobility to create offensive con-
centrations rapidly, preferring instead the broad-front approach in its advance
on Germany. Consequently, the war may have been prolonged.
M ight tactical air power have been used differently and concentrated at
crucial points like the Seine and Rhine rivers to prevent sizeable German
forces from escaping? General Weyland certainly did not oppose the idea.
After all, doctrine prescribed this application and he relished the opportuni-
ty to show off air power's ability to concentrate forces to secure an objec-
tive. At the same time, his command could seldom expect decisive aerial
results in major battles because of competing air priorities and various oper-
ational restrictions, such as foul weather. Tactical air power, like air power
in general, was first and last a supporting or, as air leaders increasingly
referred to during the last years of the war, a cooperating arm of the air-
ground team.
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An After Action Assessment
There is every indication tliat tlie U .5. Army relied on tactical air power
to provide extra firepower and to shield ground forces. General Bradley said
as much in his postwar report on air power. In a letter to General Spaatz, he
asserted:
I know that I do not need to tell you the tremendous impor-
tance which I have attached to tactical air co-operation for
my armies. In this campaign, the recurring process of mass-
ing our divisions, forcing a breakthru [sic], and the subse-
quent exploitation of our mobility to encircle and defeat the
enemy demanded almost complete air superiority to over-
come our sensitiveness in supply, reserves, and the necessity
for full use of road and rail communications.^^
H e might also have added that the U .5. A rmy had been structured in this
way precisely to allow fortactical air power's additional firepower. Similarly,
air superiority may have produced an overdependence by the army on air
power at the expense of ground action. During the North African Campaign,
General Eisenhower warned against the negative effects of an air umbrella on
ground forces. Although air leaders pointed out that tactical air forces repre-
sented a limited asset, the division commander, blessed with close air support
on most good-weather days, might not agree. As the campaign progressed, it
is fair to question whether the ground forces depended on unnatural levels of
air superiority. A few years later, more limited wars in Korea and Vietnam
would also be characterized by Allied air superiority— and perhaps an over-
reliance on air power as a substitute for ground firepower.
General Patton, hailed as a proponent of mobile rather than positional
warfare, emerged in World War II as the Allied commander most likely to pro-
duce swift, decisive military results. The Ardennes Operation to relieve
Bastogne represents one demonstration. Yet, for the most part, until late in the
war the Third Army moved on a secondary front in the theater. It is tempting
to speculate whether the XIX TAG -Third Army team, if given higher priority
in forces and supplies, might have carried out the concentrated offensive and
bold exploitation of position as urged by Patton, with a resultant shortening of
the European war. In any event, tactical air power was, as always, intimately
connected with the Army's objectives and plan of advance. Tactical air forces
appeared, in that sense, only as capable as their ground counterparts.
The success of tactical air power well-employed in the European cam-
paign was made possible by the timely convergence of four important devel-
opments: (1) the maturation of tactical aviation doctrine; (2) effective organi-
zation and procedures; (3) a technical revolution in equipment, and above all;
(4) the presence of pragmatic men of goodwill who made the system work.
General Weyland typified the practical leader who came to dominate tactical
297
Air Power for Patton's Army
air operations in tlie European tlieater. At no time in liis day-to-day operations
during tlie campaign in EuropedidWeylandadliere formally to FM 100-20 or
any other War Department declaration regarding tactical air power doctrine.
This did not mean that the XIX TAC commander ignored aerial mission pri-
orities. Rather, he relied on a practical approach to the employment of tactical
air power and a solid relationship with army officers. Using doctrine as a loose
guide and not an inflexible dogma, Weyland addressed each situation in terms
of its demands. A pragmatist by nature, he would not need to wave an AAF
flag or FM 100-20. M utual trust, respect, and a close relationship with General
Patton and other Third Army leaders meant that Weyland never had to resort
to formal doctrinal pronouncements to support his position on questions of
employing tactical air assets. M oreover, because the Allies possessed general
air superiority— their number-one air objective at the start of land combat on
the continent— attention could be devoted to conducting armed reconnais-
sance/interdiction and close air support operations in much the way Weyland
and his XIX TAC planners intended.
In view of Weyland's conduct of air operations throughout the campaign,
it appears surprising at first to find him in the immediate aftermath of the war
reaffirming the importance and doctrinal validity of Command and Employment
of Air Power (FM 100-20 of 1943). The experience of his command through
nine months of intensive air operations in collaboration with General Patton's
army, he said, showed the manual's concepts "to be basically sound." He
declared that XIX TAC followed the order of priority prescribed by the manu-
al when planning and flying combat missions. First in importance was the
achievement of air superiority and measures tal<en to maintain it. Next came
interdiction or isolation of the battlefield. "Close air cooperation with ground
units in combat" completed the triumvirate. M indful of his audience, senior air-
men, Weyland carefully used the words "cooperation with" in place of the ear-
lier phrase, "support of" Third Army. Lool<ing ahead to institutional indepen-
dence, AAF leaders had become especially sensitive over any connotations that
might reflect subordinate status, and Weyland well understood the need to val-
idate FM 100-20, especially in terms of command arrangements. Postwar pol-
itics seemed to be a driving force for many airmen involved with evaluating
thei r w arti me experi ences. N everthel ess, w hatever Wey I and f el t about the man-
ual , i n practi ce he, I i l<e many others, proved anythi ng but a servant of ri gi d doc-
trine or its prescribed order of mission priorities.^''
In response to a request from the AAF Evaluation Board assigned to the
European theater in the summer of 1944 to study the role of air power. General
Weyland compiled a report on combat operations of the XIX TAC. In early
1945, the War Department directed the AAF Evaluation Board to focus on the
effectiveness of close-in air cooperation, what the board termed Phase III oper-
ations. In M arch 1945, the board solicited responses from Ninth Air Force, the
First Tactical Air Force, and from the ground units to a 39-point questionnaire.
298
An After Action Assessment
Although many individual units replied well before the end of hostilities,
Generals Bradley and Devers submitted their views together in mid-M ay. The
board issued its Phase III report in August 1945. M eanwhile, during the pre-
vious month General B radley and his 12th A rmy G roup A ir Effects Committee
used much of the information from the questionnaire to prepare their own
report, The Effect of Air Power on M i I itary Operations. Along with the reports
from General Weyland's command, these two major studies provide a com-
prehensive analysis of tactical air doctrine and operations in the European the-
ater during World War II.
These postwar evaluation reports show that army commanders in the
theater understood and appreciated the importance of air superiority. If the
questions asked of them seemed weighted toward a validation of FM 100-20,
they nevertheless provided candid answers that reflected most ground element
leaders' views on the important issues surrounding the use of tactical air
power. Although officers at Headquarters Army Ground Forces in Washington
in late 1945 might challenge the assertion that supremacy in the air must be a
prerequisite for successful ground operations, officers leaving the field in
Northwest Europe had no such doubts. In the words of the AAF Phase III
report, "too much emphasi s cannot be I ai d on the advantage to the A 1 1 i ed cause
of having virtually unchallenged supremacy in the skies above the European
continent throughout the campaign. "^^
Army leaders knew that air superiority provided their forces nearly unre-
stricted movement and unhindered resupply on the battlefield. Free from sig-
nificant enemy air attack, ground forces could, among other activities, regroup
rapidly, maintain uninterrupted supply channels, and devote less attention to
camouflage and air defenses. M oreover. Army leaders did not have to worry
about the morale of their troops who surely would have suffered as did their
German counterparts under heavy, consistent aerial assault. Indeed, theground
forces overwhelmingly concluded "air superiority can and must be the first
priority task, not only of the air forces but of all military and economic forces
which are directing their efforts to final victory.""
General Weyland agreed completely that air superiority was essential for
success on the ground. As the tactical air commander, he ensured local air
superiority on Third Army's front, and he worked diligently in all four cam-
paigns to carry out this function. Like his fellow pilots, he enjoyed nothing
more than to report his command's success against the Luftwaffe. During the
campaign, his forces devoted approximately 18 percent of their sorties to pri-
ority one, or air superiority requirements. This was slightly below the figures
for hi s si ster tacti cal ai r commands i n N i nth A i r F orce.^^ 1 1 al so fel I wel I bel ow
the effort accorded interdiction and close air support, which amounted to 40
and 42 percent of all missions flown, respectively.
Even so, on several occasions General Weyland— and Ninth Air Force
planners— seemed overly focused on the threat from a struggling Luftwaffe,
299
Air Power for Patton's Army
given the intelligence data available to them on the state of the enemy's air
arm. This happened in the Lorraine Campaign and also in the Ardennes, dur-
ing the last phase of the counteroffensive in January 1945. Although his
Pioneer P-51 M ustang group flew the bulk of these counterair missions, his
P-47 groups also flew bomber and transport escort and area cover missions. A
good portion of these missions proved uneventful and might well have been
more profitably flown as armed reconnaissance along known, highly-traveled,
surface traffic routes. Weyland's actions are more defensible for the period
before J anuary 1, 1945, when Ultra and his reconnaissance pilots reported
extensive Luftwaffe redeployment. After the New Year's Day raid. Ultra pro-
vided data on Luftwaffe movements away from the Third Army front along
with relative inactivity for units that remained. As it transpired, the campaign
showed that air superiority could be assured with Weyland's fighter-bombers
and reconnaissance aircraft flying assigned interdiction and close air support
missions.
The Luftwaffe, in fact, posed a consistent, albeit minor, threat only at
night. Neither General Weyland nor any other air commander could entirely
prevent enemy air attacks on friendly ground forces— or the isolated bombing
of a friendly base. Once the XIX TAC command began its assault on remain-
ing German airfields in April 1945, the nighttime threat became insignificant.
Had it been otherwise, the Allies would not have dared reorient much of their
night fighter force from defensive patrol to intruder interdiction missions.
Allied air superiority allowed airmen to focus their attention on interdiction
and close air support missions.
Army commanders also understood the value of interdiction, the isola-
tion of the battlefield. Without referring specifically to air force doctrine.
General Bradley concluded that interdiction did rank second to control of the
air in terms of tactical air achievement. "The outstanding contribution of the
fighter-bombers," he declared, "aside from helping to attain and maintain air
superiority, was their continuous armed reconnaissance missions to isolate the
battlefield to the front and flanks of the ground forces. "^^
Once again. General Weyland would concur, although he might quibble,
with the word continuous. The main problem he and his colleagues faced
throughout the campaign was maintenance of a consistent interdiction pro-
gram in the face of other demands. As the Lorraine experience showed, tacti-
cal pi anners, I i ke thei r strategi c forces counterparts at that ti me, at f i rst had dif-
ficulty deciding on the right targets. Only well into the fall buildup facing the
Siegfried L ine did N inth A ir Force planners conclude that primary bridges rep-
resented absolutely the best targets to attack to disrupt all German surface
transport, therefore rendering enemy resupply and defensive efforts chaotic.
Bridges, however, proved extraordinarily difficult targets for fighter-bombers
not only to hit, but also to bring down. Even when employed against targets
judged proper for their use, bad weather could intervene to negate their effec-
300
An After Action Assessment
tiveness. After the Normandy invasion, dayliglit armed reconnaissance mis-
sions forced tlie Weiirmaciit to move supplies and personnel largely at night.
During the long nights from late fall to early spring, a small tactical night
fighter and reconnaissance force proved unable to detect and seriously disrupt
enemy nighttime operations.2°
Factors other than bad weather, darl<ness, and a small night fighter force
hampered General Weyland's flyers. Competing priorities made it next to
impossible to concentrate his force sufficiently on armed reconnaissance tar-
gets to execute a continuous, fully successful interdiction plan in the short run.
Even during the Ardennes Campaign when he commanded an eight-group
force, interdiction sorties amounted to less than 40 percent of the command's
effort. Nevertheless, General Bradley and the airmen were certainly correct in
declaring that air forces eventually isolated the Ardennes battlefield. It is
tempting to speculate whether reallocating aerial assets from priority one to
armed reconnaissance missions— ad hoc interdiction— might have hastened
Allied success. It seems unlil<ely. Given the problems that prevented airmen
from mounting consistent interdiction programs, it is doubtful that additional
interdiction sorties would have significantly altered the outcome. Allied expe-
rience with interdiction demonstrated that tactical air power represented nei-
ther an unlimited resource nor a decisive force in and of itself. Little has
changed since the Second World War to suggest altering this basic assessment
of the interdiction mission.^^
The doctrine of the tactical air force's third mission, close air support,
underwent the greatest change during the campaign. Air Force theorists con-
sidered aerial attacks on enemy ground forces in the contact zone to be the
most difficult to mount because of the danger of stril<ing friendly troops and
the most expensive in terms of operational efficiency and in losses to enemy
defenses. They also could be the least effective if employed against inappro-
priate targets, such as hardened defenses or dispersed troops. Traditional air-
men wanted these targets reserved for army artillery. The test of a proper aer-
ial target usually began with the criterion, beyond artillery range. Indeed, tac-
tical air forces seemed destined to fight primarily beyond the immediate sur-
face battle zone except in rare emergency conditions. All this had changed
by the end of the campaign, largely because Allied air superiority provided the
environment for pragmatic commanders lil<e Weyland to adjust their tech-
niques as circumstances warranted. A Ithough the number of sorties do not rep-
resent priorities in all cases, clearly air superiority in the Northwest Europe
campaign and improved communications and air control practice resulted in
an unforeseen emphasis on close air support missions, missions that often
operated in close proximity to Patton's troops.
The prominence of close air support missions flown in Europe during
World War II, however, cannot be discerned in the AAF Evaluation Board's
classic description of the air planning process, that is, the process that allocat-
301
Air Power for Patton's Army
ed air effort at the level of the army-tactical air command combined-opera-
tions center. Board members decided that tactical air-ground planners had
actually allocated missions in the following sequence:^^
1. Special targets or escort missions directed by Air Force headquarters.
2. Requirements to maintain air superiority.
3. Armed reconnaissance to prevent movement of enemy supplies and
troops into the battle area.
4. Armored column cover missions.
5. Army requests or close air support missions.
This idealized scheme, which purported to describe the actual planning of
wartime air missions, doubtless confirmed long-standing army suspicions
about what third-priority air support meant for its troops in future combat.
In practice in the field. General Weyland followed neither this nor any
other established sequence. Indeed, he affirmed that XIX TAG covered
armored columns first. The record suggests, however, that except in highly
unusual circumstances, such as the fluid conditions in the Eifel, he also
invariably provided air support for infantry divisions in combat. Weyland's
experience suggests that perhaps the AAF's aerial allocation sequence was
suspect from its conception. The determining factor for close support alloca-
tion became the rate of advance. For relatively stable situations, as occurred
during much of the Lorraine fighting, Patton's artillery could and did handle
most front line targets. That allowed Weyland's fighter-bombers to focus on
armed reconnaissance. For mobile operations, on the other hand, close sup-
port requirements received top priority in the form of armored column cover
and attacks on defended towns and strong points, with remaining aerial forces
assigned armed reconnaissance routes after minimum air superiority require-
ments had been met. Again, Weyland's air planners adjusted the aerial effort
to meet the requirements of Patton's ground offensive, not to satisfy doctri-
nal pronouncements or some other formal planning arrangement.
If the AAF Evaluation Board's description of the World War II air allo-
cation process strains the credibility of army and air liaison officers fresh from
the field, the board's claim that close air support of the army normally did not
exceed 15 percent of the tactical air forces available can be legitimately dis-
puted. This board figure is often cited as at least indicative of, if not the last
word on, overall World War II close air support commitments. This is patent-
ly incorrect. One must look beyond the broad percentage of forces allocated
and consider the actual number and percentage of sorties flown on close air
support missions.
On these points. General Bradley's own report is much more revealing
because it is based on operational summaries describing actual targets attacked.
Significantly, among Ninth Air Force tactical air commands, only the XIX
302
An After Action Assessment
TAC flew more close air support sorties than it did interdiction sorties during
the campaign. It devoted 42 percent of its sorties to close air support and 40
percent to interdiction. The close air support and interdiction figures for
General Quesada's IX TAC totaled 27 and 46 percent, respectively, and for
General Nugent's XXIX TAC, they were 33 and 47 percent, respectively. In
fact, armed reconnaissance outnumbered close support sorties for Weyland's
forces only during the spring offensive following the Ardennes Campaign.
Then, in the final drive through Germany, when the enemy facing Patton's
armored columns became progressively weaker, Weyland felt free to shift pri-
orities to armed reconnaissance targets and airfields. Is it any wonder that
Patton considered Weyland his favorite airman? Or that ground force officers
considered the Patton-Weyland relationship as something special?^^ If Third
Army could claim 42 percent of XIX TAC aerial sorties at the front, close air
support sorties for all three American armies together averaged 33 percent of
the total sorties flown during the Northwest European campaigns. Although
this figure is more than twice as high as the 15 percent allocation figure offered
by Air Force advocates, it is far more realistic.
The most controversial aspect of close air support operations during the
campaign concerned what airmen deemed proper targets for fighter-bombers.
Asa general rule. Army officers did not believe that tactical aircraft should
avoid attacking targets within the range of artillery. Weyland agreed that tar-
gets within artillery range remained suitable for his aircraft in mobile opera-
tions, because artillery normally moved up slowly. Yet, army evaluators also
believed close air support bombing necessary and effective in static opera-
tions, too. As General Bradley's analysis noted, aircraft with 500-lb. general-
purpose bombs and 250-1 b. fragmentation bombs often proved more destruc-
tive than any artillery preparation using much less destructive warheads."
General Bradley also cautioned against rules of thumb that early in the cam-
paign had excluded defended villages, for example. In winter, many villages
were filled with troops and made excellent targets for fighter-bombers attack-
ing, first with general-purpose bombs and napalm, and then strafing exposed
personnel. He argued that targets should be examined from both ground and
air points of view. This, in fact, is what occurred in the combined operations
system, and by the spring of 1945 fighter-bombers attacked most front line tar-
gets routinely.
One target, however, seldom appeared on the airmen's target list. As
General Weyland repeatedly stated, he did not consider fixed, well-defended
fortifications appropriate targets for fighter-bombers. Was he wrong? Some
Army officers thought so. As one explained:
[P]ill boxes under attack are always surrounded by troops in
strong points who do not fall back in the pill box until the
Infantry actually assaults. Air attack causes considerable
303
Air Power for Patton's Army
casualties amongst troops manning strong points outside pill
boxes and materially reduces their will to fight. We under-
stand that ordinary bombing will not destroy pill boxes, but
we do consider pill boxes excellent targets.
Some AAF officers also might have rejected Weyland's argument, noting that
analysis showed fighter-bombers loaded with 1,000-lb. bombs could have a bet-
ter chance of causing major damage. Others pointed to the indirect effect
achieved by attacking pillboxes and casemented guns in which fighter-bombers
served to neutralize these emplaced weapons until advancing ground forces
could overwhelm them. General Weyland remained unconvinced, granting
exceptions only in emergencies. Bespeaking his opposition, XIX TAG aircraft
reported only one pillbox attacked during the entire assault on the Siegfried Line
from the end of January to February 25, 1945. In this case, Weyland's stub-
bornness might very well have interfered with useful air support. On the other
hand, his aversion to this type of target did not prevent his fighter-bombers from
striking nearly everything else German within the artillery zone.^^
I n short, by the spri ng of 1945, cl ose ai r support had devolved far beyond
the stilted, theoretical confines of FM 100-20. Although the manual claimed
Phase III operations to be the most expensive, most difficult to control, and
least effective of all missions, in many instances operations in Northwest
Europe proved otherwise. One is reminded that 1943's FM 100-20 emerged
from the North African experience, where much of the time the Allies did not
enjoy air superiority and often possessed few aerial resources. These condi-
tions had changed markedly by 1944 and 1945. M oreover, improved technol-
ogy in the form of radio communications and radar normally made possible
effective control and coordination between ground controllers and fighter and
reconnaissance pilots. As for cost, XIX TAG'S experience suggested that
armed reconnaissance and cooperation missions were equally expensive in
terms of planes and pilots lost. Finally, the relatively high percentage of close
air support missions flown for Patton's forces and other armies in the 12th
Army Group suggests that air support of army forces within the artillery zone
achieved good results— and not just in emergency situations. As an 11th
Armored Division spokesman explained for the AAF Board:
From our point of view, these [cooperation] missions are
easy to control, are inexpensive in so far as loss of friendly
aircraft is concerned, and usually show profitable results.
Losses to friendly troops as a result of this type mission
when controlled by experienced air corps personnel are r\\\?°
The record bears him out and suggests once again the fundamental importance
of Allied air superiority.
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An After Action Assessment
Like other tactical air commanders, General Weyland took liberties with
formal tactical air mission priorities when the situation warranted, which
underscored his pragmatic approach to doctrine that characterized air-ground
operations during the combat in Northwest Europe. In Weyland's hands, doc-
trine served the forces, rather than the reverse, and with air superiority, he
could adjust priorities according to need rather than theory. Weyland and his
fellow airmen, however, never compromised on one issue. Besides designat-
ing mission priorities, FM 100-20 dealt with authority and control of air
resources. Control of air assets, it stated, should be centralized and their com-
mand vested in an Air Force commander. If aircraft were separated and
attached to ground units, air forces would be used improperly, nor would it be
possible to recombine and concentrate the force when necessary. The XIX
TAC commander reacted swiftly and strongly to any perceived infringement
of his control. Such incidents were few and quickly settled by General
Weyland within local channels— with solid support from General Patton and
his staff, if necessary.
If Weyland exercised the control he wanted during the last few months
of the campaign, decentralized operations became the order of the day. In late
February 1945, XIX TAC supplied a second VHF radio to corps tactical air
liaison officers and authorized them a separate channel for more direct and
efficient communication between reconnaissance aircraft, other liaison offi-
cers, and (by extension) the army corps fire-direction center. Now liaison offi-
cers could request and receive information directly from the reconnaissance
aircraft overhead without first communicating with the tactical control cen-
ter.^^This decentralization of control at the combat front preserved ultimate air
force authority while providing the army corps its organic reconnaissance.
Technology made possible this more efficient use of resources and General
Weyland embraced it as long as his prerogatives remained unaffected. He
always believed that the tactical air doctrine dealing with command and con-
trol, if applied effectively, would assure the army the support it needed. Air
officers during a campaign might decentralize operations or massage mission
priorities according to need, but they remained uncompromising in adhering to
the principle that the ultimate control of air forces rested with air commanders.
In postwar analyses, army officers also recognized and accepted the need for
centralized control of air power, even if this point was appreciated more at the
corps and army level than at the division level.
Tactical air doctrine also prescribed the organization and procedures for
conducting air-ground operations. On assessment and on balance, these orga-
nizational prescriptions proved sound. In a letter to General Spaatz in May
1945, General Bradley praised the effectiveness of joint air-ground operations.
Essential "joint planning at the appropriate command levels," he said, was
obtained first by "the close physical association of headquarters and second by
the operational linking up of ground and staff personnel in your various air
305
Air Power for Patton's Army
headquarters. The latter [innovation] is original within this theater and has
thoroughly justified itself. "^^ One might differ with the 12th Army Group
commander's claim to originality. The much maligned FM 31-35 (April
1942), Aviation in Support of Ground Forces, established the procedures and
practices for air-ground operations that airmen first introduced in North
Africa, and then further developed in the Italian theater. Yet no one could
doubt the effectiveness of joint operations in the European theater, which
stressed the collocation of air and ground headquarters, establishment of com-
bined operations centers, and exchange of air and ground liaison officers with-
in air and surface units.
Despite an almost obsessive concern for centralized control of air forces,
Weyland and his colleagues permitted far more initiative and latitude for
action at lower echelons than anyone could have foreseen. As he and his com-
mand demonstrated, operational decentralization became key to successful
joint operations during the campaign. His separate headquarters elements were
a case in point. So, too, was the coordination that evolved among forces in the
field. The airmen realized, for example, that accurate and timely field intelli-
gence required tactical reconnaissance pilots to communicate directly with the
air liaison officers at corps and, sometimes, at division level without first
communicating with the higher headquarters tactical control center. By the
spring of 1945, Weyland's fighter-bomber pilots routinely monitored recon-
naissance radio channels and reacted promptly to attack targets of opportuni-
ty. In such instances, the tactical control center often performed only a moni-
toring function.
During the final three months of the European war, fighter-bombers fly-
ing armed reconnaissance increasingly contacted corps or division headquar-
ters to learn of any immediate targets before flying their assigned routes.
Responses to the AAF Evaluation Board's questionnaire, however, indicated
that not all air-ground teams followed this procedure; some followed it only
occasionally. Third Army's XX Corps, for example, declared, regretfully, that
this did not happen on their front, but General Walker's XX Corps staff might
have responded to the board's questionnaire in March rather than in May,
when the practice appeared to be more common throughout the XIX
TAC-Third Army team. Also, as the 6th Armored Division's response indi-
cated, although armed reconnaissance flights might not check in with the corps
or division, the daily reconnaissance program, whereby tactical reconnais-
sance pilots flew assigned routes for the different Army corps, made it possi-
ble for the pilots to obtain immediate air cooperation for the ground units. If
the demands of mobile warfare predictably required flexible operational pro-
cedures at lower echelons, the commanders also resorted to these practices
during static warfare in the fall and winter months.
By 1945, decentralized air-ground operations and procedures often pro-
vided local army units with what amounted to an air umbrella, one that air force
306
An After Action Assessment
doctrine abhorred as a misuse of air power. Altliougli air force representatives
retained control of tlie air assets, army commanders often liad essentially their
own aircraft supporting their units in all but name. In such cases, the Allies'
overwhelming air superiority and the growing weakness of German defenders
made it increasingly possible to take liberties with doctrine in the name of bet-
ter and more effective operations. The XIX TAG experience shows that this
kind of air support provided to ground forces was directly proportional to the
air resources available for that particular function. Unlike in North Africa,
where relatively few resources translated into limited to modest air support, an
abundance of resources in Northwest Europe at the end of 1944 enabled Allied
air forces to provide formidable, if sometimes inconsistent, air support.
Two key technical developments during the war also contributed might-
ily to the success of tactical air operations. One was the appearance of the
well-armored, long-range fighter-bomber as the primary aircraft for close air
support. The other involved a revolution in communications that made effi-
cient coordination, command, and control at all echelons possible. Effective
air-ground procedures would hardly have been as successful without the time-
ly arrival of the turbo-supercharged, air-cooled, radial engine, P-47
Thunderbolt fighter-bomber as the premier ground support aircraft in the
European theater. Taking advantage of Allied air superiority in 1944, the P-47
made close air support far more effective than the authors of air force doctrine
had imagined possible a year earlier. Without Allied air superiority in North
Africa, notthe P-39 Airacobra, the P-40 Warhawk, northe A-20 Havoc light
bomber proved capable of accurate, low-level bombing in Phase III operations
without unacceptable losses.
By the time General Weyland arrived in England in early 1944, theAAF
had three new candidates for the fighter-bomber role. The Thunderbolt was
joined by the P-38 Lightning and the P-51 Mustang that mounted liquid-
cooled, in-line engines. All three models were initially developed as pursuit,
or fighter, aircraft for air combat at altitude against opposing fighters. When
airmen added racks to carry bombs and rockets, however, all three proved
highly adaptable to the tactical bombing mission. Likewise, they usually best-
ed enemy fighters even against considerable odds. Fortunately for Ninth Air
Force, Eighth Air Force selected the more agile P-51, rather than the P-47 as
its main fighter aircraft for bomber escort work. Despite the latter's good
speed, range, bomb-carrying capacity, and firepower, authorities preferred the
P-51 for Priority I fighter missions, and withdrew the P-38 from fighter-
bomber operations entirely. Both proved more vulnerable to flak at low alti-
tudes because of the extensive radiator plumbing that served their liquid-
cooled engines. On the other hand, they performed superbly as reconnaissance
planes and served as such throughout the campaign.
General Weyland's command preferred the rugged Thunderbolt
unequivocally for fighter-bomber operations. Its sturdy frame, ease of mainte-
307
Air Power for Patton's Army
nance, and capacity to carry a large bomb or rocket load, combined with an air-
cooled, radial engine that could take a licking and still keep on running, made
the P-47 the natural choice for close air support operations. M oreover, with or
without bombs and rockets, eight wing-mounted .50-caliber machine guns
gave to this flying engine of war enormous fire power in support of ground
forces. In its report to the AAF Evaluation Board, the XIX TAC submitted a
list of characteristics for the ideal fighter-bomber, which the board accepted
without change. Confining itself to its experience in the European theater, the
X IX TAC preferred the armament of the P-47, but it favored the more efficient
performance capabilities of the P-51. Although not commenting on engine
characteristics, the command no doubt favored the radial -type air-cooled
engine that helped make the P-47 better able to withstand hits from enemy flak
and continue flying. In light of German turbojet aircraft that had appeared in
combat, however, it is surprising that the American airmen did not project
beyond familiar, propeller-driven airplanes to include jet aircraft as they iden-
tified characteristics of their ideal fighter-bomber.^'
With the arrival of the P-47 and improved communications, close air
support or Phase III missions could no longer be considered the most expen-
sive, least effective, and most difficult to control. Equipped with external fuel
tanks, fighter-bombers could also meet the range challenges of mobile war-
fare. Even so. General Weyland was quick to remind General Patton and his
staff of the limitations of modern fighter-bombers. Despite the impressive
technical performance, their pilots could not operate them effectively in bad
weather or darkness. A rmy planners understood these problems. N evertheless,
if Patton's ground commanders always included air support in joint opera-
tional plans, they seldom postponed an offensive because weather conditions
prohibited the fighter-bombers from flying. General Weyland frequently per-
mitted pilots to violate weather minimums in declared emergencies, butnotfor
sustained offensive drives. Third Army's XX and XII Corps assaults on the
Siegfried Line in February 1945, for example, began without air cover in spite
of strong enemy defenses and rugged terrain. Normally, Third Army offen-
sives would not be rescheduled unless they required medium or heavy
bombers. Even then, individual circumstances might convince the commander
to move forward without air support since medium bombers required two days
to schedule, or to reschedule. Army commanders widely criticized the Army
Air Force's inability to provide medium bomber support on short notice.^^
Bad weather and darkness probably had a greater effect on fighter-
bomber efforts to isolate the battlefield than they did on close air support oper-
ations. German troops invariably moved the bulk of their troops and supplies
to and from the front lines during bad weather or after sundown, when Allied
aircraft harassed them the least. Similarly, German transports could move at
night almost at will because of the small Allied night fighter force. Although
initially designed for night interception operations, the P-61 Black Widow
308
An After Action Assessment
became a more effective fighter-bomber after acquiring napalm ordnance and
rocl<ets to complement its four 20-mm cannons in early 1945. Despite the lim-
itations associated with the Black Widow's armed reconnaissance missions,
however, the XIX TAC valued the twin-engine, humpbacked P-61, which pre-
sented a frightening presence at night, more for its effect on enemy morale and
less for its bombing statistics. The command simply had too few P-61s.
Except for the Ardennes emergency, Weyland's night fighter force never
amounted to more than a single squadron of 12-15 Black Widows.^^
In its evaluation of air operations, the AAF Evaluation Board highlight-
ed the weakness of Allied night flying efforts. In truth, that weakness had been
painfully obvious to all from the beginning of the drive across France. "The
absence of adequate night fighters and fighter- bombers," the report stated,
"was found to be probably the most serious handicap to the air forces through-
out the war."''° When taken together, bad weather and darkness gave the
Germans a degree of freedom for movement and clearly enabled them to pro-
long the war.
A second major development involving technology offered the promise
of overcoming the fighter-bomber's fundamental visibility problem when fly-
ing in poor weather and at night. Radio communications and the use of radar
as an offensive weapon had progressed a long way in this direction by 1944.
Together, they provided command and control of fighter-bombers and were
basic in the first attempts to develop a capability to bomb accurately in close
air support operations. General Weyland, for example, communicated directly
with General Vandenberg at Ninth Air Force headquarters and other key offi-
cers over the Redline communications system. Four communications networks
and five methods of communicating tied XIX TAC units together, even under
conditions of extreme mobility. Good VHF radio equipment met the challenge
of creating air-ground coordination. Also during the winter months, ground-
based radar became increasingly important for accurate navigation and bomb-
ing of targets beyond the bomb safety line. Indeed, any useful flying at night
and during winter would have been impossible without these developments.
In this area, too, limitations affected the impressive capabilities of new
technology. Allied forces turned to the scientists and engineers of the opera-
tional research offices at the various command levels for solutions to over-
come technical constraints. By early 1945, the XIX TAC had become deeply
involved in this research, which included methods to improve aircraft control
procedures and determine optimum bomb size and fuze types, in addition to
the study of bridge destruction by aircraft. The most attention, however,
focused on producing an effective bomb strike camera and the accurate blind
bombing radar system, SCR- 584.
Despite major efforts throughout the spring of 1945, improvements in
both systems fell short of hopes. The SCR -584 blind bombing system and
bomb strike camera projects serve as valuable reminders that, wherever new
309
Air Power for Patton's Army
technology is involved, initial expectations often go unfulfilled. Such overesti-
mation of technical potentials would become commonplace in a later age.
Altogether, Allied scientists did far better than their Axis counterparts in rec-
ognizing the potential of such systems and working to make them fulfill their
promise. M oreover, though the war proved to beacatalystfor advances in tech-
nology, radar and radio communications were still in their infancy. Solutions
for blind bombing and bomb damage assessment would have to await more
sophisticated technical developments that lay farther in the future than most
supposed.
Cooperation was the final ingredient that contributed to the success of
tactical air-ground operations. Cooperation, not confrontation, characterized
army and air force relations in Northwest Europe far more than anyone could
have imagined during the difficult days in North Africa in late 1942. Ninth Air
Force analysts at war's end correctly assessed the effectiveness of the air-
ground team at the army-tactical air command level. "The principle of estab-
lishing a separate, autonomous tactical air command to operate in an indissol-
uble operational partnership with each army proved sound and successful in
combat.'"'^ Although no one would deny the importance of doctrine, in large
part the personal element proved crucial. In his letter to General Spaatz,
General Bradley concluded by emphasizing this most important factor. "I think
that one of the most effective measures to insure good cooperation," he said,
"has been the excellent personal relationship between air and ground com-
manders which we have enjoyed during this campaign and which has been
highly gratifying to me."''^ He certainly had in mind the excel lent personal rap-
port he developed with air colleagues in joint headquarters, first with General
Quesada, then with General Vandenberg. Cooperation and trust, together with
an abundance of airplanes, served to diminish the importance of organization-
al principles and mission priorities.
The air-ground partnership reflected both personal and professional con-
siderations. The team of Patton and Weyland, perhaps more than any other,
illustrated the professional respect and understanding that proved absolutely
vital for good air-ground relations. It would be difficult to imagine two such
different personalities: the flamboyant, theatrical, implacable "man of destiny"
from California, and the soft-spoken but determined Texan. Colonel Ferguson,
XIX TAC operations officer, recounted later that General Weyland made sure
well before the Normandy invasion that the two commanders understood each
other and the capabilities and limitations of their forces. "There was such good
rapport established early on about what one could and could not do that there
were no serious difficulties."'^^ As a one-star, Weyland remained the responsi-
ble subordinate rather than a coequal commander envisioned in FM 100-20.
Regardless, he had the three-star army commander's confidence from the
beginning. He could always call on Patton to help convince higher headquar-
ters to provide additional air units or change target priorities, and Patton would
310
An After Action Assessment
do so, vigorously. Furthermore, Patton was never known to override General
Weyland when, on occasion, his air commander declined to have fighter-
bombers attack targets he judged unsuitable.
Above all, Patton knew that he could count on the XIX TAG comman-
der to support Thi rd A rmy efforts to the maxi mum. A pparently, for others, that
kind of aerial support could be considered excessive at times. Looking back on
the ai r-ground experience of World War 1 1 from another perch, N i nth A i r Force
officials warned future tactical airmen:
[It] was demonstrated repeatedly that the commander of a tac-
tical air command, deeply engrossed in and intimately associ-
ated with the ground campaign, is subject to many strong
influences to insure the maximum amount of close air coop-
eration in his area of responsibility at the possible expense of
the proper employment of the ai r force as a whole i n the com-
bined air and ground battle.'*''
Although the evaluators did not name General Weyland's XIX TAG in
this instance, they doubtless knew that Third Army received more close air
support sorties than had been provided to the First and Ninth Armies by the
other two tactical air commands in Ninth Air Force. Moreover, General
Patton's reputation as a strong leader might have suggested to them that he had
ridden roughshod over his air commander to extract so much close air support
for his forces.
This was not the case. General Weyland always spoke for air interests
whenever he thought necessary. General Patton, on his part, did not interfere
in the overall air plan, and he let the air commander run the air side of opera-
tions. He backstopped Weyland and supported his requests at higher head-
quarters, knowing full well that in return he would receive all possible aerial
support, given the vagaries of weather and other priorities. Throughout the
campaign Patton publicized the air-ground team's performance at every oppor-
tunity. Although comparatively obscure, one reference in particular captures
the confidence he had in his air commander's determination to support the
Third Army. On January 15, 1945, with the Germans in full retreat from the
Bulge, he wrote to his wife, "we have had three nice clear days and hope that
our air has done half as much as it says. However, they do try, especially
Weyland and his fighter-bombers.'"'^
Following the campaign, the two former comrades-in-arms correspond-
ed several times before Patton's death in December 1945. In September, Patton
sent the first three chapters of his manuscript. War As I Knew It, to a dispirit-
ed Weyland, who after his European exploits, instead of receiving an opera-
tional assignment, had been named Assistant Commandant of the Army's
Command and General Staff School. In reply to Weyland's letter of thanks.
311
Air Power for Patton's Army
Patton told him that the students would benefit enormously from his experi-
ence "because I am sure that now everyone realizes that the phenomenal suc-
cess of the combined operations of the X IX TA C and Third A rmy was due pri-
marily to your forethought and breadth of understanding." Offering further
encouragement and perhaps the greatest possible compliment, Patton wrote,
"Asyou know, I toldGeneral Eisenhower during the campaign that I would be
perfectly happy to have you as a Corps Commander, at any time."'^^
At the end of the war Allied leaders did seek to preserve the lessons
learned in the cooperative air-ground effort. Yet they faced the formidable
challenge of somehow institutionalizing the unusual personal and profession-
al relationships that often proved so successful. In later years, once the expe-
rience levels declined and professional relationships forged in combat disap-
peared, it would prove difficult to rely only on a shared wartime background.
Eisenhower, SHAEF Commander and a strong proponent of air-ground coop-
eration and centralized control of air power, took the first steps in M ay 1945,
when he convened a meeting among commanders of the key air-ground teams
in the European theater at General Bradley's headquarters. General Weyland
recalled that the group unanimously reaffirmed centralized control of air
power as prescribed by FM 100-20 (1943), but not before General Hodges,
U.S. First Army commander, proposed that the individual army headquarters
be authorized direct control of all reconnaissance aircraft.
The reports from army field units made it clear that General Hodges's
suggestion would be welcome in some Army circles. Weyland found this
expression of sentiment familiar. Both he and General Vandenberg spoke out
forcefully against Hodges's plan, and they were supported strongly by General
Weyland's "collaborator," General Patton. As Weyland remembered the inci-
dent, the Third Army commander explained to those assembled that although
his intelligence officer had first favored Third Army control of reconnaissance,
he realized that reconnaissance had other responsibilities, in addition to those
for his army. Weyland recalled, "Old Patton was a believer."''^
Eisenhower and his colleagues had good reason for concern about pre-
serving the lessons of tactical air power. In the European theater, individual
army commanders had long expressed reservations about command and con-
trol arrangements for tactical air forces. Many remained convinced that the
U .5. Army needed its own air force and would in the future continue to advo-
cate a strong army air arm. Normally, these officers held command positions
below corps level, where they would be less likely to appreciate air power's
larger responsibilities. M oreover, while Eisenhower and his commanders met
at Luxembourg City, Army Ground Forces headquarters published a prelimi-
nary report compiled by its Equipment Review Board under the chairmanship
of M aj. Gen. Gilbert R. Cook. Army Air Forces leaders became alarmed as
soon as they learned that its conclusions entirely opposed the precepts of FM
100-20 and the air-ground experience in Europe.'^^ The so-called Cook Board
312
An After Action Assessment
report recommended that the army have "ground support aviation organic to
and operated by ground forces... ," and that the aircraft procured for this pur-
pose be of the "flying artillery and flying tank type" for exclusive support of
ground forces.
Characteristically, air leaders mobilized to refute the findings of the
Cook Board. In response to their expressions of concern, the War Department
established a committee, with air force representation, to gather information
pertaining to the Cook Board's findings. After the committee completed its
investigation in the fall, the War Department convened an Equipment Board in
December 1945, under the chairmanship of Gen. Joseph W. Stilwell, to hear
testimony from key air and ground forces officers. General Weyland was
among those airmen called to testify in December. Like his colleagues, he had
access to the records at AAF headquarters in Washington and at the AAF
Tactical Center's library at Orlando, Florida, before appearing for a "coordi-
nating rehearsal" of all air force testimony. Weyland's views reflected his own
experience and partnership in the most successful air-ground team of the war.
In response to the report's view that there must be one team with one com-
mander, Weyland affirmed the AAF's view that the theater commander is the
single commander. Moreover, "all offensive combat aircraft must be under
unified air control to permit flexibility of employment." He referred to his own
interview with German Field M arshal von Rundstedt, who had agreed that air-
craft dispersed to corps and divisions could never be concentrated to support
one corps or an army at the expense of another. As for the army's "flying
tank," he argued that this represented nothing more than the kind of dive-
bomber that had been shot out of the sky and abandoned in Europe. The fight-
er-bomber had been developed to meet Army needs, he declared, and it was
"found by actual experience to be better than the slow planes especially
designed for army support." Any aircraft designed for a single purpose loses
flexibility that is essential for successful air operations. He also cited the expe-
rience of the Third A rmy-X IX TAC team as an example of how army support
could be attained and maintained. M oreover, on the sensitive issue of air force
interest in flying close air support, he asserted that U .5. Army ground forces
had "misinterpreted" the meaning of "third priority." Despite the implications
of formal tactical air doctrine, close air support should not be considered third
in importance, but mustfollow air superiority and interdiction missions so that
ground forces "enter [the] battle with hope of success without disproportionate
losses."5o
The War Department's own Equipment Review Board eventually decid-
ed against the Cook Board's recommendations. Instrumental in its decision.
General Eisenhower and key army and corps commanders supported AAF's
views. They agreed that air-ground support in Europe had been more than suf-
ficient to defeat the Germans without a "duplicate air organization for ground
cooperation. "^1 Whilethe War Department considered the merits of views pre-
313
Air Power for Patton's Army
sented by the army ground forces, its evaluation boards completed their stud-
ies of air power's impact in the various theaters. These studies also confirmed
the essential importance of joint operations and cooperation between air and
ground forces, and they recommended that the doctrine and procedures that
had proved so successful be updated accordingly.
General Arnold directed the AAF Evaluation Board to revise FM 31-35
to incorporate the lessons of World War II. The new manual updated sections
of the 1942 version. Aviation in Support of G round F orces, and incorporated
Field Marshal von Rundstedt (right) reviews his troops.
314
An After Action Assessment
portions of FM 100-20, Command and Employment of Air Power, which the
War Department chose not to rescind. The new manual, however, did not have
FM 100-20's stridency; in fact, the authors gave to the revised manual a new,
more neutral title, Air-Ground Operations. H eadquarters A rmy Ground Forces
now was commanded by General Devers, an experienced veteran of the
European theater and sympathetic supporter of air-ground cooperation.
Indeed, the new manual received swift approval from the War Department and
both headquarters, and it was published in August 1946.
Yet would a revised manual and sound doctrine be sufficient to preserve
the lessons of air-ground cooperation of World War II in the absence of good-
will? To be sure, in the postwar period of rapid and massive demobilization
goodwill did not prevail in the competition for declining budgets, lobbying for
an independent Air Force, and a growing emphasis on the strategic nuclear
mission to confront the Soviet Union in the Cold War. In later years interser-
vice rivalry among military leaders would lead to precisely the kind of aerial
duplication that other leaders in the euphoria of victory after the Second World
War argued against. The future would see separate tactical aviation organiza-
tions grow and evolve in the U .S. Army, Navy, and M arine Corps, in addition
to the Air Force.^^
General Bradley called the victory in Europe a victory for combined
arms and joint operations. Though correct, command of the air proved the key
to the campaign. In a sense, everything else flowed from the fundamental fact
that the Allies achieved and maintained air superiority and their enemy had
not. General Weyland realized this as much as any airman. A few years later,
when he assumed command of Far Eastern Air Forces and directed air opera-
tions in Korea, few could match his level of tactical air experience and com-
petence. Yet even Allied air superiority and his impressive background in tac-
tical aviation did not guarantee effective air-ground operations. In fact,
Weyland faced enormous problems in coordinating air-ground operations and
centralizing control of the Air Force, Navy, and M arine air. At the same time,
he struggled to convince the U.S. Army to abandon a traditional view that it
should control its own air forces. As Weyland's official report on the war
observed, "an astounding facet of the Korean War was the number of old
lessons that had to be rel earned. "^'^ That same refrain would be repeated dur-
ing the Vietnam War.
The lesson, of course, is that air superiority by itself does not ensure
either centralized control of air assets by airmen or a proper balance between
interdiction and close air support efforts. Although doctrine may serve well in
principle, no air-ground program can succeed without the cooperation and
goodwill of air and ground commanders and their staffs. Given sufficient
resources, people who will work together toward a commonly shared goal can
turn theory into effective practice. Assessing a later war. General Quesada put
it succinctly: "You can have all the doctrine you want, but unless you have
315
Air Power for Patton's Army
people, commanders, to implement those doctrines, you might as well throw
your doctrines away."^^ Generals Weyland and Patton knew this. Theirs was a
partnership founded on mutual trust, respect, and a common mission-directed
interest. That is the basic lesson from the Second World War for tactical air
power. It is a lesson worth remembering.
316
Notes
Chapter 1
1. On general doctrinal development dur-
ing the interwar period, see Robert F. Futrell,
Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine: Basic Thinking in
the United States Air Force, vol 1,
1907-1964 (Maxwell AFB: Air University,
reprint 1989), pp 1-110; Thomas H. Greer,
The Development of Air Doctrine in the
Army Air Arm, 1917-1941, U SA F H istorical
Studies No. 89 (M axwell AFB: 1955; Wash-
ington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History,
reprint, 1985), passim; Richard G. Davis,
Carl A. Spaatz and the Air War in Europe
(Washington, D.C.: C enter for Air Force His-
tory, 1993), pp 180-193; Daniel R. Morten-
sen, "A Pattern for Joint Operations: World
War II Close Air Support in North Africa,"
Historical Analysis Series (Washington,
D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1994), pp
6-13; Wesley Franl< Craven and James Lea
Cate, eds.. The Army Air Forces in World
War II, vol 1, Plans and Early Operations,
January 1939 to August 1942 (Chicago: Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, 1948; reprint,
Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force His-
tory 1984), pp 17-74; John F. Shiner,
Foulois and the US Army Air Corps,
1931-1935 (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air
Force History, 1983), pp 43-75, 212-235;
William A. Jacobs, "Tactical Air Doctrine
and AAF Close Air Support in the European
Theater, 1944-45," Aerospace Historian
(Mar 1980), pp 35-49.
2. TheA rmy normally delineated the con-
tact zone by what it called the bombline, a
line close to its own forces beyond which
aircraft could attacl< enemy targets without
coordinating with ground commanders.
Despite the confusion that subsequently
would occur in the use of statistical measure-
ments to determine tactical air power's effec-
tiveness during the World War II, officials
found the bombline a good means to distin-
guish between air interdiction and close air
support targets. Only much later, during the
Vietnam era, would planners introduce the
concept of battlefield air interdiction, which
became accepted as a subset of air interdic-
tion. When first introduced, the term battle-
field air interdiction referred to the compo-
nent of the air interdiction mission that sup-
ported army ground forces beyond the range
of their own artillery. See the discussion in
Robert F. Futrell, Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine:
Basic Thinking in the United States Air
Force, vol 2, 1961-1984 (Maxwell AFB:
Air U niversity, reprint 1989), pp 551-555.
3. For the best revisionist interpretation
that legitimately downplays Air Corps
antipathy for close air support operations,
see Daniel R. M ortensen, "Tactical Aviation
Technology Tested in World War II: Keep-
ing DoctrineA breast of Equipment," chap. 3
in "The Low Road to Independence: From
Origins to the Codification of M odern Tacti-
cal Aviation in World War II," unpublished
manuscript, AirForceHistory and M useums
Program, Washington, D.C. See also Wesley
Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, eds.. The
Army Air Forces in World War 1 1, vol 6, M en
and Planes (Chicago: U niversity of Chicago
Press, 1948; reprint, Washington, D.C:
Office of Air Force History 1984), pp
212-214; Greer, Development of Air Doc-
trine, pp 52-57.
4. Greer, Development of Air Doctrine,
pp 49-52; M ortensen. Pattern for Joint
Operations, pp 6-7.
5. Davis, Spaatz, pp 180-181; Greer, De-
velopment of Air Doctrine, pp 40-43; M or-
tensen. Pattern for J oint Operations, p 7.
317
Notes to pages 3-11
6. Mortensen, Pattern for Joint Opera-
tions, pp 11-13; Jacobs, "Tactical Air Doc-
trine," pp 182-184.
7. A later manual, FM 100-5, "Opera-
tions," dated M ay 22, 1941, established mis-
sion priorities and stressed the basic impor-
tance of air superiority as a prerequisite for
effective ground operations. Kent Roberts
Greenfield, Army Ground Forces and the
Air-Ground Battle Team, Including Organic
Light Aviation, U.S. Army Study No. 35
(Washington, D.C.: Historical Div, Depart-
ment of the Army, 1948), pp 1-5; M orten-
sen. Pattern for j oint Operations, pp 11- 13;
Jacobs, "Tactical Air Doctrine," pp 182- 184.
8. Riley Sunderland, Evolution of Com-
mand and Control Doctrine for Close Air
Support (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air
Force History, 1973), pp 7-9; Davis,
Spaatz, pp 185-186; Greenfield, Army
Ground Forces, pp 5-12. Organizationally,
Air Force Combat Command replaced
GHQ AlrForcelnJunel941.
9. Interwar air board reports had shown
that air support commands should support
field armies because the range of their
fighter- bombers could be expected to cover
the frontage of a field army. See War
Department, FM 31-35, "Aviation in Sup-
port of Ground Forces," 9 Apr 1942, paras.
5-9; see also Greenfield, Army Ground
Forces, pp 3-5; Jacobs, "Tactical Air Doc-
trine," pp 38-39; Davis, Spaatz, pp
186-189; Mortensen, Pattern for joint
Operations, pp 20-24.
10. FM 31-35, para. 26(b).
11. Ibid., para. 6.
12. Ibid., para. 31; David Syrett, "North-
west Africa, 1942-1943," In B. Franklin
Cooling, ed., Case Studies In the Achieve-
ment of Air Superiority (Washington, D.C.:
Center for Air Force History, 1993), p 6.
13. FM 31-35, para. 10.
14. Davis, Spaatz, p 189.
15. M ortensen. Pattern for J oint Opera-
tions, pp 47-56; Syrett, "Northwest
Africa," p 10.
16. Mortensen, Pattern for J oint Opera-
tions, pp 47-56; Wesley Frank Craven and
James Lea Gate, eds., The Army Air F orces
In World War II, vol 2, Europe: Torch to
Polntblank, Aug 1942 to Dec 1943 (Chica-
go: University of Chicago Press, 1949;
reprinted, Washington, D.C.: Office of Air
Force History, 1984), pp 50-66.
17. Craven and Gate, eds., vol 2,
Europe: Torch to Polntblank, pp 56-62.
For the ground campaign, see George F.
Howe, Northwest Africa: Seizing the Initia-
tive in the West, [U.S. Army in World War
II, Mediterranean Theater of Operations]
(Washington, D.C.: Office of Chief of M 11-
itary History, 1957).
18. Howe, Northwest Africa, pp 62-69.
The British Western Desert Air Force, with
headquarters In Egypt, was not a component
of the Allied Air Force headquartered in
Algeria.
19. Craven and Gate, eds., vol 2,
Europe: Torch to Polntblank, pp 136-145.
The Luftwaffe maintained a close air sup-
port strength of 300-330 ai rcraftfrom early
January to mId-Aprll 1943. See Air Min-
istry (Great Britain), The Rise and Fall of
the German Air Force, 1933-1945 (Old
Greenwich, Conn.: WE Inc., 1969), p 250.
20. M ortensen. Pattern for j oint Opera-
tions, p 69.
21. Germany's Field Marshal Erwin
Rommel, the "Desert Fox," mounted a sur-
prise attack in central Tunisia against II
Corps positions first In Fald Pass on Febru-
ary 14, 1943 and then at Kasserine four
days later Although the Allies rallied and
pushed back the German advance on Feb-
ruary 23, theAxIsoffensive wrecked Allied
plans to divide German forces by thrusting
eastward Into Tunisia. Inexperienced
American troops suffered more than 6,000
casualties compared with 989 German and
535 Italian casualties. See Howe, North-
west Africa, pp 438-481; Mortensen, Pat-
tern for Joint Operations, pp 153-161;
Sunderland, Evolution, pp 11- 12.
22. Vincent Orange, Conlngham: A
Biography of Air M arshal Sir Arthur Con-
lngham (Washington, D.C.: Center for Air
Force History, 1992 reprint), chap. 10;
318
Notes to pages 11-20
Mortensen, Pattern for Joint Operations,
pp 72-73. Kuter continued to serve in tiie
command as Coningiiam's deputy.
23. The incident provoi<ed a crisis in
Allied and joint reiations. Apparently tiie
tineater commander, General Eisenlnower,
tfireatened to resign over the issue. For addi-
tional discussion of thisaffair, seeGeorgeS.
Patton, D iary E ntri es, A pr 1-4, 1943, Patton
Collection, Box 3, Manuscript Division
(M D), Library of Congress (LC). The diary
account in the collection includes the offi-
cial messages. See also Martin Blumenson,
ed.. The Patton Papers, vol 2 (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin, 1974), pp 203-208;
Orange, Coningham, pp 146- 147; Laurence
S. Kuter, "GoddamitGeorgie: North Africa,
1943: The Birth of TAC Doctrine," Air
Force Magazine vol 56 (Feb 1973), p 55;
Craven and Cate, eds., vol 2, Europe: Torch
to Pointblank, pp 174-175; Mortensen,
Pattern for J oint Operations, pp 84-85.
24. A.F. Hurley and R.C. Ehrhart, eds.,
"The Perceptions of Three Mai<ers of Air
Power History," Air Power and Warfare,
proceedings of the 8th Military History
Symposium, United States Air Force Acad-
emy, 18-20 October 1973 (Washington,
D.C.: Office of Air Force History and the
United States Air Force Academy, 1979), p
109; Syrett, "Northwest Africa,
1942- 1943," pp 153- 192; M ortensen, P at-
tern for J oint Operations, pp 4-5.
25. Craven and Cate, eds., vol 2,
Europe: Torch to Pointblank, pp 113-115,
161-165.
26. "Some Notes on the Use of Air
Power in Support of Land Operations,
Introduced by B.L. Montgomery, Dec
1944," USAFHRA, 168.6006-137; see
also Air Marshal Sir Arthur Coningham,
"The Development of Tactical A ir Forces,"
Journal of the Royal United Service Institu-
tion vol 91 (May 1946), p 215; Davis,
Spaatz, p 311.
27. M ortensen. Pattern for J oint Opera-
tions, p 85; Davis, Spaatz, p 321.
28. M ortensen. Pattern for j oint Opera-
tions, p 86; Craven and Cate, eds., Europe:
Torch to Pointblank, vol 2, pp 166-206.
29. Memo, Brig Gen L.S. Kuter, Dep
Comdr, Northwest African Tactical Air
Force, to H.H. Arnold, CG AAF, Subject:
"Organization of American Air Forces,"
May 12, 1943, USAFHRA, 614.201-1; for
events, see Craven and Cate, eds., Europe:
Torch to Pointblank, vol 2, pp 47-56.
30. M ortensen. Pattern for J oint Opera-
tions, pp 47-56.
31. Memo, Kuter, "Organization of
American Air Forces."
32. Davis, Spaatz, pp 312-315.
33. War Department, FM 100-20, "Com-
mand and Employment of Air Power," July
21, 1943, paras. 3, 9(e); Jacobs, "Tactical
Air Doctrine," pp 39-40.
34. FM 100-20, paras. 1, 2, and 3. The
manual at no time used the word "support"
to characterize the AAF's role in air-
ground operations. Instead, it termed the air
element "coordinate" forces that must not
be distributed among or subordinated to
ground elements. A Ithough the manual per-
mitted one exception, a theater situation in
which "GROUND FORCE UNITS ARE
OPERATING INDEPENDENTLY OR
ARE ISOLATED BY DISTANCE OR
LACK OF COMMUNICATION," tactical
air operations in Northwest Europe
required far more decentralized command
and control arrangements than the manual's
authors envisioned.
35. Ibid., para 2.
36. Ibid., para 16.
37. Ibid.
38. Davis, Spaatz, p 322.
39. Ibid., pp 312-314; Greenfield, Army
Ground Forces, pp 47-50.
40. For example, M emo, Kuter, "Organi-
zation of A merican Air Forces."
319
Notes to pages 21-29
Chapter 2
1. The description of Patton's career that
follows is based for the most part on
Claude S. Erbsen, "Old Blood and Guts,"
Weel<ly Philatelic Gossip (Nov 21, 1953),
pp 366-368; and "Biographical Notes on
Gen George S. Patton, Jr.," in the Patton
Collection, Box 5, Chronological File, M D,
LC. See also Martin Blumenson, Patton:
The Man Behind the Legend, 1885-1945
(New Yorl<: William Morrow, 1985); and
Blumenson, ed., Patton Papers.
2. U.S. Third Army (hereafter cited as
US3A), "After Action Report, Aug 1,
1944- May 9, 1945," vol 2: Staff Section
Reports, Part 4: "G-3 Section Report"; Blu-
menson, ed., Patton Papers, p 407. On
Operation Fortitude, seeAlfred D. Chandler,
ed.. The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhow-
er: The War Years, vol 3 (Baltimore: Johns
Hopl<ins University Press, 1970), pp 1789,
1978- 1979, 2035; and Chester Wilmot, The
Struggle for Europe (New Yorl<: Harper &
Row, 1952), pp 199-201, 332-333. See also
Charles Cruickshank, Deception in World
War II (N ew York: Oxford U niversity Press,
1979), pp 170-189, 235-236.
3. "84th Fighter Wing" lineage and hon-
ors history in Maurer Maurer, ed.. Air
Force Combat Units of World War II
(Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force
H istory, 1983), pp 407-408. On Weyland's
career, see Intvw, Gen O.P. Weyland by
James C. Hasdorff, Nov 19, 1974,
USAFHRA, K239.0512-813; Ninth AF
(hereafter cited as 9AF), "Biographies,"
1944, USAFHRA, 533.293, 1944-45;
"Biographical Sketch," n.d., USAFHRA,
168.7104-103; XIX TAC, "History of XIX
Tactical Air Command," Dec 4, 1943-Jun
30, 1944, USA F-HRA, 537.01, 1943-44.
4. Blumenson, Patton: M an Behind Leg-
end, especially the preface and chaps. 1
and 10.
5. Blumenson, ed., Patton Papers, pp,
354-355; Blumenson, Patton: Man Behind
Legend, p 216.
6. Thomas J. Mayock, "Notes on the
Development of AAF Tactical Air Doc-
trine," M ilitary Affairs vol 14 (Winterl950),
p 187.
7. Intvw, Weyland, Nov 19, 1974, p 140.
8. Intvw, Gen James Ferguson by Lyn R.
Officer and James C. Hasdorff, May 8-9,
1973, USAFHRA, K 239.0512-672, p 129.
9. George S. Patton, Jr., War As I Knew
It (Boston: Houghton M ifflin, 1947), p 99.
10. William C. Stancik and R. Cargill
Hall, "Air Force ROTC: Its Origins and
Early Years," Air U niversity Review vol 35
No. 5 (Jul-Aug 1984), p 42.
11. For the background of Operation
Overlord, see Gordon A. Harrison, Cross-
Channel Attack, [U.S. Army in World War II:
Mediterranean Theater of Operations!
(Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of
Military History, 1951); John Keegan, Six
Armies in Normandy (New York: Viking
Press, 1982); Carlo D'Este, Decision in Nor-
mandy (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1983); Tho-
mas E. Griess, ed., vol 1, The Second World
War: E urope and the M editerranean (Wayne,
N.J.: Avery Publishing Group, 1984), pp
253-281; Charles B . M acDonald and M artin
Blumenson, "Recovery of France," in Vin-
cent J. Esposito, ed., A Concise History of
World War II (New York: Praeger, 1964), pp
70-85; and Charles B. M acDonald, The
M ighty Endeavor: The American War in Eu-
rope (New York: Ouill, 1986), pp 269-284.
12. HQ AAF, Condensed Analysis of
Ninth Air Force in the European Theater of
Operations (Washington, D.C.: Office of
Air Force H istory, 1984), pp 49-55; Wesley
Frank Craven and James Lea C ate, eds., The
Army Air Forces in World War II, vol 3,
Europe: Argument to V-E Day, January
1944- May 1945 (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1951; reprint, Washington,
D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1983), pp
107-121; RptCol H.J. Knerr, Dep,AirSup-
portCommand (ASC) toCG,AAF, "Report
on M anpower and Shipping Requirements,"
320
Notes to pages 29-32
prepared by Bradley Committee, Jun 23,
1943, USA FHRA, 612-201A.
13. Rpt,Col PhilipColeetal., VIII ASC
to HQ, 8AF, "Observers Report: Air Oper-
ations in Support of Ground Forces in
North West Africa, March 15-April 5,
1943," Jul 1, 1943, USA FHRA, 650.03-2
[hereafter cited as Rpt, 8AF, "Observers
Report" (1943)]. I am indebted to Edgar
Raines for pointing out that the range of air-
craft provided the air-ground organization
with the logic for pairing tactical air com-
mands with field armies, numbered air
forces with army groups, and strategic air
forces under the theater commander. The
interwar Air Board reports made this clear,
and air and ground leaders established this
standard for World War II. Accordingly,
evaluators deemed the range of a tactical ai r
command's fighter- bombers sufficient to
cover a field army's frontage, and they test-
ed this concept in the 1941 air-ground
maneuvers. M emo, Edgar R. Raines, Histo-
rian, A rmy Center of M ilitary History, M ay
20, 1991. See also HO AAF, Condensed
Analysis of Ninth AF , p 50; John F. Ramsey,
Ninth Air F orce in the ETC, Oct 16, 1943 to
Apr 16, 1944, USA F Historical Studies No.
32 (Washington, D.C.: AAF Historical
Office, 1945), pp 1-29, 49-65, and appen-
dix 1, pp 198-208.
On doctrinal and organizational analyses
during the interwar period, seeFutrell, Ideas,
Concepts, Doctrine, vol 1, 1907-1960, pp
1-110; Greer, Development of Air Doctrine,
passim; Davis, Spaatz, pp 180-193;
M ortensen. Pattern for ] oint Operations, pp
6-13; Craven and Cate, eds., vol 1, Plans
and Early Operations, pp 17-74; Shiner,
Foulols, pp 43-75, 212-235.
14. Rpt, 8AF, "Observers Report"
(1943), p 37.
15. Ibid., p 40.
16. Ibid., p 4.
17. Ibid., pp 20, 40. In organizing the cru-
cial air-ground support effort and in estab-
lishing the procedures for its practice in that
theater, the experience already acquired in
combat proved far more significant in shap-
ing action than did the doctrinal pronounce-
ments from army headquarters in Washing-
ton, D.C., important as the latter might be.
Despite the publication of FM 100-20
(1943), army air and ground leaders in the
field relied on what worked, on common
sense, and on the more practical FM 31-35
(1942) when ordering their cooperative
air-ground operations. For air operations in
Sicily and Italy, see Alan F. Wilt, "Allied
Cooperation in Sicily and Italy, 1943-45," in
B. Franklin Cooling, ed.. Case Studies in the
Development of Close Air Support (Wash-
ington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History,
1990), pp 193-236; Harry L. Coles, Partici-
pation of the Ninth and Twelfth Air Forces in
the Sicilian Campaign, USAF Historical
Studies No. 37 (Washington, D.C.: AAF
Historical Office, 1945); Carlo D'Este, Bit-
ter Victory: The Battle for Sicily, 1943 (New
York: E. P. Dutton, 1988); and Craven and
Cate, eds., vol 2, Europe: Torch to Point-
blank, pp 415-596. For Patton's comments,
see Memo, LtGen Carl Spaatz, CG, NAAF
to M aj Gen Barney Giles, C/S, AAF, Sep 12,
1943, Arnold Collection, File 1938-46,
370.2 (Africa) (34), Box 104, MD, LC.
Although Ninth Air Force pilots preparing
for the invasion of France benefited from
observing air operations in Italy, they con-
sidered most innovations like the Rover Joe
land-based air force controller system less
applicable for the mobile operations they
expected in Northwest Europe. Intvw, Wey-
land, Nov 19, 1974; Ltr, Maj Gen Robert L.
Delashaw, 405th FG Comdr, to author, Aug
21, 1989.
18. HO AAF, Condensed Analysis of
Ninth AF , p 50; Ramsey, Ninth Air Force, pp
1-29, 49-65; and appendix 1, pp 198-208.
19. W. A. J acobs, "Air Command in the
United Kingdom, 1933-44," journal of
Strategic Studies, vol 11 (Mar 88), pp
51-78; D'Este, Decision In Normandy, p
213.
20. Jacobs, "Air Command," pp 62-64;
Lewis H. Brereton, The Brereton Diaries
(New York: William Morrow, 1946), pp
213-276.
321
Notes to pages 33-38
21. HQ 12th Army Group, "Brief of
Joint Operations Plan— U.S. Forces for
Operation Overlord (revised May 8,
1944)," in RG 331, Records of Allied
Operational and Occupation Headquarters,
WWII, File 1943-45, 370.2, Box 85, NA.
22. For the often bewildering array of
organizational changes from December
1943 to May 1944, see XIX TAG, "Histo-
ry," Dec 4, 1943-Jun 30, 1944; Ramsey,
Ninth Air Force, appendix 1, pp 198-208;
and John Schlight, "Elwood R. Ouesada:
TAG Air Gomes of Age," in John L. Fris-
bee, ed., M akers of the M odern Air Force
(Washington, D.G.: Office of Air Force
History, 1987), pp 177-198.
23. Schlight, "Elwood R. Ouesada," pp
177-198.
24. XIX TAG, "History," Dec 4, 1943-
Jun 30, 1944; War Department: The Adju-
tant General's Office, Official Army Regis-
ter, Jan 1, 1945 (Washington, D.G.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1945).
25. Eugene M. Greenberg, XIX TAG
Signal Office, "Signals: The Story of Gom-
munications in the XIX Tactical Air Gom-
mand up to V-E Day," Jun 15, 1945,
USAFHRA 537.901; XIX TAG, "A Report
on the Gombat Operations of the X IX Tac-
tical Air Gommand," May 30, 1945, pp
18-23, USAFHRA, 537.02, 1945; George
R. Thompson and Dixie R. Harris, The Sig-
nal Corps: The Outcome, Mid-1943
through 1945 [U.S. Army in World War IIJ
(Washington, D.G.: Office of the Ghief of
M ilitary History, 1966), chap. 4.
26. X IX TAG, "Tactical Air Operations in
Europe:A Report on Employment of Fighter-
Bombers, Reconnaissance and Night Fighter
Aircraft by XIX Tactical Air Gommand,
Ninth Air Force, in Connection with the
Third US Army Campaign from 1 August
1944 to V E D ay 9 M ay 1945," M ay 19, 1945,
pp 39-41, USAFHRA, 537.04A, 1945;
Blanche D. Coll, Jean E. Keith, and Herbert
H. Rosenthal, The Corps of Engineers:
Troops and Equipment, [U.S. Army in World
War II] (Washington, D.C.: Center of M ilitary
H istory, 1958), chap. 14, pp 25, 56, 60.
27. XIX TAG, "History," Dec 4, 1943-
Jun 30, 1944; 9AF, "Annual Statistical
Summary, 1944," USAFHRA, 533.3083,
1944.
28. XIX TAG, "History," Dec 4, 1943-
Jun 30, 1944. See also the monthly histo-
ries of the individual flying groups for pre-
cise manning and aircraft statistics.
29. Rpt, AAF Evaluation Board, ETO,
"Effectiveness of Third-Phase Tactical Air
Operations in the ETO, 4 M ay 1944 to 8
May 1945," pp 305-308, USAFHRA,
138.4-36, Aug 1945 (hereafter cited as
AAF Eval Bd, "Third Phase Tactical Air
Ops"); U.S. Forces, European Theater, Bat-
tle Studies, vol 2: Air Operations, No. 14:
"Fighter-Bomber Cooperation" (USFET,
n.d.), US Army Military History Institute
(MHI).
30. N inth Air Force's procurement prob-
lem worsened initially when General Oue-
sada, among others, agreed to have project-
ed P-51S sent to the Eighth Air Force
where they could be better used as fighter
escorts for the heavy bombers in the strug-
gle for air supremacy. U ntil late spring, the
Ninth had to make do with the Eighth's
cast-off P-47 "clinkers." By D-Day, how-
ever, the Ninth began receiving the D25
and D27 Thunderbolts, which had paddle-
blade propellers, bubble canopies, and larg-
er fuel tanks. These Thunderbolt models
became famous in the battle for France.
Likewise, new P-51Ds arrived in late
spring, and this model, with its teardrop
plexiglass canopy and extra gun in each
wing, proved more than a match for the
German FW 190 and Bf 109 aircraft. Sup-
ply procedures in Britain called for com-
mon user items to be sent to units through
Army supply channels, while specialized
air forces' items were supplied through air
forces channels but under USSTAF aus-
pices. In practice, both channels broke
down and supply officials often resorted to
informal cooperation. See XIX TAG, "His-
tory," Dec 4, 1943-Jun 30, 1944; Craven
and Gate, eds., vol 3, Europe: Argument to
V-E Day, pp 631-664; Rpt, IX Fighter
322
Notes to pages 39-45
Command, A-4, n.d., Quesada Collection,
B ox 3, M D , LC ; M emo, 9A F, J an 29, 1944,
USAFHRA, 168.6005-1033; Intvw, Lt
Gen El wood R. Quesada by Steve Long
and Ralph Stephenson, May 1975,
USAFHRA, K239.0512-838.
31. XIX TAC, "History," Dec 4, 1943-
J un 30, 1944.
32. Ibid.
33. Ramsey, Nintti Air Force, pp 91-94,
101-107; XIX TAC, "History," Dec 4,
1943-Jun 30, 1944; IX TAC, "Unit Histo-
ry," Apr 1944, USAFHRA, 536.02, Apr
1944, May 1944; Intvw, Lt Gen John J.
Burns, USAF (Ret) by the author, Jan 7,
1992. General Quesada's range program set
the stage for extensive collaboration with
civilian technicians on the continent. Ulti-
mately, each tactical air command pos-
sessed an Operational Research Section
that applied scientific and engineering
expertise to tactical air power problems.
34. 9AF, "Weel<ly Intelligence Sum-
maries" (hereafter cited as "Weel<ly
I ntsum"), N ov 3, 1943-J un 1, 1944, U SA F-
HRA, 533.607, 1944-45; 9AF, "Opera-
tional Statistics," Jan 1, 1944-Jun 1, 1944,
USAFHRA, 533.3082, 1944.
35. Craven and Gate, eds., vol 3, Europe:
Argument to V-E Day, chap. 2; Air M inistry
(Great Britain), German Air Force, chap.
13; MacDonald, Mighty Endeavor, pp
266-268.
36. 9AF, "Weel<ly Intsum"; 9AF, "Oper-
ational Statistics"; IX TAC, "Unit History,"
A pr 1944, p 4; XIX TAC, "History," Dec 4,
1943-Jun 30, 1944. Ninth Air Force lead-
ers successfully promoted a vigorous pro-
gram to upgrade the status of fighter-
bomber achievements in the Northwest
European campaign. After the invasion,
combat experience found the fighter-
bomber employed far more often as a
bomber than as a fighter, significantly alter-
ing the fighter-bomber pilot's image.
37. Robert H. George, Ninth Air Force,
Apr to Nov 1944, USAF Historical Studies
No. 36 (Washington, D.C.: AAF Historical
Office, 1945), pp 30-49.
38. George, Ninth AF, pp 52-60; AAF
Eval Bd, "Third Phase Tactical AirOps," pp
48-49; Craven and Gate, eds., vol 3,
Europe: Argumentto V-E Day, pp 139-140.
39. XIX TAC, "History," Dec 4, 1943-
Jun 30, 1944. By mid-April, XIX TAC was
deployed at the following airstrips in Kent:
Unit
100th FtrWing
354th FtrGp
358th FtrGp
362d FtrGp
363d FtrGp
303d FtrWing
36th FtrGp
373d FtrGp
406th FtrGp
L ocation
Lashenden ALG
Lashenden ALG
High Halden ALG
Headcorn ALG
StaplehurstALG
Ashford ALG
Kingsnorth ALG
Woodchurch ALG
Ashford ALG
40. Ibid.
41. Schlight, "Elwood R. Ouesada," p
189.
42. HO AAF, AAF Ltr 80-3, "Air
Employment Terminology," Nov 16, 1944,
Arnold Collection, File 1938-46, Box 104,
MD, LC.
43. See for example, X IX TAC, "Com-
bat Operations," May 30, 1945, introduc-
tion.
44. IX TAC, "Unit History," Apr 1944,
p4.
45. Cooperative efforts between the First
Army and IX TAC fell short of collocating
their headquarters. For details on the lecture
program, see Ramsey, Ninth Air Force, p
104; Rpt, IX Fighter Command, A-3, n.d.,
Ouesada Collection, Box 3, MD, LC; IX
ASC, "Reference Guide on Tactical Employ-
ment of Air Power Organization and Control
Channels of Tactical U nits. Prepared Oct 29,
1943, revised Feb 24, 1944," USAFHRA,
168.6005- 103A, Feb 25,1944.
46. US3A, "After Action Report, Aug 1,
1944-May 9, 1945," vol 2: Staff Section
Reports, part 3: "G-2 Section Report," pp
4-5; XIX TAC, "History," Dec 4, 1943-
Jun 30, 1944.
47. US3A, "After Action Rpt," vol 2,
part 3: "G-2 Section Rpt," pp 5-7.
323
Notes to pages 45-58
48. Rpt, IX Fighter Command, A-3.
49. Intvw, Weyland, Nov 19, 1974, pp
64-76; XIX TAC, "History," Dec 4, 1943-
Jun 30, 1944.
50. Patton, Diary Entries, May 26, 27,
1944.
51. Blumenson, ed., Patton Papers, p 30.
52. Rpt, HQ Seventin Army, "Notes on
the Sicilian Campaign," Oct 30, 1943.
53. Ibid., p 6.
54. Ibid., p 12.
55. Ibid., Annex, p 2.
56. Intvw, Weyland, Nov 19, 1974, pp
67, 76.
57. M emo, Raines, M ay 20, 1991.
58. Ltr, Gen Sir B.L. M ontgomery to Lt
Gen George S. Patton, Jr., May 4, 1944,
Patton Collection, Box 14, M D, LC.
59. Ltr, LtGen George S. Patton, Jr., to
Gen Sir B.L. Montgomery, May 7, 1944,
Patton Collection, Box 14, M D, LC.
60. Omar N. Bradley, A Soldier's Story
(New York: Henry Holt, 1951), p 249.
Despite B radley's understandable irritation,
Brereton did not refuse joint training
because he preferred other missions before
close air support. His background in tactical
operations, his experience with the British
in the M iddle East, and his offer to conduct
such training in M ay argue to the contrary.
Moreover, he assigned Major General
Ralph Royce, his deputy commander, to
serve as N i nth A i r F orce I i ai son off i cer w ith
General Bradley on board theUSS Augusta
command ship during the invasion. Later,
Royce would accompany Bradley ashore
when the First Army commander estab-
lished his Normandy command post. See
Rpt, Col Philip Cole, "Air Planning for
Overlord," Aug 8, 1944, USAFHRA,
248.411-16, 1944.
61. For narrative and analysis of the
landing and Normandy campaign, see Har-
rison, Cross-Channel Attack; Martin Blu-
menson, Breakoutand Pursuit, [U.S. Army
in World War II: European Theater of
Operaions] (Washington, D.C.: Office of
the Chief of Military History, 1965);
D'Este, Decision in Normandy; Griess, ed..
vol 1, Second World War, pp 253-281;
MacDonald, Mighty Endeavor, pp
241-319.
62. AAF Eval Bd, "Third PhaseTactical
A ir Ops," pp 65-75; Craven and Gate, eds.,
vol 3, Europe: Argument to V-E Day, pp
185-199; George, Ninth AF, pp 76-81.
63. HO 12th Army Group, "Joint Opera-
tions Plan"; AAF Eval Bd, "Third Phase
Tactical Air Ops," pp 62-63; 9AF, "Weekly
Intsum"; 9AF, "Operational Statistics." See
also W. A. Jacobs, "The Battle for France,"
in Cooling, ed.. Close Air Support, pp
237-293; Col E.L. Johnson, G-3 (Air),
FUSA to AGF (Army Ground Forces)
Board, HO ETOUSA, "Information Regard-
ing Air-Ground Joint Operations," Jul 16,
1944, RG 337, Entry 29, Box 51, NA.
64. IX TAC, "Unit History," June 1944,
p 2, USAFHRA, 536.02, J un 1944; AAF
Eval Bd, "Third PhaseTactical Air Ops,"
pp 65-75; Craven and Gate, eds., vol 3,
Europe: Argument to V-E Day, pp
185-199; George, Ninth AF, pp 76-81.
65. IX TAC, "Unit History," Jun 1944;
XIX TAC, "History of theXIX Tactical Air
Command," J ul 1, 1944-Feb 28, 1945, part
2, Operations Narrative, USAFHRA,
537.01, 1944-45; George, Ninth AF, pp
97-98.
66. For the Cherbourg campaign, see
George, Ninth AF, pp 101-108; AAF Eval
Bd, "Third Phase Tactical Air Ops," pp
75-76; Craven and Gate, eds., vol 3,
Europe: Argument to V-E Day, pp
199-204; and Memo, Brig Gen D. M.
Schlatter, Dep C/S-Opns, 9AF, to CG,
USSTAF, "Report on Cherbourg Attack,
Jul 21, 1944," Spaatz Collection, Box 164,
M D, LC.
67. Memo, Brig Gen Schlatter, to
U SSTAF, "Report on Cherbourg Attack."
68. This analysis is based on Rpt, Col E.
L.Johnson,G-3(Air),FUSA toAGF Board,
HQ ETOUSA, "Information Regarding Air-
Ground Joint Operations," J ul 16, 1944, RG
337, Entry 29, Box 51, NA (hereafter cited as
"Johnson Report,"). See also First Army
(hereafter cited as USIA) G-3 (Air), "Air
324
Notes to pages 58-64
Support Report, 6 Aug 1944," USAFHRA,
533.4501-3, May-Aug 1944. Military des-
ignations for A rmy air specialists were G-2
(Air), Army air intelligence, and G-3 (Air),
A rmy air operations. For the airmen, intelli-
gence was termed A-2 and operations A-3,
except at the squadron level, which used S-2
and S-3, respectively.
69. "SCR" designated a Signal Corps
Radio. For air support party liaison com-
munications, Weyland's command relied
primarily on the long-range SCR-399, a
400-watt mobile HF set paired with a
SCR-624 VHF set operating on 110 volts.
H alf-tracks transported the equipment with
armored divisions, while 2y2-ton trucks
operated with the infantry. The SCR-399
100-mile range radio replaced the less
durable SCR-299 early in the campaign,
while the SCR-624, an adaptation of the
SCR-522 for ground use, provided a 130-
mile line-of-sight range from ground to
plane. The command used ground force
land lines with the HF radio for standby
during static situations, but it relied on HF
sets for mobile operations for requesting
air missions, passing bomblines, field
orders, weather reports, and operations
results. The VHF radio remained the main-
stay for contacting aircraft, adjusting
artillery fire, and receiving immediate
"flash" reconnaissance reports. See also
Greenberg, "Signals"; X IX TAC, "Combat
Operations," May 30, 1945, pp 18-23;
Thompson and Harris, Signal Corps, chap.
4.
70. IX TAC, "Unit History," Jul 1-31,
1944, pp 12-13, USAFHRA, 536.02, July
1944.
71. Ibid.; 9AF, "Reconnaissance in the
Ninth Air Force: A Report on Reconnais-
sance Operations During the European
Campaign," pp 21-27, n.d. [M ay 9, 19451,
MHI;AAF Eval Bd, "Third Phase Tactical
Ops," pp 346-350.
72. See FM 100-20, para 16. See also
FM 31-35, para 10.
73. J ohnson Report.
74. IX TAC, "Unit History," July 1944,
p 14; Rpt, IX TAC, A-3, n.d., Quesada
Collection, Box 3, M D, LC.
75. IX Engineer Command completed
six airfields inj une. See George, Ninth AF ,
pp 99-101; AAF Eval Bd, "Third Phase
Tactical Ops," p 67; 9AF, "Progress
Report, Airfield Construction," July 24,
1944, USAFHRA, 168.7104-83.
76. IX TAC, "Unit History," July 1944,
p 7; Thompson and Harris, Signal Corps,
pp 102-104, 433-435. See also Thompson
and Harris chap. 4, pp 174-176, for a dis-
cussion of the modified SCR-584 intro-
duced by Weyland's command in the fall
of 1944.
77. IX TAC, "Unit History," July 1944,
pp 7-8.
78. Ibid., p 8; 513th Fighter Sqdn, "Unit
History Report for Period Ending Jul 31,
1944, " USAFHRA, GP-406-H I.
79. George, Ninth AF, chaps. 3, 4; XIX
TAC, "History," July 1, 1944-Feb 28,
1945, pt. 2.
80. In June 1944 planners reshuffled
reconnaissance units to support the larger
visual and photographic requests. The
newly designated 10th Photo Reconnais-
sance Group sent two of its four photo
squadrons to the 67th Tactical Reconnais-
sance Group in return for the 12th and 15th
Tactical Reconnaissance Squadrons. Each
group now had two photo and two recon-
naissance squadrons. On J une 16, the 10th
joined the XIX TAC, but remained under
IX TAC control until after XIX TAC
became operational with Third Army. See
IX TAC, "Unit History," June 1944. See
also Thomas G. Ivie, Aerial Reconnais-
sance: The 10th Photo Recon Group in
World War II (Fallbrook, Calif.: Aero Pub-
lishers, 1981), pp 37-38; Ltr, Brig Gen
Russell A. Berg, USA F (Ret) to author, Sep
6, 1989.
81. George, Ninth AF, p 91.
82. AAF Eval Bd, "Third Phase Tactical
Ops," p 1. See also chapter 1 in "Third
Phase Tactical Ops" for a discussion of the
325
Notes to pages 65-73
more contemporary concept of Battlefield
Air Interdiction.
83. Rpt, 8AF, "Observers Report" (1943).
84. George, Ninth A F, p 149.
85. 9AF, "Report on Activities of the
Ninth Air Force, period Jun 6-Aug 28,
1944," p 9, USAFHRA, 533.306-2, 1944.
86. For Weyland's awareness of the
problem, seeXIX TAG, "Twelve-Thousand
Fighter-Bomber Sorties: XIX Tactical Air
Gommand's First Month of Operations in
Support of Third US Army in France," Sep
30, 1944, "Recapitulation," USAFHRA,
168.7104-69.
87. Memo, Brig Gen Schlatter to
USSTAF, "Rpt on Gherbourg Attack," p 5.
88. George, Ninth AF, p 118.
89. XIX TAG, "History," Jul 1, 1944-
Feb 28, 1945, pt 2; US3A, "After Action
Rpt," vol 2, part 3: "G-2 Section Rpt," pp
8-9; Gmd, p 2; G-3, p 11.
90. US3A, "After Action Rpt," vol 2,
part 3: "G-2 Section Rpt," p 8.
91. Ibid., p 9; II, Gmd, p 2; II, G-3, p 9;
Rpt, IX TAG, G-3 (Air), n.d., Quesada
Gollection, Box 5, M D, LG.
92. On Operation Gobra, see D'Este,
Decision in Normandy, part 3; Blumenson,
Breakout and Pursuit, part 3; Russell F.
Weigley, Eisenhower's Lieutenants: The
Campaigns of France and Germany,
1944-45 (Bloomington: Indiana U niversity
Press, 1981), chap. 8; Bradley, Soldier's
Story, chap. 17.
93. AAF Eval Bd, "Third Phase Tactical
Air Ops," pp 85-94; Graven and Gate, eds.,
vol 3, Europe: Argument to V-E Day, pp
228-238; IX TAG, "Unit History," July
1944, pp 2-5; Rpt, 12th Army Group, Air
E f f ects G 0 m m i ttee, " E f f ect of A i r P o w er o n
Military Operations, Western Europe," 15
July 1945, pp 102-105, MHI (hereafter
cited as Rpt, Air Effects Committee, "Effect
of Air Power").
94. Intvw, Ouesada, May 12, 1975; IX
TAG, "Unit History," July 1944, pp 2-5;
Graven and Gate, eds., vol 3, Europe: Argu-
ment to V-E Day, pp 238-243; Schlight,
"Elwood R. Ouesada," pp 177-198.
95. U SIA "Air Support Report," A ug 6,
1944, pp 10-11; 9AF, "Weekly I ntelligence
Summary," Jul 24-31, 1944; 9AF, "Opera-
tional Statistics," J ul 24-31, 1944.
96. XIX TAG, "History," Jul 1, 1944-
Feb 28, 1945, pt. 2; B lumenson, ed., Patton
Papers, pp 489-493.
Chapter 3
1. Weyland began a daily diary on July
29, 1944, which is indispensable to an
understanding of X IX TAG operations. See
Otto P. Weyland, "Diary,J ul 29, 1944- M ay
18, 1945," USAFHRA, 168.7104-1,
1944-45. For an overview of the campaign
in France, see Weigley, Eisenhower's Lieu-
tenants; Blumenson, Breakoutand Pursuit;
D'Este, Decision in Normandy; Graven and
Gate, eds., vol 3, Europe: Argument to V-E
Day, chap. 8.
2. This discussion of the drive across
France is based in large part on the Weyland
diary and the following: US3A, "After
Action Rpt," vol 1, Aug and Sep Ops; XIX
TAG, "12,000 FB Sorties" Sep 30, 1944;
XIX TAG, "History," Jul 1, 1944-Feb 28,
1945, part 2; Blumenson, ed., Patton
Papers, pp 494-560; US3A, "After Action
Rpt," vol 1, Aug 1, 1944; and Weyland,
"Diary," Aug 1, 1944. The fighter groups
seem to have been assigned on the basis of
their location and current operational com-
mitment.
3. U S3A , "A fter A ction Rpt," vol 1, A ug
1, 1944; Weyland, "Diary," Aug 1, 1944.
4. For a discussion of XIX TAG'S com-
munication systems, see XIX TAG, "Com-
bat Operations," pp 18-22; Greenberg,
"Signals"; XIX TAG, "CombatOperations,"
326
Notes to pages 73-86
M ay 30, 1945, pp 18-23; and Thompson and
Harris, Signal Corps, cfiap. 4.
5. Weyland, "Diary," Aug 1, 1944; XIX
TAC, "12,000 FB Sorties," Aug 1, 1944.
Tfie first weel< was a transitional period
marl<ed by a gradual buildup of forces. See
XIX TAC, "Morning Summaries," Aug
8-Sep 30, 1944, USAFHRA, 537.306A,
Aug-Sep 1944.
6. XIX TAC, "History," Jul 1, 1944-Feb
28, 1945, part2; XIX TAC, "12,000 FB Sor-
ties," pp 1-6. Normally, tiie figiiter control
center (later renamed tiie tactical control
center), or the ground controller, would pro-
vide new bombline information to pilots.
7. 1 ntvw, Weyland, N ov 19, 1974, p 143.
Air liaison officers assigned to ground units
were initially called Air Support Party Offi-
cers, and later Tactical Air Party Officers.
8. Criticism of Patton's generalship is
found in Weigley, Eisenhower's Lieu-
tenants, pp 243-245.
9. For Weyland's views, see XIX TAC,
"Combat Operations," p 43; On the air
umbrella concept, see FM 100-20, sec 3
paral6a(3)b.(l),pll.
10. The phrase is the XIX TAC histori-
an's.
11. 9AF, "Schedule of Operations, Aug
2, 1944," U SA F H RA , 533.3082, A ug 1944.
12. XIX TAC, "12,000 FB Sorties," pp
1-6. Lt John J. Burns, a 371st Fighter
Group pilot, recalled that pilots served as
air liaison officers with the ground units,
but only exclusively after the drive east. In
Brittany, his main air control officer was a
former armor officer. Lieutenant Burns
considered the air control officer, who
eventually was killed at Brest, an outstand-
ing air-ground liaison officer. See I ntvw, Lt
Gen John J. Burns by Hugh N. Ahmann,
Jun 5-8, 1984, and Jan 1986, reel no.
41509, USAFHRA, K239.0512-1587, pp
21-27; I ntvw. Burns, Jan 7, 1992.
13. XIX TAC, "12,000 FB Sorties," pp
1-6; Intvw, Burns, Jun 5-8, 1984, p 14;
I ntvw. Burns, Jan 7, 1992.
14. XIX TAC, "Combat Operations," pp
27-31, 38-40; XIX TAC, "Tactical Air Oper-
ations in Europe, pp 39-41; AAF Evaluation
Board, ETO, "HO NinthAF, Report on Tac-
tical Air Cooperation, Organization, M ethods
and Procedures with Special Emphasis on
Phase III Operations," Jul 31, 1945, pp
327-361, USAFHRA, 138.4-34, 1945.
15. "Prepared Hessian surfacing" is the
British term for prefabricated bituminized
surfacing, the ready-made, tarred canvas,
or Hessian-type material, used for aircraft
runways, taxiways, and storage areas in
World War II.
16. XIX TAC, "History," Jul 1,
1944-Feb 28, 1945, part 1, pp 114-126;
Craven and Cate, eds., vol 3, Europe: Argu-
ment to V-E Day, p 132; Roulement is a
French term meaning "rolling" (forward).
17. In this regard, Patton agreed with
Bradley, who told him privately that Brest
had to be tal<en to uphold the view that the
U.S. Army could not be beaten. B lumen-
son, ed., Patton Papers, p 532.
18. 36th FG, "Unit History," Jul-Sep
1944, USAFHRA, GP-36-HI.
19. For Weyland's early views on statis-
tical problems, see XIX TAC, "12,000 FB
Sorties," p 1.
20. Keegan, Six Armies; D'Este, Decision
in Normandy; Griess, ed., vol 1, Second
World War, chaps. 14, 15; MacDonald and
Blumenson, "Recovery of France," in
Esposito, Concise H istory, pp 91-103; M ac-
Donald, M ighty Endeavor, pp 331-376.
21. Von K luge replaced von Rundstedton
J uly 5, after the latter advised H itier to aban-
don Caen's defense. Later, von Kluge
assumed direct command of Army Group B
after British fighter-bombers severely
wounded its commander, Rommel, on July
17. Although von Kluge and other senior
Wehrmacht officers questioned H itier's strat-
egy, they dared not oppose the F uehrer, espe-
cially after the abortive plot of J uly 20, 1944.
22. HO 9AF, "Operationsjournal," Aug
6, 1944, USAFHRA, 533.305, Apr- Dec
1944. For most of the campaign in France,
the 100th Wing controlled the 354th, 358th,
371st, and 405th Fighter Groups, and the
10th Photo Reconnaissance Group; the
327
Notes to pages 86-96
303d Wing controlled the 36th, 373d, and
406th Fighter Groups.
23. US3A, "After Action Rpt," vol 2,
part 3: "G-2 Section Rpt," pp 11-12; Ivie,
Aerial Reconnaissance, pp 54-56; Patton,
Diary Entry, Aug 6, 20, 1944.
24. XIX TAG, "12,000 FB Sorties," Aug
7, 1944; XIX TAG, "Tactical Air Opera-
tions in Europe," pp 16-17.
25. Weyland, "Diary," Aug 16, 1944;
Thompson and Harris, Signal Corps, chap.
4; R pt, N i nth A i r F orce, "Tacti cal A i r 0 per-
ations,Jun 6-Aug 28, 1944," p 16, USAF-
HRA, 533.306-2, 1944.
26. Ltr, Dr. David Griggs, Member,
AdvisorSpecialistGroup, USSTAF,to E. L.
Bowles, Expert Consultant to Secy War,
Oct 17, 1944, Ouesada Collection, Box 5,
MD, LC. In late September the command
renamed the fighter control center the tacti-
cal control center (TCC) and decided to
locate it near the advance headquarters
rather than in the rear, between thewing and
the operational groups. In this instance, the
civilians seemed most concerned with fixed
interdiction targets, while Weyland's chief
worry centered on the Luftwaffe threat.
27. XIX TAG, "12,000 FB Sorties," Aug
7-8, 1944; XIX TAG, "Morning Summa-
ry," Aug 8, 1944.
28. Weyland, "Diary," Aug 6, 1944.
29. Ibid., Aug 6, 9, 1944. On direct
orders from General Arnold on January 25,
1945, Brigadier General Grandison Gard-
ner, Eglin Field commander, conducted
extensive tests under strict security against
simulated Crossbow targets using a variety
of weapons and attack methods. After com-
pleting their report on March 1, General
Gardner and his team briefed their findings
to commanders at every major headquarters
in England. Craven and Gate, eds., vol 3,
Europe: Argument to V-E Day, pp 97-99.
30. XIX TAG, "Morning Summary,"
Aug 10-11, 1944.
31. D'Este, Decision in Normandy, pp
418-460; Blumenson, Breakout and Pur-
suit, pp 479-589; G riess, ed., vol 1, Second
World War, pp 336-338.
32. Craven and Gate, eds., vol 3,
Europe: Argumentto V-E Day, chap. 2; Air
Ministry (Great Britain), German Air
Force, pp 333-339, 354, 365-367; XIX
TAG, "History," Jul 1, 1944-Feb 28, 1945,
part 2, August Operations.
33. XIX TAG, "12,000 FB Sorties," Aug
17, 1944. On German losses see D'Este,
Decision in Normandy, pp 431-432,
437-438; and AAF Eval Bd, "Third Phase
Tactical Air Ops," p 121.
34. Weyland, "Diary," Aug 13, 1944;
XIX TAG, "Tactical Air Operations in
Europe," p 17. The name "X-Ray" appears
to have been given to the liaison detach-
ment after the summer campaign.
35. US3A, "After Action Rpt," vol 2,
part 4: "G-3 Section Rpt," p 12.
36. Weyland, "Diary," Aug 16, 1944.
37. Ibid., Aug 14, 1944. In France the
command's forward directional post radars
consisted of British Type 15 and 11 radars.
Thompson and Harris, Signal Corps, pp
151, 639. In an intriguing incident at this
August 14 meeting. General Vandenberg
proposed i n the event F i rst and T hi rd A rmi es
reversed their areas of operations, that Oue-
sada and Weyland should exchange fighter-
bomber groups as well. Weyland did not
concur. Although such a move might also
demonstrate tactical air power's flexibility
and mobility, Weyland clearly believed that
his units should remain under his control to
maintain the integrity of the command.
38. Ivie, Aerial Reconnaissance, pp
54-61.
39. XIX TAG comments on the Y -ser-
vice focus on its importance in the
Ardennes Campaign rather than in the bat-
tle of France. XIX TAG, "Tactical Air
Operations in Europe," p 31; Weyland,
"Diary"; Rpt, 9AF, "Tactical Air Opera-
tions, Jun 6-Aug 28, 1944," p 16,
USAFHRA, 533.306-2, 1944.
40. XIX TAG, "Morning Summary,"
Aug 10, 11, 13, 1944.
41. XIX TAG, "Morning Summary,"
Aug 15, 16, 17, 1944; XIX TAG, "12,000
FB Sorties," Aug 17, 1944.
328
Notes to pages 97-104
42. Geoffrey Perret, There's a War to Be
Won: The U nited States Army in World War
II (New York: Random House, 1991), chap.
6; Weigley, Eisenhower's Lieutenants,
chaps. 1 and 2.
43. MacDonald, Mighty Endeavor, pp
320-327; Weigley, Eisenhower's Lieu-
tenants, pp 218-237; Griess, ed., vol 1,
Second World War, pp 347-350.
44. XIX TAG, "12,000 FB Sorties," Aug
20, 1944.
45. Weigley, Eisenhower's Lieutenants,
pp 243-245; US3A, "After Action Rpt,"
vol 1, Aug 23-24, 1944; Blumenson, ed.,
Patton Papers, pp 526-528.
46. AAF Eval Bd, "Third Phase Tactical
Air Ops," p 118.
47. XIX TAG, "12,000 FB Sorties," pp
1-6; AAF Eval Bd, "Third Phase Tactical
Air Ops," pp 305-309.
48. XIX TAG, "Morning Summary,"
Aug 20-24, 1944; XIX TAG, "12,000 FB
Sorties," Aug 20-24, 1944. The command
favored the small, high-velocity rocl<ets
before bombs because of their flexibility of
use in combat and because they added little
to an airplane's weight and did not appre-
ciably effect an airplane's speed.
49. XIX TAG, "12,000 FB Sorties,"Aug
24, 1944; 371st FG, "Unit History," Aug
1944, USAFHRA, GP-371-HI, Aug 1944.
50. US3A, "After Action Rpt," vol 1,
Aug 26, 1944; Blumenson, ed., Patton
Papers, p 547; Blumenson, Breakout and
Pursuit, pp 664-670.
51. XIX TAG, "Morning Summary,"
Aug 25, 1944; XIX TAG, "12,000 FB
Sorties," Aug 25, 1944; 354th FG, "Unit
History," Aug-Sep 1944, USAFHRA
GP-354-HI(FI).
52. Memo, Lt Gol Gharles H. Hallet,
AG/S, to GG, XIX TAG, "Air Support of
Third Army's Drive to the East," Aug 23,
1944, USAFHRA, 168.7104-85; Weyland,
"Diary." Weyland also discussed the urgent
need for air base defenses because of Third
Army's departure from the Le M ans area.
53. XIX TAG, "12,000 FB Sorties,"Aug
30, 1944.
54. US3A, "After Action Rpt," vol 1,
A ug 30, 1944. See M emo, untitled, undated,
on IX Troop Garrier supply flights to Third
Army, USAFHRA, KllO.7006-2. For a
concise analysis of Third Army's supply
dilemma, see M artin L. Van Greveld, Sup-
plying War: Logistics from Wallerstein to
Patton (Gambridge and New York: Gam-
bridge University Press, 1977), chap. 7.
Third Army's low supply priorities even
extended to communications equipment.
Early in the campaign, its radios consisted
of one set each for the enti re army of the fol-
lowing short-range (less than 25 miles) sets:
SGR-300, the celebrated FM walkie-talkie,
SGR-508 portable radio, and SGR-510
(like the 508, but vehicle-mounted), and
eight SGR-511 portable cavalry guidon
sets. See Thompson and Harris, Signal
Corps, pp 151, 638-639.
55. Graven and Gate, eds., vol 3, Europe:
Argument to V-E Day, pp 583-585; Intvw,
Burns, J an 7, 1992.
56. US3A, "After Action Rpt," vol 1,
Aug 30, 1944. See Memo, on IX Troop
Garrier supply flights; Van Greveld, Sup-
plying War, chap. 7.
57. US3A, "After Action Rpt," vol 2,
part 3: "G-2 Section Rpt," p 52.
58. XIX TAG, "12,000 FB Sorties." See
also, HO AAF, "Air-Ground Teamwork on
the W estern F ront: T he R ol e of the X I X Tac-
tical Air Gommand during August 1944,"
Wings at War Series, No. 5, USAFHRA,
537.04G, Aug 1944; XIX TAG, "Planes
Over Patton: XIX Tactical Air Command's
Supportof Third Army in Its Swift End-Run
Through France," Sep 30, 1944, USAF-
HRA, 168.7104-86, Sep 30, 1944. The
command's exploits are also highlighted in
"U.S. Tactical Airpower in Europe," in
Impact, vol 3, No. 5 (May 1945), USAF-
HRA, 168.7104-92, May 1945.
59. XIX TAG, "History," Jul 1, 1944-
Feb 28, 1945, part 1, Sep 1944, p 4.
60. US3A, "After Action Rpt," vol 1, p
52; XIX TAG, "Morning Summary," Sep
1-16, 1944. Memo, National Security
Agency (hereafter cited as NSA), "Ultra
329
Notes to pages 104-112
and Its Use by XIX TAC," May 30, 1945,
in "Reports by U.S. Army Ultra Represen-
tatives witii Army Fieid Commands in the
European Theater of Operations," part 2,
XIX TAC, pp 104-109, NSA, Special
Research, H istory-023. For a discussion of
Ultra's role with Third Army and the XIX
TAC, see chap. 4, p 186.
61. 36th FG, "Unit History," Sep 1944;
XIX TAC, "12,000 FB Sorties," Aug 24,
1944; 371st FG , "U nit H istory," A ug 1944.
62. General Weyland needed the A -20
Havoc (F-3) for daytime reconnaissance,
and Ninth Air Force agreed to its use until
the night program got underway. A s C olonel
Berg later recalled, however, the squadron
became available for daylight operations,
not because of modest requirements for
night photography during mobile opera-
tions, but because it lacked night navigation
aids at the time. In any event, it proved to be
a valuable if vulnerable reconnaissance
asset. Ltr, Brig Gen Berg to author, Sep 8,
1989; Ivie, Aerial Reconnaissance, p 68.
63. XIX TAC, "History," Jul 1, 1944-
Feb 28, 1945; 406th FG, "Unit History,"
Jun 1, 1944-May 1, 1945, USAFHRA,
GP-406- HI, 1944-45.
64. Weyland, "Diary," Sep 9-11, 1944.
65. Air Force chief. General Arnold, sent
his congratulations, adding he thought it
"most appropriate that the Air Force Tacti-
cal Commander was presentwith theArmy
Commander at the surrender ceremony."
XIX TAC, "12,000 FB Sorties," p 5; 9AF,
"Rpt on Activities, Jun 6-Aug 28, 1944";
Craven and Cate, eds., vol 3, Europe: Argu-
ment to V-E Day, pp 265-266.
66. XIX TAC, "Tactical Air Operations
in Europe," p 1.
67. Ibid.
68. Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit,
chap. 30.
69. Weyland, "Diary," Aug 22, 1944,
Sep 2, 1944.
70. For operational information on the
command's role in the Brittany assault in
September, see XIX TAC, "Morning Sum-
maries," Sep 3-18, 1944. Although a single
mission normally involved three 12-plane
squadrons, variations to match needs
occurred frequently.
71. On the Third Army buildup for the
Mosel Offensive, see US3A, "After Action
Rpt," vol 1, Sep 1-5, 1944. Characteristical-
ly, Weyland met personally with Third Army
leaders on the proposed offensive. Although
this meeting took place on the eve of the
attack, both his command's proven flexibili-
ty and the X-Ray detachment's liaison work
offset potential problems that might other-
wise have arisen on such short notice.
72. US3A, "After Action Rpt," vol 1,
Sep 4-5, 1944. FortheThird Army'soffen-
sive, see Weigley, Eisenhower's Lieu-
tenants, pp 327-344; Blumenson, Breakout
and Pursuit, chap. 32.
73. B.H. Liddell Hart, History of the
Second World War (New York: G. P. Put-
nam's Sons, 1970), p 557.
74. AAF Eval Bd, "Third Phase Tactical
Air Ops," pp 113-114.
75. For the air role, see AAF Eval Bd,
"Third Phase Tactical Air Ops," pp
113-118; Craven and Cate, eds., vol 3,
Europe: Argument to V-E Day, pp
262-265; XIX TAC, "Combat Operations,"
pp 55-57; XIX TAC, "History," Sep 1944."
76. Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit,
chap. 30.
77. Weyland, "Diary," Aug 22, 1944,
Sep 2, 1944; AAF Eval Bd, "Third Phase
Tactical Air Ops," pp 113-114.
78. XIX TAC, "History," Jul 1, 1944-
Feb 28, 1945, Sep 1944; AAF Eval Bd,
"Third Phase Tactical Air Ops," pp
113-118; XIX TAC, "H istory," J ul 1, 1944-
Feb 28, 1945, part2, pp 172-173; X IX TAC,
"Combat Operations," pp 9-10; XIX TAC,
"Tactical Air Operations in Europe," pp 5-8.
79. XIX TAC, "Combat Operations," p
56. See also Third Army's similar assess-
ment in US3A, "After Action Rpt," vol 1,
Aug Ops, p 52, and vol 2, part 4: "G-3 Sec-
tion Rpt," p 16.
80. Weyland, "Diary," Sep 8, 1944;
US3A, "After Action Rpt," vol 1, Sep 8,
1944.
330
Notes to pages 112-118
81. This analysis of tactical air support at
Brest is based primarily on XIX TAC,
"Morning Summaries," Sep 3-16, 1944;
9AF, "Weel<ly Intsum," Sep 3-16, 1944; and
XIX TAC, "History," Jul 1, 1944-Feb 28,
1945, pp 7-25. See also 358th FG, "Unit
History," Aug-Sep 1944, USAFHRA,
GP-358-HI; 358th FG, "Operational
Reports," Aug-Sep 1944, USAFHRA, GP-
358-SU-OP-S, Aug-Sep 1944; 362d FG,
"Unit History," Aug-Sep 1944, USAF-
HRA, GP-362-HI; 362d FG, "Operational
Reports," Aug-Sep 1944, USAFHRA, GP-
362-SU-OP-S, Aug-Sep 1944.
82. Appropriately, the 362d Fighter
Group appeared for the finale at Brest.
With the 358th, it had flown in support of
VIII Corps in Brittany nearly every day
since August 1, 1944. Their efforts intensi-
fied from August 25, and after September
10, these two groups normally flew against
Brest targets daily. After the fortress sur-
rendered on September 18, both groups
immediately began flying armed reconnais-
sance missions in Germany from their new
bases in eastern France. See 358th FG,
"Unit History," Aug-Sep 1944; 358th FG,
"Operational Rpts," Aug-Sep 1944; 362d
FG, "Unit History," Aug-Sep 1944; 362d
FG, "Operational Rpts," Aug-Sep 1944.
83. Weyland, "Diary," Sep 6, 1944.
84. Ibid. For airfield construction pro-
grams, seeXIX TAC, "12,000 FB Sorties,"
pp 1-6; I ntvw, B urns, J un 5-8, 1984, p 14;
Intvw, Burns,Jan 7, 1992; XIX TAC, "His-
tory," J ul 1, 1944-Feb 28, 1945, pp 77-82.
85. XXIX TAC received the 36th and
373d Fighter Groups on October 1, 1944,
and September 29, 1944, respectively. The
371st Fighter Group was transferred to the
XII TAC. Weyland, "Diary," Sep 7-8,
1944; XIX TAC, "History," Jul 1, 1944-
Feb 28, 1945, pp 77-82.
86. Weyland, "Diary," Sep 10, 1944; US3A,
"After Action Rpt," vol 1, Sep 21, 1944.
87. The worsening supply situation is
recorded in the daily ops analyses and sum-
maries. See also US3A, "After Action
Rpt," vol 1, Aug-Sep 1944.
88. XIX TAC, "History," Jul 1, 1944-
Feb 28, 1945, pp 121-124. Unit move-
ments are also described in the group histo-
ries for August and September 1944. For
unit movements, the command used its
own trucks, but it always needed assistance
from N inth Air Force and Third Army for
necessary additional transportation.
89. 36th FG, "Unit History," Aug-Sep
1944; 354th FG, "U nit H istory," A ug-Sep
1944.
90. Bad weather in September forced the
aviation engineers to lay heavier pierced-
steel planking, also known as M arston M at,
for its runways. See chap. 4, pp 188-189, and
36th FG, "Unit History," Aug-Sep 1944;
354th FG, "Unit History," Aug-Sep 1944.
91. Weyland, "Diary," Sep 17, 1944.
92. XIX TAC, "Morning Summaries,"
Sep 19-25, 1944; 9AF, "Weekly Intsum,"
Sep 19-25, 1944; XIX TAC, "H istory," J ul
1, 1944-Feb 28, 1945; 9AF, "Operational
Statistics," Sep 19-25, 1944.
93. Weyland, "Diary," Sep 20-21, 1944.
Weyland, to his credit, rarely imposed with
requests for this kind of assistance, and
then only on command matters he judged
critical. General Wood did not appear espe-
cially preoccupied with bureaucratic minu-
tia at this time, although Patton would
relieve him during the Lorraine Campaign
because of combat stress.
94. Weyland, "Diary," Sep 24-25, 1944;
XIX TAC, "Morning Summary," Sep
24-25, 1944; 405th FG, "Unit History,"
Sep 1944, USAFHRA, GP-405-HI(FTR),
Sep 1944. Regarding weather conditions,
the command normally required a 3,000-
foot ceiling with broken clouds and at least
three miles of visibility. Takeoff minimums
were a 1,000-foot ceiling and three miles of
visibility. However, as Weyland readily
admitted, "in cases of great urgency," like
the 4th A rmored D i vision crisis, he sent his
crews out when the target areas had weath-
er down to 1,500 or 1,000 feet. XIX TAC,
"Combat Operations," p 37.
95. Ltr, LtGen George S. Patton, J r.,CG,
T hi rd A rmy, to C orps C ommanders and C G ,
331
Notes to pages 118-123
XIX TAC, "Letter of Instruction Nr 4," Sep
25, 1944, in XIX TAC, "History," Jul 1,
1944-Feb 28, 1945, appendix 8, USAF-
HRA, 537.01, 1944-45. See also US3A,
"After Action Rpt," vol 1, Sep 25, 1944.
96. XIX TAC, "12,000 FB Sorties," pp
5-6. By the end of August, as Weyland
noted, his command operated on fronts 350
miles apart. By mid-September 1944, how-
ever, the distance separating operations in
Brittany and Patton's forward elements in
eastern France totaled nearly 500 miles.
97. XIX TAC,"CombatOperations," p53.
98. XIX TAC, "12,000 FB Sorties," pp
3-5. The command possessed an average
of 439 and 429 operational aircraft during
August and September 1944, respective-
ly.
99. XIX TAC, "History," Jul 1, 1944-
Feb 28, 1945, appendix 10: Statistical Sum-
mary; XIX TAC, "History," Jul 1,1944- Feb
28, 1945, part 1, pp 99-126, 193-194; XIX
TAC, "Combat Operations," pp 4-5. Ninth
Air Force had no official policy on fighter
pilot combat tourlength.TheXIX TAC nor-
mally rotated pi lots to the continental United
States after 200 combat hours; however, to
maintain fitness, the command found that
pilots required frequent leave and rest peri-
ods before accumulating 200 combat hours.
100. XIX TAC, "History," Jul 1, 1944-
Feb 28, 1945, part 1, pp 99-126; X IX TA C ,
"Combat Operations," pp 4-5.
101. Intvw, Weyland, Nov 19, 1974," p
140.
102. Weyland, "Diary," Sep 23, 1944.
Chapter 4
1. For land and air action during the cam-
paign, see H.M. Cole, The Lorraine Cam-
paign [U.S. Army in World War II: Euro-
pean Theater of Operations! (Washington,
D.C.: Office of theChief of M ilitary Histo-
ry, 1950); Weigley, Eisenhower's Lieu-
tenants, pp 327-346, 385-401; Blumenson,
ed., Patton Papers pp 536-591; Craven and
Cate, eds., vol 3, Europe: Argument to V-E
Day, pp 595-635; HO AAF, Condensed
Analysis of Ninth AF , pp 31-39; Griess, ed.,
vol 1, Second World War, chap. 15; Charles
B. MacDonald and Martin Blumenson,
"Defeat of Germany," in Brig Gen Vincent
J . Esposito, USA (Ret), ed., A Concise H is-
tory of World War II (New York: Praeger,
1964), pp 97-105; MacDonald, Mighty
Endeavor, pp 366-387; and Christopher R.
Gabel, "The Lorraine Campaign: An
Overview, September- December 1944" (Ft
Leavenworth: US Army CGSC, 1985).
2. Almost a half-century afterward, the
Combat Studies Institute at the United
States Army's Command and General
Staff College and the Army War College
made the Third Army's Lorraine Cam-
paign the centerpiece of its military cours-
es. From the perspective of Army educa-
tors, this campaign represented a well-doc-
umented, modern, complex military opera-
tion that permitted officers to evaluate a
wide variety of arms and branch activities
at different organizational levels, from
company to corps. Ltr, Col Donald P.
Shaw, USAMHI, to Lt Gen DeWitt C.
Smith, Jr., USA (Ret.), "Study of the Lor-
raine Campaign at USMAWC," Feb 11,
1982; Ltr, Jerold E. Brown, USACGSC,
Combat Studies Institute, to author, M ar 8,
1990; Gabel, "Lorraine Campaign."
Unfortunately the Lorraine Campaign
has been mostly ignored by airmen. The
aerial phase of this campaign generally has
been viewed as an unhappy experience in
which bad weather, hardened targets, and
limited achievements offered few lessons
for tactical air power. M ost students of air
power have instead fixed on the glorious
days of armored column cover in August
1944, the exciting December counterattack
in the Ardennes, or the strategic bombing
campaign and struggle for aerial suprema-
332
Notes to pages 123-133
cy high over Fortress Europe. For them, the
Lorraine Campaign has offered little drama
or instruction. In the official Army Air
Forces account of air action in Northern
Europe during World War II, for example,
tactical operations are submerged entirely
in the coverage of the strategic bombing
campaign and special operations. See
Craven and Cate, eds., vol 3, Europe: Argu-
ment to V-E Day, pp 595-635.
3. Gabel, "Lorraine Campaign," pp
1-10; Weigley, Eisenhower's Lieutenants,
pp 327-328; Cole, Lorraine Campaign,
chap. 1. This analysis of land operations is
based on the works listed in note 1, supra.
Allied forces in the north faced similar, if
larger, river obstacles in their path leading
to the Ruhr industrial region of Germany.
4. XIX TAC, "Combat Ops," pp 57-64;
XIX TAC, "History," Jul 1, 1944-Feb 18,
1945, part 2: Sep, Oct 1944.
5. Air M inistry (Great Britain), German
Air Force, pp 336-341, 365-381; Ralph
Bennett, U Itra in the West: The Normandy
Campaign 1944-1945 (New York: Charles
Scribner's Sons, 1979), pp 175-185.
6. XIX TAC, "History,"Jul 1, 1944-Feb
18, 1945, part 5: Statistical Summary.
7. Blumenson, ed., Patton Papers, pp
552-553. Patton called September 23 "one
of the bad days of my military career.
Bradley called meto say that higher author-
ity had decided that I would have to give up
the 6th Armored and also assume a defen-
sive attitude, owing to lack of supplies."
Patton, War as I Knew It, p 130.
8. XIX TAC, "History," Jul 1, 1944-Feb
28, 1945, part 1, pp 82-88; XIX TAC,
"C ombat 0 ps," pp 57-64; X I X TA C , "H isto-
ry," Jul 1, 1944-Feb 28, 1945, part 2: Sep,
Octl944. Although XIX TAC officers com-
plained about their smaller force, if pressed
they also admitted that their ground support
responsibility lessened because of Third Ar-
my's reduction to two corps along a narrow
front For a description of XII TAC, see HO
AAF, Condensed Analysis of Ninth AF , p 72.
9. The analysis of communication oper-
ations that follows is based on Rpt, J.E.
Faulkner, "Operational Employment of
Radar in the XIX Tactical Air Command,"
Advanced Science Base Laboratory, British
Branch Radiation Laboratory, M IT, n.d. [ca
1945], USAFHRA, 537.906, 1945, and on
9AF, "MEW Operations in XIX Tactical
Air Command," ORS Report No. 65, Nov
20, 1944; XIX TAC, "Combat Ops," pp
19-23; XIX TAC, "Tactical Air Ops in
Europe," pp 16-29; and Rpt, AAF Evalua-
tion Board, ETO, "Tactics and Techniques
Developed by the United States Tactical
Air Commands in the European Theater of
Operations," Mar 11, 1945, USAFHRA
138.4-33, 1945, pp 39-48.
10. XIX TAC, "12,000 FB Sorties," p 2.
11. Thompson and Harris, Signal Corps,
chap. 4 and appendix: "Signal Corps
Equipment, World War II"; XIX TAC,
"Tactical Air Ops in Europe," pp 16-31;
AAF Eval Bd, "Third Phase Tactical Air
Ops," pp 370-373; XIX TAC, "Signals:
The Story of Communications in the XIX
Tactical Air Command Up to V-E Day,"
Jun 15, 1945, USAFHRA 537.901.
12. See Rpt, Faulkner, "Operational
Employment of Radar"; Thompson and
Harris, Signal Corps.
13. Weyland, "Diary," Sep 27, 1944;
XIX TAC, "Combat Ops," pp 25-26; XIX
TAC, "History," Jul 1, 1944-Feb 28, 1945,
Sep-Oct 1944; AAF Eval Bd, "Third Phase
Tactical Air Ops," pp 384-385.
14. Ltr, David Griggs, M ember. Advisor
Specialist Group, USSTAF, to Brig Gen
O.P. Weyland, Oct 3, 1944, USAFHRA
537.101, 1944.
15. Ibid. The staff correspondence con-
sists of various routing sheets, dated October
10 and 17, 1944, and filed under X IX TAC,
"History," Jul 1, 1944-Feb 28, 1945, appen-
dix 8, USAFHRA 537.01, 1944.
16. Cole, LorraineCampaign, pp 1-255;
Weigley, Eisenhower's Lieutenants, pp
253-319; Griess, ed., vol 1, Second World
War, pp 360-365.
17. Charles B. MacDonald, The Siegfried
Line Campaign, [U.S. Army in World War
II: European Theater of Operations] (Wash-
333
Notes to pages 133-140
ington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of ivi ilitary
History, 1963), pp 119-206.
18. Bernard jviontgomery received his
fifth star and Field jviarshai's baton effec-
tive September 1, 1944, just before the
debacle of ivi arket Garden. With the addi-
tional star he outranked the Supreme A Hied
Commander, General Eisenhower. To be
sure, American authorities were not far
behind and promoted Eisenhower to Gen-
eral of the Army on December 20, 1944.
19. Weigley, Elsenhower's Lieutenants,
pp 350-355; Richard Lamb, Montgomery
In Europe, 1943-1945: Success or F allure?
(New York: Franklin Watts, 1984), pp
252-262. Eisenhower realized, certainly by
September 23, 1944, when at his direction
Bradley instructed Patton's Third Army to
assume a defensive posture, that the Allies
could not continue major offensive opera-
tions without supplies unloaded at the Bel-
gian port of Antwerp.
20. Ltr, Lt Gen Patton to Corps Com-
manders and CG, XIX TAC, "Letter of
Instruction," Sep 25, 1944, in XIX TAC,
"History," Jul 1, 1944-Feb 28, 1945,
appendix 8, USAFHRA, 537.01, 1944-45;
see also US3A, "After Action Rpt," vol 1,
Sep 25, 1944.
21. See Mary H. Williams, Chronology,
1941-1945, United States Army in World
War 11: Special Studies (Washington, D.C.:
Office of the Chief of M Ilitary History, 1960).
22. The framework for this discussion of
the Lorraine Campaign is based in large
part on the Weyland diary and on US3A,
"After Action Rpt," vol 1: Sep, Oct, Nov,
Dec Ops; XIX TAC, "Morning Sum-
maries," Sep 25- Dec 16, 1944; 9AF, "Sum-
mary of Operations," Sep 25-Dec 16,
1944, USAFHRA, 533.3082, 1944 (here-
after cited as "Ops Summary"); XIX TAC,
"Daily Intsum," Sep 25-Dec 16, 1944,
U SA FH RA , 537.606, 1944 (hereafter cited
as "Daily Intsum"); Kit C. Carter and
Robert M ueller, compilers. The Army Air
Forces In World War II: Combat Chronolo-
gy, 1941-1945 (Washington, D.C.: Office
of Air Force History, 1973); XIX TAC,
"History,"] ul 1, 1944-Feb 28, 1945, part 2:
Sep, Oct, Nov, Dec 1944.
23. R pt, L t C ol C harles H . H al let, A C/S, to
CG, 9AF, "Use of Napalm Bombs," Oct 3,
1944, USAFHRA, 537.453, Oct- Nov 1944.
24. See also XIX TAC, "Report on
Bombing of M etz Forts," Sep-Nov 1944,
USAFHRA, 537.453, 1944; Rpt, "Use of
Napalm Bombs," Oct 3, 1944; Rpt, AAF
Eval Bd, ETO, "The Effect of Air Power in
the B attle of M etz," J an 19, 1945, U SA F-
HRA, 138.4-30.
25. Cole, Lorraine Campaign, p 241.
Army Air Forces records indicate that the
attacks Cole refers to on September 28 actu-
ally occurred on September 29, 1944.
26. On the Ninth Air Force's autumn rail
interdiction program, see Craven and Cate,
eds., vol 3, Europe: Argument to V-E Day,
pp 613-623.
27. Weyland, "Diary," Oct 3, 1944; XIX
TAC, "History," Jul 1, 1944-Feb 28, 1945,
part 2: Oct 1944.
28. Americans fighting In the Lorraine
Campaign would readily concede that the
French military engineers deserved their
high reputation for building effective forti-
fications.
29. Weyland, "Diary," Oct 2, 1944.
30. US3A, "After Action Rpt," vol 1:
Sep, Oct, Nov, Dec Ops; X IX TAC, "M orn-
ing Summaries," Sep 25-Dec 16, 1944;
9AF, "Ops Summary," Sep 25-Dec 16,
1944; XIX TAC, "Dally Intsum," Sep
25-Dec 16, 1944; Carter and Mueller,
Army Air Forces In World War II; XIX
TAC, "History," Jul 1, 1944-Feb 28, 1945,
part 2: Sep, Oct, Nov, Dec 1944.
31. XIX TAC, "History," Jul 1, 1944-
Feb 28, 1945, part 2: Oct 1944.
32. Weyland, "Diary"; Hallet appears to
have understood the importance of Ultra
data much sooner, or have felt less threat-
ened by its special access channel through a
lower ranking officer, than did Koch. Irving
mistakenly asserts that Patton did not have
access to Ultra. David Irving, The War
Between the Generals (New York: Congdon
& Lattes, 1981). See Thomas Parrish, The
334
Notes to pages 140-148
U Itra Americans: The U .S. Role in Breaking
the Nazi Codes (New York: Stein and Day,
1986), pp 189-228, and the two National
Security Agency Reports: Memo, NSA,
"U Itra and the Third A rmy," M ay 28, 1945
in NSA, Special Research, History-023,
"Reports by U.S. Army Ultra Representa-
tives with Army Field Commands in the
European Theatre of Operations," part 1:
Third Army, pp 22-26; and Memo, NSA,
"Ultra," in Ibid, part 2: XIX TAC, pp
104-109. Along with Patton and Colonel
Koch, the following Third Army officers
received U Itra briefings: M aj Gen Hobart R.
Gay, Chief of Staff, Col Paul D. Harkins,
Dep Chief of Staff, Brig Gen Halley G.
Maddox, G-3 (Operations), Col Robert S.
Allen, Asst G-2. In the XIX TAC, Wey-
land's executive officer. Lieutenant Col
Walter E. Bligh was the only other officer
authorized to receive Ultra intelligence.
Apart from the German counterattack in
early August 1944 and one in the spring of
1945, the National Security Agency reports
do not elaborate on Ultra's impact on specif-
ic air or ground events.
33. Richard H. Kohn and Joseph P.
Harahan, eds.. Air Superiority in World
War II and Korea (Washington, D.C.:
Office of Air Force History, 1983), p 57;
Air Ministry (Great Britain), German Air
Force, pp 336-341, 365-381; Bennett,
Ultra in the West, pp 175-185.
34. Although Ultra information con-
firmed a sizeable Luftwaffe recovery and
buildup in October and November 1944,
the U Itra intercepts did not indicate the pur-
pose of the Luftwaffe actions. Memo, Lt
Col Charles H. Haiiet, AC/S, to A-3, XIX
TAC, Oct 6, 1944, USAFHRA, 537.306A,
Oct 1-15, 1944.
35. Weyland, "Diary,"; XIX TAC, "His-
tory," Jul 1, 1944-Feb 28, 1945, part 1,
124-133; XIX TAC, "Tactical Air Ops in
Europe," pp 39-41; Richard K. Smith,
"Marston Mat," in Air Force Magazine
(Apr 1989), pp 84-88.
36. Weyland, "Diary"; XIX TAC, "His-
tory," Jul 1, 1944-Feb 28, 1945, part 1,
124-133; XIX TAC, "Tactical Air Ops in
Europe," pp 39-41; Smith, "M arston M at,"
pp 84-88.
37. Weyland, "Diary,"; XIX TAC, "His-
tory," Jul 1, 1944-Feb 28, 1945, part 1,
124-133; XIX TAC, "Tactical Air Ops in
Europe," pp 39-41.
38. Weyland, "Diary,"; XIX TAC, "His-
tory," Jul 1, 1944-Feb 28, 1945, part 1,
124-133; XIX TAC, "Tactical Air Ops in
Europe," pp 39-41.
39. XIX TAC, "History," Jul 1, 1944-Feb
29, 1945, part 2: Oct, Nov 1944; Weyland,
"Diary," Dec 10, 1944; XIX TAC, "History,"
Jul 1, 1944-Feb 28, 1945, part 1, 124-133.
40. US3A, "After Action Rpt," vol 1,
Oct Ops.
41. XIX TAG'S attack against the dam
was the first attempt by P-47s against such
a target. Weyland, "Diary," Oct 18, 1944;
US3A, "After Action Rpt," vol 1, Oct 18,
1944.
42. Intvw, Burns, Jan 7, 1992.
43. 362d FG, "Unit History," Oct 1944;
XIX TAC, "History," Jul 1, 1944-Feb 28,
1945, part 2, pp 11-14.
44. XIX TAC, "History," Jul 1, 1944-
Feb 28, 1945, part 2, pp 11-14.
45. US3A, "After Action Rpt," vol 1,
Oct 18, 1944.
46. Weyland, "Diary," Oct 1944; Rpt,
XIX TAC, A-3, "Operation M adison: Air
Plan in Support of Third U .S. Army," Nov
3, 1944.
47. US3A, "After Action Rpt," vol 1,
Oct Ops. See also Cole, Lorraine Cam-
paign, pp 296-310; Weigley, Eisenhower's
Lieutenants, pp 383-431; Bradley, Sol-
dier's Story, pp 430-450.
48. Weyland, "Diary," Oct 27, 1944.
49. Memo, Brig Gen O.P. Weyland, CG,
XIX TAC, to Lt Gen G.S. Patton, CG,
US3A, Oct 28, 1944, USAFHRA, 537.01,
1944; XIX TAC, "History," Jul 1,
1944-Feb 28, 1945, appendix 8.
50. Weyland, "Diary," Oct 29, 1944;
Patton, Diary Entry, Oct 29, 1944.
51. XIX TAC, "History," Jul 1,
1944-Feb 28, 1945, part 2: Oct 1944. See
335
Notes to pages 149-158
also AAF Eval Bd, "Third Phase Tactical
Air Ops," part 2 for analysis of equipment
effectiveness.
52. US3A, "After Action Rpt," vol 1,
Oct 30, 1944.
53. Weyland, "Diary," Nov 1-2, 1944;
Blumenson, ed., Patton Papers, p 567.
54. Weyland, "Diary," Nov 2, 1944; Van
Creveld, Supplying War, chap. 7.
55. Weyland, "Diary," Oct 1944; Rpt,
"Operation M adison," Nov 3, 1944.
56. Weyland, "Diary," Oct 1944; Rpt,
"Operation M adison," Nov 3, 1944.
57. US3A, "After Action Rpt," vol 2,
part 3: "G-2 Section Rpt," pp 19-20; Ivie,
Aerial Reconnaissance, pp 80, 92.
58. XIX TAG "Combat Ops," p 32. Gen-
eral Weyland believed that two tactical
reconnaissance squadrons and one photo
squadron adequately met the needs of his
command and Third Army's two corps, but
only without including requirements from
higher headquarters. This had become an
issue in October because Ninth Air Force
requests took priority over those of Third
Army until October 25. Not until that date
did X IX TAG and Third Army convince the
requesters that the urgency of Operation
M adison required moving Army requests to
the top of the priority list. Like its photo
squadron, Golonel Russell Berg's 10th Photo
Group played an increasingly important role
in the fall. Despite the fact that the weather
deteriorated considerably in November, the
group flew 831 sorties, or 138 more than it
did in October. M uch of the increase can be
attributed to the ground offensive early in
the month and reconnaissance requirements
for the major assault planned for early
December. Ltr, Brig Gen Russell A. Berg,
USAF (Ret), to author, Oct 24, 1989.
59. Weyland, "Diary," Oct 31, 1944.
60. Weyland, "Diary," Nov 5, 1944;
Craven and Gate, eds., vol 3, Europe: Argu-
ment to V-E Day, p 597. The new air force
would support the operations of Lieutenant
General Jacob Devers' 6th Army Group.
61. Weyland, "Diary," Nov 1, 1944; XIX
TA C , "C ombat 0 ps," pp 27- 30; X I X TA C ,
"Tactical Air Ops in Europe," pp 24-29.
Although Weyland would continue to have
problems coordinating air defense in Third
A rmy's area of operations, he and his army
colleagues avoided the sometimes bitter
dispute between ground and air authorities
over command and control of air defense
components. The AAF argued for air force
control. See HO AAF, Condensed Analysis
of Ninth AF, pp 100-101.
62. Blumenson, ed., Patton Papers, p
570; 405th FG, "Unit History," Nov 1944;
XIX TAG, "History," Jul 1, 1944-Feb 28,
1945, part 2: Nov Ops, p 6. See appendix 3
for pilot claims for November 8, 1944.
63. Weyland, "Diary," N ov 8, 1944; X IX
TAG, "Combat Ops," p37; 362d FG, "Unit
History," Nov 1944.
64. Weyland, "Diary," Nov 9, 1944; AAF
Eval Bd, "Third Phase Tactical Air Ops," pp
156-165. Although good reasons beyond
Patton's friendship with Spaatz and Doolittle
dating from N orth A f rica existed for employ-
ing heavy bombers in tactical operations,
using them in a tactical role violated estab-
lished Army Air Forces doctrine. Yet the
record shows that Weyland and his fellow
tactical airmen did not concern themselves
with this issue. If the heavy bombers might
help the army move, they argued for employ-
ing them and welcomed their support.
65. XIX TAG, "Rpt on Bombing Metz
Fortis," Sep-N ov 1944; Rpt, "U se of N a- palm
Bombs," Oct 3, 1944; Rpt, AAF Eval Bd,
"A ir Power in Battle of M etz," J an 19, 1945.
66. AAF Eval Bd, "Third Phase Tactical
Air Ops," p 165.
67. Ibid., pp 166-175. Cobra, with its
short bombing, continued to haunt Allied
planners until the spring campaign and the
return to mobile warfare.
68. Gabel, "Lorraine Campaign," pp
24-25.
69. XIX TAG, "Combat Ops," pp 60-62.
According to Richard K. Smith, napalm's
effectiveness in World War 1 1 did not match
later, more deadly versions because the ear-
lier variety did not have a barometric prox-
imity fuze which detonated the container
336
Notes to pages 158-169
approximately 100 feet above ground.
Because this type of fuzing was unavailable
in 1944-1945, the weapon did not produce
the lethal 360-degree spread of fire.
Richard K. Smith, "M anuscript Comments"
to the author, Apr 21, 1992. For a discus-
sion of the ethical concerns of airmen, see
Conrad C. Crane, Bombs, Cities, and Civil-
ians: American Airpower Strategy in World
War II, (Lawrence, Kan.: University of
Kansas Press, 1993).
70. Air Ministry (Great Britain), Ger-
man Air Force, pp 336-341, 365-381;
Bennett, U Itra in the West, pp 175-185.
71. Weyland, "Diary," Nov 8-15, 1944.
72. XIX TAC, "Operational Statistics,"
1944-1945; XIX TAC, "Morning Sum-
maries," Sep 25-Dec 16, 1944; 9AF, "Ops
Summary," Sep 25-Dec 16, 1944; XIX
TAC, "Daily Intsum," Sep 25-Dec 16,
1944; XIX TAC, "History," Jul 1, 1944-
Feb 28, 1945, part 2: Nov, 1944.
73. XIX TAC, "History," Jul 1, 1944-
Feb 28, 1945, part 2: Nov, Dec 1944; Rpt,
Faulkner, "Operational Employment of
Radar"; 9AF, "MEW Ops in XIX TAC,"
Nov 20, 1944; XIX TAC, "Combat Ops,"
pp 19-23; XIX TAC, "Tactical Air Ops in
Europe," pp 16-29; Rpt, AAF Eval Bd,
"Tactics and Techniques," pp 39-48.
74. 354th FG , "U nit H istory," N ov 1944.
75. Weyland, "Diary," Nov 1944; XIX
TAC, "History," Jul 1, 1944- Feb 28, 1945,
parti, 133-147.
76. Weyland, "Diary," Nov 1944; XIX
TAC, "History," Jul 1, 1944- Feb 28, 1945,
part 1, 133-147.
77. Ltr, CG, XIX TAC, to CG, 9AF,
"Authorized Aircraft in Fighter Groups,"
Nov 14, 1944, USAFHRA, 537.01, appen-
dix 8, 1944-45; Weyland, "Diary," Nov
1944; XIX TAC, "History," Jul 1,
1944-Feb 28, 1945, part 1, 133-147.
78. Ltr, HO 9AF to CG, XIX TAC, Nov
25, 1944, in USAFHRA, 537.01, appendix
8, 1944-45.
79. Weyland, "Diary," Nov 14, 1944.
80. 362d FG , "U nit H istory," N ov 1944.
The 362d's air echelon moved by surface
transportation from Prosnes near Reims to
Rouvres near Verdun on November 5,
1944. The ground echelon followed later
over a three-day period, November 19-21,
while the flight echelon arrived on N ovem-
ber 19.
81. 405th FG , "U nit H istory," N ov 1944.
82. Weyland, "Diary," Nov 15, 1944.
83. Weyland, "Diary," Nov 17, 1944;
Blumenson, ed.. Fatten Papers, pp 575,
586. See comments from U .S. ground force
officers in AAF Eval Bd, "Third Phase Tac-
tical Air Ops," part 1, sec D.
84. XIX TAC, "History," Jul 1, 1944-
Feb 28, 1945, part 2: Nov 1944, pp 12-14,
appendix.
85. XIX TAC, "History," Jul 1, 1944-
Feb 28, 1945, appendix 10: Statistical Sum-
mary; XIX TAC, "Combat Ops," p 41; XIX
TAC, "History," Jul 1, 1944-Feb 28, 1945,
part 1, pp 28-33; Rpt, "Conference between
General Patton, General Weyland and Third
Army Correspondents," Dec 9, 1944,
USAFHRA, 168.7104-101, 1944; Cole,
Lorraine Campaign, p 415.
86. XIX TAC, "Combat Ops," pp 25-61;
XIX TAC, "Tactical AirOpsin Europe," pp
3-4. Like so many European theater firsts,
this counter-flak measure was used first in
the North African campaign, and then the
Allies subsequently employed it in the Ital-
ian theater, well before its rediscovery and
adoption in Northwest Europe.
87. XIX TAC, "Combat Ops," p 61;
US3A, "After Action Rpt," vol 2, part 3:
"G-2 Section Rpt," p 23.
88. Gabel, "Lorraine Campaign," pp
32-37; Cole, Lorraine Campaign, pp
417-519; Weigley, Eisenhower's Lieu-
tenants, pp 383-401.
89. US3A, "After Action Rpt," vol 1, pp
144-145.
90. Patton, Diary Entry, Nov 21, 1944.
91. US3A, "After Action Rpt," vol 1, pp
144-145.
92. Weyland, "Diary," Nov 19, 1944;
XIX TAC, "Combat Ops," p 62. Although
the M erzig bombing was second among the
four joint operations in Lorraine, both XIX
337
Notes to pages 169-184
TAC and Third Army considered it less sig-
nificant than the other three, the abortive
Operation Tink.
93. X IX TA C , "C ombat 0 ps," pp 62-63.
94. Weyland, "Diary," Nov 29, 1944;
US3A, "After Action Rpt," vol 1, Nov 29,
1944.
95. Weyland, "Diary," Nov 30, 1944;
9AF, "Operational History of the Ninth Air
Force, Bk I, Battle of the Ardennes: Dec 1,
1944-Jan 1945," sec 1: pp 11-21, USAF-
HRA, 533.01-2; Patton, Diary Entry, Nov
30, 1944.
96. Weigley, Eisenhower's Lieutenants,
pp 402-431; Griess, ed., vol 1, Second
World War, pp 362-365.
97. Weyland, "Diary," Dec 1, 1944. See
also Weigley, Eisenhower's Lieutenants, pp
397-401, 437-441.
98. Weyland, "Diary," Dec 2, 1944.
99. 9AF, "Op History of Ninth AF," pp
11-21.
100. XIX TAC, "Combat Ops," pp
62-63; XIX TAC, "History," J ul 1, 1944-
Feb 28, 1945, part 2: Dec Ops, pp 2-4; X IX
TAC, "Operational Summary," Dec 2, 1944;
9AF, "Op History of Ninth A F," pp 11-21.
101. The fighter- bombers seemed unable
to suppress the enemy defenses using regu-
lar bombs.
102. US3A, "After Action Rpt," vol 2,
part 3: "G-2 Section Rpt," pp 23, 26-27.
103. XIX TAC, "Morning Summaries,"
Sep 25-Dec 16, 1944; 9AF, "Ops Summa-
ry," Sep 25-Dec 16, 1944; XIX TAC,
"Daily Intsum," Sep 25-Dec 16, 1944; X IX
TAC, "History," Jul 1, 1944-Feb 28, 1945,
part 2: Nov, 1944.
104. Weyland, "Diary," Dec 5, 1944.
105. Weyland, "Diary," Dec 6, 1944;
XIX TAC, AC/S, A-3, "Operation Tink:
Air Plan in Support of Third US Army,"
Dec 17, 1944, USAFHRA, 537.205A,
1944; XIX TAC, "Combat Ops," p 63.
106. Weyland, "Diary," Dec 7-8, 1944.
The inner artillery zone represented a defined
airspace under army control in which all air-
craft, hostile or friendly, would be fired on by
antiaircraft artillery. See chap. 5.
107. XIX TAC, "History," Jul 1, 1944-
Feb 28, 1945, part 2: Dec 1945; US3A,
"After Action Rpt," vol 1, Dec 1944.
108. XIX TAC, "History," Jul 1, 1944-
Feb 28, 1945, part 2: Dec 1945.
109. The hectic activity is recorded in
Weyland's diary for this period. See also
Patton, Diary Entry, Dec 10, 1944.
110. Weyland, "Diary," Dec 1944; Pat-
ton, Diary Entry, Dec 10, 1944.
111. Weyland, "Diary," Dec 16, 1944.
The only problem that surfaced was
whether XV Corps would receive air sup-
port at the expense of XII Corps. General
Eddy apparently had reversed an earlier
agreement that provided XV Corps the air
support in question. Weyland wisely side-
stepped the matter, explaining that Third
Army should notify XV Corps because it
was not an air force matter. In any event,
Operation Tink, his plan to break through
the Siegfried Line, was to proceed as origi-
nally designed.
112. XIX TAC, "History," Jul 1, 1944-
Feb 28, 1945, part 2: Dec 1944, pp 11-12.
113. XIX TAC, "Operation Tink," Dec
17, 1944.
114. Weyland, "Diary," Dec 18-19,
1944.
115. Weyland, "Diary," Dec 19-20,
1944.
116. Blumenson, ed., Patton Papers,
pp 588-589. Lorraine has been valued for
its ore deposits for centuries, and with
these words Patton masked his own dis-
pleasure in the outcome of the Lorraine
Campaign.
117. Although the weather and the size
of his force limited the X IX TAC the most,
the situation would have been far worse
had theAllies not benefited from a shorten-
ing of the logistic tail that, before the port
of Antwerp became available, led all the
way back to Brittany.
118. Cole, Lorraine Campaign, p 598.
119. Rpt, "Conference Between Gen Pat-
ton, Gen Weyland and Third Army Corre-
spondents," Dec 9, 1944.
120. Ibid.
338
Notes to pages 185-194
Chapter 5
1. On the land campaign, see Hugh M .
Cole, The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge
[U.S. Army in World War II: European
Theater of Operations] (Washington, D.C.:
Office of the Chief of Military History:
1965); John S.D. Eisenhower, The Bitter
Woods (New Yorl<, Putnam: 1969); Charles
B. M acDonald, A Time for Trumpets: The
Untold Story of the Battle of the Bulge
(New York, William Morrow: 1985); and
Weigley, Eisenhower's Lieutenants, pp
445-566. This account of the ground cam-
paign is based on the works cited above, on
Griess, ed., vol 1, Second World War, chap.
16; and on 9AF, "Op History of Ninth A F."
2. Eisenhower had the benefit of avail-
able Ultra information on the Germans'
logistics situation when he chaired the De-
cember 19 meeting. See Bennett, Ultra in
the West, pp 210-211.
3. For the air contribution, see 9AF, "Op
History of Ninth AF"; Col William R.
Carter, "Air Power in the Battle of the
Bulge: A Theater Campaign Perspective,"
in Airpower Journal (Winter 1989), pp
10-33; Craven and Cate, eds., vol 3,
Europe: Argumentto V-E Day, pp 672-711.
4. Weigley, Eisenhower's Lieutenants,
pp 445-566; Griess, ed., vol 1, Second
World War, chap. 16; 9AF, "Op History of
Ninth AF"; Cole, The Ardennes, pp 1-74;
Eisenhower, Bitter Woods, pp 105-161.
5. Craven and Cate, eds., vol 3, Europe:
Argument to V-E Day, p 673. On Luftwaffe
and air doctrine, see 9AF "Op History of
Ninth AF," sec 4, pp 38-39; and Carter,
"Air Power in Battle of the Bulge."
6. Griess, ed., vol 1, Second World War,
pp 375-377; Craven and Cate, eds., vol 3,
Europe: Argumentto V-E Day, pp 673-682;
Weigley, Eisenhower's Lieutenants, pp
456-464. Hitler actually intended to begin
the German assault in late November, but
weather and supply mobilization delays
forced postponement to mid-December. See
Bennett, U Itra in the West, pp 188-227.
7. Craven and Cate, eds., vol 3, Europe:
Argument to V-E Day, pp 673-682; XIX
TAC, "History," Jul 1, 1944- Feb 28, 1945,
part 1: Dec Ops 1944; US3A, "After
Action Rpt," vol 2, part 3: "G-2 Section
Rpt", pp 23, 26-27. German communica-
tions security helped prevent Ultra from
providing sufficient information of enemy
intentions if not his preparations, while
Allied planners assumed the Wehrmacht
would not follow the same Ardennes attack
route it did when it invaded France in
1940.
8. Blumenson, ed. Patton Papers, p 582;
Bennett, Ultra in the West, pp 188-204.
9. Cole, The Ardennes, p 63.
10. Weigley, Eisenhower's Lieutenants,
pp 445-566; Griess, ed., vol 1, Second
World War, chap. 16; Cole, The Ardennes,
pp 33-74; Eisenhower, Bitter Woods, pp
217-257.
11. AAF Eval Bd, "Third Phase Tactical
Air Ops," pp 175-191.
12. 9AF, "Op History of Ninth AF," sec
2, pp 5-6.
13. Carter, "Air Power in Battle of the
Bulge," p 28. The author discusses the
reversal of second- and third-priority mis-
sions as prescribed in FM 100-20.
14. 9AF, "Op History of Ninth A F," sec
2, pp5-6.
15. See XIX TAC, "History," Jul 1,
1944- Feb 28, 1945, part 2: Dec Ops 1944,
pp 11-12, appendix.
16. 9AF, "Op History of Ninth A F," sec
2, pp 32-34; XIX TAC, "History," Jul 1,
1944-Feb 28, 1945, part 2: Dec Ops 1944,
pp 11-12, appendix.
17. XIX TAC, "Daily Intsum," Dec 17,
1944. One of the aircraft was lost when it
collided with a P-38.
18. Weyland, "Diary," Dec 19, 1944;
9AF, "Ops Summary," Dec 17-22, 1944.
19. Weigley, Eisenhower's Lieutenants,
pp 445-566; Griess, ed., vol 1, Second
World War, chap. 16; Cole, The Ardennes,
339
Notes to pages 194-200
pp 75-106; Eisenhower, Bitter Woods, pp
261-304.
20. Weyland, "Diary," Dec 18, 1944;
US3A, "After Action Rpt," voi 1, Dec 18,
1944.
21. See especially, Weigley, Eisentiow-
er's Lieutenants, pp 496-501; and Griess,
ed., vol 1, Second World War, pp 381-383.
22. Blumenson, ed., Patton Papers, pp
599-600.
23. Weyland, "Diary," Dec 19, 1944.
24. 9AF, "Op History of Ninth A F," sec
2, pp8-16.
25. Weyland, "Diary," Dec 20, 1944;
US3A, "After Action Rpt," vol 1, Dec 20,
1944.
26. Weyland, "Diary," Dec 20, 1944.
27. Ibid.; Rpt, Faulkner, "Operational
Employment of Radar."
28. For accounts of Field M arshal M ont-
gomery's troubles with his American col-
leagues, see Weyland, "Diary," Dec 20,
1944; Rpt, Joseph A. Wyant, 9AF Histori-
an to Brig Gen. R.C. Candee, "Material in
Response to Telephone Request of Sept 28,
1945 Concerning Allied Air Effort During
the Battle of the Bulge," n.d. [1945], parti,
Dec 1, 1944-Jan 26, 1945, USAFHRA,
533.4501-5; Weigley, Eisenhower's Lieu-
tenants, pp 445-566; Griess, ed., vol 1,
Second World War, chap. 16; and Cole, The
Ardennes, pp 48-74, 423-444.
29. Weyland, "Diary," Dec 21, 1944.
30. Ibid., Dec 22, 1944. Although it cer-
tainly was in Patton's best interest to sup-
port Weyland's proposal, the Third Army
commander never refused Weyland's
requests to intervene with higher authori-
ties. "Spitfire" and "Lucky" were the XIX
TAC and Third Army call signs, respec-
tively.
31. Ibid.; XIX TAC, "History," Jul 1,
1944-Feb 28, 1945, part 1, pp 88-91.
32. Weyland, "Diary," Dec 23, 1944.
The transfer of the Eighth Air Force fighter
group proved the exception to the general
rule of speedy transfers. The delay in
preparing the Metz airfield seems to have
been the main reason for this exception.
33. Ibid., Dec 20-23, 1944; US3A,
"After Action Rpt," vol 2, part 3: "G-2
Section Rpt," appendix, pp 26-27.
34. US3A, "After Action Rpt," vol 1,
Dec 22, 1944.
35. Weigley, Eisenhower's Lieutenants,
pp 445-566; Griess, ed., vol 1, Second
World War, chap. 16; Cole, The Ardennes,
pp 423-444; Eisenhower, Bitter Woods, pp
261-346.
36. 406th FG, "The 406th Occupier,"
Sep 28, 1945, p 16, USAFHRA, GP-406-
SU-NE, Sep 45.
37. US3A, "After Action Rpt," vol 1,
Dec 23, 1944. This Third Army report
dryly recorded that "the Army Comman-
der's prayer for fair weather was followed
in a few days by a break in the lowering
skies that had prevented full air support by
XIX Tactical Air Command."
38. See XIX TAC, "History," Jul 1,
1944-Feb 28, 1945, part 2: Dec Ops, pp
14-15. The framework for discussion of
the Ardennes Campaign is based in large
part on the Weyland diary and the follow-
ing sources: US3A, "After Action Rpt," vol
1, Dec, Jan Ops; XIX TAC, "Morning
Summaries," Dec 16, 1944-Jan 31, 1945;
9AF, "Ops Summary," Dec 16, 1944-Jan
31, 1945; XIX TAC, "Daily Intsum," Dec
16, 1944-Jan 31, 1945; Carter and M ueller.
Army Air Forces in World War II; and XIX
TAC, "History," Jul 1, 1944-Feb 28, 1945,
vol 2: Dec 1944, J an 1945 Ops, and appen-
dix 10: Statistical Summary.
39. Seethe preceding note for the statis-
tical record, and Ivie, Aerial Reconnais-
sance, p 108.
40. US3A, "After Action Rpt," vol 2,
part 3: "G-2 Section Rpt," p 27; Cole, The
Ardennes, p 468. For good measure, the
354th also scrambled two planes on Decem-
ber 23 to intercept "bogies" in the XX
Corps zone. None were found.
41. SeeUS3A, "After Action Rpt," vol
1, Dec, Jan Ops; XIX TAC, "Morning
Summaries," Dec 16, 1944-Jan 31, 1945;
9AF, "Ops Summary ," Dec 16, 1944-Jan
31, 1945; XIX TAC, "Daily Intsum," Dec
340
Notes to pages 200-205
16, 1944-J an 31, 1945; Carter and M ueller.
Army Air Forces in Worid War II; XIX
TAC, "History," Jul 1, 1944-Feb 28, 1945,
vol 2: Dec 1944, J an 1945 Ops, and appen-
dix 10: Statistical Summary.
42. Memo, A.C. McLean, XIX
TAC/ORS to A-3, "Analysis of Attacks on
Targets of Opportunity, Dec 15, 1944 to Jan
31, 1945," Feb 16, 1945, USAFHRA,
537.01; XIX TAC, "H istory," J ul 1, 1944-
Feb 28, 1945, appendix 7: 1944-45.
43. 9AF, "Op History of Ninth A F," sec
3, pp 16-17; Carter and M ueller. Army Air
Forces in World War II.
44. See XIX TAC, "History," Jul 1,
1944-Feb 28, 1945, part 2: Dec Ops;
US3A, "After Action Rpt," vol 1, Dec, Jan
Ops; XIX TAC, "Morning Summaries,"
Dec 16, 1944-J an 31, 1945; 9AF, "Ops
Summary," Dec 16, 1944-J an 31, 1945;
XIX TAC, "Daily Intsum," Dec 16, 1944-
Jan 31, 1945; Carter and M ueller. Army Air
Forces in World War II; XIX TAC, "Histo-
ry," Jul 1, 1944-Feb 28, 1945, vol 2: Dec
1944, Jan 1945 Ops and appendix 10: Sta-
tistical Summary.
45. Air Ministry (Great Britain), Ger-
man Air F orce, pp 374-381; Bennett, U Itra
in the West, p 216.
46. Air M inistry (Great Britain), German
Air Force, pp 374-381; 9AF, "Op History of
Ninth AF," sec 3, pp 8-16, 57-61. The
author of a recent article suggested that the
Luftwaffe committed the classic mistake of
failing to make air superiority thefirst prior-
ity for the assault, and instead divided its
attention between support for its ground
assault force and attacking the medium and
heavy bombers that were striking key air-
fields and communications targets. Perhaps
this resulted from the inappropriate nature
of the air forces assembled for the operation,
when Hitler and his advisors thought that
interceptor pilots would have little trouble
flying ground attack missions. German lead-
ers realized they stood little chance of wrest-
ing control of the air from the Allies and,
apart from doctrinal reasons, decided they
had a better chance of supporting the ground
assault in the Ardennes directly rather than
attempting to render Allied air forces inef-
fective. On the other hand, the Germans'
one chance may have been their planned
massive air assault on Allied bases in the
forward area that bad weather prevented
them from carrying out on the eve of the
battle. Indeed, the Luftwaffe's later raid on
Allied airfields on January 1, 1945, would
suggest the success such a gamble might
have produced at the start of the Ardennes
assault. In any event, the Luftwaffe would
remain a major focus of interest for Wey-
land and his fellow airmen. See Carter, "Air
Power in Battle of the Bulge," pp 27-29.
47. XIX TAC, "History," Jul 1, 1944-
Feb 28, 1945, part 2: Dec Ops, appendix
10: Statistical Summary; Air Ministry
(Great Britain), German Air Force, pp
378-379. During the period December
23-27 the Luftwaffe fought well. After the
Bastogne period, pilot inexperience and
poor maintenance began to take their toll.
48. XIX TAC, "History," Jul 1, 1944-
Feb 28, 1945, part 2: D ec, J an 0 ps, pp 2-3.
49. XIX TAC, "Op Statistics," 1944-45,
USAFHRA, 537.391, 1944-45; XIX TAC,
"History," Jul 1, 1944-Feb 28, 1945, part 2:
Dec Ops; US3A, "After Action Rpt," vol 1,
Dec, Jan Ops; XIX TAC, "Morning Sum-
maries," Dec 16, 1944-J an 31, 1945; 9AF,
"Ops Summary," Dec 16, 1944-J an 31,
1945; XIX TAC, "Daily Intsum," Dec 16,
1944-Jan 31, 1945; Carter and Mueller,
Army Air Forces in World War II; XIX
TAC, "History," Jul 1, 1944-Feb 28, 1945,
vol 2, Dec 1944, Jan 1945 Ops.
50. XIX TAC, "Daily Intsum," Dec 23,
1944; Intvw, Burns, Jan 7, 1992.
51. XIX TAC, "Rpton CombatOps," pp
38-39; Smith, "M arston M at," pp 84-88.
52. Weyland, "Diary," Dec 24, 1944;
XIX TAC, "History," Jul 1, 1944-Feb 28,
1945, parti, 88-91.
53. Weyland, "Diary," Dec 24, 1944;
XIX TAC, "History," Jul 1, 1944-Feb 28,
1945, parti, pp 88-91.
54. See XIX TAC, "History," Jul 1,
1944-Feb 28, 1945, part 2: Dec Ops;
341
Notes to pages 205-213
US3A, "After Action Rpt," vol 1, Dec, Jan
Ops; XIX TAC, "Morning Summaries,"
Dec 16, 1944-Jan 31, 1945; 9AF, "Ops
Summary," Dec 16, 1944-Jan 31, 1945;
XIX TAC, "Daily Intsum," Dec 16, 1944-
Jan 31, 1945; Carter and M ueller. Army Air
Forces in World War II; XIX TAC, "Histo-
ry," Jul 1, 1944-Feb 18, 1945, vol 2: Dec
1944, Jan 1945 Ops, appendix 10: Statisti-
cal Summary.
55. 9AF, "Op History of Ninth A F," sec
3, p 35; M acDonald, Time for Trumpets, p
522; U.S. Forces, European Til eater. Battle
Studies, vol 2: Air Operations, ca 1945, No.
21: "Air Resupply, Ardennes Counter-
Offensive (Dec 16, 1944-Feb 21, 1945),"
U SM H I . A itiiougii tiie loss rate of 2 percent
migiit appear iiigii, especially wiien com-
pared witii Eigiitii Air Force statistics for
tiie same period, much of the Luftwaffe
force normally assigned to defend against
the heavy bombers had been operating in
the Ardennes region.
56. Weyland, "Diary," Dec 26, 1944.
57. XIX TAC, "Tactical Air Ops in
Europe," p 31.
58. XIX TAC, "Rpt on Combat Ops," pp
31-34; Ivie, Aerial Reconnaissance, p 115;
Rpt, 10th Photo Group, to HO 9AF,
"Employment of Reconnaissance Aircraft,
Tactics and Techniques," Feb 10, 1945,
USAFHRA, 537.628, 1945.
59. Rpt, Air Effects Committee, "Effect
of Air Power," p 151.
60. Weyland, "Diary," Dec 26-27, 1944;
US3A, "After Action Rpt," vol 1, Dec
26-27, 1944.
61. Weigley, Eisenhower's Lieutenants,
pp 445-566; Griess, ed., vol 1, Second World
War, chap. 16; 9AF, "Op History of Ninth
A F"; Cole, The Ardennes, pp 606-648; M ac-
Donald, Time for Trumpets, Booi< 6.
62. See XIX TAC, "History," Jul 1,
1944- F eb 28, 1945, part 2: D ec 0 ps; U S3A ,
"After Action Rpt," vol 1, Dec, Jan Ops;
XIX TAC, "Morning Summaries," Dec 16,
1944-Jan 31, 1945; 9AF, "Ops Summary,"
Dec 16, 1944-Jan 31, 1945; XIX TAC,
"Daily Intsum," Dec 16, 1944-Jan 31,
1945;XIX TAC,"History,"Jui 1, 1944-Feb
28, 1945, vol 2, Dec 1944, Jan 1945 Ops,
appendix 10: Statistical Summary.
63. 9AF, "Op History of Ninth A F," sec
4, pp 6-9, 31-45; Craven and Cate, eds.,
vol 3, Europe: Argument to V-E Day, pp
701-711; Bennett, U itra in the West, p 216.
64. See XIX TAC, "History," Jul 1,
1944-Feb 28, 1945, part 2: DecOps; US3A,
"After Action Rpt," vol 1, Dec, Jan Ops;
XIX TAC, "Morning Summaries," Dec 16,
1944-Jan 31, 1945; 9AF, "Ops Summary,"
Dec 16, 1944-Jan 31, 1945; XIX TAC,
"Daily Intsum," Dec 16, 1944-Jan 31,
1945;XIX TAC, "History," Jul 1, 1944-Feb
28, 1945, vol 2, Dec 1944, Jan 1945 Ops,
appendix 10: Statistical Summary.
65. US3A, "After Action Rpt," vol 1,
Dec 23-31, 1944.
66. Craven and Cate, eds., vol 3, Europe:
Argument to V-E Day, p 699; XIX TAC,
"Rpt on Combat Ops," pp 25-26; AAF
Evaluation Board, ETO, "Tactics and Tech-
niques Developed by the U nited States Tac-
tical Air Commands in the European The-
ater of Operations," M ar 1, 1945, pp 21-23,
USAFHRA, 138.4-33, 1945; Rpt, Faulkner,
"Operational Employment of Radar."
67. XIX TAC, "History," Jul 1, 1944-
Feb 28, 1945, part 1: pp 88-91. One must
remember that not only did the night fight-
ers do a good job with the resources avail-
able, their avionics technology was more
complex than most military aircraft of the
day and hence proneto reliability problems.
68. XIX TAC, "Tactical Air Ops in
Europe," pp 26-29; XIX TAC, "Rpt on
Combat Ops," pp 27-30.
69. XIX TAC, "Tactical Air Ops in
Europe," pp 26-29; XIX TAC, "Rpt on
Combat Ops," pp 27-30.
70. See the file entitled XIX TAC,
"Reports of Attacks by Friendly-Type Air-
craft," Dec 1944-Jan 1945, USAFHRA,
537.599. M ost incidents were attributed to
pilots flying with other commands, such as
Eighth Air Force, who were less familiar
with terrain and flying conditions in Third
A rmy's area of operations.
342
Notes to pages 213-222
71. Weyland, "Diary," Dec 30-31, 1944;
Intvw, Gen Robert M . Lee, USAF (Ret) by
author, Sep 22, 1989.
72. Weyland, "Diary," Dec 30-31, 1944;
Intvw, Lee, Sep 22, 1989.
73. Patton, Diary Entry, Dec 31, 1944.
74. See tine file entitled, XIX TAG,
"Attacks by Friendly-Type Aircraft"; Davis,
Spaatz, p 535.
75. Air M inistry (Great Britain), German
Air Force, pp 379-381; Bennett, Ultra in
the West, pp 218-219; Weyland, "Diary,"
J an 1, 1945; U S3A , "After A ction R pt," vol
l,Jan 1, 1945; XIX TAG, "History," J ul 1,
1944-Feb 28, 1945, part 2: Jan Ops; 9AF,
"Op History of Ninth A F," sec 4, pp 20-21,
38-41; Patton, Diary Entry, J an 1, 1945.
76. Air M inistry (Great Britain), German
Air Force, pp 379-381; Bennett, Ultra in
the West, pp 218-219; Weyland, "Diary,"
Jan 1, 1945; US3A, "After A ction Rpt," vol
l,Jan 1, 1945; XIX TAG, "History," J ul 1,
1944-Feb 28, 1945, part 2: Jan Ops; 9AF,
"Op H istory of N inth A F," sec 4, pp 20-21,
38-41; Patton, Diary Entry, J an 1, 1945.
77. Weyland, "Diary," Jan 1, 1945. On
reaction by command personnel, see for
example, 362d FG, "Unit History," Jan
1945.
78. Weyland, "Diary," Jan 1-2, 1945.
79. Rpt, Faulkner, "Operational Employ-
ment of Radar."
80. XIX TAG, "Tactical Air Ops in
Europe," pp26-29;XIX TAG, "Rpton Gom-
batOps," pp 27-30. Goordination improved
greatly when XIX TAG supplied Third Army
controllers better FM radio (FM 1498) sets.
TheTGG also began continuous broadcasts
via SGR-399 radio, and controllers became
more proficient See HO AAF, Condensed
Analysis of Ninth AF, pp 100-101.
81. Weyland, "Diary," J an 1-2, 1945; see
also XIX TAG, "History," Jul 1, 1944-Feb
28, 1945, part 2: Dec Ops; US3A, "After
Action Rpt," vol 1, Dec, Jan Ops; XIX
TAG, "Morning Summaries," Dec 16,
1944-Jan 31, 1945; 9AF, "Ops Summary,"
Dec 16, 1944-Jan 31, 1945; XIX TAG,
"Daily Intsum," Dec 16, 1944-Jan 31,
1945; XIX TAG, "History," Jul 1, 1944-Feb
28, 1945, vol 2: Dec 1944, Jan 1945 Ops,
appendix 10: Statistical Summary.
82. XIX TAG, "History," Jul 1, 1944-
Feb 28, 1945, part 1, pp 88-91; 361st FG,
"U nit H istory," Dec 1944-J an 1945, U SA F-
HRA, GP-361-HI-FI, 1945; 367th FG,
"U nit H istory," Dec 1944-J an 1945, U SA F-
HRA, GP-367-HI, 1944-45.
83. FM 100-20, para 9.
84. US3A, "After Action Rpt," vol 1:
Jan Ops; 9AF, "Op History of Ninth A F,"
sec 4, pp 30, 46-48; Bennett, Ultra in the
West, p 219.
85. See XIX TAG, "History," Jul 1,
1944-Feb28, 1945, part2: DecOps; US3A,
"After Action Rpt," vol 1, Dec, Jan Ops;
XIX TAG, "Morning Summaries," Dec 16,
1944-Jan 31, 1945; 9AF, "Ops Summary,"
Dec 16, 1944-Jan 31, 1945; XIX TAG,
"Daily Intsum," Dec 16, 1944-Jan 31,
1945; XIX TAG, "History," Jul 1, 1944-Feb
28, 1945, vol 2, Dec 1944, Jan 1945 Ops,
appendix 10: Statistical Summary.
86. Bennett, Ultra in the West, p 221.
87. 9AF, "Op History of Ninth A F," sec
10, p 7. Although the command attempted
to use its more battle-weary aircraft for
combat air patrols, these aircraft also could
have seen better action if used against inter-
diction targets.
88. Weigley, Eisenhower's Lieutenants,
pp 445-566; Griess, ed., vol 1, Second World
War, chap. 16; 9AF, "Op History of Ninth
AF"; Gole, The Ardennes, pp 606-648.
89. See especially, Griess, ed., vol 1,
Second World War, pp 386-388; Weigley,
Eisenhower's Lieutenants, pp 550-556.
90. 9AF, "Op History of Ninth A F," sec
5, p 7; Weyland, "Diary," Jan 2, 1945. This
kind of flexibility in aerial assignment had
become routine by this stage of the war.
91. XIX TAG, "History," Jul 1, 1944-
Feb 28, 1945, vol 2, J an Ops.
92. US3A, "After Action Rpt," vol 2,
part 3: "G-2 Section Rpt," pp 31-32.
93. XIX TAG, "History," Jul 1, 1944-
Feb 28, 1945, part 2: J an Ops, pp 6-7; I vie.
Aerial Reconnaissance, pp 121-122.
343
Notes to pages 223-238
94. Weyland, "Diary," Jan 9-10, 1945;
XIX TAC, "History," Jul 1, 1944-Feb 28,
1945, part 2: J an Ops, pp 6-7.
95. Weyland, "Diary," Jan 8-10, 1945.
96. Ibid., Jan 10, 1945; Rpt, Faulkner,
"Operational Employment of Radar." The
GCA radar was unidirectional unlike the
MEW, whose omnidirectional capability
also enabled it to provide good navigation-
al assistance. David R. Mets, "Manuscript
Comments," M ay 15, 1992.
97. Weyland, "Diary," J an 10, 1945; Rpt,
Faulkner, "Operational Employment of
Radar."
98. Ibid.
99. Weyland, "Diary," Jan 12, 1945.
The command also encouraged its pilots to
visit Third Army units and meet their per-
sonnel whenever flying commitments per-
mitted.
100. 9AF, "Op History of Ninth A F," sec
4, pp 1-5, sec 5, pp 1-7.
101. Bennett, U Itra in the West, pp 219-220.
102. Weyland, "Diary," Jan 14, 1945.
103. XIX TAC, "History," Jul 1, 1944-
Feb 28, 1945, part 2: Jan Ops, p 10; XIX
TAC, "Rpt on Combat Ops," p 64.
104. XIX TAC, "Rpt on Combat Ops,"
pp 6-12; XIX TAC, "Tactical Air Ops in
Europe," pp 5-13. The command was most
critical about the absence of a good marker
bomb in the inventory.
105. XIX TAC, "History," Jul 1, 1944-
Feb 28, 1945, part 2: J an Ops, p 11; U S3A ,
"After Action Rpt," vol 2, part 3: "G-2
Section Rpt," p 31; XIX TAC, "History,"
Jul 1, 1944-Feb 28, 1945, part 1: pp
22-28.
106. XIX TAC, "History," Jul 1, 1944-
Feb 28, 1945, vol 2: Jan Ops, p 2; XIX
TAC, "Rpt on Combat Ops," p 47.
107. XIX TAC, "History," Jul 1, 1944-
Feb 28, 1945, part 2: Jan Ops, p 12. The
evening of January 17 General Patton
appeared as guest of honor at a special X IX
TAC senior officers' dinner in Luxembourg
City to help the airmen celebrate their
recent successes and consider the path
ahead. Weyland, "Diary," J an 17, 1945.
108. US3A, "After Action Rpt," vol 1,
pp 15-22.
109. Weyland, "Diary," Jan 21, 1945;
XIX TAC, "History," Jul 1, 1944-Feb 28,
1945, part 1: pp 88-91.
110. 9 A F "Op H istory of N inth A F," sec
5, pp 17-19.
111. Weyland, "Diary," Jan 22, 1945;
XIX TAC, "History," Jul 1, 1944-Feb 28,
1945, part 2: J an Ops, pp 14-16.
112. 368th FG, "Unit History," Jan
1945, USAFHRA, GP-368-HI, 1944-45.
113. XIX TAC, "History," Jul 1, 1944-
Feb 28, 1945, part 2: Jan Ops, pp 14-16;
Weyland, "Diary," J an 22-23, 1945.
114. XIX TAC, "History," Jul 1, 1944-
Feb 28, 1945, part 2: Jan Ops, p 16.
115. See XIX TAC, "History," Jul 1,
1944-Feb 28, 1945, part 2: Dec Ops; U S3A ,
"After Action Rpt," vol 1, Dec, Jan Ops;
XIX TAC, "Morning Summaries," Dec 16,
1944-Jan 31, 1945; 9AF, "Ops Summary,"
Dec 16, 1944-Jan 31, 1945; XIX TAC,
"Daily Intsum," Dec 16, 1944-Jan 31,
1945;XIX TAC, "History," Jul 1, 1944-Feb
28, 1945, part 2: Dec 1944, Jan 1945 Ops,
appendix 10: Statistical Summary.
116. Weyland, "Diary," Jan 22-23,
1945; Ivie, Aerial Reconnaissance, p 126.
117. AAF Eval Bd, "Third Phase Tacti-
cal Air Ops," p 373.
118. See XIX TAC, "History," Jul 1,
1944-Feb 28, 1945, part 2: Dec Ops;
US3A, "After Action Rpt," vol 1: Dec, Jan
Ops; XIX TAC, "Morning Summaries,"
Dec 16, 1944-Jan 31, 1945; 9AF, "Ops
Summary," Dec 16, 1944-Jan 31, 1945;
XIX TAC, "Daily Intsum," Dec 16, 1944-
Jan 31, 1945; XIX TAC, "History," J ul 1,
1944-Feb 28, 1945, part 2: Dec 1944, Jan
1945 Ops and appendix 10: Statistical
Summary.
119. Weyland, "Diary," J an 24, 28, 1945.
120. Rpt, "Allied Air Effort During Bat-
tle of the Bulge."
121. Rpt, Air Effects Committee, "Effect
of Air Power," p 63.
122. 9AF "Op History of Ninth A F," sec
5, p 18.
344
Notes to pages 239-246
Chapter 6
1. XIX TAC, "Daily Intsum," Feb 2,
1945; Air Ministry (Great Britain), Ger-
man Air Force, pp 389-392.
2. US3A, "After Action Rpt," vol 2, part
3: "G-2 Section Rpt," p 34. German troop
strength in the Eifel was uncertain, compli-
cated by a Wehrmacht policy of constantly
shifting troops out of the line. By the end of
the Eifel Campaign in late March 1945,
Third Army analysts estimated German
forces had dwindled to about the size of
one American division, approximately
16,000 troops. See Charles B. M acDonald,
The Last Offensive [U.S. Army in World
War II: European Theater of Operations]
(Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of
Military History, 1973), p 16.
3. For the land campaign, see M acDon-
ald, Last Offensive; Bradley, Soldier's Story,
pp 490-554; Weigley, Eisenhower's Lieu-
tenants, pp 567-730; Williams, Chronolo-
gy, pp 365-534; M acDonald, Mighty
Endeavor, pp 455-569; and Griess, ed., vol
1, Second World War, pp 393-410.
4. On U.S. Army weaknesses, see Wei-
gley, Eisenhower's Lieutenants, pp 567-574.
Allied military leaders chose M alta for their
discussions because it had been selected as
the site for a meeting between Churchill,
Roosevelt, and their advisors, on their way to
the Yalta conference.
5. M acDonald, Last Offensive, pp
55-69; Bradley, Soldier's Story, pp
490-554; Weigley, Eisenhower's Lieu-
tenants, pp 567-730; M acDonald, Mighty
Endeavor, pp 455-569; Griess, ed., vol 1,
Second World War, pp 393-395.
6. 368th FG, "Unit History," Feb 1945;
XIX TAC, "History," Feb 1945, pp 16-17.
For the air war, see Craven and Gate, eds.,
vol 3, Europe: Argument to V-E Day, pp
756-808; HQ AAF, Condensed Analysis of
Ninth Air F orce, pp 43-48. The discussion
and chronological format for this discus-
sion of the campaign is based in large part
on the Weyland Diary and the following
sources: XIX TAC, "History," Feb, Mar,
Apr, May, 1945; XIX TAC, "Morning
Summaries," Jan 28-May 8, 1945; XIX
TAC, "Daily Intsum," Jan 28-May 8,
1945; 9AF, "Ops Summary," Jan 28-May
8, 1945; and Carter and M ueller. Army Air
Forces in World War II.
7. XIX TAC, "History," J an- May 1945,
appendix 8: Operational Research Data.
Ninth Air Force established the Opera-
tional Research Section at XIX TAC on
January 13, 1945, although General Wey-
land's interest in the project dated from
early October 1944. See XIX TAC, "His-
tory," Jul 1, 1944-Feb 28, 1945, part 1, p
205.
8. XIX TAC, "History," J an- May 1945,
appendix 8: Operational Research Data.
9. Carter, "Air Power in Battle of the
Bulge," pp 26-27.
10. XIX TACORS, Rpt No. 91, "Oper-
ational Testing of SCR 584 Blind Bombing
Procedure," Apr 7, 1945; XIX TAC, ORS,
Memo No. 79, "SCR 584 Blind Bombing
in XIX TAC Command," Apr 20, 1945,
USAFHRA, XIX TAC, "History," May
1945, sec 2: Annexes.
11. AAF Eval Bd, "Third Phase Tactical
Air Ops," p 33.
12. XIX TAC, "Operational Testing of
SCR 584 Blind Bombing Procedure," Apr
7, 1945; see also XIX TAC, "SCR 584
Blind Bombing," Apr 20, 1945.
13. Ibid.; 9AF, ORS, Rpt No. 85,
"Operational Accuracy of the Modified
SCR 584 in Controlling Tactical Air Coor-
dination Missions," May 8, 1945, USAF-
HRA , X IX TAC, "H istory," M ay 1945, sec
2: Annexes.
14. XIX TAC, "SCR 584 Blind Bomb-
ing," Apr 20, 1945.
15. XIX TAC, "History" Feb 1945, pp
4-5; XIX TAC "History" Mar 1945, pp
105-108; XIX TAC, "Ordnance-Arma-
ment Handbook for Tactical Air Liaison
Officers," Mar 1945, USAFHRA, XIX
345
Notes to pages 246-257
TAC, "History," May 1945, sec 2: Annex-
es. More powerful than TNT, the British
RDX could be considered the "original
plastic" explosive.
16. Craven and Gate, eds., vol 3, Europe:
Argument to V-E Day, pp 756-808; HQ
AAF, Condensed Analysis of Ninth AF, pp
43-48; Weyland, "Diary," Mar, 1945; XIX
TAC, "History," Mar 1945; XIX TAC,
"Morning Summaries," Jan 28-May 8,
1945; XIX TAC, "Daily Intsum," Jan 28-
May 8, 1945; 9AF, "Ops Summary," Jan
28-M ay 8, 1945; Carter and M ueller. Army
Air Forces In World War II.
17. Weyland "Diary," Feb 4, 1945. On
February 4, the day after General Weyland
discussed reinforcing General Nugent's
command, he announced to his staff that
the 354th would convert back to P-51s,
while the 367th would replace its P-38
Lightnings with Thunderbolts.
18. 362d FG, "Unit History," Feb 1945.
19. 354th FG , "U nit H Istory," Feb 1945.
20. Ibid.
21. For Patton's operations in the Eifel,
see especially M acDonald, Last Offensive,
pp 55-69, 84-115.
22. Ibid.
23. The 371st Fighter Group transferred
to XII TAC on September 29, 1944. In the
spring of 1945 it boasted the fewest number
of pilots and aircraft lost, and the lowest
aircraft abort rate in the command.
24. Craven and Gate, eds., vol 3, Europe:
Argument to V-E Day, pp 756-808; HQ
AAF, Condensed Analysis of Ninth AF , pp
43-48; Weyland, "Diary," Feb, Mar, Apr,
May, 1945; XIX TAC, "History," Feb, Mar,
Apr, May, 1945; XIX TAC, "Morning
Summaries," Jan 28-May 8, 1945; XIX
TAC, "Daily Intsum," Jan 28-M ay 8, 1945;
9AF, "Ops Summary," Jan 28-May 8,
1945; Carter and M ueller. Army Air F orces
In World War II.
25. XIX TAC, "History," appendix 10:
Statistical Summary (see appendix 4).
26. Patton lost an infantry division and
hislll Corps headquarters to General Simp-
son's Ninth Army.
27. Squadrons seem to have supported
different corps on the same day, less from
proximity to the target area than to needs of
the particular ground element Siegfried
Line fighting often saw artillery assume
primary responsibility for close support.
28. 9AF, "Ops Summary," Feb 1-25,
1945. Tactical air power's flexibility also
applied to priorities, which In this case found
close air support becoming most Important.
29. Ibid. The special assault teams are
described in M acDonald, Last Offensive, p
111. Weyland never mentioned earlier AAF
tests that suggested fighter-bombers might
have the best chance against plllbox-type
targets. On the other hand. Third Army
leaders seem to have preferred their assault
team tactics rather than face the coordina-
tion problems required for fighter-bomber
attacks against potential flak traps close to
friendly troops In bad weather.
30. For discussion of four-plane flight
operations, see XIX TAC, "Tactical Air
Ops In Europe," p 3, and 362d FG, "Unit
History," Mar 1945. Four-plane missions
had been flown In North Africa, but the tac-
tic received criticism from airmen, albeit
under very different circumstances.
31. To be sure. In mid-March 1945,
when the front moved far to the east and the
Luftwaffe began to contest the Allied
advance to the Rhine River more seriously,
Weyland returned to the larger eight-plane
close support formation.
32. Craven and Gate, eds., vol 3,
Europe: Argument to V-E Day, pp
732-735; AAF Eval Bd, "Third PhaseTac-
tical Air Ops," pp 195-196; Rpt, Air
Effects Committee, "Effect of Air Power,"
pp 64-65. Allied losses included only
seven of 1,411 heavy bombers, which
bombed at exceptionally low altitudes. The
XIX TAC lost two P-51S in this operation.
33. General Bradley's report downplays
Clarion's impact because his evaluators
considered it too isolated an operation.
34. Weyland, "Diary," Feb 25, 1945.
35. Ibid., Feb 28-Mar 7, 1945; XIX
TAC, "Tactical Air Ops in Europe," p 35.
346
Notes to pages 257-270
General Weyland, who was promoted to
major general on February 6, 1945, decid-
ed to spend a week in Cannes on the Riv-
iera at the Hotel Martinez, popularly
known as Flak House. In his absence, chief
of staff Colonel Roger Browne assumed
command. Opened in early 1945 for N inth
Air Force personnel, the Hotel Martinez
had 50 beds reserved weekly for X IX TAC
personnel. The command invariably filled
its quota and viewed the rest-area policy as
a major factor in reducing combat fatigue
and preserving high morale. As for Gener-
al Weyland, the vacation was his first of
the campaign and gave him a chance to
celebrate his recent promotion in pleasant
surroundings.
36. MacDonald, Last Offensive, pp
196-197.
37. XIX TAC, "History," appendix 10:
Statistical Summary.
38. MacDonald, Last Offensive, pp
185-207; Weigley, Eisenhower's Lieu-
tenants, pp 619-622.
39. Weyland, "Diary," Mar 9, 1945;
Bennett, U Itra in the West, p 242.
40. XIX TAC, "Rpton Combat Ops," p
68. See also the "Statements from Allied
Ground Forces" in AAF, "Third PhaseTac
Air Ops," pp 215-254, and the report com-
piled under General Bradley's direction,
Rpt, Air Effects Committee, "Effect of Air
Power," Annex 1.
41. Weyland, "Diary," Mar 9, 1945;
XIX TAC, "History," Mar 1945.
42. See especially, Weigley, Eisenhow-
er's Lieutenants, pp 633-639.
43. On the Saar-M osel-Rhine Trap, see
Ibid., pp 633-639; XIX TAC, "Rpt on
Combat Ops," pp 68-70; and M acDonald,
Last Offensive, pp 185-207.
44. XIX TAC, "Rpt on Combat Ops,"
pp 68-70.
45. Mission rates varied considerably
with the combat conditions. With smaller,
four-plane missions, the rate was relative-
ly high. Sortie rates, by contrast, refer to
the number of individual airplane flights
during a given amount of time.
46. MacDonald, Last Offensive, chap.
11; Air Ministry (Great Britain), German
Air Force, p 389.
47. XIX TAC, "Casualties, Mar 1944-
M ay 1945," USAFHRA, 537.391, 1944-45.
48. Many close air support targets
appear to have been what might be termed
battlefield air interdiction targets. Such air-
craft were normally assigned to a corps for
cooperation missions, then released for
armed reconnaissance-interdiction flying.
XIX TAC, "Casualties, Mar 1944- May
1945."
49. 362d FG , "U nit H istory," M ar 1945;
Intvw, Burns, Jan 7, 1992.
50. XIX TAC, "History," Mar, Apr,
1945, appendix 10: Statistical Summary.
51. Eisenhower, it must be said, was
unwilling to cater any longer to Bernard
Montgomery's crushing ego. Indeed, his
public carping a few weeks earlier during
the Battle of the Bulge nearly cost the
Field M arshal his job. When he learned he
was about to be sacked, only an obse-
quious letter to Eisenhower, wherein he
pledged to the Supreme Commander his
future support as a subordinate in all mat-
ters, saved him his European command in
World War II. For this episode, see
Bradley, Soldier's Story, pp 509-522; Wei-
gley, Eisenhower's Lieutenants, pp
641-644; and Bennett, U Itra in the West, p
242.
52. Weyland, "Diary," Mar 20-22,
1945; XIX TAC, "Rpton Combat Ops," pp
69-70.
53. Without a better means of fore-
stalling German movement at night, tactical
air power could not prevent some degree of
German escape. See XIX TAC, "History,"
M ar 1945; Griess, ed., vol 1, Second World
War, pp 399-400.
54. US3A, "After Action Rpt," vol 2,
part 3: "G-2 Section Rpt," p 39.
55. XIX TAC, "Rpton Combat Ops," p
70; Air M inistry (Great Britain), German
Air Force, p 390.
56. XIX TAC, "History," M ar 1945, sec
2, Annexes.
347
Notes to pages 270-290
57. XIX TAC, "History," Mar 1945; Air
iviinistry (Great Britain), German Air
Force, p 390.
58. US3A, "After Action Rpt," vol 2,
part 3: "G-2 Section Rpt," p 39.
59. Ibid., p 45.
60. Weyland, "Diary," M ar 27, 1945. For
details on the Hammelburg incident, see
Blumenson, ed., Patton Papers, pp 664-676;
Weigiey, Eisentiower's Lieutenants, pp
654-657; and MacDonaid, Last Offensive,
pp 280-284.
61. Griess, ed., voi 1, Second Worid War,
pp 404-405.
62. Weyland, "Diary," M ar 23-31, 1945.
63. Ibid, Mar 26, 1945.
64. 9AF, "Report on Tactical Air Coop-
eration, Organization, Metfiods and Proce-
dures witii Special Empfiasis on Pfiase III
Operations," Jul 31, 1945, USAFHRA,
N 138.4-34, 1945, pp 37-43. A itiiougii eas-
ier to transport, tiie Britisii mesii traci<
could prove troublesome on site and, once
broi<en, would require considerable time
and effort to repair Smith, "M arston M at,"
pp 84-88.
65. Weyland, "Diary," M ar 27-31, 1945;
XIX TAC, "History," M ar 1945.
66. XIX TAC, "History," Apr 1945.
67. Blumenson, ed., Patton Papers, pp
680-681; Weigiey, Eisenhower's Lieu-
tenants, pp 681-687.
68. XIX TAC, "History," Apr 1945;
362dFG, "Unit History," Apr 1945.
69. Ibid.
70. Air Ministry (Great Britain), Ger-
man Air Force, pp 391-392.
71. Weyland, "Diary," Apr 8, 1945; X IX
TAC, "History," appendix 10: Statistical
Summary; Ivie, Aerial Reconnaissance, pp
151-157.
72. XIX TAC, "History," Apr 1945.
73. Weyland, "Diary," Apr 1, 1945; X IX
TAC, "History," Apr 1945; XIX TAC,
"Tentative M oving Schedule," Apr 5, 1945,
USAFHRA, 537.391, Aug 1944-Mar
1945.
74. Weyland, "Diary," Apr 3, 1945.
75. 368th FG , "U nit H istory," A pr 1945.
76. Weyland, "Diary," Apr 12, 1945.
77. Ibid, Apr 4-10, 1945.
78. Weyland, "Diary," Apr 11-13, 1945;
Blumenson, ed., Patton Papers, pp 683-685;
and MacDonaid, Last Offensive, pp
379-384.
79. Weyland, "Diary," Apr 10, 1945.
80. See Air Ministry (Great Britain),
German Air Force, pp 391-392.
81. XIX TAC, "History," Apr 1945, pp
101-103.
82. Weyland, "Diary," Apr 16-17, 1945;
Patton, Diary Entry, Apr 17, 1945.
83. XIX TAC, "History," Apr 1945.
84. XIX TAC, "Daily Intsum," Apr
19-20, 1945.
85. Weyland, "Diary," Apr 21, 1945.
86. US3A, "After Action Rpt," vol 2,
part 3: "G-2 Section Rpt," pp 39, 45.
87. Ibid.
88. Weyland, "Diary," Apr 29, 1945.
89. XIX TAC, "History," appendix 10:
Statistical Summary; Ivie, Aerial Recon-
naissance, pp 151-157.
90. Weyland, "Diary," Apr 18-30, 1945;
XIX TAC, "History," Apr 1945.
91. Weyland, "Diary," Apr 28, 1945.
92. Ibid.
93. Intvw, Weyland, Nov 19, 1974, p
157.
94. Weyland, "Diary," M ay 1-8, 1945.
95. US3A, "Gen Order No. 98," and
XIX TAC, "Gen Order No. 34," both May
9, 1945, in XIX TAC, "History," May
1945, sec 2: Annexes, USAFHRA, 537.01.
348
Chapter 7
Notes to pages 291-298
1. US3A, "GO 98," and XIX TAG, "GO
34," both M ay 9, 1945.
2. AAF Eval Bd, "Third Phase Tactical
Air Ops," Aug 1945, p 38.
3. XIX TAG, "History," appendix 10:
Statistical Summary; XIX TAG, "Op Sta-
tistics," 1944-45. An aborted sortie refers
to a combat sortie in which the airborne air-
craft returns to its base or flies toward
another friendly base before completing the
scheduled mission for reasons other than
enemy action (e.g., engine trouble).
4. Ltr, Brig Gen Robert M . Lee, Dep GG
for Ops, 9AF, to Maj Gen O.P. Weyland,
GG, XIX TAG, Mar 5, 1945, USAFHRA
537.01, 1945, appendix 8.
5. Rpt, Maj Gen Weyland to GG, 9AF,
"Tank and Armored Vehicle Glaims," M ar
17, 1945.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid. Authorities also allowed for re-
porting constraints based on a pilot's abbre-
viated view while operating a 300-mph air-
plane.
8. R pt, I X TA G , "A ssessment of F i g hter-
Bomber Glaims," Apr 15, 1945, Ouesada
Gollection, Box 5, M D, LG.
9. The questionnaire, responses, and
correspondence among key commanders
are found as an untitled Board report, AAF
Evaluation Board, ETO, 1945, USAF-
HRA, 138.36A, 1945. This information
was used to prepare the Board's report on
Phase III operations (USAFHRA, 138.4-
36, 1945), which included extracts entitled
"Statementsfrom Allied Ground Forces on
the Effectiveness of Air Gooperation." The
Board's report resulted from the initiative
of Lieutenant General Barney Giles, AAF
Deputy Gommander, in late January 1945,
who wanted an assessment of close air
support procedures, operations, and effec-
tiveness from both ground and air view-
points. Army Major General Jacob E.
Fickel served as president of the board,
whose members included three air officers
and one ground officer, supported by a
staff of one ground and four air officers.
Board members visited 18 major air and
ground headquarters in the European the-
ater, including those of Third Army and
the XIX TAG. After its European survey,
the board convened at Orlando Army Air
Base, Florida, assigned to the AA F's Tac-
tical Genter. The report was issued on
August 20, 1945.
10. Ltr, M aj Gen Walton H. Walker, GG,
XX Gorps, US3A to Maj Gen O.P. Wey-
land, GG, XIX TAG, Apr 16, 1945, USAF-
HRA 537.01, 1945, sec 2: Annexes. Like
most of his fellow airmen in tactical avia-
tion during World War II, Weyland did not
discuss his views on air power at great
length. Ouesada, who did speak out, left the
Air Force. Later, when Weyland served as a
four-star general and commander of the
Tactical Air Gommand, he often expressed
himself on the nature of tactical air power.
His theme remained that of FM 100-20,
centralized control of air assets at the the-
ater level with air and ground elements
directing their own forces.
11. Gen Ouesada's winter assault plan is
discussed in Ltr, Dr. David Griggs to E.L.
Bowles, Oct 17, 1944.
12. Weigley, Eisenhower's Lieutenants,
pp 727-730. Whatever difficulty one might
have with the logic of Weigley's argument,
Patton always argued that mobility and
superior numbers and tactics prevailed
against the heavier-gun German weapons.
See for example, "Transcript of Gonference
between Lt Gen G.S. Patton, Jr, and Third
Army Gorrespondents," Sep 7, 1944, in Pat-
ton Collection, Box 15, Chronological File,
MD, LG.
13. Ltr, Gen O.N. Bradley, GG, 12th
Army Group, to Gen Garl Spaatz, GG,
USSTAF, May 17, 1945, USAFHRA,
138.4- 36A, 1945.
14. XIX TAG, "Rpt on Gombat Ops,"
Introduction.
349
Notes to pages 299-306
15. AAF Eval Bd, "Third Phase Tactical
Air Ops," p 38; Rpt, Air Effects Commit-
tee, "Effect of Air Power," pp 151.
16. AAF Eval Bd, "Third PhaseTactical
Air Ops," p 1. On the relations between
U.S. Army Ground Forces and U.S. Army
Air Forces headquarters and on postwar
tactical air power developments, see Caro-
line F. Ziemke, "In the Shadow of the
Giant: USAF Tactical Air Command in the
Era of Strategic Bombing, 1945-1955"
(PhD diss, Ohio State U niversity, 1989), pp
1-75. In late 1945 General Devers, then
commanding general of Army Ground
Forces, could be expected to support the
AAF view on air superiority as prerequisite
for ground action.
17. AAF Eval Bd, "Third PhaseTactical
Air Ops," p 25.
18. See the statistics and charts in Rpt,
Air Effects Committee, "Effect of Air
Power," plates 1, 2.
19. Ibid., p 193.
20. Despite Ninth Air Force's outstand-
ing record flying against the Seine and
Loire bridges prior to D-Day, planners ini-
tially focused on destroying enemy road
and rail convoys in the fall of 1944, before
deciding to concentrate air power against
bridge targets.
21. On the subject of air interdiction, see
Richard H. Kohn and Joseph P. Harahan,
eds.. Air Interdiction in World War II,
Korea, and Vietnam (Washington, D.C.:
Office of A ir Force H istory, 1986).
22. FM 100-20, Introduction and para
16 b.(3); Jacobs, "Tactical Air Doctrine,"
pp 35-49.
23. AAF Eval Bd, "Third PhaseTactical
Air Ops," p 342.
24. Ibid., pp 341-343; XIX TAC, "Tacti-
cal Air Ops in Europe," p 1.
25. AAF Eval Bd, "Third PhaseTactical
Air Ops," p 1.
26. M emo, Raines, M ay 20, 1991.
27. Rpt, Air Effects Committee, "Effect
of Air Power," p 43. The 105- and 155-mm
howitzers, the most widely used American
artillery pieces, fired projectiles weighing
approximately 30 and 100 pounds, respec-
tively. See MacDonald, Last Offensive, p
12; and Roland G. Ruppenthal, Logistical
Support of the Armies, vol 2 [U .S. Army in
World War II: European Theater of Opera-
tions] (Washington, D.C.: Office of the
Chief of Military History, 1989), pp
524-543; also. Department of the Army,
The Army Almanac (Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1950),
pp 123-126.
28. Rpt, AAF Evaluation Board, ETO,
"Ouestionnaire for Army Officers, 1945,"
USAFHRA, 138.36A, 1945, response to
question #2.
29. The fact remains that P-47s with
standard 500-lb bombs normally could do
little damage to pillbox-type targets. As H.
M. Cole described a three-squadron air
attack during the Lorraine Campaign, "the
planes hit their targets, but the 500-pound
bombs carried by the P-47's had little
effect on reinforced concrete." Cole, Lor-
raine Campaign, p 154.
30. Rpt,AAF Eval Bd, "Ouestionnaire for
Army Officers," response to question #14.
31. US3A, "After Action Rpt," vol 2,
part 3: "G-2 Section Rpt," p 39, 45.
32. Ltr, Gen Bradley to Gen Spaatz, M ay
17, 1945.
33. Despite the laudatory emphasis on
individual initiative in air-ground opera-
tions in western Europe, clearly future tech-
nology would enable commanders of Wey-
land's generation to centralize control more
effectively and by so doing constrain junior
officer initiative. Advanced technology for
command and control eventually would
give to less-disciplined leaders far from the
scene the ability to micro-manage events on
the battlefield, and along with that, a corre-
sponding decrease in the delegation of
authority to leaders on the scene (though
responsibility for the outcome remained
securely tied to the field commanders). By
the time of the Vietnam War in the 1960s,
this trend had captured the President of the
United States in the Oval Office! How
might General Eisenhower, Supreme Com-
350
Notes to pages 306-316
mander of Allied Expeditionary Forces,
have responded at the eleventh hour to
imprecations from President Franklin Roo-
sevelt for a delay of D-Day?
34. Rpt, AAF Eval Bd, "Questionnaire
for Army Officers," response to questions
#23 and #36.
35. Ibid., response to question ^3.
36. AAF Eval Bd, "Third Phase Tactical
Air Ops," pp 305-309. To be sure, the
effectiveness of Allied fighters against the
Luftwaffe's Bf 109 and FW 190 aircraft
depended on more than technology alone.
Piloting sl<ills and experience, among other
considerations, also proved crucial.
37. X I X TA C , "R pt on C ombat 0 ps," p 5.
38. Rpt, AAF Eval Bd, "Questionnaire
for Army Officers," response to questions
#20 and #21.
39. AAF Eval Bd, "Third Phase Tactical
Air Ops," pp 384-385; XIX TAG, "Rpt on
Combat Ops," pp 25-26.
40. AAF Eval Bd, "Third Phase Tactical
Air Ops," p 33.
41. HQ AAF, Condensed Analysis of
Ninth Air Force, p 105.
42. Ltr, Gen Bradley to Gen Spaatz, M ay
17, 1945.
43. Intvw, Gen James Ferguson, USAF,
J un 14, 1988, videotape on file at Air U ni-
versity television studio. Maxwell AFB,
Alabama.
44. HQ AAF, Condensed Analysis of
Ninth AF, p 121.
45. Blumenson, ed., Patton Papers, p 624.
46. Ltr, Patton to Weyland, Sep 21,
1945, Box 32, Personal and Professional
Correspondence, Patton Collection, MD,
LC.
47. Gen O.P. Weyland, "Interview," Nov
19, 1974, pp 151-152, USAFHRA,
K239. 0512-813; see also Kohn and Hara-
han, eds.. Air Superiority, pp 68-69.
48. Weyland, "Interview," Nov 19, 1974,
pp 151-152.
49. AGF, "Report of the Army Ground
Forces Equipment Review Board," J un 20,
1945, and subsequent correspondence and
reports, including Weyland's notes, in
Weyland Papers, USAFHRA,
168.7104-89, 1945. Cook had been XII
Corps commander briefly under General
Patton during the first half of A ugust 1944,
before blood and circulatory problems
forced his reassignment and return to the
United States. Had he served a longer tour
with the air-ground team, perhaps his views
on air support would have been more in
accord with his former commander's.
50. Ibid.
51. Ibid.
52. See Kohn and Harahan, eds.. Air
Superiority, p 68; Futrell, Ideas, Concepts,
Doctrine, pp 74-75, 165; Ziemke, "In the
Shadow of the Giant," pp 1-30; War
Department FM 31-75, "Air Ground Oper-
ations" (Aug 1946).
53. For postwar developments, see
Futrell, Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine; Ziemke,
"In the Shadow of the Giant."
54. The official report in two volumes is
in the Weyland Papers, USAFHRA,
168.7104-53, 1954. On tactical air prob-
lems in Korea, see especially, Allan R. M il-
lett, "Korea, 1950-1953," in Cooling, ed.,
Close Air Support, pp 345-405.
55. Kohn and Harahan, eds.. Air Superi-
ority, p 72.
351
Sources
The study of close air support for Lt. Gen. George S. Patton, Jr.'s,
army is based mainly on primary materials located in two superb government
repositories. The United States M ilitary History Institute at Carlisle Barracks,
Pennsylvania, maintains an important World War II collection of air-ground
records and invaluable after action reports prepared by the U .5. Third Army.
The comprehensive archival collection of the United States Air Force
Historical Research Agency at M axwell Air Force Base, Alabama, provided
the bulk of the primary sources on tactical aviation's role in general and of the
XIX Tactical Air Command's support of Third Army operations in particular.
Among these records, the XIX Tactical Air Command file. General 0. P.
Weyland's personal papers, and the XIX Tactical Air Command's unit histo-
ries proved especially rewarding. The materials at both repositories can be
examined in their original hard copy forms. Specific archival listings cited
below also identify other valuable records examined for this history.
United States Government
Archives
USAF Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB, Alabama
Class 138: AAF Evaluation Board
Rpt, AAF Evaluation Board, ETO, "The Effect of Air Power in the Battle of
Metz," Jan 19, 1945 (K 138.4- 30).
Rpt, AAF Evaluation Board, ETO, "Tactics and Techniques Developed by the
United States Tactical Air Commands in the European Theater of Op-
erations," M ar 11, 1945 (138.4-33, 1945).
Rpt, AAF Evaluation Board, ETO, "HO Ninth A F, Report on Tactical Air Co-
operation, Organization, M ethods and Procedures with Special Empha-
sis on Phase III Operations," Jul 31, 1945 (138.4-34, 1945).
Rpt, Ninth AF, "Report on Tactical Air Cooperation, Organization, M ethods
and Procedures with Special Emphasis on Phase III Operations," J ul 31,
1945 (138.4-34, 1945).
Rpt, AAF Evaluation Board, ETO, "Effectiveness of Third Phase Tactical Air
Operations in the ETO, M ay 4, 44 to M ay 8, 45" (138.4-36, M ay 19,
45).
Rpt, AAF Evaluation Board, ETO, "Ouestionnaire for Army Officers, 1945"
(138.36A, 1945).
353
Air Power for Patton's Army
Ltr, Gen. 0. N. Bradley, CG, 12th Army Group to Gen. Carl Spaatz, CG,
USSTAF, May 17, 1945 (K138.4-36A, 1945).
CZflss 168: Papers of Retired Officers
Weyland Papers
Weyland, Maj. Gen. Otto P. "Diary, Jul 29, 44- May 18, 45" (K 168.7104-1,
1944-1945).
Lecture, "Air Power and Its Application," Sep 21, 1955 (168.7104-46, 1954).
Diary, "Korea, Dec 1, 1951-May 31, 1952" (168.7104-52, 1951-52).
FEAF, "ReportontheKorean War" 2 Vols, 1954 (K 168.7104-53, 1954).
"Twelve-Thousand Fighter-Bomber Sorties: XIX Tactical Air Command's
First M onth of Operations in Support of Third US Army in France," Sep
30, 1944(168.7104-69).
"Progress Report, Airfield Construction," Jul 24, 1944 (168.7104-83).
"Planes Over Patton: XIX Tactical AirCommand'sSupportof Third Army in
its Swift End-Run Through France," Sep 30, 1944 (168.7104-86, Sep
30, 44).
"Ziegenburg Hq Attack," Mar 19, 1945 (168.7104-87, 1945).
Cook Board Correspondence, 1945 (K 168.7104-89, 1945).
HO AAF, "Impact: U.S. Tactical Airpower." Vol 3, No. 5 (May 1945)
(168.7104-92, May 45).
Intvw, Rundstedt, Field M arshal Gerd von, with M aj. Gen. 0. P. Weyland, J ul
2, 1945 (168.7104-95).
"Conference between General Patton, General Weyland and Third Army Cor-
respondents," Dec 9, 1944 (168.7104-101, 1944).
Weyland/XIX TAC Photo Album (168.7104-114, 1944-45).
Miscellaneous Reports
IX Air Support Command, "Reference Guide on Tactical Employment of Air
Power Organization and Control Channels of Tactical Units," Prepared
Oct 29, 1943, revised Feb 24, 1944 (168.6005-103A), Feb 25, 1944).
"Some Notes on the Use of Air Power in Support of Land Operations, Intro-
duction by B. L. Montgomery," Dec 1944" (168.6006-137)
CZflss 520: Eighth Air Force
Rpt, "Report on M anpower and Shipping Requirements Prepared by Bradley
Committee," J un 23, 1943 (K 520.122- 1, 1943).
"Statistical Summary of Eighth Air Force Operations, Aug 17, 42-M ay 8, 45"
(520.308-11, 1942-45).
354
Sources
CZflss 533: Ninth Air Force
Studies and Statistics
Ninth A F, "Annual Statistical Summary, 1944" (K 533.3083, 1944).
" 0 perati onal Hi story of the N i nth A i r F orce, B k I , B atti e of the A rdennes: D ec
1, 1944-Jan 26, 1945" (K 533.01-2).
"Operational Statistics, Jan 1, 44-Jun 1, 44" (K 533.3082, 1944).
"OperationsJournal,Aug 6, 1944" (K533.305, Apr-Dec 1944).
"Scheduleof Operations, Aug 2, 1944" (K 533.3082, Aug 1944).
"Weekly Intelligence Summaries, Nov 3, 43-J un 1, 44" (K 533.607, 1944-45).
Reports
First Army G-3 (Air), "Air Support Report, Aug 6, 44" (K 533.4501-3, M ay-
Aug 1944).
"Report on the Activities of the Ninth Air Force, period 6 J un-20 Aug 1944"
Sep 27, 1944(533.306-2, 1944).
"Fighter-bomber Control: A Compilation of Procedures Used by the Ninth Air
Force during Operations on the European Continent" (Brig. Gen. Robert
M . Lee, Chief of Staff) (533.503-1, 1945).
"ORS Report No. 65, MEW Operations in X IX Tactical Air Command," Nov
20, 1944.
"Reconnaissance in the Ninth Air Force: A Report on Reconnaissance Opera-
tions During the European Campaign," n.d. (M ay 9, 1945).
Joseph A. Wyant, Ninth AF Historian to Brig. Gen. R. C. Candee, "M aterial
in Response to Telephone Request of Sep 28, 1945 Concerning Allied
Air Effort During the Battle of the Bulge," n.d. [1945] (533.4501-5).
ORS Rpt No. 85, "Operational Accuracy of the Modified SCR 584 in Con-
trolling Tactical Air Coordination Missions," May 8, 1945 (XIX TAC
Hist/M ay/Annexes).
"Air Force Operations in Support of Attack on Cherbourg, J un 22 thru J un 30,
1944, " File 536: IX Tactical Air Command.
"IX TAC in Review: Organization, Personnel, Equipment, M aintenance. Oper-
ations, Costs," Nov 43-May 45 (536.01, 1945).
IX TAC,"UnitHistory, Apr, May,Jun,Jul 1944" (536.02)
CZflss 537: XIX Tactical Air Command
Studies and Histories
XIX TAC, "History of XIX Tactical Air Command," Dec 4, 1943-Jun 30,
1944 (537.01, 1943-44).
XIX TAC, "History of the XIX Tactical Air Command," J ul 1, 1944- Feb 28,
1945, Parti: "Administrative Narrative, Aug 44-May 45" (537.01).
355
Air Power for Patton's Army
XIX TAC, "History of the XIX Tactical Air Command," J ul 1, 1944- Feb 28,
1945, Part 2: "Operations Narrative, Aug 44-May 45" (537.01).
XIX TAC, "History of tlieXIX Tactical Air Command," J ul 1, 1944- Feb 28,
1945, A pp 1: "General Orders, Aug 44-May 45" (537.01).
XIX TAC, "History of the XIX Tactical Air Command," J ul 1, 1944- Feb 28,
1945, A pp 2: "Special Orders, Aug 44-May 45" (537.01).
XIX TAC, "History of theXIX Tactical Air Command," J ul 1, 1944-Feb 28,
1945, A pp 3: "M emoranda, A ug 44-M ay 45" (537.01).
XIX TAC, "History of the XIX Tactical Air Command," J ul 1, 1944-Feb 28,
1945, A pp 4: "M ovement of Troops Orders, A ug 44-M ay 45" (537.01).
XIX TAC, "History of the XIX Tactical Air Command," J ul 1, 1944-Feb 28,
1945, App 5: "Assignment/Attachment Orders, Aug 44-May 45"
(537.01).
XIX TAC, "History of theXIX Tactical Air Command," J ul 1, 1944-Feb 28,
1945, App 6: "Twelve-Thousand Fighter-Bomber Sorties, Aug 44-M ay
45" (537.01).
XIX TAC, "History of theXIX Tactical Air Command," J ul 1, 1944-Feb 28,
1945, App 7: "Operational Research Data, Aug 44-May 45" (537.01).
XIX TAC, "History of theXIX Tactical Air Command," J ul 1, 1944-Feb 28,
1945, App 8: "Correspondence, Aug 44-M ay 45" (537.01).
XIX TAC, "History of theXIX Tactical Air Command," J ul 1, 1944-Feb 28,
1945, App 9: "Periodic Staff Reports, Aug 44-M ay 45" (537.01).
XIX TAC, "History of theXIX Tactical Air Command," J ul 1, 1944-Feb 28,
1945, App 10: "Statistical Summary of theXIX Tactical Air Command,
Aug 44-May 45" (537.01).
XIX TAC, "Signals: The Story of Communications in the XIX Tactical Air
Command upto V-E Day,"Jun 15, 1945 (537.901).
Reports
"Reports of Attacks by Friendly-Type Aircraft," Dec 1944-Jan 1945.
(537.599).
"Report on Bombing of M etz Forts," Sep-Nov 1944.
"A Report on the Combat Operations of theXIX Tactical Air Command," M ay
30, 1945 (537.02).
10th Photo Gp, to HO Ninth AF, "Employment of Reconnaissance Aircraft,
Tactics and Techniques," Feb 10, 1945 (537.628, 1945).
Faulkner, J . E., Advanced Science Base Laboratory, British Branch Radiation
Laboratory, MIT, "Operational Employment of Radar in the XIX
Tactical Air Command," n.d. [1945] (537.906, 1945).
ORS Rpt No. 91, "Operational Testing of SCR 584 Blind Bombing
Procedure," Apr 7, 1945.
ORS Memo [Rpt] No. 79, "SCR 584 Blind Bombing in XIX Tac Command,"
356
Sources
Apr 29, 1945 (Hist/M ay/Sec 2: Annexes).
A-3, "Operation M adison: Air Plan in Support of Third U .S. Army," Nov 3,
1944 (537.4501, 1944).
A-3, "Operation Tink: Air Plan in Supportof Third U .5. Army," Dec 17, 1944
(537.205A, 1944).
Weyland, M aj. Gen. to CG, Ninth AF, "Tank and Armored Vehicle Claims,"
Mar 17, 1945 (XIX Hist, App 8).
"Immediate Report No. 41 (Combat Observations)," ca 1945 (537.01, 1945).
Hallett, Lt. Col. CharlesH., AC/S to CG, Ninth AF, "Use of Napalm Bombs,"
Oct 3, 1944 (537.453, Oct-Nov 44).
"Tactical Air Operations in Europe: A Report on Employment of Fighter-
Bomber, Reconnaissance and Night Fighter Aircraft by XIX Tactical Air
Command, Ninth Air Force, in Connection with the Third U.S. Army
Campaign from Aug 1, 1944 to V-E Day, May 9, 1945." (537. 04A,
1944-45).
HQ AAF, "Air-Ground Teamwork on the Western Front: The Role of theXIX
Tactical Air Command during Aug 1944 [Wings at War Series, No. 5]
(537.04C, Aug 44).
Correspondence
Ltr, Dr. David Griggs, M ember. Advisor Specialist Group, USSTAF, to Brig.
Gen. 0. P. Weyland, Oct 3, 1944 (K537.101, 1944).
Ltr, CG , X IX TAC to CG , N inth A F, "A uthorized A ircraft in Fighter Groups,"
Nov 14, 1944 (537.01, App 8, 1944-45).
Ltr, Maj. Gen. Walton H. Walker, CG, XX Corps, U.S. Third Army to Maj.
Gen. 0. P. Weyland, CG, XIX TAC, Apr 16, 1945 (537.01, Apr, 1945,
Sec 2: Annexes).
Ltr, "Tentative M oving Schedule," Apr 5, 1945 (537.391).
Ltr, Brig. Gen. Robert M . Lee, Dep CG for Ops, Ninth AF to Maj. Gen. 0. P.
Weyland, CG , X IX TAC, M ar 5, 1945 (537.01, 1945, App 8).
M emo. Brig. Gen. 0. P. Weyland, CG , X IX TAC to Lt. Gen. G. S. Patton, CG ,
U.S. Third Army, Oct 28, 1944(537.01, 1944).
Memo, Lt. Col. Charles H. Hallet, AC/S, to CG, XIX TAC, "Air Supportof
Third Army's Drive to the East," Aug 23, 1944 (168.7104-85).
Memo, Lt. Col. Charles H. Hallet, AC/S to A-3, XIX TAC, Oct 6, 1944
(537.306A,Oct 1-15, 1944).
Memo, A. C. McLean, XIX TAC/ORS to A-3, "Analysis of Attacks on
Targets of Opportunity, Dec 15, 1944 to Jan 31, 1945," Feb 16, 1945
(537.01, App 7).
Memo, No. 100-25B, "SOP, Tactical Air Communications," Apr 29, 1945.
"Ordnance-Armament Handbook forTactical Air Liaison Officers," M ar 1945
(537.01, M ar 1945, Sec 2: Annexes).
357
Air Power for Patton's Army
Statistics
"Daily Intelligence Summaries (Intsum)," Aug 9-May 8, 1945 (537.606,
1944-45).
"Morning Summaries," Aug 8, 1944- May 8, 1945 (537.306A).
"Operational Statistics," A ug 8, 1944- M ay 9, 1945 (537.3800-3900, 1944- 45).
Class 612: Northzvest African Air Forces
R pt, C ol . H . J . K nerr, D ep, A SC to C G , A A F, " R eport on M anpo w er and S hi p-
ping Requirements Prepared by Bradley Committee," Jun 23, 1943
(K612.201A).
CZflss 614: Northwest African Tactical Air Force
Memo, Brig. Gen. L. S. Kuter, Dep Comdr/Allied Air AF to CG, AAF, subj:
Organization of American Air Forces, M ay 12, 1943 (614.201-1).
Class 626: Mediterranean Allied Tactical Air Force
Rpt, HO, MASAAF, "XXII Tactical Air Command's Close Support of the
Fifth Army" (K 626.4501-1, 1944).
Class 651: XII Air Support Command
Rpt, AEAF, "Notes on Air Power Taken During a Visit to Fifth Army Front
Between the 5th to 20th of Feb 1944." (K651.152, Feb 5, 1944).
Unit Histories
36th Fighter Group (GP-36-HI/Apr-Sep 44).
354th Fighter Group (GP-354-HI/Nov 43-May 45).
358th Fighter Group (GP-358-HI/Feb-Nov 44).
361st Fighter Group (GP-361-HI/Dec 44-Jan 45).
362d Fighter Group (GP-362-H I/Jan 44-May 45).
367th Fighter Group (GP-367-H I/Dec 44-Feb 45).
368th Fighter Group (GP-368-H I/Dec 44-Feb 45).
371st Fighter Group (GP-371-HI/M ar-Sep 44; Feb-May 45).
405th Fighter Group (GP-405-HI/Apr 44-Feb 45).
406th Fighter Group (GP-406-HI/Feb 44-Feb 45).
"The 406th Occupier: Special Historical Issue," (GP-406-SU-NE/Sep 45)
Miscellaneous Reports
Rpt, Philip Cole, etal.,VIII Air Support Command to HO, Eighth AF, "Ob-
servers Report. Air Operations in Support of Ground Forces in North
West Africa Mar 15-Apr 5, 1943," Jul 1943 (K650.03-2).
358
Sources
Rpt, George S. Patton, HQ, Seventh A rmy, "Notes on the Sicilian Campaign,"
Oct 30, 1943.
U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania
U.S. Third Army, "After Action Report," Aug 1, 1944-May 9, 1945, Vol 1:
Operations; Annex No. 3: "XIX Tactical Air Command," Regensburg,
1945.
, "After Action Report," Aug 1, 1944-May 9, 1945, Vol 2: Staff Se-
ction Reports, Part 1: "Command Section Report." Regensburg, 1945.
, "After Action Report," Aug 1, 1944-May 9, 1945, Vol 2: Staff Se-
ction Reports, Part 3: "G-2 Section Report," Regensburg, 1945.
, "After Action Report," Aug 1, 1944-May 9, 1945, Vol 2: Staff Se-
ction Reports, Part 4: "G-3 Section Report" Regensburg, 1945.
12th Army Group, Air Effects Committee, "Effect of Air Power on M ilitary
Operations, Western Europe," J ul 15, 1945.
, "Answers to Questionnaire for Key Commanders on the Effects of
Strategic and Tactical Air Power on M ilitary Operations, ETO," 1945.
, "Answers to AAF Evaluation Board Guide Questions on Air- Ground
Cooperation." May 11, 1945.
, "Destruction of the German Armies in Western Europe, J un 6, 1944-
M ay 9, 1945." ca 1945.
U.S. Army Ground Forces, Observer Board, European Theater, "Reports of
Observers," 3 Vols, Bad Nauheim, Germany, 1944-46.
U .S. Forces, European Theater. Battle Studies, Vol 2: Air Operations, ca 1945:
No. 2: "Army Air Forces Logistical Summary (During WWII in ETO)."
No. 5: "Tactical Development of Fighters in the European Theater."
No. 14: "Fighter-Bomber Cooperation."
No. 15: "AAF Tactical Reconnaissance in the European Theater."
No. 19: "The Battle for Metz and the Surrounding Forts, 1500 Years- 15
Days."
No. 21: "Air Resupply: Ardennes Counter-offensive (Dec 16, 1944- Feb
21, 1945)."
No. 22: "Air Force Participation in the Battle of the Ardennes (Dec 16,
1944-Jan 16, 1945)."
No. 29: "Employment of theAir Forces in the European Theater During
WW II and the Role of Fighter Aviation."
U.S. Forces, European Theater, General Board, "The Utilization of Tac Air
Recce Units of the Army Air Forces to Secure Information for Ground
Forces in the European Theater." Study No. 19, ca 1945-46.
General Board. "Liaison Aircraft with Ground Force Units." Study No. 20, ca
1945-46.
359
Air Power for Patton's Army
, General Board, "Organization, Operations and Equipment of Air-
Ground Liaison in All Echelons from Divisions Upwards." Study No.
21, ca 1945-46.
, General Board, "Air Power in the European Theater of Operations."
Study No. 54, ca 1945-46.
, General Board, "The Control of Tactical Aircraft in the European
Theater of Operations." Study No. 55, ca 1945-46.
, General Board, "The Tactical Air Force in the European Theater of
Operations." Study No. 56, ca 1945-46.
N i nth A i r F orce. " R econnai ssance i n the N i nth A i r F orce: A R eport on R econ-
naissance Operations During the European Campaign," M ay 9, 1945.
Library of Congress (LC), Washington, D.C.
Henry H. Arnold Collection
HQ,AAF,AAF Ltr80-3, "AirEmploymentTerminology," Nov 16, 1944, File
1938-46, Box 104, MD, LC.
Memo, Lt. Gen. Carl Spaatz, CG, NAAF to Maj. Gen. Barney Giles, C/S,
AAF, Sep 12, 1943. Arnold Collection, File 3 1938-46,
(370.2/Africa/34), Box 104, M D, LC.
George S. Patton, Jr., Collection
Chronological File: Miscellaneous Correspondence, 1944-1945, Boxes
14-16, MD, LC.
Diaries and Correspondence, 1942-1945, Boxes 2-4, M D, LC.
Photo Albums, 1944-1945, Boxes 111-113, M D, LC.
Elwood R. Quesada Collection
Ltr, Dr. David Griggs, Advisory Specialist Group, USSTAF, to Dr. E. L.
Bowles, Expert Consultant to the Secretary of War, M ar 17, 1944, Box
5, MD, LC.
Rpt, IX Fighter Command, A-3, n.d.. Box 3, M D, LC.
Rpt, IX Fighter Command, A-4, n.d.. Box 3, M D, LC.
Rpt, IX TAC, G-3 (Air), n.d.. Box 5, M D, LC.
Carl A. Spaatz Collection
Rpt, IX TAC, "Assessment of Fighter-Bomber Claims." Apr 45, Box 5, M D, LC.
Memo, Brig. Gen. D. L. M. Schlatter, Dep C/S-Opns, Ninth AF, to CG,
USSTAF, "Report on Cherbourg Attack, Jul 21, 44," Box 164, MD, LC.
360
Sources
National Archives, Washington, D.C.
RG 331: Records of Allied Operational and Occupation Headquarters, WWII
HQ, Twelfth Army Group, "Brief of Joint Operations Plan— U.S. Forces for
Operation Overlord" (revised M ay 8, 1944), File 1943-45 (370.2), Box
85, NA
RG 337: Records of the Army Ground Forces
Rpt, Col. E. L. Johnson, G-3 (Air), U.S. First Army to AGF Board, HQ
ETOUSA, "Information Regarding Air-Ground Joint Operations," Jul
16, 1944, RG 337, Entry 29, Box 51, NA
National Security Agency Reports
Memo, NSA, "Ultra and the Third Army," May 28, 1945, in NSA, Special
Research, History- 023.
Rpt, NSA, "Reports by U.S. Army Ultra Representatives with Army Field
Commands in the European Theater of Operations," parts 1 and 2, in
NSA, Special Research, History- 023
Books and Studies
Department of the Army. The Army Almanac. Washington: U .S. Government
Printing Office, 1950.
HQ AAF, Condensed Analysis of the Ninth Air Force in the European Theater
of Operations. Washington, 1946. repr, Washington, 1984.
Air M inistry (Great Britain). The Rise and Fall of the German Air Force,
1933-1945. Old Greenwich, Conn: WE Inc., 1969.
Beck, Alfred M ., Abe Bortz, Charles W. Lynch, Lida Mayo, and Ralph F.
Weled. The Corps of Engineers: The War Against Germany [United
States Army in World War II: The Technical Services]. Washington:
Center of M ilitary History, 1985.
Blumenson, Martin. Breakout and Pursuit [United States Army in World War
II: The European Theater of Operations]. Washington: Office of the
Chief of M ilitary History, 1965.
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Index
advanced landing ground (ALG): 41, 62
air umbrella: 46, 49, 76, 111, 220, 253,
297, 306
Aircraft: 4, 38, 77, 143, 192, 199-203,
293, 307
A- 20: 2, 95, 162, 233, 307
A-26: 233
B-17: 2
B-26: 200, 201
Bf 109: 99, 100, 148, 213, 215,
216, 226, 248, 276
C-47: 102, 116, 141, 199, 200,
204, 279
F-3: 95
F-5:60, 61, 95, 222
F-6:60, 95, 104, 206, 226
FW 190: 54, 155, 157, 192, 203,
226, 227, 276, 279
L-1: 205
L-5: 120
Mosquito: 48, 211
P-38: 60, 95, 151, 192, 196, 206,
217, 222, 247, 285, 288, 307
P-39: 2, 307
P-40: 2, 26, 307
P-47:23, 37, 38-40,46, 55,56,
63, 64, 70, 73, 74, 77, 81, 84,
85, 86, 89, 90, 96, 98, 99, 110,
111, 118, 120, 143, 146, 160,
172, 192, 193, 200-203, 208,
213, 214, 215, 218, 219, 226,
243, 247-248, 263, 271, 273,
282, 300, 307-308
P-47/D-30: 143
P-51: 38, 40, 46, 60, 77, 84, 87,
95, 98, 99, 100, 104, 141, 142-
143, 160, 162, 172, 196, 200,
203, 206, 213, 217, 218, 226,
247-248, 250, 258, 263, 268,
271, 276, 288, 300, 307-308
P-51D: 248
P-61: 79, 127, 130, 162, 210,
268, 308-309
P-70: 162
Air Forces (numbered):
Sixth: 26
Eighth: 29, 30, 35, 36, 38, 40, 65,
137, 143, 149, 158, 159, 174,
177, 180, 195, 196, 199, 200,
201, 212, 217, 218, 220, 222,
232, 307
Ninth: 29, 30,31, 32-33, 34, 35,
36, 38, 39, 41, 42, 43, 44, 48,
52, 55, 64, 65, 75, 77, 79, 81,
85, 88, 91, 100, 109, 111, 114,
115, 119, 121, 135, 137, 138,
139, 141, 143, 148, 152, 162,
163, 164, 170, 172, 190, 195,
201, 203, 208, 211, 212, 216,
222, 230, 232, 236, 237, 242,
243, 245, 250, 255, 263, 264,
275, 280, 282, 283, 287, 289,
294, 298-300, 302,307, 309,
310, 311
Twelfth: 7, 9
Fifteenth: 40
Allied Expeditionary Air Force (AEAF):
30, 32-33,41, 52
Ancon,USS: 52-53, 54, 70
AN/CPS-1: 129, 131
Anderson, K.A.N.: 10, 14
Anderson, Samuel E.: 232, 242-243
Andrews, Frank M .: 17
Antiaircraft Artillery (AAA): 212, 217
Ardennes: 123, 133, 180, 181, 183, 185-
238, 292-294, 297, 300, 301, 303, 310
Argentan Trap: 90
Argentan-Falaise gap: 90
Armies (numbered):
First: 21,34, 41,48, 49, 54-55,
371
Air Power for Patton's Army
56, 59, 61, 66, 67, 68, 77, 86,
90, 97, 102, 114, 132, 133,
146-147, 148, 149, 155, 179,
180, 185, 189, 192, 196, 208,
215, 220, 225, 230, 248, 258,
260, 270, 276, 283, 312
Third: 1,21, 27,34, 36, 41,43,45,
47, 56, 62,66-67, 69-71,73,
75, 79, 81, 86, 89, 90, 91, 94,
97, 100, 102, 109-112, 115,
118, 119, 120, 121, 123, 125,
127, 132, 140-141, 144, 145,
146-149, 150, 157, 159, 163,
166, 167, 168, 169-177, 180,
183, 185, 195, 197, 199, 204,
205, 207, 208, 210, 212, 214,
215, 217, 219, 223-224, 226,
240, 248, 249-250, 253, 254,
255, 256, 257, 260, 262, 263,
267-270, 271,272, 273, 275,
276, 280, 281, 283, 285, 288,
291, 292, 297, 298, 299, 300,
303, 306, 308, 311, 312, 313
Fifth: 7, 21
Seventh: 25, 97, 99, 104, 127,
137, 163, 174, 177, 179, 186,
239, 260, 265
Ninth: 107
Army Air Corps: 1-3
Army Air Forces (AAF): 4, 6, 15, 16, 18,
22, 26, 27, 30, 32, 37, 43, 65, 66, 69,
90, 94, 98, 110, 111, 120, 211, 215,
220, 248, 272, 288, 290, 292, 296,
298, 299, 301, 302, 304, 306, 307,
308, 309, 314, 314
Army Ground Forces (AGF): 67
Arnold, Henry H.: 2, 3, 4, 14, 16, 26, 43,
44, 233, 314
Bastogne: 180, 185, 186, 193, 194, 195,
198, 199, 200, 203-215, 220, 234, 297
battle area control unit (BACU): 224, 244
Bayfield, USS: 52, 53
Berg, Russell A.: 95
Black Letter Day: 160
blank check: 212
Blitz warfare: 70-86
blitzkrieg: 3, 25, 69, 75, 121
Blumenson, M artin: 24
Bradley, Omar N .: 21, 22, 34, 48, 51, 59,
67, 68, 70, 86, 90, 102, 106, 123, 127,
133, 147, 148, 149, 155, 172, 181,
194, 196, 213, 214, 234, 240, 248,
256, 257, 260, 267, 273, 275, 281,
297, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303, 305,
310, 312, 315
Brandenberger, Eric: 186, 239
Brereton, Lewis H.: 15, 16, 30, 32, 48,
49, 55, 71, 73
bridge too far 132
broad-front strategy: 97, 98
Browne, Roger: 128
Bulge, Battle of the: 185, 225-234
Burns, John J.: 39, 79, 265
Byers, Robert C: 35
Candee, Robert C: 29
Casablanca: 12, 15, 24, 28, 44
Chandler, Berry: 206, 213
Chief of Staff to Supreme Commander
(COSSAC): 29
chief warrant officer (CWO): 212
Churchill, Winston: 28
Clark, Mark W.: 21
Cole, Philip: 29, 30, 35, 37
Coleman, Glenn C: 35, 195
Colmar pocket: 171
Commands (numbered):
VII Air Support: 29, 30
IX Tactical Air: 34, 36, 37, 38,
41, 43, 53, 54-55, 59, 63, 64,
66, 68, 71, 73, 77, 79, 86, 87,
88, 109, 115, 131, 132, 147,
172, 180, 196, 197, 206, 211,
232, 295, 303
XII Air Support: 7, 10, 29
XII Tactical Air: 29, 30, 127, 137,
147, 148, 152, 153, 163, 174,
177, 179, 222, 249, 283
XIX Tactical Air: 1, 23, 27, 30,
33-43, 45-46, 47,48,49, 54,
55, 56, 62, 64, 66, 67, 68, 69,
70, 71, 73-75, 77, 79-88, 89,
90-95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100,
372
Index
102, 103, 104, 106, 107, 108,
109, 112, 113, 115, 116, 117,
118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 125,
127, 130, 132, 133, 135, 137,
138, 139, 141, 143, 144, 146,
147, 148, 152, 153, 155, 160,
161, 163, 166, 169, 173, 174,
177, 180, 183, 185, 189, 195,
196, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202,
203, 204, 208, 210, 211, 212,
215, 218, 220, 222, 224, 225-
234, 236, 239, 242, 244, 246,
248, 249, 255, 257, 258, 262,
268, 270, 273, 275, 276, 208,
281, 282, 283, 285, 286, 287,
288, 289, 290, 291, 292,
293, 294, 297, 298, 300, 302,
303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308,
309, 311, 312, 313
XXIX TAC: 96, 104, 114, 148,
172, 199, 249, 303
Coningham, Arthur: 7, 17, 196
Cook, Gilbert R.: 314
Corps (numbered):
First Armored: 24
II: 10, 11, 25, 29
III: 194, 195, 199, 205, 206, 207,
208, 220, 222, 224, 225, 230,
250, 283
IV: 46
V: 197
VI: 97
VII: 70, 257, 258
VIII: 55, 67,68, 70, 73, 77, 80, 81,
91, 96, 99, 100, 104, 108, 109,
110, 112, 179, 180, 185, 189,
190, 193, 194, 195, 199, 205,
206, 207, 208, 220, 222, 224,
225, 230, 248, 249, 250, 252,
254, 256, 257, 258, 260, 262,
263, 270, 271, 276, 281, 283
XII: 70, 91,96, 100, 110, 115, 117,
133, 134, 137, 143, 144, 146,
153, 154, 163, 166, 167, 170,
173, 174, 175, 177, 180, 192,
193, 194, 195, 199, 208, 215,
222, 224, 225, 230, 232, 234,
248, 249, 250, 252, 254, 256,
257, 258, 260, 262, 265, 270,
271, 276, 281, 283, 285, 308
XV: 68, 70, 77, 80, 86, 89, 90, 91,
96, 110, 137, 153
XX: 70, 76, 77, 87, 91, 96, 100,
103, 110, 115, 136, 137, 138,
146, 153, 154, 163, 166, 167,
170, 173, 174, 175, 177, 192,
195, 208, 215, 222, 223, 224,
230, 233, 246, 250, 252, 253,
254, 256, 257, 260, 262, 267,
270, 271, 276, 281, 283, 285,
293, 296, 306, 308
Craig, Howard A.: 10
D-Day: 22, 37, 39, 41, 44, 45, 51-53, 54,
61, 293
De Gaulle, Charles: 220
Devers,Jacob L.: 171, 174, 194, 222,
240, 260, 265, 267, 299, 315
Dietrich, Sepp: 186, 188, 189, 198
Ding Bat 1: 172
Ding Bat 2: 172
Direction Finder (D/F): 129
Divisions (numbered):
3d Infantry: 25
4th Armored: 76, 77, 79, 89, 117,
193, 195, 198, 207, 228, 256,
258, 260, 262, 264, 265, 270,
273
5th Infantry: 135, 137, 138
6th Armored: 166, 277
9th Armored: 263
10th Armored: 166, 194, 257
nth Armored: 283
26th Infantry: 146
83d Infantry: 106
90th Infantry: 138, 177, 263
95th Infantry: 167, 170, 172
101st Airborne Infantry: 193,
194, 198, 206, 207, 228
Doolittle, James: 156, 174, 175, 214,
215, 280, 288
Dragon's Teeth: 169
Earnest, Herbert L.: 77
373
Air Power for Patton's Army
Eddy, M anton S.: 123, 133, 137, 153,
166, 248, 271, 276
Eisenhower, Dwight D.: 7, 9, 10, 12, 15,
21, 22, 25, 29, 32, 33, 40, 51, 86, 90,
96, 97, 98, 102, 123, 132, 133, 163,
174, 181, 185, 193, 194, 195, 220,
240, 248, 256, 263, 265, 267, 273,
275, 276, 281, 297, 312, 313
Elster, Botho: 107, 108
Fall Gelb: 186
Faulkner,]. E.: 132
Felber, Hans: 260
Ferguson, James: 27, 35, 87, 91, 94, 113,
117, 118, 120, 139, 147, 151, 153,
195, 207, 212, 213, 224, 258, 275,
287, 310
Field Manual (FM): 3
FM 1-5: 4
FM 31-35: 4, 6, 7, 14, 16, 18, 29,
30, 56, 306, 314
FM 100-20: 16, 18, 43, 44, 54,
76, 234, 290, 298, 299, 304,
305, 310, 312, 315
firebombs: 112
fireman: 102, 118
five minute alert: 216
Foltz, Howard F.: 35
Frankfurt-Kassel corridor: 242
Fw 190: 54, 155, 192, 203, 226, 276
Gaffey, H ugh J .: 79, 86, 89, 90, 91, 94,
110, 112, 116, 117, 119, 137, 171, 215
Galland, Adolph: 215
Gay, H. R.: 94, 112, 115, 117, 119, 171,
224
General Headquarters (GHQ): 2
General Headquarters Air Force: 2
German National Redoubt: 283
Goddard, George W.: 243, 244
Griggs, David: 131
ground-controlled approach (GCA): 131
ground-controlled intercept (G CI): 130
Groups (numbered):
6th Army: 126, 133, 171, 194,
222, 240, 260, 265
10th Photo Reconnaissance: 52,
87, 95, 99, 103, 115, 127, 141,
142, 151, 160, 178, 199, 206,
207, 249, 260, 272, 285
12th Army: 29, 67, 73, 98, 100,
123, 126, 172, 175, 194, 208,
273, 304
21st Army: 52
36th Fighter-Bomber: 62, 81, 89,
96, 116
67th Tactical Reconnaissance: 60
303d Fighter: 91, 94
354th Fighter: 38, 46, 64, 66, 127,
141, 142, 148, 152, 160, 180,
192, 218, 247, 248
358th Fighter: 73, 81, 127, 141,
148, 153, 163
361st Fighter: 196, 200, 210,218
362d Fighter: 46, 89, 141, 144,
155, 160, 163, 175, 177, 199,
203, 205, 206, 207, 213, 214,
252, 265, 271, 276
363d Fighter: 104
363d Tactical Reconnaissance: 77,
104
367th Fighter: 197, 204, 218, 247,
271
368th Fighter: 216, 226, 232, 243,
254, 257, 271
371st Fighter: 79, 99, 100, 246,
249, 253, 254, 263, 271
405th Fighter: 73, 117, 135, 137,
139, 144, 146, 152, 156, 166,
172, 175, 177, 202, 205, 207,
214, 219
406th Fighter: 63, 86, 102, 104,
141, 166, 169, 172, 179, 198,
204, 205, 206, 207
Grove, Harry M .: 140
Grow, Robert W.: 276
Haislip, WadeH.: 70, 110
Hallett, Charles H.: 35, 100, 107, 135,
140, 141, 151, 174, 226, 265
Harkins, Paul D.: 148, 171
Hart, B. H. Liddell: 110
Heifers, Melvin C: 140
Herbstnebel: 185, 186-190
Hessian: 78
374
Index
H itier, A dolf : 51, 86, 127, 141, 186, 215,
220, 242, 285, 286, 288, 289
Hodges, Courtney H.: 21, 34, 97, 133,
146, 147, 240, 263, 276, 312
Hoefkenjohn H.: 192
Holbury, Robert].: 222, 223
Horsefly: 233
indentification friend or foe (IFF): 246
Iron Men: 167, 170
Irwin, S. LeRoy: 138, 283
Johnson, Edwin L.: 61
Johnson, Leo H.: 212
J u 87: 239
key system: 272, 285, 290
Kiljauczyk: 117
Kluge, Guenther von: 86
Koch, Oscar W.: 140
Kuter, Laurences.: 9, 10, 11, 14, 15, 16,
18, 43
Laughlin, Joseph: 144, 146
Lee, Robert M.: 211
Leigh-Mallory,Trafford: 32, 33, 52
Lorraine: 123-184, 192, 194, 197, 204,
208, 221, 226, 246, 253, 291, 292,
300, 302
Luxembourg City: 256, 257, 273, 275,
280, 281, 312
M-47: 246
M acArthur, Douglas: 288
Macon, Robert C: 106, 107
Maginotline: 123, 135, 169
M ainz-Frankfurt: 242
M almedy-Liege axis: 186
M anteuffel, Hasso von: 186, 188, 198, 239
Marshall, George C: 16, 24, 139
marschgruppe: 108
M ayhew, Donald: 153
M cGuire, George F.: 170
McLean, Arnold C: 243, 245
McNair, LesleyJ.: 4, 67
M e 109: 99, 100, 148, 213, 215, 216,
226, 248, 276
Me 262: 219
Merzig: 199, 222, 223, 232
microwave early warning (M EW): 88,
89, 129, 130, 131, 132, 159, 195, 211,
217, 224, 245, 280
M iddleton, Troy H .: 70, 108, 109, 190,
225, 248, 254
milk run: 87
Milliken,John: 206, 225
Montgomery, Bernard L.: 7, 9, 12, 14,
16, 25, 29, 48, 86, 97, 106, 109, 123,
132, 133, 147, 195, 196, 208, 220,
240, 242, 246, 248, 256, 260, 263,
265, 267, 268, 270, 272, 273, 275
M organ, Frederick E.: 27
Northwest African Air Forces (NAAF):
12
Northwest African Tactical Air Force
(NATAF): 11, 12
Nichols, Howard: 233
Nugent, Richard E.: 94, 107, 113, 114,
147, 247, 303
Ohrdruf: 281
Operations:
Anvil: 97
Clarion: 255, 256
Cobra: 67, 74, 81, 102, 152, 157,
211
Dagger: 177
Dragoon: 97
Fortitude: 22, 41
Grenade: 255
Hi-Sug: 125, 169, 170, 171, 172,
173, 174, 175, 183
Husky: 47
Lumberjack: 240, 257
Madison: 125, 146, 147, 148, 153,
155, 158, 159, 160, 180, 183
Market Garden: 132, 133, 198
Neptune: 52
Overlord: 22, 29, 30, 33, 43, 44,
51
Pointblank: 30, 33
Oueen: 147, 155, 157, 174
Tink: 125, 177, 179, 180, 181,
182, 183, 192, 193, 194, 195
Torch: 6, 7-14, 19, 24, 47
Undertone: 240, 260
Varsity: 268, 270
Veritable: 240, 257
375
Air Power for Patton's Army
Patch, Alexander: 97, 104, 127, 177,
179, 260
Patton, George S.: 11, 12, 21-28, 34, 37,
41, 44-48, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 73, 74,
75, 76, 80-81,86-96, 97-98, 102,
103, 104, 109-110, 112, 113, 115,
117, 118, 119, 122, 123, 125, 127,
133, 135, 138-140, 144, 146, 147,
148, 149, 151, 152, 153, 156, 159,
167, 169, 170, 171, 172, 174, 177,
179, 180, 181, 183, 185, 189, 193,
194, 195, 196, 207, 208, 213, 214,
215, 222, 223, 230, 232, 234-236,
239, 248, 249, 253, 256, 257, 258,
260, 262, 265, 267, 270, 273, 276,
281, 283, 285, 288, 289, 290, 295,
297, 298, 303, 305, 308, 310, 311,
312,316
penny-packet: 254
Pershing, John J.: 24
pillbox: 252,253
prisoner of war (POW): 65
Quesada, Elwood R.: 16, 23, 33-34, 36,
37, 39, 43, 54, 55, 59, 63, 67, 73, 76,
77, 87, 88, 113, 140, 185, 194, 196,
197, 232, 246, 281, 295, 296, 310, 315
RDX Composition-B: 246
Redline: 71
Reserve Officers Training Corps
(ROTC):25, 35
Ripsaw: 216
Rommel, Erwin: 10, 51
Roosevelt, Franklin D.: 28, 282
roulement: 62, 80, 95, 98, 99, 100, 102,
104, 113, 117, 118
Royal Air Force (RAF): 7, 16, 29, 30,
32, 39, 40, 41, 89, 177, 180, 197, 211
Royce, Ralph: 73, 79, 152, 153, 155, 174
Rundstedt, Gerd von: 51, 186, 189, 313, 314
Russian High: 199
Saarlautern: 293
Saar-M osel: 255
Saar-M osel-Rhinetrap: 250, 254, 260-270
Saunders, Homer ("Tex"): 147
Saville, Gordon P.: 137, 138, 147, 163,
177, 179, 245
Schlatter, David M .: 73
Schwartzberg, Samuel L.: 212
SCR-284: 53
SCR-399: 53, 58
SCR-522: 59, 67, 74
SCR-584: 62, 131, 159, 217, 224, 244,
245, 246, 309
Siegfried Line: 102, 110, 123, 125, 144,
146, 149-158, 167, 169, 170, 171-
181, 182, 186, 194, 230, 235, 240,
246, 248-254, 256, 260, 290, 291,
293, 300, 304, 308
Simpson, William H.: 106, 107, 240,
256, 273
Skorzeny, Otto: 188
Smith, Nicholas M.: 242, 243, 244
Smyser, Rudolf E.: 36, 80, 94, 203, 275
Spaatz, Carl A: 9, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 32,
43, 90, 146, 156, 174, 175, 177, 214,
215, 233, 280, 288, 297, 305, 310
Spitfire X-Ray: 196
Stilwelljoseph W.: 313
Stimson, Henry L.: 181
Strickland, A uby C: 17
Student, Kurt: 133
Supreme Headquarters Allied Expedi-
tionary Forces (SHAEF): 173, 177,
181, 195, 196, 222, 230, 240, 242,
248, 255, 256, 257, 281, 282, 283,
287, 294, 295, 312
Tactical Air Force (TAF): 29
Tedder, Arthur: 12, 90
Third Reich: 127, 132, 286
Thompson, J ames F.: 35, 91, 195, 279
Thunder Bums: 250, 289
Tiger Tamers: 192, 249
Tiger tanks: 296
Tindal, Larry N.: 53
Torgau-Dresden-Prague axis: 282
Twelve Thousand Fighter-Bomber Sorties:
103
Ultra: 104, 105, 140, 158, 187, 207, 217,
220, 223, 225, 258, 267, 300
United States Strategic Air Forces
(USSTAF): 30, 32, 174
V-1: 88, 90, 128
376
Index
Vandenberg, Hoyt S.: 71, 94, 107, 108,
109, 113, 114, 139, 143, 147, 155,
162, 174, 175, 179, 181, 194, 196,
197, 201, 213, 214, 217, 218, 222,
230, 232, 233, 275, 280, 282, 288,
289, 294, 309, 310, 312
Van Fleet, James A.: 284
V-E Day: 291
victory weather: 199-203, 207, 210, 226
Virginia IV| ilitary Institute (VM I): 24
Walker, Walton H.: 70, 87, 123, 135,
175, 177, 250, 270, 276, 296, 306
watch on the Loire: 87, 91, 104, 112, 285
Waters, John K.: 273
Weyland, Otto P.: 4, 18, 21, 22, 23-28,
33-36, 37, 39, 55, 64, 68, 73, 76, 79,
86-90, 91, 93, 98, 102, 106, 107, 108,
109, 112, 113, 114, 115, 118, 119,
120, 122, 125, 127, 128, 130, 131,
135, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 143,
144, 146, 147, 148, 149, 151, 152,
155, 158, 160, 162, 163, 166, 169,
170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 177,
179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 185, 192,
194, 195, 196, 201, 203, 204, 206,
208, 211, 212, 213, 214, 216, 217,
219, 222, 223, 224, 227, 230, 232,
233, 234, 235, 236, 240, 242, 245,
248, 249, 250, 252, 253, 254, 256,
258, 260, 267, 268, 270, 272, 273,
275, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283,
285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291,
292, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299,
300, 302, 303, 304, 305, 308, 310,
311, 312, 313, 315, 316
Wood, John S.: 76, 77, 117, 166
Wood, Leonard: 24
X-Ray: 35, 93, 115, 120, 195, 213, 235,
273, 289
Y -service: 96, 128, 140
377
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